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ABSTRACT  
A legitimate regulation rarely constitutes an indirect expropriation. Conversely 
an indirect expropriation will almost always arise from regulatory action that 
does not conform to international standards of legitimacy and the Rule of Law. 
Yet, distinguishing regulation from expropriation remains one of the most 
important challenges in international investment law. The lack of a clear 
dividing line between legitimate regulation and compensable indirect 
expropriation creates considerable uncertainty for foreign investors and States 
alike. The investor-State dispute settlement mechanism was intended to solve 
investment disputes arising from alleged breaches of standards of protection 
agreed upon by the home State and the host State of the investor under 
international investment agreements.  
What constitutes a breach of an international obligation has – almost always – 
been rooted in domestic regulation adopted by host States, which in turn may 
constitute a breach of a standard of investment protection under international 
investment law. Therefore, the outcome of an investment dispute will generally 
require the host State to repeal the regulatory measure or to pay 
compensation to the investor. For these reasons, the international investment 
regime has been perceived, in certain academic and political circles, as 
potentially adverse to the regulatory prerogatives of States. This perception 
does not consider that States’ regulatory prerogatives, exercised under the 
Police Power, are legitimate under international law; yet, it is common ground 
that the Police Power of States does not constitute a ‘blank exception’ to 
international State responsibility for breach of standards of protection under 
investment agreements. After all, by signing international investment 
agreements, States agree to submit disputes arising from their own regulatory 
action to international tribunals; thereby, limiting a portion of their own 
internal sovereignty to conform with international obligations negotiated under 
those agreements.  
International investment law, as international trade law, is continuously 
confronted with the assessment of legality of domestic regulatory measures 
under international law. It is not infrequent that domestic regulatory 
measures pursue important welfare objectives which will inevitably have an 
affect over investors’ property rights. Rarely will such measures be deemed 
expropriatory provided they constitute a legitimate exercise of the Police Power 
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of the host State. Therefore, distinguishing legitimate regulation from indirect 
expropriation does not only require deep understanding of the nature of the 
regulatory measure, it also requires scrutiny of the domestic law surrounding 
the subject matter under regulatory action.  
An example of a case where international tribunals may need to scrutinize 
domestic law is in the area of water resources management. Water has a 
unique nature due to its physical, economic and social characteristics, all of 
which in combination put water resources at the heart of social and 
environmental concerns. Challenges around water management do not pertain 
exclusively to limited quantities and increasing scarcity, but also to quality 
issues. In addition, increasing demand as a result of demographic growth, 
economic globalisation, and larger trade and investment flows trigger fierce 
competition for water resources, which may potentially be exasperated by 
climate change. In this vein, increased hydrological variability has an effect on 
the predictability of water availability, and availability in turn may have an 
effect on the security of water entitlements. All these factors ought to be 
considered by investment tribunals when challenged with investment disputes 
arising from a water-related measure. Regulatory measures affecting the 
availability of water resources will most likely have serious effects over the 
development of the investment project, since water has no substitutes. Hence, 
from a sole effects approach, a regulatory measure affecting availability of 
water to investors may always be expropriatory, under current investment 
arbitration frameworks. The analytical framework proposed in this work 
serves two purposes, in the context of investment arbitration: It details the 
case for a sector-specific approach to water resources by addressing the 
special nature of water resources, which should influence the construction of 
investor’s property rights under the domestic law of the host State and the 
scope of protection of such rights. It also advances a dividing line to 
distinguish legitimate regulation from indirect expropriation by considering 
not only the effects of the measure but also the purpose of the measure and 
the manner in which such measure was adopted by the host State. 
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PREFACE 	  
In 2000, the residents of Cochabamba, Bolivia led an unprecedented protest 
known as the ‘Cochabamba water war’. The trigger was the privatisation of the 
public provider SEMAPA and the sudden and extreme rise of water tariffs. As a 
result, the government rescinded the concession contract with Aguas del 
Tunari S.A. (International Water Limited). In response, the investor initiated 
international arbitration proceedings against Bolivia. The case was settled due 
to international and social pressure on the investor, and the rest is history.  
I find myself playing a dual role in this story. I was a resident of Cochabamba 
and a legal officer at the regulatory system for public utilities. In my capacity 
as a legal officer, I understood, with time, that the problem neither started 
with the privatisation process, nor would it end with the termination of the 
concession contract. In my view, there are two underlying problems in this 
scenario: pride of the residents of Cochabamba to pursue their longed 
‘Misicuni Project’ that potentially effected their access to drinking water, and 
prejudice against private providers and foreign investors. I believe that the 
lack of interdisciplinarity in addressing the abovementioned issue may be 
explained by the same underlying problems. The absence of communication 
and exchange between epistemic communities weakens decision-making and 
prevents holistic solutions. Decision-making is increasingly confronted with 
the need to interact with science. A good example of this was present in the 
recent Pulp Mills case at the International Court of Justice. 
In the same vein, within the field of law, public lawyers are rarely aware that 
their decisions will have an effect on international law. When confronted with 
domestic political and social pressure, domestic decision-makers will not be 
focused on how their decisions may come under scrutiny from international 
arbitrators and judges. In turn, international tribunals have had little 
connection to the domestic realities and pressures under which local decisions 
were taken; nor do they have the mandate, under international law, to 
incorporate such considerations. In my work, I propose a scenario of wide 
concern to test such a situation; where domestic action has the potential to 
effect international obligation: namely water scarcity and hydrological 
variability, where domestic measures require flexible decisions in order to 
avert potential conflict. This may sound like the perfect storm for investors. 
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Yet, as with many academics and practitioners, I believe it is possible to find a 
middle point where decisions adopted at the domestic level would be 
considered legal at the international level as well. Undoubtedly, States bear a 
larger burden of risk and costs than foreign investors, but arbitrators have not 
been oblivious to this fact so far. It is therefore important for arbitrators to 
secure predictable outcomes under unpredictable scenarios by compelling 
States to carefully respect the rule of law when confronted with measures that 
affect the vested rights of foreign investors.  
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CHAPTER 1 
INTRODUCTION 
 
Water is the driving force in nature Leonardo	  Da	  Vinci	  	  
Whiskey is for drinking, water is for fighting 
over 
attributed to Mark Twain 
 
Most of societies' arguments are kept alive by 
a failure to acknowledge nuance. We tend to 
generate false dichotomies and then try to 
argue one point, using two entirely different 
sets of assumptions 	   	   	   	   	   Tim Minchin 
 
1.1 Introduction 
As the law evolves, expands and specialises, the overall normative coherence 
of particular legal orders can become more elusive. This increases the 
likelihood for potential conflict arising between different regimes or areas of 
law, such as between water law and international investment law. On the one 
hand, water laws and policy are increasingly moving towards a holistic and 
adaptive approach to the management of water resources. International 
investment law, on the other hand, covers the obligation to protect foreign 
investment through stable and predictable legal environments, by means of 
international investment agreements. 
To date, any conflict between these epistemic communities of water lawyers 
and investment lawyers has been engaged – by necessity – in the context of 
disputes arising out of international investment obligations.  International 
investment law, and not water law per se, constitutes the applicable law to 
decide potential conflicts between the regulation of water resources and the 
obligation to protect foreign investment. The proliferation of investment 
treaties has given rise to specific dispute settlement mechanisms granting 
jurisdiction to handle investment disputes. In contrast, the fields of 
international environmental and water law have fairly limited dispute 
settlement mechanisms embedded in their respective treaties. 
At the end of the 1980s and during the early 1990s, the field of international 
investment law witnessed an explosion of Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) 
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and to a lesser extent other International Investment Agreements (IIAs) such 
as Free Trade Agreements (FTAs).1 By the early 2000s, there was an upsurge 
in the initiation of disputes granted jurisdiction under these BITs and FTAs. 
International investment disputes allow a private foreign investor to initiate 
binding arbitration against the state hosting their investment. To date, these 
cases have primarily been brought under the specific mechanisms of the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID), as well 
as other arbitration centres, such as the Permanent Court of Arbitration 
(PCA), the International Chamber of Commerce (ICC) and the Stockholm 
Chamber of Commerce (SCC).2  
During the period between the 1990s and the early part of the 2000s, 
international investment practitioners and commentators were well aware of 
the potential disputes arising from the exercise of regulatory prerogatives by 
Host States in relation to the promises given to foreign investors. In addition to 
political risk, these commentators, such as Thomas Wälde and Stephen Dow, 
famously identified a new risk: ‘regulatory risk’.3 Perhaps, having observed the 
Libyan nationalization cases and the cases coming out of the United States 
(US)-Iran Claims Tribunal, very few investment specialists believed that IIAs 
constituted a real threat to the regulation of the environment, health and 
safety. As Wälde and Kolo expressed as far back as the mid-1990s, Non-	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 UNCTAD reports that by the end of 2011 there were 3164 IIAs of which 2833 were BITs. See 
United Nations Conference on Trade Development, World Investment Report 2012: Towards a 
New Generation of Investment Policies  (New York; Geneva: United Nations, 2012). 84. 
2 Up to the end of 2011 the number of investor–state disputes reached 450. This year also 
presented the highest number of dispute recorded so far i.e. 46. Ibid., 87.  
3 Thomas Wälde and Stephen Dow, "Treaties and Regulatory Risk in Infrastructure Investment. 
The Effectiveness of International Law Disciplines versus Sanctions by Global Markets in 
Reducing the Political and Regulatory Risk for Private Infrastructure Investment" Journal of 
World Trade 34, no. 2 (2000); Thomas W. Wälde and Todd Weiler, "Investment arbitration under 
the Energy Charter Treaty in the light of new NAFTA precedents: Towards a global code of 
conduct for economic regulation" Transnational Dispute Management 1(2004); Thomas Wälde 
and Abba Kolo,"Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection. 
and ‘Regulatory Taking’ in International Law" International and Comparative Law Quarterly 
50, no. 4 (2001); Andrew Newcombe, "The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in 
International Law" ICSID Review 20, no. 1 (2005); Vaughan Lowe, "Regulation or expropriation?" 
Current legal problems 55 (2002); L. Yves Fortier and Stephen L. Drymer, "Indirect Expropriation 
in the Law of International Investment: I know it when I see it, or Caveat Investor" ICSID review: 
Foreign investment law journal 19, no. 2 (2004); Howard Mann, "The Right of States to Regulate 
and International Investment Law," in Expert Meeting on the Development Dimension of FDI: 
Policies to Enhance the Role of FDI in Support of the Competitiveness of the Enterprise Sector and 
the Economic Performance of Host Economies, Taking into Account the Trade/Investment Interface, 
in the National and International Context (Geneva 2002); Howard Mann and Konrad von Moltke, 
"NAFTA's Chapter 11 and the Environment: Addressing the Impacts of the Investor-State 
Process on the Environment" International Institute for Sustainable Development, Publication 
Centre (1999); M. Sornarajah, "State responsibility and Bilateral Investment Treaties" Journal of 
World Trade Law 20, no. 1 (1986). 
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Governmental Organizations (NGOs) and other civil society actors may have 
adopted exaggerated views towards the scope of BITs and their effects over the 
police power of states. Several commentators agreed with Wälde and Kolo that 
regulatory measures aimed at protecting the environment, if adopted in good 
faith and following due process of law, would hardly be challengeable.4 It is 
also relevant to consider that under customary international law, 
expropriation does not constitute a wrongful act unless it is an exercise in 
breach of general requirements, among which compensation is quintessential 
to the right of a State to expropriate. Under this line of reasoning, it is 
essential to assess when States are not expropriating, but rather are 
legitimately regulating according to the police power.  
Environmental lawyers, among whom some water lawyers could already be 
identified, 5  have challenged the legitimacy of these new types of dispute 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
4 Christoph Schreuer, "The Concept of Expropriation under the ECT and other Investment 
Protection Treaties," (2005); Gary H. Sampliner, "Arbitration of Expropriation Cases under U.S. 
Investment Treaties: A Threat to Democracy or the Dog didn't Bark?" ICSID Review: Foreign 
investment law journal 18, no. 1 (2003). 
5 The following examples do not only address water legal experts, but also some jurists, scholars 
and policy oriented experts that have written on the protection of water resources: Marie-Claire 
Cordonier Segger, Markus W. Gehring, and Andrew  Newcombe, eds., Sustainable Development 
in World Investment Law, Global Trade Law Series (Alphen aan den Rijn Kluwer Law 
International, 2011); Edith Brown Weiss, Laurence Boisson de Chazournes, and Nathalie 
Bernasconi-Osterwalder, eds., Fresh Water and International Economic Law (Oxford; New York: 
Oxford University Press, 2005); Celine Levesque, "Investment and Water Resources: Limits to 
NAFTA", in Sustainable Development in World Investment Law, ed. Marie-Claire Cordonier 
Segger, Markus W. Gehring, and Andrew Newcombe, Global Trade Law Series (Alphen aan den 
Rijn: Kluwer Law International 2011); Howard Mann, "Who Owns “Your” Water? Reclaiming 
Water as a Public Good under International Trade and Investment Law" International Institute for 
Sustainable Development (2003); Howard Mann, "International Economic Law: Water for 
Money's Sake" International Institute for Sustainable Development (2004); Howard Mann, 
"Implications of International Trade and Investment Agreements for Water and Water Services: 
Some Responses from Other Sources of International Law" available at: http://www.idrc.ca/ 
en/ev-102451-201-1-DO_TOPIC.html, last visited October 2008 (2006); Hugo A. Muñoz, "La 
administración del agua y la inversión extranjera directa ¿Cómo se relacionan?", in Estudios en 
homenaje al Dr. Rafael González Ballar, ed. Universidad de Costa Rica (UCR) (San Jose: Isolma 
S.A., 2009); Miguel Solanes, "Water Services and International Investment Agreements", in 
Global Change: Impacts on Water and food Security, ed. Claudia  Ringler, Asit K. Biswas, and 
Sarah Cline, Water Resources Development and Management (Berlin/Heidelberg: Springer 2010); 
Miguel Solanes and Andrei Jouravlev, "Revisiting Privatization, Foreign Investment, 
International Arbitration and Water" Serie Recursos Naturales e Infrastructura 129(2007); Attila 
Tanzi, "On Balancing Foreign Investment Interests With Public Interests in Recent Arbitration 
Case Law in the Public Utilities Sector" The law and practice of international courts and tribunals: 
A Practioners' Journal 11, no. 1 (2012); Paul Stanton Kibel, "Grasp on Water: A Natural Resource 
that Eludes NAFTA's Notion of Investment" Ecology Law Quarterly 34, no. 2 (2007); Joseph  
Cumming and Robert  Froehlich, "NAFTA Chapter XI and Canada's Environmental Sovereignty: 
Investment Flows, Article 1110 and Alberta's Water Act" University of Toronto Faculty of Law 
Review 65(2007); Vivien Foster and Tito Yepes, "Is Cost Recovery a Feasible Objective for Water 
and Electricity? The Latin American Experience" World Bank Policy Research Working Paper 
3943(2006); John D. Leshy, "A Conversation About Takings and Water Rights" Texas Law 
Review 83, no. 7 (2005); Fabrizio Marrella, "On the changing structure of international 
 	  18	  
resolution mechanisms that permit a private investor in the form of a 
transnational corporation to sue a sovereign state before an international 
investment tribunal. The permissions of investor-State dispute settlement 
under BITs and FTAs has brought back issues that States may have been 
trying to overcome when they signed IIAs in the first place.  Such issues relate 
to the permanent sovereignty over natural resources, the sovereignty of states 
linked to their prerogative to regulate, and problems linked to decolonisation, 
among others.  
From a generalist perspective these two epistemic communities, namely 
investment lawyers and environmental/water lawyers, do not look at the 
problem from a similar perspective, they do not share the same values, and 
the interests to be protected are diverse. It was not too long ago that the 
investment arbitration regime saw as its mandate the application and 
enforcement solely of investment obligations, as purported in the relevant 
agreement, as a clear and strict one.6 As Professor Hirsh suggests: 
thus far no arbitral tribunal has absolved a party to an investment dispute from 
its investment obligations (or significantly reduced its responsibility to 
compensate the injured investor).7 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
investment law: The human right to water and ICSID arbitration" International Community Law 
Review 12, no. 3 (2010); Stuart Orr, Anton Cartwright , and Dave  Tickner, "Understanding 
water risks A primer on the consequences of water scarcity for government and business," 
(World Wildlife Fund, 2009); Carin Smaller and Howard Mann, "A Thirst for Distant Lands: 
Foreign investment in agricultural land and water" International Institute for Sustainable 
Development. Foreign Investment for Sustainable Development Program (2009); Paul Stanton and 
Jon Schutz, "Two Rivers Meet: At the Confluence of Cross-Border Water and Foreign Investment 
Law", in Sustainable Development in World Investment Law, ed. Marie-Claire Cordonier Segger, 
Markus W. Gehring, and Andrew Newcombe, Global Trade Law Series (Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Kluwer Law International, 2011); The International Federation of Private Water Operators 
(AquaFed), "Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Right to Water: The case of the provision of 
public water supply and sanitation services.(Submission by AquaFed)," in Office of the UN High 
Commissioner for Human Rights: Consultation on business and human rights: Operationalizing the 
"Protect, Respect, and Remedy" framework on business and human rights (Geneva2009); 
Epaminontas E. Triantafilou, "No Remedy for an Investor’s Own Mismanagement: The Award in 
the ICSID Case Biwater Gauff v. Tanzania,"  International Disputes Quarterly. Focus: An 
Arbitrator’s Perspective Winter (2009), http://www.whitecase.com/files/Publication/cc5f123c-
0700-4b93-aef0-a628ebb05bd1/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/b81f3439-af93-4aab-
9f45-7c2dee791bc1/IDQ_Winter_2009.pdf; Jorge E. Vinuales, "Access to Water in Foreign 
Investment Disputes" The Georgetown International Environmental Law Review 21(2009); Jorge 
E. Vinuales, "Iced Freshwater Resources: A Legal Exploration" Yearbook of International 
Environmental Law 20, no. 1 (2011).  
6 Of course, investment agreements cannot be applied in isolation of other instruments of 
international law such as the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties (VCLT), and principles 
of international law.  
7 Moshe Hirsh, "Sources of International Investment Law", in International Investment Law and 
Soft Law, ed. Andrea K.  Bjorklund and August Reinisch (Cheltenham, UK; Northampton, MA: 
Edward Elgar Pub., 2012), 13. 
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Conversely, in the context of international investment law, the implementation 
and continuity of environmental regulation is seen by environmental lawyers 
as dependent on the decision of investment tribunals. The area of 
international environmental law generally lacks specialised enforcement 
mechanisms where the protection of the environment is effectively 
implemented. Due to the dearth of environmental tribunals, many 
environmental lawyers would like to use economic law forums (such as 
investment arbitration and World Trade Organization (WTO) dispute 
settlement mechanisms) as a means of converting trade and investment 
tribunals into environmental tribunals.  While this has certainly been the case 
in the context of investment arbitration, the WTO has faced similar challenges, 
and to some extent, there has been some cross-fertilization between the two 
regimes. In the context of the WTO, Professor Trachtman has adopted an 
institutional perspective to illustrate the normative and institutional 
boundaries of the WTO in relation to the applicability or non-applicability of 
the other fields of law, in their intricate relationships:  
one of the phenomena we observe in relation to WTO law is jealousy on the part 
of environmentalists, labor rights advocates, human rights proponents and 
others due to the stronger enforceability and sanctions available with respect to 
violations of WTO law.8  
It is incontestable that a balance between the protection of foreign investment 
and the protection of other societal values is needed, to advance economic as 
well as human development. However, it is a reality that environmental, health 
and safety regulations – among others – affecting covered investments, 
constitute the subject matter of investment disputes and that arbitral 
tribunals are called to scrutinize them. It follows that host States may have to 
repeal the measure as a way of restitution, or when this is not possible, pay 
compensation. 9  In the large majority of cases, foreign investors seek 
compensation, due to large interests at stake and because the relationship 
between investor and state is no longer one of trust and cooperation. The core 
issue examined in this work pertains to the potential tensions that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Joel P. Trachtman, "Transcending “Trade and . . .” An Institutional Perspective," SSNR. 
Available at: http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=271171, last visited 
September, 2012(2001). In this article Professor Trachtman coins the term ‘penance envy’ to 
argue that not all international law has been created equal, and therefore some field still lack 
institutions and enforcement mechanism.  
9 This is the principle of reparation adopted in the case of Chorzów Factory (Germany v. Poland) 
1928 PCIJ (ser. A) No. 17. For an account of remedies in International Law, see Dinah Shelton, 
"Righting Wrongs: Reparations in the Articles on State Responsibility" Symposium: The ILC's 
State Responsibility Articles. The American journal of international law 96, no. 4 (2002). 
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protection of foreign investment has created in relation to the management of 
water resources. A regulatory measure may deprive the investor significantly 
of his investment, rendering a property right useless, which constitutes de 
facto or indirect expropriation.10 These measures contrast with acts of direct 
expropriation of the investment, where a shift in ownership takes place, 
depriving the investor of the title and control over the property right. 
This work also addresses the application of standards of investment protection 
to secure long-term economic returns on investments, which include water 
rights as production inputs from naturally variable water flows that require a 
flexible management framework to ensure sustainable development and 
environmental protection. Therefore, this work explores two potentially 
contradictory sets of values: security and predictability, which are pivotal in 
the realm of investment law, and variability and adaptability, which are 
inherent to the nature and management of water resources. The argument 
develops on the basis of the police power doctrine – or the prerogative of States 
to regulate – because that doctrine has been consistently recognised by 
investment tribunals as a legitimate exercise of State sovereignty. However, 
the notion of the police power needs to be revisited in the context of its 
foundations and underlying values. In order for the police power to be 
reasonably invoked and legitimately applied, there must be a dividing line 
between an act of indirect expropriation and the adoption of a legitimate 
regulation, which imposes reasonable burdens on investors. 
Despite diverse approaches by arbitral tribunals and commentators to the 
issue of indirect expropriation or regulatory takings, (as referred to by US 
takings jurisprudence),11 investment tribunals seems to be moving away from 
contradictory decisions towards a relatively consistent approach within the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 Notwithstanding discussion regarding the different notions between de facto expropriation 
and indirect expropriation, as proposed by Veijo Heiskanen for instance in Veijo Heiskanen, 
"The Contribution of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal to the Development of the Doctrine 
of Indirect Expropriation" International law FORUM du droit international: The Journal of the 
International Law Association International Law Forum du droit international 5, no. 3 (2003). This 
work will address both terms indistinctly.  
11 A description of such cases adopting different approaches to regulatory measures with an 
effect over investors’ rights can be found in Rudolf Dolzer, "New Foundations of the Law of 
Expropriation of Alien Property" American Journal of International Law 75(1981); Rudolf Dolzer, 
"Indirect Expropriations: New Developments?" New York University Environmental Law Journal 
11(2002); Rudolf Dolzer and Felix Bloch, "Indirect Expropriation: Conceptual Realignments?" 
International Law Forum du Droit International (2003); Heiskanen, "The Contribution of the Iran-
United States Claims Tribunal to the Development of the Doctrine of Indirect Expropriation." 
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regime of investment arbitration.12 If this is indeed desirable, as this work 
suggests, it is also possible to consider the increasing scrutiny that the 
investment arbitration regime has been subject to as a system that is 
increasingly interrelated to other fields of knowledge and areas of law.13 The 
admission of amicus curiae by arbitral tribunals – beginning with the Methanex 
v United States tribunal – suggests that tribunals are opening up to the 
advocacy of informed interest groups, such as non-governmental 
organisations (NGOs).  
The development of this fairly young investment arbitration regime has paved 
the way for the approach adopted by this work. It argues for a sector-specific 
approach tailored to the particular characteristics and nature of each sector 
under dispute: in this case, water resources.14 It is further argued that a 
sector-specific approach is appropriate for water resources because special 
consideration is needed in relation to the unique nature of water in order to 
meet food, energy and water security needs; ultimately all three are essential 
for human survival. Such emphasis is necessary due to current challenges 
around increasing water scarcity, in the context of stiffer competition for 
limited water resources between users in various economic sectors. 
 
1.2 Problematique  
Markets for strategic natural resources have had a tendency to swing between 
liberalization and nationalization. Latin American countries, for instance, have 
a long history of attracting and rejecting private investment in natural 
resources and public services, imposing large transaction costs on investors 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 Professor Andrea Bjorklund explored the increasing reliance of arbitral tribunals on previous 
decisions which indicates the emergence of a ‘Jurisprudence constante’. See Andrea K. 
Bjorklund, "Investment Treaty Arbitral Decisions as "Jurisprudence Constante"", in International 
Economic Law: The State and Future of the Discipline ed. Colin B. Picker, Isabella D. Bunn, and 
Douglas W. Arner (Oxford: Hart, 2008). 
13 The admission of amicus curiae submissions illustrates the pressure of expert groups and 
civil society to have access to the proceedings, taking place within this arbitration mechanism. 
Some examples are: Methanex Corp. v. United States of America (under UNCITRAL Rules), Azurix 
Corp. v Argentine Republic, ICSID CASE No. ARB/01/12; Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v 
United Republic of Tanzania (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22); Aguas del Tunari S.A. v Republic of 
Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3, among others. 
This mechanism of dispute resolution was private for many years as it followed the path of its 
close cousin commercial arbitration; in this vein the regime appears to opened up to debate and 
discussion with other fields such as environmental law.  
14 It is noteworthy that this approach is not novel, the Energy Charter Treaty embraced the 
strategic importance of energy resources and devised an instrument to protect and promote 
trade and investment in the energy sector.  
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and consumers who ultimately suffer the consequences of such political 
swings.15 This type of expropriation has traditionally been identifiable with the 
intention of the host State’s policy being clearly politically motivated. This type 
of political risk is nothing new.16 However, this is not the only risk that 
investors face in their host countries as Wälde and Dow explain: overt takings 
of property rights are being replaced by a different kind of interference linked 
to the use of a State’s regulatory powers and the way in which such powers 
are exercised.17 The attention and scrutiny has thus turned towards the issue 
of regulatory risk. This means that the emerging field of international 
investment law and arbitration is increasingly confronted with the challenge of 
identifying legitimate (non-compensable) regulation from a compensable 
indirect expropriation.  
Professor Lowe, for example, has expressed the methodological difficulties in 
addressing the identification of a regulatory measure from an expropriatory 
one. Professor Stern has proposed a methodological approach to assist in 
understanding such a distinction. 18  The Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development (OECD) has extensively discussed the 
challenges around indirect expropriation, 19  and in more recent years, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 The oil nationalisations carried out by Mexico in 1917, followed by Iran (1950’s) Cuba 
(1960’s), Libya (1970’s), and a few Latin American countries, several of which negotiated later 
different types of investment arrangements, such as Product Sharing Agreements (PSAs) and 
other Public Private Partnerships. In South America, Argentina, Bolivia and Venezuela for 
instance, involved and abandoned foreign investment in different fashions during the last 
century. The nationalisation of Petróleos de Venezuela S.A. (PDVSA) accounts for large set of 
measures adopted by Venezuela to recover the control of their oil resources. Likewise Bolivia 
and Argentina have nationalised their energy resources in recent years. Bolivia have 
nationalised the provision of water services (Cochabamba and La Paz), and also the provision of 
electricity (La Paz and Oruro) between 2000 and 2012. 
16 This term was used by Professor Thomas Wälde in relation to the negotiations and agreement 
of the Energy Charter Treaty, making reference to the risk associated with energy infrastructure 
that required extensive amounts of investment capital, which accounted to high sunk costs. 
Such costs could only be recouped during long periods of time that placed foreign investors in a 
position where they faced periods of high political risk, meaning that policy developments in the 
host State could undermine the economic arrangements that attracted the investor in the first 
place. See Wälde and Weiler, "Investment arbitration under the Energy Charter Treaty in the 
light of new NAFTA precedents: Towards a global code of conduct for economic regulation," 430; 
Wälde and Dow, "Treaties and Regulatory Risk in Infrastructure Investment. The Effectiveness 
of International Law Disciplines versus Sanctions by Global Markets in Reducing the Political 
and Regulatory Risk for Private Infrastructure Investment" 3.  
17  See Wälde and Dow, "Treaties and Regulatory Risk in Infrastructure Investment. The 
Effectiveness of International Law Disciplines versus Sanctions by Global Markets in Reducing 
the Political and Regulatory Risk for Private Infrastructure Investment " 4.  
18 See Lowe, "Regulation or expropriation?"; Brigitte Stern, "In Search of the Frontiers of Indirect 
Expropriation" ed. W. Arthur Rovine, Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and 
Mediation The Fordham Papers 2007 (Brill, the Netherlands: Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, 2007). 
19 See OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, ""Indirect Expropriation” and the 
“Right to Regulate” in International Investment Law" (Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-
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institutions such as the International Institute for Sustainable Development 
(IISD) have followed suit with analysis on the best practices around indirect 
expropriation. 20  The United Nations (UN) Conference for Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) has also published new developments regarding the 
issue. 21  These are just a few examples to illustrate that the distinction 
between indirect expropriation and regulation is far from being drawn. A new 
generation of IIAs has started tackling this problem by including provisions 
that delineate the assessment of regulatory practice.22 However, there are still 
an important number of IIAs which contain traditional provisions regarding 
expropriation and compensation. These distinctions between provisions in 
early BITs and so-called second (and third) generation BITs create a continued 
lack of clarity as to how tribunals should approach the exercise of regulatory 
powers.  
Under the provisions of a typical IIA, an investor has a legitimate expectation 
of being protected against undue interferences with his covered investment. 
This normally includes security of expected profits and guarantees against 
certain types of political and regulatory risk. IIAs cover a non-exhaustive list of 
property rights and property interests, including water resources.23 On the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
operation and Development, 2004); OECD Secretariat, "Draft OECD Principles for International 
Investor Participation in Infrastructure," in OECD Global Forum on International Investment. 
Enhancing the Investment Climate: the Case of Infrastructure (Istanbul, Turkey: OECD, 2006). 
20 Mann, "The Right of States to Regulate and International Investment Law"; Suzy H. Nikièma, 
"Best practices indirect expropriation," (Winnipeg, Man.: International Institute for Sustainable 
Development, 2012). See also, Martins Paparinskis "Regulatory Expropriation and Sustainable 
Development", in Sustainable Development in International Investment Law, ed. M.C. Cordonnier-
Segger and A. Newcombe M.W. Gehring (Kluwer Law International, 2010). 
21 OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, ""Indirect Expropriation” and the 
“Right to Regulate” in International Investment Law". Nikièma, "Best practices indirect 
expropriation"; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
"EXPROPRIATION: A Sequel. UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements 
II" (New York, Geneva: United Nations, 2012). 
22 2004 and 2012 United states Model BITs, the 2004 Canadian Model BIT, the Dominican 
Republic-Central American Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA) and others, which will be discussed 
in the next chapters. 
23 Mark Kantor makes an account of the changes observed between the US Models BIT 2004 – 
2012, he argues that the protected investment under BITs is quite similar that the property 
rights covered by the Takings Clause in the United States. In this vein Kantor cites the Florida 
Rock Industries, Inc. v United States, which asserts:  
‘Property interests are about as diverse as the human mind can conceive. Property interests 
may be real and personal, tangible and intangible, possessory and non-possessory. They can be 
defined in terms of sequential rights to possession (present interests—life estates and various 
types of fees—and future interests), and in terms of shared interests (such as the various kinds 
of co-ownership). There are specially structured property interests (such as those of a 
mortgagee, lessee, bailee, adverse possessor), and there are interests in special kinds of things 
(such as water, and commercial contracts).’ 
in Florida Rock Industries, Inc. v United States (Florida Rock IV), 18 F. 3d 1560, 1572 fn 32 (Fed 
Cir 1994); as cited by Kantor in: Mark Kantor, "Little Has Changed in the New US Model 
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other hand, NGOs, environmental and human rights groups, and increasingly 
governments, perceive that the provisions in IIAS hinder the development of 
regulatory actions aimed at protecting public welfare, due to the risk of having 
to compensate investors for loss of their expected profits.24 It is undeniable 
that there is a level truth in the latter perspective, for it is indeed the case that 
a regulatory measure with an effect on investors’ property rights, understood 
broadly, diminishes the investment. It is also the case that States stall the 
implementation of environmental and general public welfare standards when 
subjected to arbitral disputes.  
From that perspective, the obligation to protect foreign investment under IIAs, 
on one hand, may be perceived as hindering the States’ prerogative to regulate 
water resources. The regulation of water resources, on the other hand, may 
have expropriatory effects over the property rights of foreign investors, in 
breach of IIAs’ obligations.25 International law recognises the police power of 
states, when it is exercised in good faith and in a non-discriminatory fashion. 
Under this premise, investors could not reasonably expect a static regulatory 
environment. The evolution of such a regulatory environment, however, is at 
least expected to share the burden of costs among all beneficiaries; for 
instance, the costs of more stringent labour standards could not be solely 
borne by investors.  
Investment practitioners have asserted for years that the findings of 
expropriation linked to the protection of the environment, public health and 
safety are rather unlikely and that so far very few tribunals have decided in 
favour of a claim of expropriation. Susan Frank has undertaken quantitative 
research linked to the incidence in which investors win cases against host 
States, and her conclusions appear to prove the arguments expressed above.26 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Bilateral Investment Treaty" ICSID review: Foreign investment law journal 27, no. 2 (2012): 346.  
See also Parvanov, Parvan, and Mark Kantor. "Comparing U.S. Law and Recent U.S. Investment 
Agreements: Much More Similar Than You Might Expect." In Yearbook on International Investment 
Law and Policy, edited by Karl P. Sauvant. New York: Oxford Unversity Press, 2010-2011. 
24 UNCTAD reports that host States have been subject to claims for up to 114 billion US Dollars 
in awards of 1.77 billion US Dollars. These two amounts related to disputes in the oil sector, the 
former against Russia and the latter against Ecuador. See United Nations Conference on Trade 
and Development (UNCTAD), "Reform of Investor-State Dispute Settlement: In Search of a 
Roadmap (Updated for the launching of the World Investment Report (WIR), 26 June 2013)" 
(Geneva: UNCTAD, 2013), 3. 
25 Muñoz, Hugo, “La administración del agua y la inversión extranjera directa ¿Cómo se 
relacionan?”. 
26 In her article Frank addressed the incidence of success of claimants and defendants. In the 
specific case of ‘Ultimate winners in Treaty Cases’ Frank finds that governments won 57.69% of 
the cases; investors 38.46% and settlement agreements were reached between investor and 
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However, as mentioned in the previous section, the increase of investment 
arbitration cases is unprecedented, and it is fair to argue that host States 
continue to face claims of expropriation, along with claims for breach of other 
standards of treatment. The mere initiation of investment arbitration 
proceedings already constitutes a considerable burden for governments. In 
some cases governments have repealed their regulatory measures under the 
imminent possibility of being subject to liability, thus having to pay high 
compensation, e.g. Ethyl v Canada, 27  SunBelt v Canada, 28 Vattenfall v 
Germany.29 Conversely, in some cases such as Methanex v the United States, 
Chemtura v Canada, 30 and S.D. Myers v Canada, 31  the government has 
defended its regulatory measure successfully. What seems to trouble 
governments and civil society actors is the possibility of being sued for 
regulatory measures that aim to protect the public interest because the 
anxieties of litigation may cause a ‘regulatory chill’ on the side of host States. 
Therefore, in the context of international investment law, this work attempts 
to develop a framework of analysis, which may assist arbitrators in 
distinguishing indirect expropriation from legitimate regulation. The criteria 
embedded in such framework may in turn provide guidance to host States and 
investors as to what would be a test to assess a claim of indirect 
expropriation. This work attempts to addresses these two allegedly 
independent fields of law, namely international investment law and water 
(resources) law,32 whose operation may influence each other’s development. An 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
government in 3.85% of the cases. See Susan D. Franck, "Empirically Evaluating Claims About 
Investment Treaty Arbitration" The North Carolina Law Review 86, no. 1 (2007): 48-52.  
27 In this case the Government of Canada imposed a ban on the importation of Ethyl products 
(gasoline additive MMT), the measure was challenged by the American investor claiming USD 
251 Million Dollars for losses arising from the expropriatory measure. See Ethyl Corporation v 
the Governments of Canada, (NAFTA Chapter 11, under UNCITRAL Rules) 
28 In this case, the claimant sought restoration of water export licences granted previously by 
British Columbia and payment of compensation of lost business opportunity. Alternatively in 
case the said restoration did not take place, Sun Belt claimed compensation for permanent loss 
of business opportunity amounting to USD 10.5 Billion Dollars. See Sun Belt v Her Majesty the 
Queen (Government of Canada), (NAFTA Chapter 11, under UNCITRAL Rules), Notice of Claim and 
Demand for Arbitration.       
29 Vattenfall AB, Vattenfal Europe AG, Vattenfall Europe Generation AG v Federal Republic of 
Germany, (lCSID Case No. ARB/09/6) (hereinafter Vattenfall v Germany). This case will be further 
analyse in Chapter II 
30 Chemtura Corporation v Canada, Ad hoc—UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Award signed 2 August 2010. 
31 S.D. Myers, Inc. v the Government of Canada, (NAFTA, Chapter 11). In this case, however, the 
claimant got redress on grounds other than expropriation, namely Fair and Equitable 
treatment.  
32 The term ‘law of water resources’ will refer specifically to the allocation, management, the 
regulation of uses and permits to use water resources, which may differ from the laws 
regulating the supply of water services, its infrastructure, operation costs, investment costs, 
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understanding of water resources management and its regulation plays a 
pivotal role in the development of a framework that intends to assist arbitral 
tribunals in addressing claims of indirect expropriation in water-related 
disputes arising out of international investment arbitration disputes.  
The framework incorporates extensively the elements of analysis discussed by 
academics and practitioners and takes into consideration the approach 
embedded in the US and Canada Model BITs of 2004 and several agreements 
of the new generation. In addition, it adopts a sector-specific perspective, 
because water has inherent characteristics that make it different from other 
natural resources. This special nature can be seen, for instance, in the 
precariousness of water property rights, as well as in the natural variability of 
water, which makes it less reliable, calling for adaptive management.  
In this vein, this work is required to address concepts of national law as well 
as international law, and their intersection. It is common ground that an 
investor’s property rights are acquired and shaped through the national legal 
system of the host State, whereas the protection of such property rights occur 
under the rules of international law, through the application of specific treaty 
provisions or the application of customary international law.  
 
1.3 Research Question  
There are two challenges that this work attempts to address. The first one 
pertains to the sphere of international investment law, and it is linked to the 
difficulties in assessing when a regulatory measure constitutes an indirect 
expropriation and not a legitimate regulation.  The second one considers 
specific challenges around water resources and the increasing need for 
adaptive and integrated management, which in turn may affect the stability 
and predictability of IIAs. Therefore, as a contribution to the jurisprudence, 
this work seeks to answer the following two-fold question: Can the specific 
characteristics of water resources assembled together, justify considering this 
natural resource as unique, or at least special, amongst natural resources? If 
so, can this special nature and the nature of property rights in water be 
incorporated in the assessment of an investment dispute, by investment 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and pricing, among others. The supply of water services may be under the scope of the law of 
water resources, predominantly regarding allocation and use of water resources.   
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arbitration tribunals, when distinguishing claims of indirect expropriation 
from legitimate regulation? 
 
1.4 Why Water? –  Scope   
Each element of the environment is special in its own right, and the legal 
frameworks that regulate them reflect this fact. Yet, water – as will be 
illustrated – is unique; it is the combination of all its characteristics 
assembled that makes it this way. Perhaps the first and foremost distinct 
characteristic is that water has no known substitutes and its direct 
consumption is so essential to life that it is regulated as a common good33 in 
most legal systems. Arguably the same could be said of air, but fortunately air 
has not yet become a potentially scarce resource.  
Rarely in investment arbitration have governments assessed the importance of 
managing the quality of their water resources so as to pursue more general 
goals such as the environment, public health, and safety. Perhaps, this is 
because the said spheres of regulation, which rest within the police power of 
states, enjoy a higher level of deference than others. However, they could also 
mask disguised acts of protectionism adopted by governments to benefit their 
national industry. This work suggests that more specific defences – adopted by 
governments – would direct the assessment of potential investment disputes to 
the origins of the regulatory measure, and provide more transparency and 
justification to the process. There might also be disputes over water quantities 
in which governments may need to justify the need for allocating or 
reallocating water resources in a different manner than originally planned. In 
such cases, the examination of the issue may be located in a broader sphere of 
regulatory prerogative – different from the protection of public health, 
environment and safety – hence incorporating stricter scrutiny of the measure 
at issue. 
In this light, as will be examined in Chapters II and IV water resources may 
constitute a special case under the umbrella of international investment law. 
As such, regulatory measures adopted by governments will be linked to the 
management of water resources and the effects on water rights. This work 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  33	  This work refers water as a common good, generally as synonymous of common-pool 
resources. This term is used and explained by Elinor Ostrom and it is further developed and 
clarifies in Chapter II, Section 2.4.3 of this thesis.  
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pays special attention to the construction of water property rights within the 
proposed framework of analysis; it therefore suggests the relevance of looking 
at the domestic laws of host States. Yet, in doing so, this work adopts a broad 
look to the national laws of host States, identifying commonalities across host 
States, that illustrate the special nature of water property rights. Essentially, 
the establishment of water rights systems seems dependent on the variability 
and uncertainty of water resources, which differs from the nature and 
structure of property of other natural resources such as in oil, gas, forests and 
land. It is noteworthy that the supply of water services is not the main focus of 
this work because the provision and regulation of water services has more 
commonality with the regulation of other network infrastructure for the 
delivery of public utilities. This work considers, also the high level of 
sensitivity and entitlement that water inspires in users and communities as 
evidenced by past disputes over water service investments.  
 
1.5  Why an Analytical Framework that Distinguishes Indirect 
Expropriation from Legitimate Regulation? 
As regards the relationship between the fields of international investment law 
and other fields of law, such as environmental law, human rights, and – 
relevant to this work - water law, the academic literature on the issue 
proposes a wide range of methodologies that could assist in determining the 
dividing line between expropriation and regulation. Most of the literature tends 
to focus on how to reconcile IIAs obligations of investment protection with 
other societal values or welfare objectives (some of these welfare objectives 
constitute obligations enshrined in other international agreements and 
declarations, requiring complex methods of incorporation into investment 
agreements).34 Among the methodologies put forward to assist both the parties 
to the dispute and arbitrators in deciding such disputes, the literature covers 
the principle of systemic integration of IIAs with other relevant rules 
international law such as environmental agreements, human rights 
obligations, labour standards and trans-boundary watercourses agreements, 
under Article 31(3)(c) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 Those values maybe focused on human rights, the environment, indigenous rights, health, 
safety, security, water resources, and sustainable development. There are many societal 
concerns that are potentially affected by the operations of foreign, whether such an effect is 
attributable to the investor or not.  
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(VCLT).35 Further, some authors propose that investment dispute resolution 
should resort to analytical frameworks to address conflict of laws in trade and 
international investment law. 36  Miguel Solanes, for instance, has also 
proposed - in the area of water resources and water services - a perspective 
that addresses the asymmetric relations between investors and States, in 
which the interests of investors would be widely protected by investment 
tribunals with detrimental effects to States. This approach advocates for the 
application of general principles of law accepted by relevant legal systems.37 A 
specific analysis of these methodologies is beyond the scope of this work; 
nonetheless, this thesis does not disregard their assistance to arbitrators 
when applying the proposed framework of analysis, discussed in Chapter IV. 
The analysis of water-related measures in the context of investment 
arbitration, which will be discussed in the next Chapters, considers the large 
number of IIAs of the first and second generation that are currently in force. 
The second generation of IIAs – as argued below – develops important 
clarifications in the interpretation of the provisions linked to indirect 
expropriation and the prerogative of States to regulate. Such clarifications may 
elucidate a sense of obligation of States and investors towards an emergent 
standard of review that defers to the exercise of regulatory prerogatives. 
Therefore, the scope of analysis does not cover a conflict preventive approach, 
this scope of analysis rather aims to assist the investor-State dispute 
settlement mechanism to progress into a more predictable and consistent 
mechanism. Perhaps, it may also assist in improving the legitimacy crisis that 
the investor-state arbitration mechanism appears to be undergoing in recent 
years.38  
 
1.6 Method and Structure 
Ever increasing challenges around freshwater resources will have an effect 
over economic activities regulated under several fields of law other than water 
law. The more regulation a sector is subject to, within a particular area of law, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 See Chapter III infra note 202.  
36 The work of Pauwelyn in the context of the potential conflicts between WTO law and other 
societal values constitutes an important example. See Joost Pauwelyn, Conflict of norms in 
public international law: How WTO law relates to other rules of international law (Cambridge, UK; 
New York: Cambridge University Press, 2003). 
37  See Solanes and Jouravlev, "Revisiting Privatization, Foreign Investment, International 
Arbitration and Water". 
38 See Chapter IV infra note 13. 
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the more potential for conflicts arises with other areas of law. There exist 
challenges to the application of lex lata as stipulated in the agreement; 
however there are also challenges as to whether a broader or rather systemic 
analysis of investment agreements can be sustained.39  
This work adopts an analytical approach to the literature on water resources, 
as well as reports and international conferences and documents addressing 
the challenges around water resources and hydrological variability. The 
analysis of conventions, declarations and other relevant international 
documents and conferences, as well as a wide range of other secondary 
sources, purports to answer the first part of the research question, as to 
whether water is special. The second part of this work adopts a theoretical 
analysis of the police powers doctrine – the theoretical framework of Chapter 
III - as it intends a review of this doctrine from its origins to its current status 
in international investment law. In order to place the police power in the 
context of international investment law, this work includes a brief reference to 
the development of the protection of aliens and – later – foreign investors, in 
the international law. In order to answer the second research question, this 
work also adopts the jurisprudential approach of legal positivism in analysing 
a range of investment treaties and some arbitral awards solving investor-State 
arbitration disputes. Finally, in order to derive criteria to test the legitimacy of 
regulatory measures – adopted under the police power doctrine - this thesis 
analysis and takes forward existing literature, addressing the challenge of 
distinguishing legitimate regulation from indirect expropriation. Subsequently, 
the last part of this study analyses potential water related regulatory 
measures against each criterion of the proposed framework of analysis.   
The following sections set out the structure of the thesis. 
 
1.6.1 Chapter 2: The Special Nature of Water Resources 
In order to understand the special nature of water resources within the 
broader context of international investment law, Chapter 2 addresses the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
39 See for instance Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States of America, Award under UNICTRAL Rules, 
June 8, 2009, and the analysis of Professor Michael Reisman of the systemic approach adopted 
by the tribunals in that dispute. W. Michael Reisman, "'Case Specific Mandates' versus 
`Systemic Implications': How Should Investment Tribunals Decide?, The Freshfields Arbitration 
Lecture" Arbitration International 29, no. 2 (2013).  
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physical, economic social and environmental characteristics of water 
resources. It is important to assess the ownership and formation of water 
rights/entitlements. While this may be best explained by economic theory, this 
work will instead focus on the origin of property rights from commons to 
individual private property, and to observe why the robust construction of 
property rights in land, for instance, has not reached water resources. 
However, the features of ownership in water do not end the discussion; the 
real issue arises regarding the use and enjoyment of water resources, how 
these entitlements are granted and what is the extent of their protection. One 
way of looking at the challenges of water resources is to consider the potential 
disputes that could arise in different geographical contexts. However, a 
downside of this approach is that property rights are generally created under 
the domestic legal systems of states, causing difficulties in identifying a set of 
commonalities across legal systems, especially in relation to water property 
rights granted to investors. This challenge has been overcome by addressing 
certain legal systems from a general standpoint and treating them as examples 
that may be representative of a significant number of other legal systems. In 
this light, Chapter 2 also considers a number of relevant investment disputes 
linked to water resources.  
 
1.6.2 Chapter 3: The Protection of Foreign Investment  
The notions of sovereignty and the police power are closely related to investor-
State arbitration, and they have been used and abused by friends and foes of 
this dispute settlement mechanism. In this vein, both perspectives appear to 
have lost some of the original underpinning values that justified their initial 
positions. For this reason, this work proposes a revisiting of the concepts of 
sovereignty and police power in their historical and legal foundations. 
Expropriation could not be properly assessed without addressing the principle 
of sovereignty of States, closely linked to the doctrine of the police power. An 
analytical approach to the literature devoted to these concepts is undertaken 
in order to assess their relevance in the context of international law as well as 
national law. Likewise an analytical approach to the literature on international 
investment law – with a focus on the issue of expropriation – has been 
included with a view to provide a general context of the area of investment 
arbitration. This approach, however, would not be complete without 
addressing positive law and a legal interpretation of relevant IIAs, as well as 
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case law analysis. Chapter III undertakes this endeavour, and in doing so, it 
pays greater attention to the American tradition, which appears to shape the 
principle of police power as recognised under customary international law. 
However, it is not possible to make an account of this conceptual framework 
without referring to the sovereignty of States, which will be briefly addressed 
from a few perspectives. Chapter III also contains a brief reference to the 
development of international investment law and investment arbitration, with 
a focus on the standard of non-expropriation without compensation, and its 
transition to the issue of indirect expropriation, which is at the heart of this 
work. As such, Chapter III analyses the academic literature, as well as the 
case law on matters relevant to international investment agreements.  
 
1.6.3 Chapter 4: The Framework of Analysis  
Chapter 4 articulates the analysis of the policy power as regulatory prerogative 
to regulate and sets a framework of analysis that aims at assisting arbitral 
tribunals in identifying regulatory measures adopted under the exercise of the 
police power and those that constitute an indirect expropriation. These criteria 
are drawn from the requirements for a lawful expropriation (public purpose, 
non-discrimination and due process), and are used to address the quality of 
the governmental measure.40 The first stage considers two aspects, namely the 
extent and nature of water property rights. This criterion argues that water 
rights are not only shaped by whatever entitlements investors may acquire, 
but are also shaped by all other related regulations and principles that inform 
the rationale behind water property rights and their operation, which makes 
such rights precarious in nature. The second aspect is that water rights 
constitute only one element of the whole investment41 (the approach of the 
unity of the investment).42 This fact may be of relevance to the definition of 
investment and, thus to the jurisdiction of the tribunal deciding a case. The 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 Professor Brigitte Stern proposes some of the criteria that will be adopted by the framework of 
analysis addressed in Chapter IV. See Stern, "In Search of the Frontiers of Indirect 
Expropriation". 
41 A comparison could be drawn between the investment -as a complex project formed by 
contracts, licences, concessions, etc. - and the “bundle of rights” with sticks represented the 
enjoyment of each right of property. Schlager and Ostrom analyses property as bundle rights, 
and identified five property rights – or sticks of the bundle - that are most relevant for the use of 
common-pool resources, including: access, withdrawal, management, exclusion, and alienation. 
See Edella Schlager and Elinor Ostrom, "Property-Rights Regimes and Natural Resources: A 
Conceptual Analysis" Land Economics 68, no. 3 (1992), 250-51. 
42 Holiday Inns S.A. and others v. Morocco, (ICSID Case No. ARB/72/1). This case was settled. 
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second stage of the framework covers the economic impact of the measure over 
the investment, which constitutes a quantitative analysis.43 Finally, the third 
stage of the framework pertains to a qualitative analysis of the legitimate use 
of the police power, which will be provided by the following additional criteria: 
public purpose, non-discrimination, due process and legitimate expectations. 
These will all be addressed in the light of the challenges around water 
resources.  
It may be argued that the concept of proportionality ought to be included as 
an additional criterion of the proposed framework. This work asserts that the 
interactions of the two parts of the framework, namely the quantitative 
approach and the qualitative one, constitute an implicit application of 
proportionality in the broader sense of the concept. Each element of these 
criteria has been previously analysed in the international investment 
literature. However, the novelty of this work is in a methodological approach, 
which is to be followed in line with a specific standard of review, linked to the 
characteristics of water resources and the nature of water property rights. The 
result of applying the framework of analysis will determine the extent to which 
the nature of water can and should be taken into account by arbitral 
tribunals.  
 
1.6.4 Chapter 5: Conclusions 
Finally Chapter V will offer conclusions on the application of the framework 
and provide recommendations to host States and investors in the development 
of their investment relations. There have been few cases related specifically to 
the protection of water resources, and even fewer in which host States have 
invoked the need for adaptability and flexibility of water resources 
management. Water management is generally embedded in the field of 
environmental protection, or increasingly perhaps human rights. While 
tribunals seem to be sympathetic of these arguments, they have not expressly 
decided on the alleged conflicts between human rights or environmental law 
and international investment law. 44  This works argues that historical 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Professor Stern proposes this quantitative approach. See Stern, "In Search of the Frontiers of 
Indirect Expropriation", 38-44. 
44 In Suez v Argentina this issue was address: ‘[T]he Tribunal does not find a basis for such a 
conclusion either in the BITs or international law. Argentina is subject to both international 
obligations, i.e. human rights and treaty obligation, and must respect both of them equally.’ See 
Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A. v Argentina, 
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development of water laws should play a pivotal role in the assessment of 
water entitlements. In this vein, from a government’s perspective, the 
development of water law and the adoption and implementation of Integrated 
Water Resources Management (IWRM) will be of great relevance in defending a 
water-related investment disputes in the future.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 and under UNCITRAL Rules AWG Group v Argentina, Decision on 
Liability, July 30, 2010, para. 262. 
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CHAPTER 2  
THE SPECIAL NATURE OF WATER RESOURCES  
 
2.1  Introduction  
Water is essential to life and pivotal to any human undertaking. To date, 
humans have found substitutes for wood, for whale oil, for petroleum. In sum, 
there are potential substitutes for most sources of energy, but there is no 
substitute for water. This chapter explores the challenges around water 
resources management, which are exacerbated by increased stress over water 
resources that in turn may result in future crises across the globe. 
In the past, interaction between water law experts and experts from other 
disciplines of knowledge was not common. Recently, water law experts have 
developed their own specialism – water law – and have reached important 
synergies with other disciplines such as geography, climatology and hydrology. 
Water resources are influenced by several factors, such as geography, climate 
and human behaviour. These disciplines are critical for understanding the 
behaviour of the water cycle e.g. rainfall, aquifers, runoff, and in turn, its 
appropriate regulation. However, the relationship between water law and a 
number of other fields of law has not been so clearly established, despite the 
great potential for cross-fertilization among the disciplines linked to water 
governance. This is particularly the case with international economic law in 
general, and international trade law and international investment law 
specifically.45 Thus, this chapter elaborates on the possible different types of 
relationships between water and international investment law, so as to 
establish the basis for the subsequent chapters of this work. In order to 
address the interaction between water regulation and investment law, Chapter 
IV proposes a classification of possible regulatory measures linked to the 
management of water resources,46 which could be a source of investment 
disputes. In doing so, this work joins an important set of water as well as 
international investment law scholars, who have addressed the potential 
complexities in the relationship between water resources management, water 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
45 Other areas of International Economic Law, such as International Tax Law, International 
Development, International Intellectual Property, International Business Regulation, 
International Banking Law, International Commercial Arbitration, may eventually intersect with 
water issues. They however, are not the within the scope of this work.  
46 See Chapter IV, Section 4.3 
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services supply and international investment law. 47 Indeed, there is increasing 
awareness among water professionals of the effects of international investment 
protection obligations over the regulation of water resources and water 
services.  
In some cases, host States seeking to avoid responsibility under International 
Law, i.e. payment of compensation and reputational issues, have stalled the 
adoption of environment regulation – including water resources regulation – 
resulting in a ‘regulatory chill’. This kind of regulatory disincentive can be 
observed ex-ante investment and ex-post investment. The United Nations 
Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) points out – from an ex ante 
perspective - that capital importing countries which are competing to attract 
foreign investment, may have incentives to lower their social and 
environmental standards.48 This phenomenon has also been referred to as a 
‘race to the bottom’ among capital importing countries.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
47 See for instance the work of: Cumming and Froehlich, "NAFTA Chapter XI and Canada's 
Environmental Sovereignty: Investment Flows, Article 1110 and Alberta's Water Act"; Matthias 
Finger and Geremy Allouche, Water Privatisation (London: Spon Press, 2002); Levesque, 
"Investment and Water Resources: Limits to NAFTA"; Andrew Lang, "The GATS and Regulatory 
Autonomy: A case Study of the Social Regulation of the Water Industry" Journal of International 
Economic Law 7, no. 4 (2004); Mann, "Who Owns “Your” Water? Reclaiming Water as a Public 
Good under International Trade and Investment Law"; Mann, "International Economic Law: 
Water for Money's Sake"; Mann, "Implications of International Trade and Investment 
Agreements for Water and Water Services: Some Responses from Other Sources of International 
Law."; Marrella, "On the changing structure of international investment law: The human right to 
water and ICSID arbitration"; Timothy O'Neill, "Water and Freedom: The Privatization of Water 
and its Implications for Democracy and Human Rights in the Developing World" Colorado 
Journal of International Environmental Law and Policy 17, no. 2 (2006); Orr, Cartwright , and 
Tickner, "Understanding water risks A primer on the consequences of water scarcity for 
government and business"; Miguel Solanes, "Privatization, Foreign Investment, Arbitration and 
Water: A Time to Revisit. Summary of the main issues raised by Michael Hantke-Domas, 
Howard Mann and Jorge Barraguirre"; Solanes, "Water Services and International Investment 
Agreements"; Solanes and Jouravlev, "Revisiting Privatization, Foreign Investment, International 
Arbitration and Water"; Stanton Kibel, "Grasp on Water: A Natural Resource that Eludes 
NAFTA's Notion of Investment"; Stanton and Schutz, "Two Rivers Meet: At the Confluence of 
Cross-Border Water and Foreign Investment Law"; The International Federation of Private Water 
Operators (AquaFed), "Bilateral Investment Treaties and the Right to Water: The case of the 
provision of public water supply and sanitation services.(Submission by AquaFed)."; Vinuales, 
"Access to Water in Foreign Investment Disputes"; Vinuales, "Iced Freshwater Resources: A 
Legal Exploration"; Jorge E. Vinuales, Foreign Investment and the Environment in International 
Law  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2012); Jeffory S. Wade, "Privatization and the 
Future of Water Services" Florida Journal of International Law 20 (2008); Muñoz, "La 
administración del agua y la inversión extranjera directa ¿Cómo se relacionan?"; Tanzi, "On 
Balancing Foreign Investment Interests With Public Interests in Recent Arbitration Case Law in 
the Public Utilities Sector". 
48 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), "International Investment 
Agreements: Key Issues Volume II" (Geneve: United Nations, 2004), 73. 
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In the case of ex post investments, Howard Mann argues that lack of clarity in 
the obligations contained in International Investment Agreements (IIAs), could 
be used by investors to threaten sovereign governments with arbitration 
procedures whenever a government proposes the adoption or modification of 
national regulations.49  
In both cases, the phenomenon of ‘regulatory chill’ may take place in the 
context of water management, affecting the ability to adopt adaptive measures 
to tackle actual or imminent challenges around water resources, and affecting, 
in turn, the short and long run welfare of the citizens of the Host State.      
In order to better understand the importance of the relationship between 
water law and international investment law, Section 2 analyses the nature of 
water resources by addressing its physical characteristics, as well as its social, 
economic and environmental aspects. Section 3 addresses current and 
potential challenges around water resources, such as increasing demand and 
competition for water resources, and issues of availability linked to water 
stress and scarcity. Section 4 briefly addresses the development of 
international water governance, through international conferences and 
declarations, which might have paved the way for some common 
understanding in the management of water resources. The international 
context of water resources may have influenced domestic water law, and this 
is also addressed in Section 4. This Section also considers the ownership and 
control over water resources, which may have been influenced by the special 
nature of water resources. Finally, Section 5 addresses the relationship 
between water law and investment law. 
The provision of drinking water (water services) is considered in this Chapter 
as an area of regulation that is distinct from water resources management. 
However, the activity of drinking water supply will be considered within the 
scope of water resources management. This is because drinking water supply 
could be in competition with other activities demanding water resources, and 
may be subject to similar allocation rules.  
It is also noteworthy that regulation of water services is highly sensitive, in the 
social and economic contexts. In this vein, the regulation of water 
infrastructure, as well as the regulation of private sector provision of drinking 
water, deserve special attention and will be dealt with in specific subsections. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
49 Mann, "The Right of States to Regulate and International Investment Law" 8. 
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2.2  The Unique Nature of Water Resources 
This section underpins the unique nature of water resources from different 
perspectives, and explores its physical characteristics within the hydrological 
cycle. In this context, when the Ohio Supreme Court of the United States (US) 
was confronted with the issue of whether an environmental amendment was 
to be applied to ground water, it stated the following:  
water is a sine qua non of the happiness, health, welfare, and agricultural and 
industrial progress of the state. Its absence or presence makes the difference 
between a desert and a garden. It is essential to preserve life of both man and 
beast, and industrial progress and development depend in a tremendous 
measure upon an adequate underground water supply.50 
The fact that water is essential to life appears to be unchallenged. Yet, to 
understand how such essentiality works, water needs to be seen as a unity 
that is present simultaneously in all contexts of life. Cullet appears to be 
critical of current mechanisms of water allocation (or appropriation of water 
rights). He criticises the diversity of modern water-allocation mechanisms, 
which has changed the structure of water rights and its historical relation to 
land: 
taken together, the tendency of the state to assert direct or indirect control 
and the multiplicity of rights that have been granted to individuals in relation 
to water have led to a situation where water is more often seen as a ‘a natural 
resource’ to be (sustainably) exploited or as a ‘good’ to be traded and efficiently 
managed rather than the basic substance that makes life on earth possible.51   
Further, the way in which water is perceived and regulated and the nature of 
(water) rights, granted to users, may not be always consistent with the 
physical nature of water resources. For example, while economics and law 
have traditionally advocated for secured rights, hydrologists and scientists are 
conscious of the unpredictable nature of water resources, which contradicts 
the security of water rights. Savenije illustrates this example by explaining 
that professionals from other fields, such as economics, argue that water 
professionals fail to see the larger picture due to their specific knowledge of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
50 See State v. Martin, 168 Ohio St. 37, 151 N.E.2d 7 (1958), 11 in Joseph M.  Reidy, "Cline v. 
American Aggregates Corp.  an Ohio Waterloo?" Capital University Law Review 13(1983-1984), 
684. 
51  Philippe Cullet, "Water Law in a Globalised World: the Need for a New Conceptual 
Framework" Journal of Environmental Law, 23, no. 2 (2011), 6. 
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the subject just, ‘like the father who refuses to see that his daughter is just a 
girl’.52  
 
2.2.1 Water is Finite, it is a System, it is Bulky and it is Non-
Substitutable  
Water is a finite and vulnerable resource53. While 97.5 per cent of water is in 
the oceans, 2.5 per cent is fresh water. From this amount of water, only 0.3 
per cent of fresh water is found in rivers, lakes and ponds; and from the 2.2 
per cent left, 70 per cent is found frozen as ice or snow in the mountainous 
regions, generally away from human access, and finally 30 per cent is 
groundwater. 54  
The amounts of water remain invariable in nature, although fresh water is 
unevenly distributed, in a geographical context. For several hundreds of years, 
human demand, ecosystems and industry were served from the same portion 
of fresh waters available in nature.55 However, as the population grows and 
consumption increases, so does the demand for water.  
The finite characteristic of water lies in the fact that, in some regions, it 
cannot be replenished at the same rate at which it is withdrawn. In other 
words, water demand for e.g. human consumption, industry, agriculture, 
cannot be met because water resources are being consumed faster than the 
water cycle can replenish such fresh water.56  
Water is essential to life, the environment and most forms of economic 
activities.57 Physically, water is a system, fugitive and bulky. Any action taken 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
52 Hubert H.G. Savenije, "Why water is not an ordinary economic good, or why the girl is 
special" Physics and Chemistry of the Earth 27(2002), 741. 
53 Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, Dublin, Ireland, 31 January 1992 
54 UN Water, Statistics, Graphs and Maps, United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 
available at http://www.unwater.org/statistics_res.html, last visited 11 November 2009. 
55 ‘There is precisely the same amount of [water] on the planet as there was in the age of the 
dinosaurs, and the world's population of more than 6.7 billion people has to share the same 
quantity as the 300 million global inhabitants of Roman times’. In Geoffrey Lean, ‘Water scarcity 
'now bigger threat than financial crisis’, The Independent, Sunday, 15 March 2009. 
56 World Water Assessment Programme, "The United Nations World Water Development Report 
2: Water a Shared Responsibility," (Paris - New York: United Nations, 2006), 116; Meena 
Palaniappan and Peter H. Gleick, "Peak Water", in The World's Water 2008-2009: The Biennial 
Report on Freshwater Resources, ed. Peter H. Gleick, et al. (Washington: Pacific Institute for 
Studies in Development, Environment and Security, 2009), 1. 
57 Viñuales addresses this point with regard to the special characteristics of water, such as the 
lack of substitutes, limited temporal supply, uneven distribution and essentiality. Furthermore, 
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concerning water will inevitably have an effect on the water system. The 
hydrological cycle is the mechanism through which water is transferred from 
the oceans (and water from the sub-surface and surface environments and 
plants) to the atmosphere and back to the surface through rainfall. The 
hydrological cycle constitutes an indivisible system that involves complex 
processes of rainfall, runoff, infiltration, recharge, seepage, re-infiltration and 
moisture recycling. These processes are all interconnected and 
interdependently related to one direction of flow: downstream.58 In addition, 
prior use of water (physical upstream interference) brings about consequential 
effects to future demand (physical downstream availability)59: 
Use of soil moisture diminishes the availability of groundwater; use of 
groundwater diminishes the availability of surface water etc. Thus any use of 
water affects the entire water cycle.60  
Water is physically elusive as it is in a constant state of flux. In other words, 
and opposed to the static characteristics of land, water flows under gravity 
and unless it is captured and stored, it is capable of constant movement.61 
However, while water can also be found in stocks in nature, such as aquifers 
and lakes, the quantities will vary due to the other processes mentioned above 
i.e. infiltration, surface runoff, recharge, and, of course, human interference.  
Another distinctive characteristic of water is its bulkiness. Yet, this 
characteristic is not unique in water, as other commodities such as oil and 
land, share such physical conditions. As explained by Savenije, water’s 
bulkiness in combination with its elusiveness and scarcity contributes to its 
complex nature. Water cannot be easily transported from one place to another 
because it is too bulky. 62  For instance, the amount of water needed for 
irrigation in agriculture, in relation to the price farmers may be willing pay for 
it, does not justify the transportation of water resources to the place of water 
scarcity because the amounts consumed can be extremely large. The cost of 
transportation would exceed the actual value given by users to water 
resources. In contrast, most commodities such as fuel, food and energy do 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
he expresses: ‘It is for these reasons, a vital strategic resource, which cannot be managed as 
any other tradable good’. See Viñuales, "Iced Freshwater Resources: A Legal Exploration", 203.    
58 Savenije, "Why water is not an ordinary economic good, or why the girl is special" 742. 
59  The clarification of physical upstream effects over physical downstream availability is 
necessary in the context of this work because – as it will be discussed below – from a legal 
perspective downstream use is potentially equally harmful to upstream users.  
60 P. Van der Zaag and Huber H.G.  Savenije, "Water as an economic good: the value of pricing 
and the failure of markets" Value of Water Research Report Series No. 19 (2006), 9. 
61 Savenije, "Why water is not an ordinary economic good, or why the girl is special", 142. 
62 Ibid. 
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reflect the costs of production and transportation in the final price, which 
consumers are willing to pay.  
Human consumption as well as land use (such as the construction of dams 
and well-drilling) interfere with the water cycle, because they affect surface 
and ground water, respectively, and in turn, the overall water system. In 
addition, climate variability e.g. global warming also has major effects on 
water’s temporal availability due to evaporation of ocean and fresh waters. 
These drivers of water variability, in turn, may trigger physical redistribution 
e.g. floods in some places, and drought in other places, as well as economic 
redistribution i.e. water reallocation among competing users.  
As water does not recognize national territories nor does it recognize 
boundaries, it moves according to its natural flow, which means that 
upstream interferences and downstream effects occur at the national as well 
as international levels. Note, however, there may also be effects on the other 
direction, namely downstream users effecting upstream users. Indeed projects 
associated with water resources such us dams, mining, irrigation undertaken 
by downstream users could create historic rights, foreclosing future water 
demand for upstream users. Salman Salman reports several examples where 
upstream users expressed concern for the use of water resources by their 
downstream neighbours, ‘by virtue of prescriptive rights gained with time’.63 
Current use of water resources for projects in riparian states –upstream or 
downstream – may create expectations of future quantities of water allocation, 
which the other riparian may not have ever acknowledged. As such, reduced 
downstream (or for that matter future user) availability of water resources can 
clearly create tensions among competing users, which can in turn cause 
conflicts between states when trans-boundary interference is involved.  
Finally, water has no substitutes. This characteristic will be addressed later in 
this chapter, but for now, it should be briefly considered. When the non-
substitutable characteristic of water is added to those mentioned above, 
namely: scarcity, bulkiness and elusiveness, the uniqueness of water 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  63	  Salman Salman analyses the case of the Baardhere Dam and Water Infrastructure Project in 
Somalia, involving the use of water of the Juba River of which Ethiopia is an upstream riparian. 
In this case the World Bank was requested by Somalia to notify Ethiopia of its intentions to put 
forward the project. In response, Ethiopia exposed her future plans of hydroelectricity and 
irrigation expansions using waters of the Juba River, and expressed concerns for the harm that 
Somalia’s project may cause to her rights over such waters. Although the conclusion of the 
World Bank and its independent experts was that the project would not foreclose Ethiopia’s 
future water demand, the project was cancelled due to the political situation of Somalia. See 
Salman M. A., "Downstream Riparians Can Also Harm Upstream Riparians: The Concept of 
Foreclosure of Future Uses" Water international 35, no. 4 (2010), 359-62. 
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resources becomes readily apparent. The fact that water has no substitutes 
implies, in the first instance, that in case of scarcity and high prices, users are 
not freely able to switch to other sources. Since transportation proves difficult, 
users would have to restrict consumption and compete with other users.  
This section assesses the nature of water resources from a systemic 
perspective. The elusiveness of water through the hydrological cycle does not 
allow diversion and storage, without physically affecting other downstream 
users. Water’s lack of substitutes, in addition to the aforementioned 
characteristics, could hardly be reflected in water prices, which affect its 
transportation to regions under scarcity. Overall, what makes water special is 
not each characteristic independently considered, but rather the combination 
of all of them and the aggregate effect that each of them has on the availability 
of water.   
This work suggests three perspectives to look at water resources, namely 
environmental, economic and equitable/social, which are considered below. 
They serve as a first approach to the three main values embedded in the 
notion of Integrated Water Resources Management (IWRM), which will also be 
considered below.  
 
2.2.2 The Environmental Perspective 
An environmental perspective to water resources touches mainly upon 
ecosystems degradation, 64  water pollution (quality of water) 65  and climate 
change. Regulatory measures linked to environmental governance – including 
water measures - have the potential to affect users’ entitlements e.g. pollution 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
64  The Millennium Ecosystems Assessment Programme defines Ecosystem as follows: ‘An 
ecosystem is a dynamic complex of plant, animal, and microorganism communities and the 
non-living environment interacting as a functional unit. Humans are an integral part of 
ecosystems. Ecosystems vary enormously in size; a temporary pond in a tree hollow and an 
ocean basin can both be ecosystems. See Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, "MA Conceptual 
Framework", in Ecosystems and Human Well-being: Current State and Trends, Volume 1: 
Findings of the Condition and Trends Working Group of the Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, 
ed. Rashid Hassan, Robert Scholes, and Neville  Ash (Washington, Covelo, London: Island Press, 
2003), Box 1.1: Key Definitions, 27. 
65 The United Nations World Water Development Report 3 (WWDR3) briefly identifies two main 
types of polluted water: 1) Black water, which contains the greatest level of pollution, usually 
with microbes; it is, therefore, unsuitable for human or ecological consumption; and 2) Grey 
water, which contains lower levels of contamination than black water and could be reused; it is 
generated from domestic activities e.g. laundry, bathing and other washing. See World Water 
Assessment Programme, "The United Nations World Water Development Report 3: Water in a 
Changing World" (Paris - London: United Nations, 2009), 162.  
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abatement, ecosystems protection and climate change adaptability. As 
expressed above, water constitutes a system that integrates other components 
of ecosystems, such as land, air and forests. Interference over water resources, 
mainly by human action, will have an effect over other natural resources, 
ecosystems and their services.66 The quality of water is, therefore, essential for 
the wellbeing of ecosystems, which in turn have an impact on the occurrence 
of droughts, crops success/failure, flood, etc.67 Economic as well as social 
development, by means of power generation, industrial production, household 
appliances, irrigation and mining, demand large quantities of water resources. 
They also often require diversion or storage, which in turn can potentially 
affect watershed repletion and competition over water resources. 68  While 
consumptive uses of water affect the amounts of water available, non-
consumptive uses, which are returned to the watershed, are likely to be of less 
quality than raw water in nature. It should be pointed out, that economic and 
social development are unlikely to be sustainable when an ecosystem’s health 
is ignored. 69  Therefore, healthy ecosystems imply additional demand for 
environmental flows and the sustainability for future generations.70 However, 
such demand has been largely neglected in the past.71  
The shrinking of the Aral Sea in Central Asia, as well as the depletion of fish 
stocks and catchment degradation in Lake Victoria in Africa, constitute 
striking examples of depletion of ecosystems due to overconsumption and 
diversion of water resources. These abuses of ecosystems negatively affect 
both upstream and downstream users.72 Water quality is not only raw water in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66  The planet’s ecosystems are not only systems of interaction among water, air, land, forests, 
etc.; they also provide benefits to human population. The notion of ecosystems services 
expresses the benefits accruing from them; thus, healthy ecosystems services provide ‘food, 
water, disease management, climate regulation, spiritual fulfilment, and aesthetic enjoyment’. 
See Millennium Ecosystem Assessment, "MA Conceptual Framework". 
67 Ibid., 27. 
68 Consumptive use of water, consist of water withdrawals from available sources, which will 
not return to the water cycle, such use can be found for instance in irrigation and food 
production. Non-consumptive uses of water, on the other hand, constitute the use of water that 
can be returned to the water cycle, weather treated or not, e.g. hydro-electricity generation, 
cooling systems, recreational uses of water and mining.      
69  The first principle embedded within the Dublin Statement, states: ‘... water resources 
demands a holistic approach, linking social and economic development with protection of 
natural ecosystems…’ Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, Dublin, Ireland, 
31 January 1992. 
70 See Ronald C. Griffin, Water Resources Economics. The Analysis of Scarcity, Policies and 
Projects  (Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press, 2006). Ch2. 
71 Sandra L. Postel, "Securing water for people, crops, and ecosystems: New mindset and new 
priorities" Natural Resources Forum 27, no. 2 (2003), 90-91. 
72 World Water Assessment Programme, "The United Nations World Water Development Report 
3: Water in a Changing World", 128. See also United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), 
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nature. Water resources must retain their quality characteristics for human 
consumption. Drinking water may need more or less treatment depending on 
the quality of the raw water to be supplied.  The more contaminated water 
resources are, the more extensive treatment and dilution will be required,73 
with a direct effect on the overall cost of water supply. It is estimated that 
eight litres of water are required to dilute one litre of ‘grey water’.74 Finally, 
climate change is increasingly addressed as a new driver for water stress.75 
The World Development Report 2011 asserts that the impacts of climate 
change on climate variability, food production, and energy generation remains 
to be fully observed.76 However, the same report also contends that climate 
change is already affecting availability of water resources in developing as well 
as developed countries.77 
It appears that regulatory measures are deemed necessary to tackle the effects 
of climate change over hydrological variability. Sadoff and Muller assert that:  
Changes in the availability, timing and reliability of rainfall and the water 
resources that flow from it will have impacts on all water-using sectors. These 
impacts in turn will affect the broader dynamics of national economies as well 
as environmental and social needs, particularly in poorer societies. Specifically, 
since effective water management is important for the achievement of many of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
"GEO: Year Book 2003", in GEO: Global Environment Outlook (Washington: United Nations, 
2003). Available at http://www.unep.org/yearbook/ 2003/071.htm, last visited April, 14, 2011. 
For the case of Lake Victoria, see World Water Assessment Programme, "The United Nations 
World Water Development Report 2: Water a Shared Responsibility", Box 5.1, 163. 
73 Palaniappan and Gleick, "Peak Water", 6. 
74  Estimation made by the World Health Organization, in: Orr, Cartwright and Tickner, 
"Understanding water risks A primer on the consequences of water scarcity for government and 
business", 20. 
75 On the effects of Climate Change see for instance World Water Assessment Programme, "The 
United Nations World Water Development Report 3: Water in a Changing World", Chapter 5; 
World Bank, "World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development", 
(Washington: World Bank, 2011); William R. Sutton, Jitendra P. Srivastava, and James E. 
Neumann, "Looking beyond the Horizon: How Climate Change Impacts and Adaptation 
Responses will reshape Agriculture in Eastern Europe and Central Asia" (Washington D.C.: 
Directions in development: Agriculture and Rural Development, World Bank, 2013). Available 
at: http://documents.worldbank.org/curated/en/2013/03/17473996/looking-beyond-horizon-
climate-change-impacts-adaptation-responses-reshape-agriculture-eastern-europe-central-asia, 
last visited July 20, 2013; Bryson C.  Bates et al., "Climate Change and Water. IPCC Technical 
Paper IV", (Geneva: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change, 2008). Available at: 
http://www.ipcc.ch/pdf/technical-papers/climate-change-water-en.pdf, last visited January 
2012; Scientific United Nations Educational, Cultural Organization, "The United Nations World 
Water Development Report (WWDR4)", (Paris: UNESCO, United Nations 2012). 
76 World Bank, "World Development Report 2011: Conflict, Security, and Development", 35. 
77 Ibid., 230. 
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the Millennium Development Goals, these impacts could also threaten their 
achievement and their sustainability once achieved.78 
The protection of the environment, in a broad sense, is of great concern within 
the field of international economic law, and subject of intense scrutiny by 
Non-Governmental Organisations (NGOs) and citizens. Likewise, water law 
increasingly considers the effect of investment obligations to protect property 
rights and the effect that water management and supply regulation will have 
on foreign direct investment. 79  Regulation of water resources for 
environmental purposes – among others - could be deemed expropriatory in 
international investment law context. Such a relationship will be addressed in 
the next Chapters.  
2.2.3  The Economic Perspective  
The economic value of water resources is addressed in the fourth principle of 
the Dublin Statement:  
Water has an economic value in all its competing uses and should be recognized 
as an economic good. Within this principle, it is vital to recognize first the basic 
right of all human beings to have access to clean water and sanitation at an 
affordable price. Past failure to recognize the economic value of water has led to 
wasteful and environmentally damaging uses of the resource. Managing water 
as an economic good is an important way of achieving efficient and equitable 
use, and of encouraging conservation and protection of water resources.80 
This principle, however, has raised discussion among water professionals as to 
how the economic nature of water should be understood. Van den Zaag and 
Savenije identify two schools of thought addressing the economic value of 
water. 81 The first one argues that market interaction will allocate a price to 
water based on the value each user gives to it.82 As a consequence, and when 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Claudia W. Sadoff and Mike Muller, "Perspectives on water and climate change adaptation. 
Better water resources management – Greater resilience today, more effective adaptation 
tomorrow", (Stockholm: Global Water Partnership, 2009), 4. 
79 Mann, "The Right of States to Regulate and International Investment Law"; Mann, "Who Owns 
“Your” Water? Reclaiming Water as a Public Good under International Trade and Investment 
Law"; Mann, "International Economic Law: Water for Money's Sake"; Mann, "Implications of 
International Trade and Investment Agreements for Water and Water Services: Some Responses 
from Other Sources of International Law"; Solanes, "Water Services and International 
Investment Agreements"; Solanes and Jouravlev, "Revisiting Privatization, Foreign Investment, 
International Arbitration and Water"; Muñoz, "La administración del agua y la inversión 
extranjera directa ¿Cómo se relacionan?". 
80 Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, Dublin, Ireland, 31 January 1992. 
81 Van der Zaag and Savenije, "Water as an economic good: the value of pricing and the failure 
of markets", 7. 
82 Ibid. 
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under competition, water would be priced to its highest value, which has the 
potential to limit some uses of water, especially the uses of those users unable 
to pay the market price of the resource.83 
The second school of thought does not necessarily incorporate the element of 
financial interaction in its interpretation.84 In other words, it does not consider 
water’s economic value as based solely on price. On the contrary, it takes into 
account uses and users that are unable to afford a price, i.e. ecosystems, 
cultural and recreational uses, etc. Green asserts that allocation of water 
resources should be analysed in the light of the other Dublin Principles, such 
as public participation and the role of women in water management.85  
Scarcity and increasing demand for water affect its availability; leading to 
prioritisation of some uses over others. Consumptive uses exclude other uses, 
making water resources unavailable until renewed through the hydrological 
cycle. Agriculture, which is a consumptive use, for instance, amounts to 70 
per cent of water demand.86 The United Nations (UN) Food and Agricultural 
Organization (FAO) reports that this sector:  
is often criticized for high wastage and inefficient use of water at the point of 
consumption (i.e. at farm level) encouraged by subsidized low charges for water 
use or low energy tariffs for pumping. It is often claimed that the charges made 
for irrigation water, fail to signal the scarcity of the resource to farmers.87 
On the other hand, non-consumptive uses allow for reuse of water e.g. 
hydropower generation can transfer water either for agricultural irrigation or 
human consumption.88 It is noteworthy, however, that non-consumptive and 
other uses cannot always be harmonised due to seasonal or geographical 
incompatibilities. In the abovementioned example may illustrate this situation: 
hydropower generation in many cases uses greater amounts of water during 
the winter season when energy demand is high; thus, the water available from 
this activity is unlikely to be useful for agricultural purposes because crops 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 See Green, referring to the neo-classical interpretation of the fourth Dublin statement. 
Kenneth C. Green, "If Only Life Were That Simple; Optimism and Pessimism in Economics" 
Physics and Chemistry of the Earth 25, no. 3 (2000), 205-206  
84 Van der Zaag and Savenije, "Water as an economic good: the value of pricing and the failure 
of markets", 7. 
85 Green, "If Only Life Were That Simple; Optimism and Pessimism in Economics", 206. 
86 Kerry Turner et al., "Economic valuation of water resources in agriculture: From the sectoral 
to a functional perspective of natural resource management", (Rome: Food and Agriculture 
Organization of the United Nations (FAO), 2004), 3.  
87 Ibid.  
88 Palaniappan and Gleick, "Peak Water ", 6. 
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are typically consumptive of water in the spring and summer seasons.89 
National authorities are, therefore, confronted with numerous trade-offs, as 
they are called to prioritise and allocate water resources, in line with 
development polices. In addition, policies may change and evolve at different 
points in time, as governments face new challenges or have new political 
agendas. In such cases, governments may adopt water reallocations, which 
have the potential to negatively affect foreign investors’ property rights.  
As opposed to fossil fuels, water has no possible substitutes at present. 
Therefore, if all uses of water would be – hypothetically – priced, water’s price 
elasticity demand would be virtually inelastic, which means that users would 
be willing to pay high prices for water because there is no alternative source 
that users could switch to when water prices increase. Gleik argues that the 
‘ultimate water backstop is still water, from an essentially unlimited source’, 
referring to ocean water, which still involves high desalinisation costs.90  
In sum, as water has no substitutes to date, there are no other sources that 
could ‘backstop’ water prices (cross-price elasticity demand).91 In addition, in 
some cases such as water supply and water for irrigation, the prices of water 
not always reflect the real costs of provision. In contrast, in the case of oil 
there exist alternative sources of energy that can backstop oil prices, in 
addition oil prices reflect the costs of exploration and production, turning oil 
into the perfect commodity.  
It is noteworthy that the real value of water may become apparent in times of 
unavailability, when economic losses are quantifiable, which is observable in 
the case of industrial users, energy generation and large-scale farming. Yet, 
there also exist unquantifiable losses in times of water scarcity, such as the 
effects of famine, water-borne deceases, and water-collection from faraway 
sources among others. These problems affect present and future human 
development e.g. malnutrition is linked to present and future physical and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
89 See for instance, the conflicts of water availability schedules in Central Asia in Victor  . 
Dukhovny and Vadim I. Sokolov, Integrated Water Resources Management: Experience and 
Lessons Learned from Central Asia – towards the Fourth World Water Forum  (Tashkent: GWP - 
CACENA, 2005), 18. 
90 Palaniappan and Gleick, "Peak Water", 8-9. It is perhaps, pertinent to point out that while 
desalinization technologies are rapidly developing, they still imply high costs of operation and 
for the environment.  
91 The notion of cross-price elasticity demand is relevant to explain the responsiveness of 
demand toward one good when the price of another good is changed.  See Robert S. Pindyck 
and Daniel L.  Rubinfeld, Microeconomics, 6th ed. (New Delhi: Prentice Hall of India, 2006), 34. 
In the case of water, there is no alternative good that demand for water could switch to.  
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intellectual performance, and the time children spend helping the collection of 
water, affects their intellectual development (education). The long-term effect 
of these problems is difficult to quantify.  
In conclusion, water - from a demand perspective - is highly valued, yet for 
several uses e.g. human consumption, irrigation, ecosystems and the 
environment, such value cannot be expressed in water prices. In turn, market 
prices solely could not solve potential conflicts, arising from competition of 
water resources, where the lack of substitutes plays an important role. For 
this reason, the allocation of water resources requires a balanced approach to 
the interests of all users, including ecosystems and the environment.  
 
2.2.4 The Social Perspective 
The social perspective focuses especially on the access to water through 
supply of drinking water and sanitation, which for the purpose of this study 
could be summarised as human consumption and its competition with other 
uses of water resources. There exist numerous social aspects to water 
resources, such as cultural and recreational uses, as well as the 
empowerment of indigenous and women’s rights through water 
management.92 These aspects are all interlinked and raise concerns about 
increasing stress over water resources.93 
Access to safe drinking water and sanitation are essential components of 
human development. The 2006 Human Development Report addresses the 
water crisis and its link to human development: ‘deprivation in access to water 
is a silent crisis experienced by the poor’.94 This report depicts the inequalities 
in water uses and shows that residents of poor areas in developing countries, 
such as Accra and Manila, paid more for water supply than residents in 
London and New York. 95  In 2000, the UN adopted the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), which aim at reducing by half the amount of 
people without access to safe drinking water and sanitation. The target was 
met and in 2012 UNICEF reported that 2 billion people gained access to safe 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
92 World Water Assessment Programme, "The United Nations World Water Development Report 
3: Water in a Changing World", 38, 51. 
93 Ibid., 36-39. 
94  United Nations Development Programme, "Human Development Report 2006. Beyond 
scarcity: Power, poverty and the global water crisis", (New York: United Nations, 2006), 1. 
95 Ibid., 52. 
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drinking water between 1990 and 2010.96 Yet, 780 million people still lack 
access to safe drinking water and 2.5 billion live without improved 
sanitation.97 The MDGs status report of 2010 forecasted that the world would 
achieve and exceed the goal of access to drinking water, and quite rightly was 
less optimistic as regards the goal on access to sanitation.98  
However, there exist other types of deprivations intimately linked to poverty, 
which are underlined by the lack of water resources. The 2011 Human 
Development Report (HDR) estimates that almost 1.75 billion people 
experience multidimensional poverty. 99  Multidimensional poverty does not 
only cover access to safe water for consumption, it also encompasses access to 
water for other basic activities that influence the quality of life. In turn, quality 
of life and fulfilment of basic human needs are included within the scope of 
the International Covenant on Social, Economic and Cultural Rights.100 The 
right to water, as a stand-alone human right, was first addressed in 2002 by 
the Committee on Economic Social and Cultural Rights, which embeds the 
human right to water in Articles 11 and 12 of the Covenant.101 Finally, the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 World Health Organization, "Progress on Drinking Water and Sanitation. 2012 Update" 
(Geneva: World Health Organization, 2012), 4-5. Available at: http://www.unicef.org/media/ 
files/JMPreport2012.pdf, last visited June 20, 2013. 
97 Ibid., 2. Previously it was reported that 2.6 people lacked access to improved sanitation. See 
WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for Water Supply and Sanitation (JMP), "Progress 
on Sanitation and Drinking Water. 2010 Update," (Geneva: WHO/UNICEF, 2010), 6-7. 
98  United Nations, "The Millennium Development Goals: Report 2010", (New York: United 
Nations, 2010), 58, 61. 
99  United Nations Development Programme, "Human Development Report 2010. 20th 
Anniversary Edition. The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development" (New York: 
United Nations, 2010), 96. The notion of multidimensional poverty is explained in the HDR in 
terms of The Multidimensional Poverty Index (MPI), which identifies ‘multiple deprivations at the 
individual level in health, education and standard of living’. In this case standard of living is 
estimated by thresholds of basic access to services, such electricity, clean drinking water, 
adequate sanitation, clean cooking fuel. It also refer to accessibility to basic goods, such having 
a home with a dirt-free floor, owning a car, a truck or similar motorized vehicle, and owning at 
most one of these assets: bicycle, motorcycle, radio, refrigerator, telephone. See ibid., 221. 
100 See Articles 11 (Right to an Adequate Standard of Living) and Article 12 (Right to Health) of 
the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General Assembly 
Resolution 2200A (XXI) of 16 December 1966 (ratification and accession), entry into force 3 
January 1976. 
101 See Committee on Economic, Social And Cultural Rights, ‘Substantive Issues Arising in the 
Implementation of the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights’ General 
Comment No. 15 (2002), The right to water (arts. 11 and 12 of the International Covenant on 
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), E/C.12/2002/11 20 January 2003, Twenty-ninth 
Session Geneva, 11-29 November 2002, paras 1-3. See also: Human Rights Council, ‘Report of 
the independent expert on the issue of human rights obligations related to access to safe drinking 
water and sanitation, Catarina de Albuquerque’, Addendum, Progress report on the compilation 
of good practices, Fifteenth session, A/HRC/15/31/Add.1, 1 July 2010; Human Rights Council, 
‘Human rights and access to safe drinking water and sanitation’, GA Assembly United Nations,  
A/HRC/RES/15/9, October 6, 2010; Human Rights Council, ‘Human rights and access to safe 
drinking water and sanitation’, GA, United Nations, A/HRC/15/L.14, September 24, 2010. 
 	  50	  
human right to water and sanitation was expressly recognised by the General 
Assembly of the UN in 2010, which adopted Resolution A/RES/64/292.102 
The efforts made by national governments to realise the right to water imply 
the need for private and public investment, as well as aid funding.103 However, 
the recent past has shown a tense relationship between foreign investment 
and government’s measures regulating water supply and access to water. This 
issue will be further analysed in Chapters III and IV.  
2.3  The Global Water Crisis: Pressures over Water Resources  
Currently, it is widely acknowledged that the world is in a water crisis or 
under the threat thereof. 104  Increasingly, the international community is 
taking consciousness of this crisis and is looking into ways to tackle water 
stress, and reduce the effects of water scarcity.105 While it cannot be asserted 
that there exists a mechanism of global water governance in place,106 there 
exists persuasive evidence of emerging trends aiming to promote coordinated 
and coherent mechanisms of water resources management. However, the 
process has proven challenging, Conca, for instance, asserts that there 
continues to be a deep underlying struggle amongst the international 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102 General Assembly, United Nations, ‘The human right to water and sanitation Resolution’, 
A/RES/64/292, August 3, 2010. 
103 Human Rights Council, ‘Report of the independent expert on the issue of human rights 
obligations related to access to safe drinking water and sanitation, Catarina de Albuquerque’, 
A/HRC/15/31, 15th Session, June 29, 2010 
104 Orr, Cartwright and Tickner, "Understanding water risks A primer on the consequences of 
water scarcity for government and business"; World Economic Forum, Global Risks 2011, Sixth 
Edition. “An initiative of the Risk Response Network", (Geneva: World Economic Forum, 2011); 
World Water Assessment Programme, "The United Nations World Water Development Report 3: 
Water in a Changing World"; World Water Assessment Programme, "The United Nations World 
Water Development Report 2: Water a Shared Responsibility." 
105 This work adopts the notions of water stress and water scarcity based on the amounts of 
water resources available proposed by the Human Development Report in 2006. The HDR 2006 
notes that the quantity of water, considered adequate, to meet industry, agriculture, energy and 
environmental requirements is 1700 cubic metres per person. Water available below that 
threshold is considered to be a situation of water stress. On the other hand, availability of water 
under 1000 cubic metres is regarded as water scarcity, and below 500 cubic metres, extreme 
water scarcity. See United Nations Development Programme, "Human Development Report 
2006. Beyond scarcity: Power, poverty and the global water crisis," 135. There is, however, 
another approach to water scarcity which does not only consider physical availability of water 
resources, this aspect was addressed by the HDR 2006, which stated:  
‘Water scarcity can be physical, economic or institutional, and—like water itself—it can 
fluctuate over time and space. Scarcity is ultimately a function of supply and demand. But both 
sides of the supply-demand equation are shaped by political choices and public policies’. Ibid., 
134. 
106 Claudia Pahl-Wostl, Joyeeta Gupta, and Daniel Petry, "Governance and the Global Water 
System: A Theoretical Exploration" Global Governance 14(2008), 421. 
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community striving for a coordinated regime of global water governance.107 As 
a result, it seems important to identify the challenges water experts are 
confronted with, and what developments have been achieved towards water 
management.  
In 2009, the UN in the WWDR3 exposed the link between water and other 
crises or potential crises, such as climate change, energy, food and financial 
markets. The WWDR3 stressed that unless these links are addressed with the 
aim of solving the water crisis, the other crises could worsen at all levels, and 
may lead to political instability.108 In this vein, water experts warn that global 
sustainable management of freshwater is a daunting challenge, which despite 
efforts and commitments at different levels remains under-attended. 
Therefore, the issue of water security can only be adequately addressed in 
conjunction with two other convergent issues, namely energy security and 
food security. 109 The water crisis is not only linked to scarcity. It is also linked 
to other hazards such as flood, pollution, and extreme variability, all of which 
are also significant drivers of water crisis. On one hand, climate variability has 
significant effects on floods and droughts, aggravated by climate change; in 
turn, extreme weather events have harsher effects on developing countries, 
because they generally lack risk management and risk assessment capacity.110 
On the other hand, water pollution originating from human and industrial 
activity111 cannot always be tackled through treatment and reuse, as levels of 
water contamination may be high. Therefore, from a water management 
perspective, trade-offs between human development, economic growth and 
environmental protection appear to be unavoidable. The Secretary General of 
the UN remarks: 
As the global economy grows, so will its thirst. This is not an issue of rich or 
poor, north or south. All regions are experiencing the problem of water stress. 
There is still enough water for all of us – but only so long as we keep it clean, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 Ken Conca, Governing water: Contentious transnational politics and global institution building  
(Cambridge: MIT Press, 2005), 6. 
108 World Water Assessment Programme, "The United Nations World Water Development Report 
3: Water in a Changing World", XX. 
109  Patricia  Wouters, Sergei Vinogradov, and Bjoern-Oliver Magsig, "Water Security, 
Hydrosolidarity, and International Law: A River Runs Through It" Yearbook of International 
Environmental Law 19 (2010). See also the system diagram for risks associated with the water-
food-energy nexus, and the risks connected to these three main security risks: World Economic 
Forum, “Global Risks 2011”, Sixth Edition. An initiative of the Risk Response Network", 29.  
110 World Water Assessment Programme, "The United Nations World Water Development Report 
3: Water in a Changing World", 211. 
111 See Section 2.2 which addresses the social perspective of water resources 
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use it more wisely and share it fairly. Governments must engage and lead, and 
the private sector also has a role to play in this effort.112 
The World Economic Forum, in its 2011 Global Risks Report, identified a 
landscape of risks grouped into five categories: economic risks (extreme energy 
price volatility), environmental risks (storms, flooding, climate change and 
biodiversity loss), societal risks (water security and demographic challenges), 
geopolitical risks (global governance failures) and technological risks.113 In 
addition, drivers - fundamental to human activity - can exacerbate the 
materialization of these risks. The vehicle interconnecting these drivers with 
clusters risks is water: ‘climate change with water security, food security and 
extreme energy price volatility’.114 Two additional elements are noteworthy in 
relation to the clusters of risks: i) the inherent uncertainty of water resources 
and ii) the need for predictability and security by users of water resources.  
All these elements, in combination, pose a challenging scenario for the near 
future. The problem may become more acute when the solutions come from 
different areas of expertise, which do not interact with one another, such as 
arbitral tribunals assessing investment disputes, linked to water resources.   
Reference made to water crisis in the global context appears to be a long-term 
challenge that high and middle-income countries may eventually face. For low-
income countries the ‘water crisis is a silent one’,115 which affects mostly the 
poor. 116  The next section identifies the pressures over water resources, 
focusing on the drivers related to water stress. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
112 Ban Ki-Moon, Secretary-General, United Nations, as cited in: World Economic Forum Water 
Initiative, "The Bubble Is Close to Bursting: A Forecast of the Main Economic and Geopolitical 
Water Issues Likely to Arise in the World during the Next Two Decades. Draft for Discussion at 
the World Economic Forum Annual Meeting 2009", (World Economic Forum, 2009), 5.  
113  World Economic Forum, "Global Risks 2011. Sixth Edition. An initiative of the Risk 
Response Network", Figure 1: Global Risks Landscape 2011: Perception data from the World 
Economic Forum’s Global Risks Survey. 
114 Ibid., 45. 
115 Kristen Lewis, ed. Water governance for poverty reduction: Key issues and the UNDP response 
to millenium development goals (New York: Water Governance Programme, Bureau for 
Development Policy, UNDP, 2004), 79. 
116 The WWDR3 confirms that poor people are already facing a drinking water crisis: two in 
every three people lack access to safe drinking water and lives on two dollars a day, one in three 
lives on one dollar a day, and 385 million people live on less than one dollar a day. See World 
Water Assessment Programme, "The United Nations World Water Development Report 3: Water 
in a Changing World", 84. 
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2.3.1 Pressures on Water Resources  
As explained above, the global water crisis is largely linked to an increased 
demand for water resources that continues to grow at alarming rates. Demand 
for water is not only attributable to demographic growth and human 
consumption and pollution. Indeed economic and social activities such as 
some cultural practices, globalization and trade have multiplying effects over 
the demand for water resources. Climate change constitutes an additional 
driver exacerbating water’s already variable nature.117  
Water stress results from an imbalance between water use and renewal of the 
water cycle, which may be due to water variability.118 Both quantity and 
quality of water resources are affected by water stress for reasons of over 
exploitation and pollution, respectively. The WWDR3 identifies three main 
drivers of water stress: demographic, economic and social.  
2.3.1.1 Demographic Drivers  
Population growth, gender and age distribution affect availability of fresh 
water resources. 119 It is predicted that in the next 25 years, the population in 
Latin America and the Caribbean will increase by 50 per cent, while doubling 
in Africa and Asia.120 It is further forecasted that by 2100, half of the global 
population will be concentrated in Sub-Saharan Africa and South Asia.121 Age 
distribution also constitutes an emergent concern. Life expectancy has 
increased, which requires greater amounts of water for health and elderly 
services. Furthermore, globalization and trade have an effect on young 
consumers’ habits, as consumer corporations, e.g. fashion and IT 
corporations, often target youngsters. These drivers have direct effects on 
demand and pollution of water resources. In addition, migration and 
urbanization create additional pressure on the availability of water resources 
because population concentration in urban areas pushes up demand for 
water-related services.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
117 Ibid., 68.  
118 For a notion of water stress see Chapter II, supra note 59. 
119 World Water Assessment Programme, "The United Nations World Water Development Report 
3: Water in a Changing World", 29-32. 
120 James  Winpenny, "Financing Water For All", (Report of the World Panel on Financing Water 
Infrastructure, 2003), 5. (Hereinafter Camdessus Report)   
121 World Water Assessment Programme, "The United Nations World Water Development Report 
3: Water in a Changing World", 31. 
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2.3.1.2  Economic Drivers  
Globalization and international trade in goods and services have a significant 
impact on a number of issues of global concern.122  Economic growth due to 
an increase in production of goods and services not only enlarges company 
‘footprints’,123 it also augments the consumption of energy, raw materials and 
labour and, in turn water resources. Two phenomena are worth highlighting in 
regard globalization and trade: i) the effect of biofuels on the food crisis, which 
has unforeseen consequences on land use, water consumption and fuel for 
transportation,124 and ii) production of water intensive goods and services that 
are to be transported to the home country of investors. This phenomenon is 
known as ‘virtual water’,125 and is relevant in the context of international 
investment, when assessing the movement of investment capital flows to 
locations where water availability allows for the manufacture and production 
of high water content goods and services. Investment in land for farming may 
have negative impacts on indigenous landowners as local populations are 
pushed from their land in order to allow the entry of private investors, foreign 
or national:  
It is no longer just the crops that are commodities: rather, it is the land and water for 
agriculture themselves that are increasingly becoming commoditised, increasingly 
subject to globalized rights of access. 126 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
122 Ibid., 32-36. 
123 ‘Footprints’ are defined as the measure of human demand on earth’s ecosystems. 
124 The High Level Conference on World Food Security, cautiously addressed the link between 
biofuel production and food crisis, advising further research in order to assess such 
relationship: ‘It is essential to address the challenges and opportunities posed by biofuels, in 
view of the world’s food security, energy and sustainable development needs. We are convinced 
that in-depth studies are necessary to ensure that production and use of biofuels is sustainable 
in accordance with the three pillars of sustainable development and takes into account the need 
to achieve and maintain global food security’. See the Declaration of the High-Level Conference 
on World Food Security: The Challenges of Climate Change and Bioenergy, ed. FAO, WFP, and 
IFAD (RomeJune 5 2008), article 7(f).  
On the other hand, however, the World Economic Forum warns that the production of biofuels 
posts high risks for water resources with the potential to ‘consume between 20-100% of the 
total quantity of water now used worldwide for agriculture’; such situation according to the 
Forum constitutes an unsustainable trade-off. See World Economic Forum, "Global Risks 2011. 
Sixth Edition. An initiative of the Risk Response Network", 31.  
125 ‘Countries with more water are able to trade water-intensive goods for export. Water 
embedded in traded crops has been termed ‘virtual water’. Virtual water trade has been 
suggested as a way to alleviate water shortages’. See Orr, Cartwright and Tickner, 
"Understanding water risks A primer on the consequences of water scarcity for government and 
business", 18. 
126 Smaller and Mann, "A Thirst for Distant Lands: Foreign investment in agricultural land and 
water", 7. 
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Water demand for economic development may also give rise to competition for 
the resource amongst economic sectors, such as industry, mining, energy 
generation, etc. In addition, such competition can exacerbate the relationship 
between local users and foreign investors. 
 
2.3.1.3  Social Drivers  
Social drivers127 relating to water resources are linked to poverty, education, 
social values and lifestyle. Poverty and education are intimately related to 
people’s lack of choices and knowledge about adequate use and management 
of water resources. People in poor regions use - and sometimes abuse - 
natural resources with the intent to survive in the short-run. Understandably 
populations with imminent needs do not necessarily pay attention to 
environmental sustainability and the needs of future generations. Therefore, 
depletion of inland aquifers and inadequate sanitation services contribute to 
an accelerated pollution of water resources. Education is consequently a key 
answer for poverty alleviation and in turn for better management of water 
resources. Governments focusing on the social pillar of sustainable 
development often face trade-offs to the other two pillars (economic and 
environment) because, as the WWDR3 suggests, some level of economic 
development is desirable before environmental concerns can be tackled.128  
Cultural values and lifestyle also constitute social drivers and are linked to 
age distribution, as mentioned above. The former determines people’s views 
toward the environment and the role such views play in sustaining it; lifestyle 
is increasingly linked to the roles people desire and the place they achieve 
within their society. Changes in lifestyle are largely linked to the globalization 
of information and economic growth. For instance, rising incomes have an 
impact on China’s consumption of meat, which has grown from 20 kilograms 
per person per year in 1985 to 50 kilograms in 2000 and it is expected to grow 
further to 85 kilograms by 2030.129  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 World Water Assessment Programme, "The United Nations World Water Development Report 
3: Water in a Changing World", 36-39. 
128 Ibid., 37. 
129 James Keeley, “Global dimensions of China’s food production and consumption”, presentation 
at Overseas Development Institute Public Event: Can China continue feeding itself? Climate 
change, water stress and the global food system, 9 October 2008. 
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The drivers for water stress are likely to exacerbate competition for the 
resource in the near future. The measures necessary to prevent and to settle 
water conflicts are far from being identified and tested. In this vein, it is 
important to consider that legal issues related to water are not always dealt 
with by water and environmental lawyers. Water resources are central to most 
human and economic activities, and are therefore potentially subject matter of 
disputes outside the realm of water law. It is likely that trade and investment 
dispute resolution mechanisms may be confronted with water related 
disputes. 
 
2.3.2 Drinking Water Supply and Access to Water 
Before addressing water supply (also referred to in this work as water services, 
two clarifications need to be made: i) drinking water supply is relevant in the 
context of international investment arbitration because there have been 
various high profile investment disputes over the provision of water services. 
In this regard, the relationship between water services and investment 
protection illustrates people’s sensitivities and the intense scrutiny around 
water for human consumption, ii) it is also important to state that water 
services regulation is outside the scope of this work and its analysis is limited 
to the use of water resources for human consumption in relation to other uses 
of water resources. Therefore, this work does not deal with the economic 
regulation of water supply, subsidies for the poor, or expansion of the network 
to reach under-served areas.      
The issue of drinking water supply has been addressed in the context of 
Section 2.2.4 (Social Perspective). Water services have been at the core of 
debates regarding the human right to water, as well as the private/public 
provision of water services. Discussions in such contexts have had an 
important effect on the way consumers, governments, corporations, and NGOs 
perceive the provision of water services.  
Water supply and sanitation constitute an integral component of water 
resources management and their provision is part of the overall allocation of 
water resources. Water demand for human consumption amounts to ten per 
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cent of the total demand for water,130 and its supply has priority over other 
demands.131  
At the core of the challenges linked to water supply was the reduction by half 
of the population without access to safe and adequate water. This goal was 
achieved in 2010, with some 780 million people still to access safe drinking 
water,132 with the UN General Assembly recognising the status of access to 
safe drinking water as a human right: 
[The GA] calls upon States and international organizations to provide financial 
resources, capacity-building and technology transfer, through international 
assistance and cooperation, in particular to developing countries, in order to 
scale up efforts to provide safe, clean, accessible and affordable drinking water 
and sanitation for all.133 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
130 In contrast, agriculture demands 70 per cent and industry and energy, together, 20 per cent 
of the total demand. See World Water Assessment Programme, "The United Nations World Water 
Development Report 3: Water in a Changing World," 99. 
131 Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, “General Comment No. 15: The Right to 
Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant)”, adopted at the Twenty-ninth Session of the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, on 20 January 2003 (Contained in Document 
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Water resources for human consumption could be affected under the Eminent Domain, when 
water is needed for municipal purposes See Article § 11.033 of the 2005 Texas Water Code, 
Chapter 11, sub-chapter A General Provisions. The Peruvian Water Act (Ley N° 29338 of 31 de 
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on 8 June 2012 (Ley Nacional de Aguas) gives priority to domestic use and public use (Article 13 
BIS 4, 14 BIS 5 XXII).  
132 In March 2012 the World Health Organisation reported that MDG to reduce by half the 
amount of people without access to safe drinking water had been met: ‘The report, Progress on 
Drinking Water and Sanitation 2012, by the WHO/UNICEF Joint Monitoring Programme for 
Water Supply and Sanitation, says at the end of 2010 89% of the world’s population, or 6.1 
billion people, used improved drinking water sources. This is one per cent more than the 88% 
MDG target. The report estimates that by 2015 92% of the global population will have access to 
improved drinking water.’ See World Health Organisation, Media Centre, ‘Millennium 
Development Goal drinking water target met’, March 6, 2012, Geneva, New York. Available at:  
http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2012/drinking_water_20120306/en/ last 
visited September 10, 2012. See also Chapter II, supra notes 50 and 51. 
In contrast, the goal of providing sanitation to the world’s population is behind target. As to 
2012 still 2.5 billion people lack access to improved sanitation. See World Health Organisation, 
Media Centre, ‘Millennium Development Goal drinking water target met’, March 6, 2012, Geneva, 
New York. Available at:http://www.who.int/mediacentre/news/releases/2012/drinking_water_ 
20120306/en/, last visited September 10, 2012 
133 See Chapter II supra note 56. (GA, A/RES/64/292).  
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The Camdessus Report estimate that in 2003 the financing of water services in 
developing countries amounted to USD 13 billion a year and that an 
additional USD ten billion would be required to meet the 2015 MDGs, by 
means ‘basic standards of service and technology’. 134  Challenges to the 
financing of drinking water and sanitation are not only faced by developing 
countries. While populations in developed countries do have access to water 
and sanitation, in the context of investment, developed countries face 
challenges linked to rehabilitation, maintenance and compliance with 
increasingly strict health and environmental regulations of existing 
infrastructure.135 The OECD reports that France and the United Kingdom (UK) 
may require 20 per cent increase in water expenditure, as a share of their 
gross domestic product (GDP), in order to maintain current levels in water 
services.136 In the case of South Korea and Japan this increase would be 40 
per cent. 137  The challenges for countries which have already reached 
significant levels of development with regard to access to water and sanitation 
is, therefore, not less intimidating than that of developing countries. This 
means not only increased water consumption, it also means higher pollution 
linked to sewage. In turn, sewage treatment (waterborne waste) requires 
further water resources and energy to operate sewerage systems.  
In the past, Governments resorted to private sector participation with the aim 
of improving water management and infrastructure. Such participation was 
deemed necessary to avoid alleged inefficiencies entrenched in the provision of 
public services by governmental agencies, and overcome the lack of 
investment capital to expand water infrastructure and reach a wider sector of 
the population.138 Private sector participation, however, has not always been 
successful and in some cases, has turned into disputes between operators and 
governments. Bechtel in Bolivia,139 Biwater Gauff in Tanzania,140 and Azurix, 
Vivendi and others in Argentina141 are examples of water supply projects that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
134 Winpenny, "Financing Water For All", 3. 
135 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Managing Water for All: An 
OECD Perspective on Pricing and Financing. Key Messages for Policy Makers", (Paris: OECD, 
2009), 7. 
136 Ibid. 
137 Ibid. Data regarding Japan does not include current demands due to the earthquake.  
138 Ibid., 10. 
139 See Section 2.5.1.1 for the case of Aguas del Tunari S.A. v Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/02/3.  
140 See Section 2.5.1.2 for the case of Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v United Republic of 
Tanzania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22.  
141  See Section 2.5.1.3 for the case of Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi 
Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3. 
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failed due to a combination of political, social and economic variables, which 
in the context of foreign investment are exacerbated by the negative perception 
that the population already has towards the idea of transnational corporations 
providing national public services.142 There is a connection between the failure 
of water services projects, the unique nature of water (as in its physical, 
economic and social components) and the entitlement people feel towards 
water to meet basic human needs. This connection is linked to the social 
aspect of water resources, which resists approaching water as an economic 
good, because it is essential for human life. In any case, the participation of 
foreign investment remains limited and closely scrutinised by the civil society. 
By 2008 private investment in water supply amounted to around 11 per cent 
of total capital investment,143 which is not all of foreign origin. Indeed, the 
OECD reports that during the 1990s, five international companies were 
granted 53 per cent of the relevant contracts for water related projects in 
developing countries.144 In contrast, by 2000 the number of such companies 
acquiring new contracts had dropped to 23 per cent.145 Furthermore, it seems 
unlikely that there will be many new large water services projects that involve 
significant flow of foreign direct investment, such as divesture or 
concessions. 146 Currently, the World Bank Private Participation and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 Mann, "Who Owns “Your” Water? Reclaiming Water as a Public Good under International 
Trade and Investment Law", 3. See also with respect to privatisation processes in water services 
Susan Spronk and Carlos Crespo, "Water, National Sovereignty and Social Resistance: Bilateral 
Investment Treaties and the Struggles against Multinational Water Companies in Cochabamba 
and El Alto, Bolivia" Law, Social Justice & Global Development (LGD) 1(2008); Maria  Sánchez-
Moreno and Tracy MacFarland Higgins, "No Recourse: Transnational corporations and the 
Protection of economic, social, and cultural rights in Bolivia" Fordham International Law Journal 
27, no. 5 (2004); O'Neill, "Water and Freedom: The Privatization of Water and its Implications for 
Democracy and Human Rights in the Developing World." 
143David Lloyd  Owen, Pinsent Masons Water Yearbook 2007 - 2008  (London: Pinsent Masons, 
2007), 27. 
144 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Managing Water for All: An 
OECD Perspective on Pricing and Financing. Key Messages for Policy Makers", 11. 
145 Ibid. 
146  The terms for private involvement, public-private partnership involvement and public 
involvement in the provision of water services and sewerage are diverse and sometimes allow for 
different meanings. While the provision of water services is outside the scope of this work, for 
the purpose of clarity it is useful to mention some of these terms. From high to low degrees of 
private involvement in the provision of water services (drinking water supply and sewerage): 
divesture, followed by concession, lease contracts, affermage and management, franchising and 
O&M contracts. Public-private partnerships from high to low involvement can be found under: 
build operate and transfer (BOT), built own operate transfer (BOOT), build own operate (BOO), 
among the most common ones, as well as joint venture, services, corporatisation and 
performance contracts. Finally public involvement is undertaken under cooperative and 
municipal or provincial authorities. See Jeffrey Delmon, "Understanding Options for Public-
Private Partnerships in Infrastructure Sorting out the forest from the trees: BOT, DBFO, DCMF, 
concession, lease…", (Washington: Finance Economics & Urban Department Finance and 
Guarantees Unit - World Bank, 2010), 12. 
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Infrastructure Database shows more projects relating to water treatment 
plants and fewer projects relating to the supply of water. Likewise, while there 
is private participation, it does not necessarily come from foreign investors, 
but rather from private national investors.147 Therefore, there appears to be a 
transformation of private participation in water supply due to new forms of 
public private partnerships (PPPs) 148  that seek to eliminate political and 
regulatory risks through shorter agreements and lower levels of investment 
and involvement, such as lease and management contracts.149 Past conflicts 
and new trends in water-related projects with private investment involvement 
seem to reflect the high sensitivity over water supply, which is linked to water 
as a human right:  
people think of water resources as public property. They feel entitled to water. 
They have an opinion about it. Because they drink it and know that life isn't 
possible without it, they can get emotional about water.150  
Decision-making in the water sector entails a high degree of public 
involvement – formal and informal – which needs to be properly channelled by 
governments through democratic processes. 
This thesis does not adopt a position as to whether the private or public 
sectors should provide water services. However, it observes that the highly 
social component in water resources and the feeling of entitlement people 
share towards water, exacerbate the relationship between consumers and 
providers. Rarely have governments been responsible for the failure of water 
projects in the eyes of the population; it is corporations that seem to bear the 
political and social risks of water services projects. Indeed, this hypothesis 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
147 By the end of 2011 the World Bank reports 31 water related projects, from which 25 took 
place in China, with 6 projects undertaken totally or partially by foreign investors. Latin 
America records four projects, of which two were totally or partially undertaken by foreign 
investors (under BOT), but directly supplying water services. The last two took place in the 
Middle East, in both cases undertaken by foreign investor; however, only under management 
and lease contract for water treatment plants. See The World Bank, ‘Private Participation in 
Infrastructure Database’, PPI Data update note 76, (Washington: September 2012), 4-8. 
Available at: http://ppi.worldbank.org/features/September2012/Water%20Note%20%20 
Final%202011.pdf, last visited 4 February 2013 
148 Marin points out that numerous public-private partnerships increasingly avoid private 
ownership of the infrastructure, which implies less risk for the private operator. See Philippe 
Marin, "Public-Private Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities A Review of Experiences in 
Developing Countries", (Washington: World Bank, 2009), 8. 
149 Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, "Managing Water for All: An 
OECD Perspective on Pricing and Financing. Key Messages for Policy Makers", 11. 
150 See Ronald Griffin, Water Resources Economics. The Analysis of Scarcity, Policies and Projects: 
Ch.2, 2. 
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appears to be reflected in the decrease of private involvement in the provision 
of water services or the change of such an involvement towards less visible 
participation. These aspects are relevant in the context of international 
investment law, and may illustrate potential conflicts around water services, 
which are linked to management of water resources. 
 
2.4  Water Governance: Ownership, Management and Regulation 
The previous sections’ purpose was to assert the especial nature of water 
resources, based on a combination of physical, social and economic 
characteristics. This Section seeks to illustrate that such special nature of 
water resources has played a pivotal role in the way States designed their 
ownership and allocation systems, which is quite different from the systems of 
ownership and allocation of other natural resources.  
Addressing governance in water requires a two-fold consideration. Firstly, 
water governance at the international level, and secondly, water governance at 
the local or national level. This Section addresses both levels in the context of 
the special nature of water resources and the particular types of ownership 
and regulation. Water governance within the international context (first 
subsection) serves as an umbrella of commonly identified challenges and 
proposed actions to be implemented by States at the national level. In this 
vein, Section 2.4.1 makes a brief historical reference to water resources 
management in the international context, linking its implementation in 
domestic law. Subsequently, Section 2.4.2 addresses water governance from a 
national law perspective. This Section considers the need for a holistic 
approach to water management, which has given rise to IWRM. Furthermore, 
climate change and increasing hydrological variability are briefly discussed.  
This work uses the term ‘regulation’ in a broad sense, thus it refers to laws, 
decrees, administrative acts and any other decision adopted by the host State, 
which may affect the interests of a foreign investor. Regulations can be 
adopted by governmental institutions at all levels i.e. parliaments, ministries, 
national and local.     
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2.4.1 Global Governance of Water Resources   
This section revisits some of the most relevant documents adopted by the 
international community in the area of water management and the protection 
of the environment.151 There is also increasing consensus on the need to 
address and prevent the effects of an acute water crisis and its connection 
with food and energy crises.152 This means that allocation and reallocation of 
water resources, to meet new and larger demands, into line with national 
policies. This will require special attention to the regulatory prerogatives of 
States, as well as greater levels of adaptive management. In this context, the 
notion of governance acquires greater relevance. 
In 1997 the UN Development Programme (UNDP) Report defined governance in 
the following terms:  
Governance can be seen as the exercise of economic, political and 
administrative authority to manage a country's affairs at all levels. It comprises 
the mechanisms, processes and institutions through which citizens and groups 
articulate their interests, exercise their legal rights, meet their obligations and 
mediate their differences.153 
On the basis of the former definition the Global Water Partnership (GWP) built 
a definition of water governance as a: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
151 For a general discussion on fairness and legitimacy of global or international governance and 
institutions, and the discussion on the legitimacy of this regime, see primarily Thomas M. 
Franck, Fairness in International Law and Institutions  (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1995); 
Daniel Bodansky, "The Legitimacy of International Governance: A Coming Challenge for 
International Environmental Law?" American Journal of International Law 93(1999). For another 
critic on the effectiveness of governance of water at the international level, referred to by the 
author as expert networks, see Conca, Governing water: Contentious transnational politics and 
global institution building.  
152  United Nations Development Programme, "Human Development Report 2010. 20th 
Anniversary Edition. The Real Wealth of Nations: Pathways to Human Development"; World 
Economic Forum, "Global Risks 2011. Sixth Edition. An initiative of the Risk Response 
Network"; World Water Assessment Programme, "The United Nations World Water Development 
Report 3: Water in a Changing World"; Wouters, Vinogradov, and Magsig, "Water Security, 
Hydrosolidarity, and International Law: A River Runs Through It". 
153 United National Development Programme (UNDP), “Good governance - and sustainable 
human development”, Governance for sustainable human development A UNDP policy 
document, (New York: United Nations, 1997), available at http://mirror.undp.org/ 
magnet/policy/chapter1.htm#b, last visited May 10, 2011.   
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range of political, social, economic and administrative systems that are in place 
to develop and manage water resources, and the delivery of water services, at 
different levels of society.154   
Rogers and Hall stress that governance is not defined in a single manner, 
conversely it considers various approaches (such as accountability, 
democracy, human rights, among others) to the way in which ‘allocative and 
regulatory politics’ play a role in the management of water resources, from a 
natural, social and economic perspectives.155 This last element is of special 
interest to this work given that allocation of water resources implies 
competition among users whose interaction may also be affected by, or will 
affect, governments’ strategies and policies.  
Declarations, conferences, summits and forums have taken place over the last 
40 years: some under the auspices of the UN and some as multi-stakeholder 
forums e.g. World Water Forums and non-UN meetings e.g. the International 
Conference on Freshwaters held in Bonn and the Dublin Conference which 
has given rise to the Principles contained in the Dublin Statement.156  
The UN Conference on the Human Environment - held in Stockholm in 1972 - 
declared water as one of those representative samples of natural ecosystems 
that must be ‘safeguarded for the benefit of present and future generations 
through careful planning or management’. 157  In 1977, the UN held a 
Conference on Water, in Mar del Plata, Argentina. This conference was the 
first of its kind, and its main objective was to promote greater awareness on 
the problems regarding water resources at the national as well as 
international levels. It recommended the implementation of systemic water 
resources assessments, as well as collaboration amongst governments to 
tackle the challenge of assessing water resources. The conference also 
recognised the right of access to water by all human beings. 158  The 
International Drinking Water Supply and Sanitation Decade 1981-1990, 
launched by the UN, and the Global Consultation on Safe Water and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
154 Peter Rogers and Alan W. Hall, "Effective Water Governance", (Stockholm: Global Water 
Partnership. Technical Committee (TEC), 2003), 7. 
155 Ibid. 
156  See Joseph Dellapenna and Joyeeta Gupta, "Toward Global Law on Water" Global 
Governance 14(2008), 6. 
157 United Nations Conference on the Human Environment, "Report of the United Nations 
Conference on the Human Environment, Stockholm, 5-16 June, 1972", (New York, 1973), 
Principle 2. 
158 United Nations, "Report of the United Nations Water Conference: Mar del Plata, 14-25 March 
1977", (New York, Sales No. E.77.II.A.12 and corrigendum, 1977). 
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Sanitation in 1990, organised by the UNDP in New Delhi, focused on water 
supply and sanitation. The New Delhi meeting embraced the following 
principle for water supply: ‘some for all rather than more for some.’ The 
statement also included guiding principles for the protection of the 
environment ‘through integrated management of water resources’.159   
In 1992, five hundred participants - among which were government 
designated experts and representatives of intergovernmental and non-
governmental organizations – attended the International Conference on Water 
and the Environment in Dublin, Ireland. 160  The outcome, known as the 
‘Dublin Statement’, proposed four general guiding principles for the 
management of water resources:  
i) fresh water is a finite and vulnerable resource, essential to 
sustain life, development and the environment; 
ii) water development and management should be based on a 
participatory approach, involving users, planners and policy-
makers at all levels; 
iii) women play a central part in the provision, management and 
safeguarding of water; and 
iv) water has an economic value in all its competing uses and 
should be recognised as an economic good.161 
The ‘Dublin Statement’ informed the recommendations embedded in Chapter 
18 (Protection of the Quality and Supply of Freshwater Resources: Application 
of Integrated Approaches to the Development, Management and Use of Water 
Resources) of ‘Agenda 21’, adopted at the UN Conference on Environment and 
Development (UNCED) in Brazil – 1992.162 These conferences promoted the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 See United Nations: General Assembly, "Proclaming of the International Drinking Water 
Supply and Sanitation Decade, Resolution 35/18. 55th Plenary Meeting", (New York, 10 
November 1980). See also United Nations Development Programme, "Global consultation on 
safe water and sanitation for the 1990s: 10-14 September 1990, New Delhi, India", (New York, 
1990), Guiding Principles and Principle 1. 
160 Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, Dublin, Ireland, 31 January 1992. 
In this meeting “The Conference participants call for fundamental new approaches to the 
assessment, development and management of freshwater resources, which can only be brought 
about through political commitment and involvement from the highest levels of government to 
the smallest communities”. 
161 Dublin Statement on Water and Sustainable Development, Dublin, Ireland, 31 January 1992. 
162 United Nations Conference on Environment Development, "United Nations Conference on 
Environment and Development : Rio de Janeiro, 3-14 June 1992: item 9 of the provisional 
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need for an integrated approach to water resources management, whereby 
governments assess the various uses of water. They also recognised the 
disadvantages of a fragmented institutional approach to the management of 
water resources.163 In order to overcome these disadvantages and achieve 
sustainability of water resources and services, the Conference suggested that 
governments could cooperate in adopting the principles of IWRM, in order to 
progressively meet targets by 2000 and 2025.164 States were encouraged to 
adopt various possible activities in order to enhance their IWRM programmes, 
amongst which were to assess: i) their quantities of water resources, ii) natural 
disasters risk assessment, as well the link to the environment and society, iii) 
assessment of the various types of interrelation of freshwater bodies, on the 
surface and underground, taking into account issues of quality and quantity, 
and iv) conservation of water resources by means of adoption of water-
efficient-use programmes.165 
Subsequently, in 2001, the International Conference on Freshwaters 
recognised that water is key for sustainable development, within its economic, 
social and environmental dimensions. The document titled ‘Recommendation 
for Action’ discussed the impact and benefits of the principles of IWRM, in the 
light of sustainable development, the needs of poor people, and the promotion 
of decentralization.166 The Conference also addressed the important issue of 
management of risks to cope with variability and climate change:  
Decision-making mechanisms under uncertainty should ensure flexibility to 
respond to both rapid onset disasters and long term changes to water resources. 
Risk management should be an integral part of water resources management. 
This should include establishing close co-ordination beyond the water sector.167  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
aganda: adoption of agreements on environment and development: Agenda 21", (New York, 
1992). 
163  The subsection Basis for Action of CH 18, Agenda 21 states: “The fragmentation of 
responsibilities for water resources development among sectoral agencies is proving, however, to 
be an even greater impediment to promoting integrated water management than had been 
anticipated. Effective implementation and coordination mechanisms are required”. See ibid., 
para. 18.6. 
164  By 2000 “(i) To have designed and initiated coasted and targeted national action 
programmes, and have put in place appropriate institutional structures and legal instruments;  
(ii) To have established efficient water-use programmes to attain sustainable resource utilization 
patterns”. By 2025 “(i) To have achieved subsectoral targets of all freshwater programme areas”. 
See ibid., para. 18.11. 
165 Ibid., para. 18.12. 
166 International Conference on Freshwater, "Bonn Recomendations for Action", (Bonn, 3-7 
December, 2001). See specially Actions in the Field of Governance. 
167 Ibid., Actions in the Field of Governance, point 9.  
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This statement appears to acknowledge the increasing unpredictability of 
water resources and the effects of climate change, asserting the need for 
flexibility within the decision-making processes. The 2002 World Summit on 
Sustainable Development, held in Johannesburg, recognised a need for more 
accountable and effective multilateral and international institutions.168 The 
Summit proposed several actions to tackle the effects of climate change, 
climate variability and disaster prevention. In 2012 UN Water through the 
United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP) presented the status of 
implementation of the IWRM principles, which was launched at the UN Rio+20 
Summit. The report is optimistic regarding the results observed in the 
implementation of the IWRM principles. Eighty per cent of countries have 
embarked in the adoption of the IWRM principles169, 133 countries were 
responsive to the survey launched by UN Water showing different levels of 
implementation.170 
Another instance of water governance has taken place through the World 
Water Forums, every three years.171 While each forum focuses on specific 
themes, they all promote multi-stakeholder participation and discussion, 
through the organisation of thematic meetings, related to water management, 
water services, governance issues, economic regulation of services, access to 
water for the poorest and financing, amongst others. As argued above, the 
shaping of global policy, has not only been the effort of national governments 
and international institutions, it has also been the work of various 
stakeholders and non-governmental organisations and/or ‘expert networks’, 
such as the GWP, World Water Council, Worldwide Fund for Nature, among 
others.172  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
168 United Nations. World Summit Sustainable Development, "Report of the World Summit on 
Sustainable Development Johannesburg, South Africa, 26 August- 4 September, 2002. 
A/CONF.199/20", (Johannesburg, 2002), 4, para. 31. 
169  (UNWater) United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), "Status Report on the 
Application of Integrated Approaches to Water Resources Management", (Nairobi, Kenya: UNEP, 
GWP, SIWI, UNDP, UNEP-DHI Centre for Water and Environment, 2012), iv. 
170 Ibid. Chapter IV addresses the status of implementation of IWRM principles in the context of 
broader discussion of property rights under international investment law. This discussion is 
relevant in the context of investment arbitration as it assess the likelihood of changes in 
legislation that could affect current water rights, especially of foreign investors. See Chapter IV, 
Section 4.3.1, footnote 14, 16-17.  
171 The first Forum took place in Morocco in 1997, followed by the Netherlands 2000, Japan 
2003, Mexico 2006, Istanbul 2009 and Marseille 2012. 
172 As referred to by Conca in his analysis of global networks and water governance. See Conca, 
Governing water: Contentious transnational politics and global institution building.  
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Despite the importance of water resources, the adoption of harmonised rules 
and cooperation to protect fresh water resources, at the international level, 
appears to be a challenge. One possible reason may be underpinned by the 
sovereignty of States and resistance to give up some of this sovereignty.173 On 
the other hand, it has been suggested that an ‘epistemic community’ among 
experts in the area of fresh water resources may be still in an early stage.174 
Nonetheless, states have taken steps forward in the adoption of integrated 
management policies, which shows that these conferences have served as a 
global community framework for the governance of water resources.175 The 
extent to which such declarations and conferences have shaped regulatory 
frameworks at the national level remains to be evaluated within each national 
legal system, on a case-by-case basis.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
173 Note for example that the UN Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Watercourses (the UN Watercourses Convention) adopted in 1997 has not yet 
entered into force, as it awaits ratification, approval or accession of five States (by June 2013). 
Article 36 of the Convention provides: ‘1. The present Convention shall enter into force on the 
ninetieth day following the date of deposit of the thirty-fifth instrument of ratification, 
acceptance, approval or accession with the Secretary-General of the United Nations.’ 
http://treaties.un.org/Pages/ViewDetails.aspx?src=TREATY&mtdsg_no=XXVII-
12&chapter=27&lang=en, last visited July 20, 2013.  
In this vein, Chapter III addresses the issue of sovereignty in the context of the Police Power of 
States. See also Chapter III, Section 3.2. 
174 Dellapena and Gupta comparing water governance communities with other environmental 
communities such as climate change, note that: ‘Water lawyers are not yet integrated into the 
nascent epistemic community on water management, and as such there is little integration of 
policy ideas between these communities’. Dellapenna and Gupta, "Toward Global Law on 
Water", 450.   
Note for instance that despite the fact that water is admittedly one of the most important 
vehicles of the effects of climate change, it has been difficult to include it within the negotiations 
on adaptation to climate change. See for instance the speech of Pasquale Steduto: “Let me be 
very clear. There is no development without water. There is no food security without water. 
There is most likely also no energy security without water. Water is the primary medium 
through which climate change influences the Earth's ecosystems and therefore people's 
livelihoods and well-being. If water is not further recognized in adaptation strategies and plans, 
we are making a big mistake.” Pasquale Steduto, Chair, UN-Water and Service Chief, FAO 
Global Water Partnership, “Water evaporates from the climate change negotiating text”, Press 
Release, November 3, 2009. In addition, the GWP asserts: ‘[T]he latest iteration of the 
negotiating text on adaptation, the so-called Non-Paper 31, has deleted any clear references to 
water and its management as a vital consideration for climate change adaptation’. 
175 See Dellapenna and Gupta, "Toward Global Law on Water", 6. On the assessment of global 
water conferences and water initiatives See: Robert G. Varady and Matthew Iles-Shih, "Global 
Water Initiatives: What Do the Experts Think? Report on a Survey of Leading Figures in the 
World of Water," in Workshop on Impacts of Megaconferences on Global Water Development and 
Management (Bangkok Third World Centre for Water Management (Mexico) with support from 
the Sasakawa Peace Foundation (USA and Japan), January 29-30, 2005). Peter H.  Gleick and 
Jon Lane, "Large International Water Meetings: Time for a Reappraisal" Water International 30, 
no. 3 (2005). Asit K.  Biswas and Cecilia Tortajada, Impacts of Megaconferences on the Water 
Sector  (Berlin: Springer, 2009). 
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The relevant inquiry, in the context of this work, is whether these emerging 
principles, which appear to be widely influential in the implementation of 
management practices, could have an effect in the approach of international 
investment tribunals to water rights or water entitlements granted to foreign 
investors. This potential encounter of water governance and international 
investment law reflects on the question of whether these non-binding 
declarations and action plans, increasingly incorporated in the national legal 
systems of states, could shape such water rights by reflecting water’s 
precarious nature, in light of hydrological variability and uncertainty. This 
issue will be addressed in the next chapters.   
 
2.4.2 Water Resources Management: The National Law Dimension 
This section will address the management of water resources from the 
perspective of the holistic approach promoted by several international 
conferences and meetings,176 in the national context. The integrated approach 
to management informs the regulatory frameworks for the allocation and 
eventual reallocation of water resources.  
One aim of this work is to address the extent of regulatory flexibility of host 
States in the context of international investment disputes, by developing a 
framework of analysis that distinguishes a legitimate regulation from an 
indirect expropriation. This Section should provide some insights to 
understand the relationship between water management and regulatory 
activity in the domestic law of the host State, which will in turn inform one 
criterion in the framework proposed in Chapter IV. 
This work follows the approach of several international organisations, 
academics and water professionals, on the need for a holistic approach to 
water management, reflecting on the special nature of the resource.177 It 
observes the traditional regulation of water resources and its evolution and 
continuous development in response to increased and more diversified needs. 
This might explain why the regulation of water resources is different in nature 
from the regulation of land and other types of property. This distinction is of 
relevance for the next chapters, which will address disputes arising out of 
foreign investment in the provision of water services, and potential investment 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 See Section 2.4.1 
177 See Section 2.4.1. 
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disputes arising out of water resources management, where diverse regulatory 
measures will be assessed by investment tribunals. In such cases water is the 
common denominator. The question that arises relates to whether the alleged 
curtailment of property rights, by a regulatory measure, should be considered 
under a different approach.  
 
2.4.2.1 Towards an Integrated Water Management Approach  
Under an ‘umbrella’ of international declarations and action plans,178 States 
are encouraged to shape their water resources management strategies with a 
view towards environmental sustainability and universal access to drinking 
water. Each national legal system ought to take into account its own social, 
economic and cultural realities when implementing some common 
principles. 179  An integrated approach to water resources management is 
probably the most common policy tool that has been devised for this 
purpose. 180  One definition of IWRM that aims at providing a common 
framework for implementation states:  
IWRM is a process which promotes the co-ordinated development and 
management of water, land and related resources, in order to maximize the 
resultant economic and social welfare in an equitable manner without 
compromising the sustainability of vital ecosystems.181   
The definition of IWRM incorporates the three contextual aspects under which 
water resources have been analysed in this thesis, namely environmental, 
economic and social. 182  As such, the allocation of water resources requires 
adequate consideration of the synergies among these three aspects. IWRM 
aims at assisting to manage the availability of water for different users and 
activities that share common sources of water.183 A growing number of States 
are adopting this integrated approach to water management, and are 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 See Section 2.4.1. 
179 Salman M.A. Salman and Daniel D. Bradlow, Regulatory Frameworks for Water Resources 
Management: A Comparative Study  (Washington: The World Bank, 2006), 11. 
180 Muhammad  Rahaman Mizanur and Olli  Varis, "Integrated water resources management: 
evolution, prospects and future challenges" Sustainability: Science, Practice, & Policy - 
http://ejournal.nbii.org 1, no. 1 (2005), 18. 
181 Global Water Partnership Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), "Integrated Water Resources 
Management", (Stockholm: Global Water Partnership (GWP), 2000), 22. 
182 See Sections 2.2.2, 2.2.3 and 2.2.4. 
183 The GWP identifies as one important challenge ahead ‘To strike a balance between the use of 
the resources as a basis for the livelihood of the world’s increasing population and the 
protection and conservation of the resource to sustain its functions and characteristics’. See 
Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), "Integrated Water Resources Management", 12. 
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implementing IWRM principles - within their regulatory traditions - in different 
fashions, for instance: i) by embracing the participation of competing users 
and stakeholders,184 ii) by aiming to strike a balance between conservation 
and water use,185 iii) by using incentives in order to achieve efficient use of 
water resources, 186  and iv) by building institutional capacity for water 
management.187 These are some examples of cases where States have taken 
one or more steps in implementing the principles of IWRM.188  
There is broad consensus that IWRM should be implemented at the local level. 
Two strategies are considered for this: i) the traditional top-down strategy for 
policy implementation, and ii) a bottom-up strategy, which allows for the 
actual water-demand to drive the processes of management and allocation.189 
The International Conference on Freshwaters recommended the 
implementation of water ‘management at the lowest appropriate level’, 
specifically local governments, community organisations, and perhaps any 
group of stakeholders capable to manage some level of decision-making.190 The 
bottom-up participation in the decision-making process has the advantage of 
informing national water policies and regulation by taking into account the 
needs of large and small consumers from different sectors and geographical 
points. While this is a positive step in terms of democratic and legitimacy 
perspectives, it may also lead to disagreements among stakeholders (e.g. 
central and regional governments, economic sectors or activities, communities 
upstream and downstream). After all, there are key interests at stake that may 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
184 See for instance the case study of Zambia: ‘Zambia: Integrated Water Resources Management 
and Water Efficiency (IWRM/WE) planning process’, Global Water Partnership (GWP), ToolBox. 
Available at http://www.gwptoolbox.org/index.php? option=com_case&id=223&Itemid=39, last 
visited May 12, 2011. See also the case of Peru, regarding community participation: ‘Peru: 
Participatory regional development planning in municipality of Cajamarca’, Global Water 
Partnership (GWP), ToolBox. Available at: http://www.gwptoolbox.org/index.php? 
option=com_case&id=56&Itemid=43, last visited May 12, 2011.   
185 See as an example the case study from Indonesia: Indonesia: ‘Indonesia's water resources 
policy reform process’, Global Water Partnership (GWP), Toolbox. Available at: 
http://www.gwptoolbox.org/index.php?option=com_case&id=118, last visited May 12, 2011. 
186 See for instance the case study of Tunisia: ‘Tunisia: Reform of irrigation policy and water 
conservation’, Global Water Partnership (GWP), Toolbox. Available at 
http://www.gwptoolbox.org/index.php?option=com_case&id=17, last visited May 12, 2011 
187 See the case of Brazil: ‘Brazil: The establishment of the National Water Agency’, Global Water 
Partnership (GWP), Toolbox. Available at: http://www.gwptoolbox.org/index.php? 
option=com_case&id=274&Itemid=43, last visited May 12, 2011. See also the case of Colombia: 
‘Colombia: Building institutional coordination for water resources management’, Global Water 
Partnership (GWP), Toolbox. Available at: http://www.gwptoolbox.org/ 
index.php?option=com_case&id=64&Itemid=43, last visited May 12, 2011. 
188 On the developments of IWRM implementation see Rio+20 Summit in Section 2.4.1.  
189 Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), "Integrated Water Resources Management", 46. 
190 International Conference on Freshwater, "Bonn Recomendations for Action", Actions in the 
Field of Governance, Point 11. 
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try to influence the process of water allocation, thus exacerbating an 
appropriate and balanced apportion of water resources. In addition, 
disagreements of this kind may, in turn, have negative effects on the overall 
adoption of water policies, regulations and administrative decisions.191  
In order to secure legal frameworks, the World Bank observed that while 
governments have mechanisms for the authorization of water use, 
prioritization and allocation policies are often ignored or poorly designed. 
Moreover, non-obvious uses, such as the protection of in stream flows and 
environmental uses are integrated inadequately or not integrated at all.192 
However, changes in policy or adaptive regulation of water resources, linked to 
reallocation, could bring about high costs for the parties involved:  
Governments should clearly indicate priorities for reallocations and establish 
practical rules for handling the year-to-year variability in precipitation and 
availability of water. The rights to water need to be clearly defined, with due 
concern shown for the interests of indigenous people, the poor, and other 
disadvantaged groups.193  
Through IWRM or other holistic management tools, the prioritization, 
allocation and eventual reallocation of water rights must be adaptive, but this 
approach can give rise to potential claims of takings of property rights. The 
question of whether such an action amounts to a taking and whether it 
requires compensation will be subject of discussion in the next sections and 
especially the next chapters. In this context, IWRM resembles a ‘process’ of 
continuous assessment, adaptation and perhaps resilience, due to water 
variability. It is not the purpose of this work to propose IWRM as the 
appropriate policy tool for the management of water resources, nor is it to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
191 One such case is the privatisation process of the water services in the city of Cochabamba, 
Bolivia, where struggles between central and local governments, concluded in a poor biding 
process, which in turn led to the so-called ‘water water’ in the city of Cochabamba. The trigger 
of the social unrest was the steep raise of water tariffs imposed by the company, in turn 
approved by the regulator. See William Finnegan, ‘Letter from Bolivia. Leasing the Rain: The 
Race to Control Water Turns Violent’, (The New Yorker, April 8, 2002), 44-47. For further details 
of this example see Section 2.5.1.1.  
Another example took place in Argentina in the context of the provision of water services: The 
example of the water supply sector in Argentina illustrates a similar situation as the one 
described above: the local government of Tucuman in Argentina disagreed with the tariffs 
previously negotiated by the central government, which led to the conclusion of the concession 
contract for the provision of water services and the initiation of an international investment 
dispute against the Republic of Argentina. See J. Luis Guasch, Jean Jacques Laffont, and 
Stéphane Straub, "Concessions of infrastructure in Latin America: Government-led 
renegotiation" Journal of Applied Econometrics 22, no. 7 (2007): 1270. 
192 The World Bank, "Water Resources Management", (Washington: The World Bank, 1993), 43-
44. 
193 Ibid., 44. 
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scrutinise the implementation processes and legal frameworks related to 
IWRM. IWRM has been developed through a process of negotiations at the 
international level and it, therefore embeds common principles and actions, 
without ignoring social, economic and environmental realities of each State.  
The next subsection takes the discussion on the role of management of water 
resources one step further and addresses new challenges that may trigger 
recognition of the need for adaptability and flexibility.  
 
2.4.2.2  Concerns around Hydrological Variability and Climate 
Change: New Challenges  
As stated in the previous section, the international community envisions a 
holistic approach to the management of water resources. In doing so, it 
considers the ‘long term nature of water resources management’,194 whereby 
management and allocation of water resources has historically relied on the 
assumption of invariability and consistency of fresh water resources. 195 
Consequently, such an assumption informed national water regimes, 
consistent with traditional views of a relatively stable hydrological cycle. For 
instance, water supply in many countries relies on availability of expected 
amounts in dams and reservoirs, and any changes in the pattern of water 
sources, be it quality (e.g. temperature, level of pollution) or quantity, may 
result in an uncertainty of water supply that will negatively affect different 
users, e.g. farmers, industry, ecosystems.196  However, -as expressed above - 
additional pressures over water could challenge traditional approaches to 
water management by revealing a growing need for prediction and reaction 
mechanisms. Climate change is expected to have an effect on climate 
variability, which constitutes a global driver for water stress. Water, in turn, 
plays a critical role as a vehicle for the impacts pertaining to climate change. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 Sadoff and Muller, "Perspectives on water and climate change adaptation. Better water 
resources management – Greater resilience today, more effective adaptation tomorrow", 1, 2.  
195 According to Kundzewicz, Z.W., L.J. Mata, N.W. Arnell, P. Döll, P. Kabat, B. Jiménez, K.A. 
Miller, T. Oki, Z. Sen and I.A. Shiklomanov, 2007: Freshwater resources and their management, 
in M.L. Parry, O.F. Canziani, J.P. Palutikof, P.J. van der Linden and C.E. Hanson, eds, Climate 
Change 2007: Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability. Contribution of Working Group II to the 
Fourth Assessment Report of the Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change (Cambridge: 
Cambridge University Press, 2007) 173-210, 196. 
196 Sadoff and Muller, "Perspectives on water and climate change adaptation. Better water 
resources management – Greater resilience today, more effective adaptation tomorrow" 1, 3-4. 
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The State of the Environment Report launched by the Australian Government 
concluded:  
Climate change is an important issue for Australia. While there is debate about 
scientific predictions, it is almost universally accepted that temperatures are 
rising. The extent of rise is uncertain and continuous adaptation of 
environmental and sectoral policies, in an uncertain environment, is the key.197  
In the same vein, Hughes et al consider that despite the on-going debate with 
regard to the real impacts of climate change on the availability of water 
resources, it seems likely that the patterns of water variability will divert from 
previous and historical patterns. 198  In agreement with the above, Sadoff 
concludes that it seems reasonable to expect fierce competition among water 
users in the coming years, 199  and also to foresee that ‘past rights and 
mechanisms may no longer be viable’.200  Indeed, in the past water policy 
instruments have developed over long periods of time, but currently there 
appears to be growing need for flexible and resilient policy making that can 
evolve and change rapidly in order to respond to climate variability and other 
challenges over water resources. Demsetz proposed that ‘[c]hanges in 
knowledge result in changes in production functions, market values, and 
aspirations’.201 Consequently, there will also be a need for new and enhanced 
regulatory frameworks that take into account the high unpredictability of 
water availability: 
Systems of water rights, allocation and conflict resolution mechanisms will need 
to be put in place or strengthened to deal with these new realities. Flexible 
systems will need to be developed to respond to extremes of water availability 
and unpredictability.202  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197  The State of the Environment Report 2006, available at: http://www. 
environment.gov.au/soe/2006/publications/report/key-findings.html, last visited March 5 
2011. The latest Report on the Environment 2011, will be launched on December 31, 2011. 
198  See D. A.  Hughes and S. J. L.  Malloryb, "The importance of operating rules and 
assessments of beneficial use in water resource allocation policy and management" Water Policy 
11(2009): 732. 
199 Sadoff and Muller, "Perspectives on water and climate change adaptation. Better water 
resources management – Greater resilience today, more effective adaptation tomorrow", 734. 
200 Ibid., 11. 
201 Harold Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights" The American Economic Review 57, no. 
2 (1967), 250. 
202 See Sadoff and Muller, "Perspectives on water and climate change adaptation. Better water 
resources management – Greater resilience today, more effective adaptation tomorrow", 11. See 
also Neuman discussing the case of the western part of the United States where existing law 
regarding property in water differs from the rest of the country. Janet C. Neuman, "Adaptive 
Management: How Water Law Needs to Change" Environmental Law  Reporter, 31 no. 12 (2001). 
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The need for governments to adjust and ‘expand capacity to address existing 
regulatory vulnerabilities while anticipating and averting severe climate 
change effects’,203 constitute even a greater challenge for developing countries.  
In conclusion, the effects of climate change over water resources and 
increased hydrological variability, affects the predictability of the hydrological 
cycle with consequences on water users - specifically - in the context of 
international investment law: i) adaptive policies and more flexible regulatory 
frameworks could mean increased governmental intervention, which in turn 
may raise concerns of political as well as regulatory risk, from a foreign 
investor’s perspective, ii) increased regulatory activity tackling rapid changes 
in the water cycle – prioritisation and allocation – may affect the predictability 
of water property rights/entitlements.  
It is therefore, relevant to address the characteristics of ownership in water, 
and whether such characteristics influence the nature of property 
rights/entitlements over water resources. It is important to clarify that this 
work makes a differentiation between ownership of water resources and water 
property rights. In the context of international investment the allocation of 
water that travels in the streams, granted through permits, concession, 
licences, etc. may be protected under the ‘definition of investment’, thereby 
protected as a property right in a broad sense. Ownership of the resource, on 
the other hand, is understood as the property over water generally held by the 
State or considered as common good, under stewardship of the State.    	  
2.4.3 Ownership, Control and Allocation of Water Resources 
The uniqueness of water resources does not only lie in the combination of its 
physical characteristics. The historical context that has shaped the way in 
which water is appropriated and the current pressures over the resource also 
shapes the nature of water ownership and control. 204  Thomson, citing 
Professor Joseph Sax’s work, asserts: 
in order to understand water policy and address current societal needs, Sax 
emphasizes that one must first appreciate the uniqueness of water as revealed 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
203  Alejandro Camacho, "Adapting Governance to Climate Change: Managing Uncertainty 
Through a Learning Infrastructure" Emory Law Journal 59(2009), 17. 
204 Cullet, "Water Law in a Globalised World: the Need for a New Conceptual Framework", 6. 
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in both its physical characteristics and the law's historical approach to water 
resource issues.205  
Both the physical and historical context of water regulation shapes water 
ownership and allocation thereafter. According to Cullet various societies have 
embraced the basic premise within their water laws that water should not be 
subject to ownership.206 As to the mechanism to allocate water – from a 
government’s perspective – or to acquire water rights – from a user’s 
perspective – it varies amongst different national legal systems. Legal scholars 
have undertaken exhaustive examination of national water laws to compare 
the different manners in which water is allocated and the rights that such 
allocation involves.207 While doing similarly falls beyond the scope of this 
work, this section aims to achieve a general understanding of water ownership 
and argue that such ownership is different from other types of ownership such 
as land ownership.    
The development of property systems in water and land followed two different 
paths. Although they might have shared a similar origin within an open- 
access regime or common property regime, property over land soon would 
move toward individual or private property systems.208  
Conversely water would remain within the realm of open-access or would be 
nationalised by governments to be stewarded, however, rarely water recourses 
would become subject of private or individual ownership. .  
Water scholars and practitioners often refer to the nature of water as a public 
good and as a common good without distinction.209 This work submits that 
these two concepts are different, yet in order to draw a distinction – in the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 Barton Thompson Jr., refers to professor Sax’s work and expose what it could be the 
underlying assumption that, arguably, contributed to shape water law and policy. See Barton H. 
Jr. Thompson, "Water Law as a Pragmatic Exercise: Professor Joseph Sax's Water Scholarship" 
Ecology Law Quarterly 25(1998-1999): 367.  
206 Cullet, "Water Law in a Globalised World: the Need for a New Conceptual Framework", 236 
(footnote omited)  
207 For a comparison of national legal systems see Salman and Bradlow, Regulatory Frameworks 
for Water Resources Management: A Comparative Study; Sarah Marjorie Hendry, "An Analytical 
Framework for Reform of National Water Law", (PhD Thesis, Water Law, Dundee, 2008); Dante 
Augusto  Caponera, Principles of Water Law and Administration: National and International  
(Rotterdam: A.A. Balkema, 1992). 
208 The late Prof. Elinor Ostrom addressed the common confusion of open-access regimes and 
common property regimes in her article "Private and Common Property Rights", in Encyclopedia 
of Law and Economics: Civil Law and Economics, ed. Gerrit De Geets and Bouckaert Boudewijn 
(Gent: Cheltenham, Edward Elgar, 2000), 335-36. 
209 See for instance Stanton: ‘The public good nature of water … has had a decisive influence on 
the legal status of water…’. Stanton Kibel, ‘Grasp on Water: A Natural Resource that Eludes 
NAFTA’s Notion of Investment’, Ecology Law Quarterly, 34, 2 (2007), 134. 
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context of this thesis – it is important to revisit the work of some economic 
and legal academics such as Elinor Ostrom, Richard Epstein and Siegfried von 
Ciriacy-Wantrup. Ostrom stresses the differences between common property 
regimes and open access (res nullius) regimes. While the concept of common 
property applies some way of exclusion for the benefit of the members of the 
community and some rules of enjoyment and use, the concept of open access 
is a system of non-property, non-exclusion and no rules. The term open 
access regime is akin to the concept public goods, which are generally non-
rival and non-exclusive e.g. open seas and atmosphere.210 Ciriacy-Wantrup 
and Bishop point out the indistinctive use of the terms open-access/non-
owner or res nullius and commons/res commune or common property regime. 
They contend that the notion of commons (res commune) have been misused 
for some economists over the years to describe resources that had no-owners 
(res nullius), such as the fisheries in the high seas: 211  
The problems of managing fisheries in territorial waters and those on the high 
seas have similarities-they are fugitive resources-but they are very different in 
actual and potential institutional regulation.212 
Ostrom further explains that common-pool resources (different from the 
concept of common property regime) share with public goods the difficulty of 
physical and institutional exclusion of beneficiaries, resulting in a lack of 
investment to monitor and protect. Common-pool resources also share with 
private goods the characteristic that one’s consumption affects quantities 
available to others. 213 Common-pool resources – such as water resources – 
can be owned by national or local governments, as well as private individuals 
or corporations. As Ostrom suggests there is no automatic relationship 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
210 Ostrom adds that open access regimes are much less than proposed in the literature. Some 
open-access regimes are the result of ‘conscious public policies’ which aim to guarantee access 
to all citizens ‘to the use of a resource within a political jurisdiction. The concept of jus publicum 
applies to their formal status, but effectively these resources are open access.’ See Elinor 
Ostrom, ‘Private and Common Property Rights’, 336. 
211 In this vein, several academics argue that Hardin referred to an open access regime in his 
seminal work: The Tragedy of the Commons, rather than a common property regime. See for 
instance: Elinor Ostrom, "Private and Common Property Rights", 335-36; Lee Anne Fennell, 
"Ostrom’s Law: Property Rights in the Commons" International Journal of the Commons 5, no. 1 
(2011), 12. Hardin’s work describes the problem of open pastures where farmers could bring 
their cattle to graze. According to Hardin each farmer would have incentives to bring as much 
cattle as possible to graze, imposing the costs of overgrazing to other farmers also using the 
common land. Ultimately, such costs would result in the pastures being overexploited and 
consequently damaged. 
212 S.V. Ciriacy·Wantrup and Richard C. Bishop, ""Common Property" as a Concept in Natural 
Resources Policy" Natural Resources Journal 15(1975), 715. 
213 Ostrom, "Private and Common Property Rights", 337-38. See also Demsetz, "Toward a Theory 
of Property Rights". 
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between common-pool resources and common property regimes.214 This is 
better illustrated when one considers that rivers, lakes, groundwater basins 
are a good example of common-pool resources, which may be own by the State 
or be under the stewardship of the State. In this vein, several users could 
share the common-pool resource of a river, lake, basin, etc. The problem 
arises over the need to control access and use, which in practice have been 
addressed through a mechanism of allocation of water rights, with a much 
narrower scope of enjoyment, usage and alienability than – for instance – 
individual property of land.215 
This distinction is relevant in the context of water resources, as it clarifies the 
fact that the nature of the proprietary relationship between the user and the 
resource shapes the institutional arrangement for the regulation of the natural 
resource. 216  From a much broader perspective Professor Richard Epstein, 
asserts that water, within its original source, was considered as res commune, 
as opposed to res nullius. Epstein seems to be considering water within a 
common property regime, where water pertains to the community as a whole, 
where – by default – everyone is entitled to it, and no one can be deprived from 
it. Scott et al assert that except for the Roman Law approach to ownership of 
water as public or private, there is an overall notion of water as res commune, 
whose nature does not allow for ownership. According to such a view, a 
portion of water is, thus, used and restored to the flow for the use of the rest 
of the community: a term that is referred to as a ‘negative community’, and 
which disadvantages have been addressed above.217  
As Epstein explains the precise domain of common water is not always 
clear.218 Nonetheless, the notion of commons remains useful to identify the 
regulation of water as distinct from the regulation of land. Epstein contends 
that res commune was used in order to:  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  214	  Elinor Ostrom, "Private and Common Property Rights", 338.	  
215 See, for instance, a brief reference on this issue made by Epstein, in Richard A. Epstein, 
"The Historical Variation in Water Rights", in The Evolution of Markets for Water: Theory and 
Practice in Australia, ed. Jeff Bennett, New Horizons in Environmental Economics (Cheltenham: 
Edward Elgar, 2005), 25. See also Ostrom, "Private and Common Property Rights", 336-37. 
216 Note that in this case the definition of institution is an economic one, where ‘Institution’ is 
understood as a term that encompasses more than the organisation, constituted by either 
government, regulatory agency, etc. In this case institution means ‘the rules of the game’, which 
consider formal and informal constrains and their enforcement rules “Institutions are the 
humanly devised constrains that structure human interaction” See Douglas North, "Economic 
Performance Through Time" American Economic Review 84, no. 3 (1994), 360. 
217 Anthony Scott and Georgina Coustalin, "The Evolution of Water Rights" Natural Resources 
Journal 35(1995), 836. See also Epstein, "The Historical Variation in Water Rights", 28. 
218 Epstein, "The Historical Variation in Water Rights", 25. 
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establish a background legal environment for water rights that is the exact 
opposite of what it is for land [...] the paradigmatic act of acquiring ownership of 
land … now constitutes the quintessential violation of the communal rights to 
water’.219  
The movement away from common property systems over land, toward 
individual property systems, responds to the need of full internalization of 
costs and benefits, which are understood in a broad sense, as linked to actual 
investment costs, as well as the implied costs of harmful effects due to the use 
and enjoyment of the land, i.e. pollution and depletion.220 Such externalities 
are identifiable by societies over long periods of time, and in some cases, 
without full rationalisation of the effects that new types of ownerships were to 
achieve.221  
Extensive analysis of land ownership is beyond the scope of this work. This 
brief reference to the evolution of land ownership intends to show the 
emergence of societal preferences and the needs of economic development that 
are different from water ownership and as a consequence water 
rights/entitlements. As Ostrom contends, property rights constitute a pivotal 
driver of economic development.222  
In contrast, the ownership of water remains away from the concept of 
individual property systems, and the rights to use and enjoy water resources 
continues to be rather limited. Many legal systems around the world have 
reserved the ownership of water resources to the State. Under such a system, 
the State can exclude, manage and allocate the uses of water. 223  Other 
jurisdictions, however, such as the common law systems, have refrained from 
stipulating the ‘ownership of water’, due to its physical characteristics and 
nature. Through these regimes, States have kept the power to control the uses 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
219 Ibid.  
220 The need may be understood in this context, when the benefits of full internalization 
outweigh the costs thereof. See Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of Property Rights", 350; Robert C. 
Ellickson, "Property in Land" Yale Law Journal 102 (1992-1993). 
221  Demsetz: ‘I do not mean to assert or to deny that the adjustments in property rights which 
take place need be the result of a conscious endeavor to cope with new externality problems. 
These adjustments have arisen in western societies largely as a result of gradual changes in 
social mores and in common law precedents’. See Demsetz, "Toward a Theory of Property 
Rights", 350. 
222 Ostrom, "Private and Common Property Rights", 334.   
223 Legal academics such as Caponera use the term public ownership of water resources, not be 
confused with a common property regime used by Ostrom above. On public ownership and its 
comparison with private ownership of water resources, see Dante A. Caponera, "Possible 
contents of and reasons for water law", in Principles of water law and administration: national 
and international, ed. Dante A. Caponera and Marcella Nanni (Routledger - Taylor & Francis, 
2007), 138. 
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of water.224 In both scenarios, States have the power to steward and allocate 
the use of water, according to their strategies for social, economic and 
environmental development.  
Historically, allocation/appropriation systems and control mechanisms 
respond to a community context, geographical location, and cultural values 
among others. As Dellapena asserts ‘[i]n general, regions that were water rich 
had little need to develop rules, while water-poor regions had great need to do 
so’.225 Furthermore, regions facing water scarcity are more likely to develop 
legal regimes with ‘defined private property rights’.226  Note, however, that 
geography and water availability have not always been the main driver for the 
adoption of water law regimes. While water scarcity triggered the development 
of a system of prior appropriation in the Western part of the United States 
(US),227 abundance gave rise to a riparian system within the common law of 
England.228 Other legal systems, such as the Spanish one, adopted customary 
rules developed by the Moors. These traditions were later exported from Spain 
to its colonies in South America and North America.229 Australia received the 
common law tradition from England; thus, adopting a riparian water law.230 
However, in the case Australia the inherited English legal tradition ill fitted 
Australia’s geography and water availability.231 It follows that hydrological 
availability as well as information on variability should assist in shaping water 
policy and the scope of property.  
Inadequate knowledge of the hydrological cycle in the past gave rise to 
misunderstandings of the water sources that integrated a single system. In 
other words, the unity of the hydrological cycle was not understood in its 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
224 Ibid. 
225 Dellapenna and Gupta, "Toward Global Law on Water", 439. 
226 Dellapenna explains this situation more specifically, when referring to the evolution of water 
allocation in the United States. ‘As a result, concern over water law evolved to the west of 
Kansas City in the direction of well-defined private property rights—appropriative rights or dual 
systems that at least avoid the worst of the tragedy of the commons’. See Joseph W.  
Dellapenna, "United States: The Allocation of Surface Waters", in The Evolution of the Law and 
Politics of Water, ed. Joseph W.  Dellapenna and Joyeeta  Gupta (Springer, 2009), 191. 
227 Dan A. Tarlock, "National water law: the foundations of sustainable water use" Journal of 
Water Law 15 no. 3-4 (2004), 121. 
228 Epstein, "The Historical Variation in Water Rights", 7. For the development and evolution of 
water rights see Scott and Coustalin, "The Evolution of Water Rights". On the other hand, for 
the evolution of land rights, see Ellickson, "Property in Land." 
229 Tarlock, "National water law: the foundations of sustainable water use", 121. 
230 Stephen Hodgson, "Modern water rights. Theory and practice", (Rome: Development Law 
Service FAO Legal Office, Food and Agriculture Organization of the United Nations, 2006), 9. 
See also Scott and Coustalin, "The Evolution of Water Rights", 902. 
231 Janice Gray, "Legal approaches to the ownership, management and regulation of water from 
riparian rights to commodification" Transforming Cultures 1, no. 2 (2006), 72. 
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whole dimension. In this regard, the Ohio Supreme Court, following the 
English rule of absolute ownership of the resources under the soil 
(groundwater), considered:  
the existence, origin, movement and course of such waters, and the causes which 
govern and direct their movements, are so secret, occult and concealed, that an attempt 
to administer any set of legal rules in respect to them would be involved in hopeless 
uncertainty, and would be, therefore, practically impossible. 232 
Surface water is generally under State’s ownership, stewardship and control, 
while groundwater historically was usually attached to the land under the 
ownership of the landowner, as the maxim: ‘a caelo usque ad centrum’ – ‘the 
owner of the land owns everything located above and below his land, including 
groundwater’. 233  However, this has progressively changed with time as 
evidence and knowledge concerning the interrelated nature of the hydrological 
cycle developed. For example, it is widely accepted today that groundwater is 
connected to surface water.234 It has also become common knowledge that 
increasing groundwater withdrawals impose a burden on both the river 
(surface water) and groundwater systems,235 affecting many more types of 
uses than was previously thought.  
To date, largely due to the recognition of the close link between ground and 
surface water, increasing numbers of legal systems have placed groundwater 
(in addition to surface water) under the ownership and control of the State.236 
It is therefore currently contended that States should steward groundwater 
and integrate its regulation with surface water regulation.237 “Grandfathering” 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
232 Frazier v Brown, 12 Ohio St. 294, 311 (Ohio 1861). See also Juliane R.  Borquin and A. 
Matthews, "Modern approach to groundwater allocation disputes: Cline v. American Aggregates 
Corporation" Journal of Energy Law Policy 7:2(1986), 361. 
233 Caponera, "Possible contents of and reasons for water law", 138. Salman and Bradlow, 
Regulatory Frameworks for Water Resources Management: A Comparative Study: 145.  
234 See Savenije, "Why water is not an ordinary economic good, or why the girl is special", 9. 
Principle No. 1 of the Dublin Statement, recognizes that management of water resources should 
be undertaken under the ‘whole catchment area and groundwater aquifer’, see Dublin Statement 
on Water and Sustainable Development, Dublin, Ireland, 31 January 1992. In the same vein the 
definition of Integrated Water Resources Management, adopts the holistic approach to the 
‘[M]anagement of water, land and related resources’, see Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), 
"Integrated Water Resources Management", 22. 
235 Epstein when addressing the treatment of ground water, makes reference to the externalities 
that increasing consumption by some users impose on other uses, justifying as Demsetz before, 
the shift from one system of property rights to another, in this case from private ownership to 
public ownership. See Epstein, "The Historical Variation in Water Rights", 30-31.  
236  Salman and Bradlow, Regulatory Frameworks for Water Resources Management: A 
Comparative Study: 145. 
237 Thompson, "Water Law as a Pragmatic Exercise: Professor Joseph Sax's Water Scholarship," 
370. See also Caponera, "Possible contents of and reasons for water law", 138; Salman and 
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is widely recognised in legal systems, where States –acquiring ownership or 
control - protect historic property rights temporarily or in perpetuity.238 
To conclude, Professor Sax analysed the relationship between communities 
and water as the notion of ‘water as a heritage’ in which he identified the 
various links that communities developed in relation to water resources: i) 
communities’ rights to enjoy water resources, ii) communities’ control over 
water resources policies, and iii) the question of whether communities should 
enjoy greater rights than other individuals or entities.239 These three aspects 
appear to be timeless, linking water to communities appear to have largely 
shaped the way in which society feel about water resources, and the way that 
water is regulated and managed under most legal systems.  
 
2.4.4 Water Rights and Entitlements: A Fragile Right 
As regards the use of water, States may allow the use of water in a number of 
ways. Caponera identifies three such ways which can be observed alternatively 
on in combination:  i) a free use regime, under which, water users are allowed 
to freely use rainwater, springs, ponds, flows within the boundaries of their 
private property (under such a regime, legislation might account for excessive 
use and for the need to avoid conflicts with other neighbouring water users),240 
ii) a declaration/registration regime, which requires water users to register 
their use of water  (this regime applies to measured uses of water, such as 
shallow wells and irrigation of limited areas. It may also include water 
management principles for the identification of particular regions and basins, 
in order to assess the demand for water, as well as potential competitors)241 
and iii) a permit system, which appears to be the most widely used regime for 
the regulation of water resources. The definition of a permit, in its broad 
sense, encompasses several types of administrative acts aimed at allowing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Bradlow, Regulatory Frameworks for Water Resources Management: A Comparative Study, 143-
44. See also, e.g. Ley de Aguas No. 276 de la República de Costa Rica, Article 4. (Water Act, No. 
276, Republic of Costa Rica, Article 4).  
It is noteworthy that reference to springs can be an expression of groundwater that flows at the 
surface, which would otherwise be accessible through boreholes. On a brief notion of springs 
see Garth Van der Kamp, "The Hydrology of Springs in Relation to the Biodiversity of Spring 
Fauna: A Review" Journal of the Kansas Entomological Society 68, no. 2 (1995), 4. 
238 See for instance Morocco Water Law Article 6; Arizona Groundwater Code.  
239 See Thompson in his analysis of the Professor Sax’s water scholarship, Thompson, "Water 
Law as a Pragmatic Exercise: Professor Joseph Sax's Water Scholarship", 379-80. 
240 Caponera, "Possible contents of and reasons for water law", 139-40. 
241 Ibid. 
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water users the enjoyment of – mostly – fixed quantities of water. The names 
differ from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, e.g. authorization, lease and licence, 
among others. A permit constitutes a right of usage.  
Once the State has exercised its water ownership by apportioning water use to 
different users – through a ‘water right’ - they are entitled to enjoy the 
quantities specified within the conditions provided for by regulations.242 It is 
appropriate to state that this thesis uses the term water rights in a broad 
sense. In the next chapters the term will be often used interchangeably with 
the terms water permit and water entitlement, because in the context of 
international investment law, investor’s exploiting water resources would most 
likely hold a water permit, which may constitute a property right under the 
protection of an investment agreement. 
Water rights appear, prima facie, to have the same characteristics as other 
natural resources entitlements, such as oil, gas, minerals, etc. However, water 
is not present in fixed quantities in catchments and basins, as it flows 
through the hydrological cycle, it is subject to atmospheric and other physical 
conditions. Traditionally, legal regimes aim at guaranteeing the stable and 
peaceful enjoyment of rights granted by States by providing some levels of 
security and predictability for the user. Given the nature of water resources, 
however, experts agree that such rights must be subject to limitations.243 
Professor Tarlock confirms that there are differences between major regimes of 
general property with those of water. While most general regimes seek for 
‘secure, exclusive, individual entitlements’, water regimes do not usually follow 
such a standard. For reasons of public interest and interrelated common use, 
water rights regimes cannot always guarantee complete property rights.244 The 
Western US is possibly the best, and virtually the only example of a property 
based system, which - some argue - require higher levels of regulatory 
flexibility.245 Note that in Bayview Irrigation District v Mexico (a NAFTA case 
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243 See Tarlock, "National water law: the foundations of sustainable water use", 121. Caponera, 
"Possible contents of and reasons for water law", 145; Hodgson, "Modern water rights. Theory 
and practice". 
244 Tarlock, "National water law: the foundations of sustainable water use", 121-22.  
245 Neuman inquire: “Water users who hold vested water rights in arid regions hold valid 
property rights, even though they are considerably different than ownership rights to a piece of 
land. How, indeed, could those rights be made more “flexible?” …. Yet to truly incorporate 
adaptive management, there needs to be some “give” at the individual level as well. One way to 
achieve this goal is to “regulate” for it”. See Janet Neuman, "Adaptive Management: How Water 
Law Needs to Change", 11436. In this vein, Ross agree that water property rights are of a fragile 
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initiated by US investors against Mexico, claiming the expropriation of water 
property rights by Mexican authorities), the tribunal addressed the issue of 
water ownership in its Award on jurisdiction. While the tribunal declined 
jurisdiction in this case, it stated in an obiter dicta: 
The Tribunal does not accept that the Claimants own water in Mexico, in the 
sense of the ownership of personal property rights in the physical waters of 
rivers flowing in Mexican territory … there is an evident and inescapable 
conceptual difficulty in positing the existence of property rights in water up-
river in Mexico in a context where the entitlement of each Claimant depends 
upon the apportionment of a certain volume of water …246 
Thompson states that Professor Sax has extensively argued that water rights 
may deserve less protection than other property rights:247 
These public aspects of water law undermine the claims of individual water 
users to inviolable and perpetual rights. Although the government might award 
private rights over water to the degree that private use promotes the public 
interest, such rights always remain subject to the “exigencies of the . . . 
interests of the Commonwealth.” Given the immense and unique importance of 
water to the public, “trifling inconveniences to particular persons must 
sometimes give way to the necessities of a great community.”248 
Professor Sax also holds the views that the level of compensation due for the 
expropriation of water property rights should be limited. He refers to a number 
of cases within the US court systems, where tribunals have dismissed claims 
for compensation against regulatory measures over ownership of water and 
water rights.249 Tarlock considers that in such cases - termination of a permit 
for environmental protection - the extent of the deprivation suffered by the 
holder should be taken into account, as such cases represent incremental 
risks that the water-rights holders are already subject to.250 Indeed, several 
experts assert that compensation should be paid when the withdrawal of a 
water permit takes place. In this regard, Caponera asserts:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
nature, see Shelley Ross Saxer, "The Fluid Nature of Property Rights in Water" Pepperdine 
University School of Law. Legal Studies Research Paper Series Paper Number 2010/13(2010), 3.  
246 Bayview Irrigation District et al. v United Mexican States, (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/05/1), 
(Additional Facility), Award on Jurisdiction, paras. 114-115.  
247 Joseph Sax, "The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of Water Law" University of 
Colorado Law Review 61(1990), 260. Joseph L. Sax, "Takings and the Police Power" Yale Law 
Journal 74, no. 36 (1964). 
248  Thompson citing Professor Sax. See Thompson, "Water Law as a Pragmatic Exercise: 
Professor Joseph Sax's Water Scholarship", 369.  
249 See Sax, "The Constitution, Property Rights and the Future of Water Law", 259.  
250 Tarlock, "National water law: the foundations of sustainable water use", 125. 
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Permits and concessions may also be terminated because the provisions of a 
water resources plan so require. In this case the water law should entitle the 
permit or concession holder to compensation, because termination is not due to 
his fault and he should be guaranteed against any possible loss of the capital 
invested.251 
However, some scholars would disagree, especially so in the case of water 
resources, but also the area of land management; note the article of Professor 
Holly Doremus:  
Compensation requirements should be narrowly drawn to avoid over deterrence of 
regulatory change. Courts should require takings claimants to prove that they have 
been the victims of a change in the principles governing use or ownership of their 
property.252 
The issue of termination of water rights – in the national law context – 
inquiries: i) whether the withdrawal of a permit constitutes an expropriation, 
and if so ii) whether compensation is due. Some domestic legal systems do not 
stipulate payment of compensation for cancelation of water permits.253 In 
contrast, the international investment context may require a different a 
different line of inquiry, under different applicable laws.  
Later chapters will pay special attention to these issues. Chapter III will 
discuss the prerogative of states to regulate, also referred to as the police 
power, which pertains to the sphere of internal sovereignty of the States. In 
this context the police power doctrine plays a pivotal role in the ability of 
States to regulate strict narrow spheres of interest, such as public health, 
safety and the environment, and broader spheres of interest. This work 
revisits the origin and exercise of the police power at the national and 
international levels. As addressed later, its exercise in a broad sense is not an 
absolute as may give rise to State responsibility under International Law. 
Therefore, arbitral tribunals deciding disputes originating in regulatory 
measures linked to water resources may be called to scrutinise the legitimacy 
of States’ exercise of their police. Such analysis is undertaken in Chapter IV, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
251 Caponera, "Possible contents of and reasons for water law", 143. See also Callies and 
Chipcase, addressing several American court decisions, where the court order the payment of 
compensation upon the determination of water property rights. David L. Callies and Calvert G. 
Chipchase, "Water Regulation, Land Use and the Environment" University of Hawai'i Law 
Review 30(2007), 73-74. 
252 Holly Doremus, "Takings and Transitions" Journal of Land Use 19, no. 1 (2003), 45. 
253 The Alberta Water Act, for instance, provides for the cancellation of a water licence under s 
55(2) when `a significant adverse effect on the aquatic environment occurred, occurs or may 
occur that was not reasonably foreseeable at the time the licence was issued’ Water Act RSA 
2000 c. W-3 (Alberta Canada). 
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which proposes a framework of analysis that may assist arbitrators in 
undertaking this scrutiny, through a three-fold analysis.  
The next section addresses important lessons that could be derived from 
investment disputes in the area of water services projects. Such disputes have 
received attention from academics and practitioners, due to the highly 
sensitive nature of water supply.  
 
2.4.5 The Regulation of Water Utilities  
Regulatory mechanisms for water supply involve specific institutional 
arrangements, such as the separation of water sector policymakers from 
regulatory bodies and service provision.254 It would therefore, be ‘misleading to 
discuss resources management and services delivery in the same institutional 
context’.255 This section focuses on the provision of water services for human 
consumption. 
Water demand for human consumption amounts to ten per cent of the total 
demand for water resources. It has priority over other uses of water, because it 
is essential to life.256 Therefore, water for human consumption constitutes an 
integral part of the planning and management of water resources. However, 
when water is extracted and enters the network of distribution, it moves into a 
different sphere or regulatory activity within the industry of water supply and 
its infrastructure.  
The distribution of water services shares the (natural) monopolistic nature of 
other network industries such as telecommunications, electricity and gas.257 
Under monopoly schemes, suppliers have incentives ‘to charge excessive 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 Relevant experiences in Latin America see: Roberto Lentini, "Servicios de Agua Potable y 
Saneamiento: Lecciones de Experiencias Relevantes", (Santiago: CEPAL and Ministerio Federal 
de Cooperacion Economica y Desarrollo, 2011), 7. 
255 World Water Assessment Programme, "The United Nations World Water Development Report 
3: Water in a Changing World", 51. 
256 Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights, “General Comment No. 15: The Right to 
Water (Arts. 11 and 12 of the Covenant)”, adopted at the Twenty-ninth Session of the Committee 
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, on 20 January 2003 (Contained in Document 
E/C.12/2002/11), para. 6; United Nations, “Conference on Environment & Development, 
“Agenda 21”, (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 1992), 18.6; United Nations, "Report of the World 
Summit on Sustainable Development", para 26, (c).  
257 Note however, that frequently electricity and telecommunications industries differ from the 
water industry, in that networks and grids are not shared among the providers of the service. As 
pointed out by Vinnary Eija M., The Economic Regulation of publicly owned water utilities: The 
case of Finland, Utilities Policy, 14, 2006, 159. Yet, this may depend on the various structures in 
place. 
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prices or ask for excessive subsidies or provide low quality service or any 
combination of the above’.258 When economic regulation operates over utilities 
that have the form of natural monopolies, such as the provision of water 
services, it aims at resembling a competitive market in long-run equilibrium. 
Economic regulation, thus, seeks an optimal price for the provision of services. 
In doing so, it allows the provider to cover his production costs, as well as 
allowing him to achieve a reasonable rate of return: ‘the principal benchmark 
for “just and reasonable” rate levels has been the cost of production, 
including, […], the necessary return to capital’. 259  The methodologies to 
calculate the rate of return in the water sector will not be discussed in this 
Chapter, but it suffices to state that they are generally based on the cost and 
risks associated with capital investments, and these will differ according to the 
characteristics of each market, industry and country, the assessment and real 
structure of which is essentially known by the service provider.260  
It follows that the task of regulators proves rather difficult due to information 
asymmetries, since regulators - in reality - are not always fully informed of the 
relevant variables necessary to set a price that is expected to resemble a 
competitive one. These variables are for instance demand, costs of production, 
managerial efforts and performance.261  This setback endangers one of the 
aims of the regulatory task, which seeks to strike a balance between 
consumers’ and investors’ interests, in line with governmental public policy, 
weighting the balance in favour of the provider of the service. Moreover, the 
service provider may have no incentives to reverse the situation, and is likely 
to adopt strategic behaviour whereby he fails to inform the regulator of real 
costs, demand, and service capacity, among others.262  
Note, however, that while this is the traditional theory of information 
asymmetries and natural monopoly regulation, regulatory agencies have 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
258 Michael Klein, "Economic Regulation of Water Companies", (Washington: World Bank, 1996), 
3. 
259  Alfred E. Kahn, The Economics of Regulation. Principles and Institutions  (London: 
Massachusetts Institute of Technology, 1988), 63. 
260  Public-Private Infrastructure Advisory Facility. World Bank, Approaches to private 
participation in water services: A toolkit  (Washington, DC: International Bank for Reconstruction 
and Development/World Bank, 2006). 115-16. See also David Hall and Emanuele Lobina, 
"Water as a Public Service", (Public Services International, 2006), 35-36. 
261 Paul L. Joskow, "Regulation of Natural Monopolies," in 05-008 WP (Boston: Center for Energy 
and Environmental Policy Research, 2005), 93-94. See also Hall and Lobina, "Water as a Public 
Service", 43. 
262 Joskow, "Regulation of Natural Monopolies", 93-94. 
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developed sophisticated mechanisms of accountancy and control put in place 
to minimise the effects of investors’ incentives to maximise profit.263  
Such a challenge is possibly greater in developing countries where regulatory 
mechanisms were adopted after intense economic reforms in search of greater 
efficiency in the provision of public services, thereby transferring the control 
and in some cases the ownership of public services to private investors. 
‘Privatizing’ states were advised to develop secure regulatory frameworks and 
set institutions to administer such frameworks. There was, however, a high 
level of inexperience among government officials. In this vein, Boehm 
illustrates:   
This new institutional environment is characterized by rules which are often 
still unclear, new public organisations with possible conflicting interest to other 
public agencies, and a lack of experience concerning the application of these 
new rules and the handling of the new situation. Even the World Bank and the 
Inter-American Development Bank […] note that public service sector reforms 
occurred sometimes in an environment of “incomplete reforms and immature 
regulatory frameworks.” Such settings clearly open the risk for opportunistic 
behaviour: regulated firms may capture the reform for their own narrow 
interests (‘regulatory capture’), or politicians may abuse regulatory powers for 
their own purposes (‘regulatory opportunism’, or capture by the political 
sphere).264 
The notion of full cost recovery in the context of investment in the water sector 
has been contested, mainly due to the high sensitivities that access to water 
generates. Some authors consider that the competitive effects achieved by way 
of regulation should be moderated for reasons of ‘social integration and the 
achievement of non-economic values, such as social solidarity and equity’.265 
The concept of full cost recovery is intrinsic in the fourth principle of the 
Dublin Statement: ‘water is an economic good’. This principle has adopted the 
social component in water; hence water was subsequently recognised as a 
‘social and economic good’.266  The ‘economic good’ component was highly 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
263 Ibid., 95. 
264 Frédéric Boehm, "Regulatory Capture Revisited – Lessons from Economics of Corruption" 
Working Paper (2007), 3. 
265 Christopher McCrudden, Regulation and Deregulation. Policy and Practice in the Utilities and 
Financial Services Industries  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1999). 276. See also Anthony Ogus, 
Regulation. Legal Form and Economic Theory  (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1994), 46-54; Sergio 
Navajas, "El Servicio de Agua Potable y Desagues Cloacales en Buenos Aires", in La Regulación 
de la Competencia y de los Servicios Públicos. Teoria y Experiencia Argentina Reciente (Buenos 
Aires: Fundación de Investigaciones Economicas Latinoamericanas, 1999). 
266 “Agenda 21” Chapter 18, added in its text the social component to the 4th Dublin’s principle: 
“Integrated water resources management is based on the perception of water as an integral part 
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criticized, especially by professionals who argued against the ‘privatization’ of 
water supply. They claimed that, given its strategic importance, water should 
be the responsibility of the public domain. 267   The Technical Advisory 
Committee (TAC) of the GWP states:  
The recovery of full cost should be the goal for all water uses unless there are 
compelling reasons for not doing so. While, in principle, the full cost needs to be 
estimated and made known for purposes of rational allocation and management 
decisions, it need not necessarily be charged to the users.268  
Whether private participation in the provision of the water supply has been a 
failure or a success appears to be a question with many answers. 269 
Admittedly there have been a number of important problems especially in 
Latin America and some African countries. There has also been a switch in the 
type of contracts between government and private investors, as concession 
contracts are no longer the preferred arrangement. Favour has shifted toward 
less risk and capital-involved private participation, and perhaps even more 
importantly, less network expansion obligations.270 
In the aftermath of the termination of the water concession in Cochabamba 
and the economic crisis in Argentina, increasing social concerns regarding 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of the ecosystem, a natural resource and a social and economic good, whose quantity and 
quality determine the nature of its utilization”. United Nations, “Conference on Environment & 
Development, “Agenda 21””, (Rio de Janeiro, Brazil, June 1992), para. 18.8. 
267 “The financial focus needs to be switched from providing incentives and subsidies for 
multinational operators, to identifying the financial needs of local public sector water providers, 
and ways in which they can be supported”. Hall and Lobina, "Water as a Public Service", 63. 
See also Stefan M.M. Kuks, "The privatisation debate on water services in the Netherlands: 
public performance of the water sector and the implications of market forces" Water Policy 
8(2006); Maude Barlow and Tony Clarke, Blue Gold The Battle Against Corporate Theft of the 
World's Water  (London: Earthscan Publications Ltd., 2003). 
268  See Technical Advisory Committee (TAC), "Integrated Water Resources Management", 20.  
269 A number of experts such as Marin in his report on private participation, assert that private 
participation in the provision of water has not necessarily dropped since early 1990’s: Marin, 
"Public-Private Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities A Review of Experiences in Developing 
Countries", 26-29. See also Owen, Pinsent Masons Water Yearbook 2007 - 2008.  Another more 
critical approach appears to focus on specific examples such as the water concession in 
Cochabamba and La Paz in Bolivia; Dar-Es-Salaam in Tanzania; Buenos Aires, Tucuman in 
Argentina, Montevideo in Uruguay, among others, for some of them see: Spronk and Crespo, 
"Water, National Sovereignty and Social Resistance: Bilateral Investment Treaties and the 
Struggles against Multinational Water Companies in Cochabamba and El Alto, Bolivia"; Hall 
and Lobina, "Water as a Public Service"; Schouten addresses the possible failure of private 
participation in the water sector, in the context of the institutional capacity, of the receiving 
country, in his specific example of Cochabamba, see Marco Schouten, "Strategy and Performace 
of Water Supply and Sanitation Providers. Effects of Two Decades of Neo-Liberalism", (UNESCO-
IHE, Erasmus Universiteit Rotterdam, 2009), 37-40; Solanes and Jouravlev, "Revisiting 
Privatization, Foreign Investment, International Arbitration and Water". 
270 Marin, "Public-Private Partnerships for Urban Water Utilities A Review of Experiences in 
Developing Countries", 36. 
 	   89	  
access to water (as a human right) and affordability, promoted further debate 
on the way forward to realise access to water and achieve the MDGs.271 
The regulation of water supply appears to relate to a two-faceted discussion. 
On one hand, some issues are linked to efficiency, due diligence, and 
corporate behaviour. On the other hand, other issues are linked to social 
aspects such as human rights, equity, subsidies and affordability, which are 
not only dependent on the operator’s performance, but rather on the 
government in its relationship with the operators. Both aspects are of 
relevance in the sphere of international investment arbitration because the 
extent to which arbitrators may consider and integrate these issues in their 
assessment of the circumstances of the case is still subject to debate.272  
 
2.5  Water in the Context of International Investment Arbitration  
Water resources have been and will be essential to the development of any 
investment project. The role that water plays in every project varies. However, 
even when there is no competition for water resource due to stress or scarcity, 
the use of water by industry e.g. mining, energy generation, oil extraction, all 
generate sensitivities among communities. Perhaps the inherent nature of 
water perceived as a common good (or common-pool resource), which does not 
allow for full exclusion of other users, limits a full exercise of the bundle of 
property rights, as discussed in Section 1.6.3 (fn41). This sense of 
commonality appears to be reflected in the feeling of entitlement that each 
person has over water resources, as an individual and as part of a community.   
This Section revisits a few investment disputes linked to the provision of water 
services. By examining these cases in retrospect, it intends to determine if any 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
271 Marrella makes reference to several states proposing constitutional amendments, on the 
human right to water, such as Bolivia, Argentina, Ecuador, etc. Marrella, "On the changing 
structure of international investment law: The human right to water and ICSID arbitration", 
339; William Schreiber, "Realizing the Right to Water in International Investment Law: An 
Interdisciplinary Approach to BIT Obligations" Natural Resources Journal 48, no. 1 (2008). See 
also Juan Pablo Bohoslavsky’s presentation on ‘Tratados de protección de las inversiones e 
implicaciones para la formulación de políticas publicas’ in the Workshop: ‘Tratados 
internacionales de protección a la inversión y regulación de servicios públicos’, ECLAC, (Buenos 
Aires: November 2010). 
272 It is worth noting a number of investor-state disputes where arbitrators, attending the public 
interest, admitted amicus curiae briefs. Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v United Republic of 
Tanzania (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22), Award 24 July 2008; Compania de Aguas del Aconquija 
SA and Vivendi Universal SA v Argentine Republic (ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3), Award 20 August 
2007. See also the Workshop: ‘Tratados internacionales de protección a la inversión y 
regulación de servicios publicos’, ECLAC, (Buenos Aires: November 2010). (available in Spanish) 
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lessons can be learned from past disputes linked to water services in the 
context of investment arbitration.  
 
2.5.1 Water Services and International Investment Arbitration  
2.5.1.1 Aguas del Tunari S.A. v Bolivia 
The so-called Cochabamba’s ‘water war’ is of special interest as it depicts 
problems of governance, the strong feelings towards water accessibility and 
the effects of these elements on international investment law. 
In this case, there was a disagreement between the central government, 
through its executive branch under the president Gonzalo Sanches de Lozada, 
and the municipal government of Cochabamba under Manfred Reyes Villa. 
Although the President and Mayor agreed on the need for a project to deliver 
water to the city of Cochabamba, they held different views on how to achieve 
this objective. The alternative project, advocated by the central Government, 
was called Corani which would source water from an electricity generation 
project, part of the President’s privatisation programme. The Misicuni project, 
on the other hand, was long awaited by the citizens of Cochabamba and 
strongly advocated by the local government. Finally, the Misicuni project was 
put forward and the central government proceeded with the biding process 
which concluded with the negotiation of a 40-year concession contract.273 
However, the disproportionate increase in tariffs at a very early stage of the 
project and the continuous problems of lack of water caused social unrest, 
resulting in the violent events of February 2000. Water consumers, irrigators 
and several local organisations took the streets of Cochabamba, condemning 
the privatisation process until the final expulsion of the company and the 
cancellation of the concession contract.  
Bechtel and Abengoa, the main shareholders of Aguas del Tunari S.A., 
initiated an investment claim against the government of Bolivia before ICSID, 
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  For a background of the privatization process of water services in the city of Cochabamba, 
see William Finnegan, ‘Letter from Bolivia. Leasing the Rain: The Race to Control Water Turns 
Violent’, 46-47; The Democracy Center, ‘Water Revolt: The World Bank Letters’, June, 2002. 
Available at: http://democracyctr.org/bolivia/investigations/bolivia-investigations-the-water-
revolt/bechtel-vs-bolivia-role-of-the-world-bank/water-revolt-the-world-bank-letters/, last 
visited April 5, 2014.	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claiming USD 50 million in compensation.274 The proceedings did not reach an 
award on the merits due to an active lobby of NGOs advocating for the right to 
water of citizens of Cochabamba and the government of Bolivia avoided the 
payment of a detrimental compensation. The claimants settled the case for two 
Bolivianos (about USD 0.30) as a token payment.275  
This case illustrates how internal struggles in the governance systems of host 
States, as well as people’s strong feelings of entitlement may result in loss for 
all the parties involved. On the one hand the people from Cochabamba have 
not yet access to water from Misicuni.276 On the other hand, the investor was 
forced to leave the country and settled the investment arbitration case, in part 
due the pressures of NGOs and civil society. 
 
2.5.1.2 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v United Republic of 
Tanzania277 
In this case, City Water Services Limited278 signed a number of contracts for 
the provision of water services in the city of Dar es Salaam. The difficulties in 
meeting its contractual obligations, such as billing and tariffs collection, 
became apparent shortly after the contracts started operating. The Tanzanian 
government denied requests to modify the contractual provisions and adopted 
several measures to recover the control of the company, including: i) the 
cancellation of the contract, ii) the occupation of City Water’s facilities, iii) the 
takeover of the management of the company, and iv) the deportation of senior 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
274  The Democracy Center On-Line, Bechtel VS. Bolivia: The People Win!! (2006), 
http://www.democracyctr.org/newsletter/vol69.htm, last visited March 12, 2010. 
275 Susan Spronk and Carlos Crespo, “‘Water, Sovereignty and Social: Investment Treaties and 
the Struggles against Multinational Water Companies in Cochabamba and El Alto, Bolivia’”, 
Law, Social Justice & Global Development (LGD) 1(2008), 8. 276	  Over ten years later the Misicuni Project has not yet been concluded. In this regard, OOSKA 
News reports that Bolivia still needs US$ 32.5 million to complete the project. The contract with 
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277 Biwater Gauff (Tanzania) Limited v. United Republic of Tanzania (ICSID Case No. ARB/05/22), 
Award, July 24, 2008. 
278 Biwater (UK) and Gauff (Germany) incorporated as BGT for the tender and later incorporated 
under Tanzanian laws as City Water Services Limited to provide the service in partnership with 
Dar es Salaam Water and Sewerage Authority (DAWASA). 
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managers. These actions triggered an arbitration claim. 279  The arbitral 
tribunal considered that the investor had performed poor management of the 
utility from the bidding process and failed to meet its contractual obligations. 
However, it found that Tanzania had breached its BIT obligations regarding 
expropriation with compensation,280 fair and equitable treatment,281 and the 
provision of full protection and security. 282  Yet it did not grant any 
compensation to the investor, since the economic value of the utility was nil at 
the moment of the claim.283 
This is one of the first cases in which a tribunal in an investment dispute 
allowed amicus curiae submissions. The submissions asked the tribunal to 
increase its sensitivity towards human rights, access to water and sustainable 
development. 284  However, none of the issues raised in the amicus curiae 
submissions were specifically addressed by the tribunal in the substantive 
part of the Award. 
 
2.5.1.3  Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi 
Universal S.A. v Argentine Republic285  
Vivendi Universal from France286 and Aguas de Aconquija from Argentina 
signed a concession contract for the provisions of water services to the 
Province of Tucuman. The newly elected Government of Tucuman expressed 
its discontent with the tariff increase and exhorted the company to reduce 
tariffs.  
The situation was exacerbated by two events of turbidity in the drinking water 
that led the Ministry of Health to warn citizens of Tucuman of health issues, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
279 Andrea K. Bjorklund, “ICSID Tribunal Finds Tanzania to Have Violated Bilateral Investment 
Treaty but Declines to Award Any Damages”, The American Society of International Law (ASIL) 
12, no. 17 (2008). 
280 Biwater Gauff v Tanzania, paras 451-520. 
281 Ibid., paras 586-675. The tribunal did not uphold all Biwater’s claims with regard to the Fair 
and Equitable Treatment standard. 
282 Ibid., paras 724-731. 
283 The tribunal concluded that by the time of the wrongful act by Tanzania the value of the 
assets was already zero and that termination of the contract was inevitable in any event Biwater 
Gauff v Tanzania, para. 799. 
284 Five organisations presented amicus submissions: Lawyers’ Environmental Action Team; the 
Legal and Human Rights Centre; the Tanzania Gender Networking Programme; the Centre for 
International Environmental Law; and the International Institute for Sustainable Development.  
285 Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v Argentine Republic (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/97/3), Award 20 August, 2007.  
286 Formerly the French Compagnie Général des Eaux. 
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such as cholera, typhoid and hepatitis. Moreover, the Government of 
Tucuman encouraged consumers not to pay their water bills. 
After a period of unsuccessful negotiations, the contract was terminated and 
the investor was required to continue providing the services for nearly one 
year. Vivendi initiated arbitration proceedings before ICSID in 2003.287 The 
arbitral award concluded that Argentina had breached the fair and equitable 
treatment and the expropriation with compensation standards, granting USD 
105 million compensation in favour of the claimants.  
In response to Argentina’s allegations of public interest in this case, the 
tribunal contended that it is the effect of the measure and not the intent of the 
government that is the determining factor for the violation of the expropriation 
with compensation standard. 288  However, the role of the Government of 
Tucuman in the evolution of the conflict played an important role in the 
decision of the tribunal.289 
These cases illustrate the strong social and political components embedded in 
water services, and the influential power of stakeholders. While there is 
increasing pressure on arbitrators to consider a State’s human rights and 
environmental obligations, the result of these investment disputes could have 
an effect on foreign investment flows, as well as the way in which States see 
the investor-State dispute settlement mechanism. It is possible that these 
disputes led to the reduction of private sector involvement in the water 
services sector overall (as pointed out in the previous sections). However, new 
types of disputes may arise from the use and competition for water as a 
resource. As water scarcity is exacerbated by climate change and population 
growth, the investment arbitration community will need novel approaches for 
balancing the interests between the entitlements investors hold to use water 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
287 This was the second request for arbitration presented by Vivendi Universal, as the first 
Award was partially annulled in 2002.   
288 Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija S.A. and Vivendi Universal S.A. v. Argentine Republic (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/97/3), Award 20 August, 2007, para.7.5.20. See also Compañia del Desarrollo de 
Santa Elena S.A. v. Republic of Costa Rica (ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1), Award 17 February, 
2000 and Rectification of Award of June 8, 2000 (Santa Elena v. Costa Rica); and Técnicas 
Medioambientales Tecmed v. United Mexican States, (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2), Award 29 
May 2003, para. 116. 
289 The tribunal quotes the working paper of a World Bank expert, who served as Argentina’s 
witness during the arbitration proceedings: ‘Instead of coming out and explaining the reasons 
for the changes, the Tucumán Government added its voice to the protests. In truth, a veritable 
chorus was formed, where legislators, journalists, politicians and leaders from civil society 
competed to be perceived as the most virulent’. See Vivendi v Argentina, Award, para. 7420.  
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and the need for reallocation, adaptive management and climate change 
mitigation.  
 
2.5.2 Water Resources and International Investment Law 
The cases below illustrate potential conflicts arising from the regulation of 
water resources in the context of international investment law (as distinct 
from disputes relating to the provision of water services. These three cases 
depict the levels or spheres of interaction between investors, other users and 
governments, namely water as a good, competition over water resources, and 
environmental and health concerns linked to water resources.  
 
2.5.2.1 Sun Belt Inc. v Her Majesty the Queen (Canada) 
In October 1999, the American corporation Sun Belt filed a Notice of 
Arbitration against Canada, under the North American Free Trade Agreement 
(NAFTA), to reverse a national ban imposed on the export of fresh water by 
marine tankers from the Great Lakes. It also requested the restoration of the 
fresh water export licensing arrangements for bulk shipment by marine 
tanker. Initial temporary lost business opportunity costs were claimed in the 
order of USD 468 million, with the further claim that these costs could rise to 
USD 1.5 billion.290 The dispute was settled between the parties, and the 
conditions of the settlement and possible compensation remain unknown.291 
2.5.2.2 Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG, Vattenfall Europe 
Generation AG v Federal Republic of Germany292  
In 2007, the city of Hamburg agreed on a provisional licence in favour of 
Vattenfall to meet future energy demand through the development of nuclear 
energy.293 In 2008, when the final approval for the project was due, the city of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
290 Sun Belt Inc. v. Her Majesty the Queen, “Notice of Claim and Demand for Arbitration”, 12 
October 1999, 4. 
291 For an analysis of this case in the context of the relationship between Canadian domestic 
law and the North American Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA), see Cumming and Froehlich, 
"NAFTA Chapter XI and Canada's Environmental Sovereignty: Investment Flows, Article 1110 
and Alberta's Water Act". 
292 Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG, Vattenfall Europe Generation AG v Federal Republic of 
Germany, (ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6).  
293 The negotiation was undertaken despite the opposition of environmental and political groups 
who argued that the project was larger than what was needed to meet the demand for energy in 
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Hamburg issued a new permit, including additional restrictions on the use of 
water within the project in order to avoid impact on the volume of water, 
temperature and oxygen content. 294  Such modifications led Vattenfall to 
initiate an investment dispute against Germany for € 1.4 billion in 
compensation. In 2010 the parties reached an agreement to settle the dispute, 
and Germany issued new water permits, in line with the original ones, since 
the project was not possible without access to water resources.295 	  	  
2.5.2.3 Bayview Irrigation District et al. v United Mexican 
States296 
This case is probably the most important in terms of reference to the special 
nature of water resources. The dispute arose out of a claim initiated by 
irrigators in the State of Texas in the US against Mexico for alleged diminution 
of their property rights in water. The permits had been granted by the US after 
the allocation of water resources as provided for in the Treaty for the 
‘Utilization of the Waters of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and of the Rio 
Grande/Rio Bravo’, signed on 3 February 1944 between Mexico and the US. 
As in the aforementioned investment disputes, the arbitral tribunal did not 
decide on the merits of the case. The tribunal, however, articulated an 
important obiter dictum with regard to the ownership of water resources:  
One owns the water in a bottle of mineral water, as one owns a can of paint. If 
another person takes it without permission, that is theft of one's property. But 
the holder of a right granted by the State of Texas to take a certain amount of 
water from the Rio Bravo / Rio Grande does not 'own', does not 'possess 
property rights in', a particular volume of water as it descends through Mexican 
streams and rivers towards the Rio Bravo / Rio Grande and finds its way into 
the right-holders irrigation pipes.297 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Hamburg. See Nathalie Bernasconi, “Background Paper on Vattenfall V. Germany Arbitration,” 
(Winnipeg: International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 2009), 1 
294 See Vattenfal Notice of Arbitration: Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG, Vattenfall Europe 
Generation AG & Co. KG. (Sweden and Germany) and the Federal Repunlic of Germany, March 
30, 2009, paras 37-40. The claimant sated that ‘Under German law, without a water use permit 
the Vattenfall Group would not be entitled to the immission control permit for the construction 
of the piant’.  
295 Vattenfall v Germany. Award March, 11, 2011, p17 (Article 2: Conditions). 
296 Bayview Irrigation District et al. v United Mexican States, ICSID (Additional Facility) Case No. 
ARB (AF)/05/1), Award 19 June, 2007. 
297 Ibid., para. 116. See further Chapter IV, Section 4.4.1. 
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The tribunal declined jurisdiction on the basis that the claimants did not own 
investments in Mexico, as their farms and irrigation rights were situated in the 
State of Texas. Therefore, protection under the NAFTA Chapter 11 could not 
be afforded. One may still wonder, however, what would have been the 
position of the tribunal should it have found it had jurisdiction to decide the 
case, and its view with regard to prospective water property rights of Texas 
investors (as reflected in the dicta).  
Potential water conflicts can be observed in various sectors of investment: 
such as mining projects in conflict with local populations, projects competing 
for water for irrigation, or projects potentially causing excessive water 
pollution.298 New types of investment could also cause disputes: such as 
licences granting foreign investors large extensions of land with water for 
agricultural production, so called ‘land grabs’.299 
 
2.6 Conclusion and Way Forward 
The unique nature of water has been argued on the basis of its physical 
characteristics and economic, social and environmental perspectives. If all 
these attributes, however, were not sufficient to assert that water is unique, 
further scarcity and lack of substitutes amounting to increasing 
unpredictability, may at least justify the argument that water should be 
treated in a special manner.  
This chapter has set out current and potential challenges for water resources 
management and the provision of drinking water, where adaptation to scarcity 
and climate change, along with prioritization of uses, may require regulatory 
flexibility.  
Developing countries are advised to achieve certain levels of development prior 
to undertaking measures towards the protection of the environment, and prior 
to adopting more sophisticated water management mechanisms. It follows that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
298  See for instance Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of El Salvador (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/09/12).  
299 Howard Mann addressing the: ‘[E]early movers are seeking to lock in access to water for 
agriculture with investments in states perceived to have a surplus of water today’. Countries 
where water resources are traditionally scarce, started to invest in agricultural lands, with 
leased periods of 50 to 90 years, and extension up to 1 million hectares.  Carin Smaller and 
Howard Mann, “A Thirst for Distant Lands: Foreign Investment in Agricultural Land and Water”, 
International Institute for Sustainable Development. Foreign Investment for Sustainable 
Development Program (2009), 5-6. 
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developing countries, as well as developed ones, in face of new realities, will be 
confronted with the need to adopt resilient steps towards protection of water 
resources, or to achieve better management mechanisms. This reality appears 
to endanger the secure and predictable regulatory environment promised to 
investors and property rights holders. Cases such as Methanex Corp. v. United 
States of America,300 Chemtura Corporation v Canada,301, Pac Rim Cayman LLC 
v. Republic of EI Salvador,302 illustrate how changing regulatory environments 
in the face of threats to health and the environment can affect investor rights. 
In at least two of these cases, Methanex and Pac Rim, those threats were linked 
to water resources.      
A holistic approach to water resources by way of IWRM or other policy tools 
implies a process of constant evolution and adaptation of policy and law, with 
the need to address competing demands for water because of growing scarcity 
and increasing pollution. For regulators, this means that water management 
and water services regulation (potentially) might have expropriatory 
implications for investors. 
As will be discussed in the next chapter, the prerogative of States to regulate 
is not contested under international law. Sovereignty and the police power of 
states play a pivotal role in next Chapter’s discussion. Chapter III discusses 
the commitments entered into by States, which within the realm of 
international investment law are of a particular nature. Under such 
commitments, States agree to protect investors’ assets and property rights, 
limiting the exercise of their sovereignty. It is therefore important to revisit the 
notions of sovereignty and the police power of states because these concepts 
are often invoked by host States, NGOs and groups of interest in the context of 
the legitimacy of the dispute settlement mechanism of investor-state 
arbitration.  
This work explores the extent to which arbitrators could incorporate, in the 
analysis, of an investment dispute, the holistic approach to water resources 
management. Such a framework of analysis would need to take into account 
the specific relationships between water, human development, environmental 
sustainability and investment protection. All these aspects have been barely 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
300 Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, Ad hoc—UNCITRAL (NAFTA). 
301 Chemtura Corporation v Canada, Ad hoc—UNCITRAL (NAFTA). 
302 Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of EI Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12. 
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incorporated within the first generation of international investment 
agreements.   
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CHAPTER 3 
THE POLICE POWER DOCTRINE IN THE CONTEXT OF 
INDIRECT EXPROPRIATION 
 
3.1  Introduction  
This thesis intends to identify the extent to which investment tribunals could 
incorporate the special nature of water resources in the assessment of 
regulatory measures over water that have been claimed to be expropriatory by 
foreign investors. On one hand, the management of water resources could 
negatively affect the overall investment project rendering it useless, thus de 
facto expropriated. On the other hand, it does not seem reasonable to expect 
that a highly variable and unpredictable resource, such as water, should 
remain subject to static rules, hindering adaption and resilience in times of 
scarcity and climate variability.  
This work also intends to contribute in finding a balance between the interest 
of investors and the regulatory prerogatives of States. In so doing, it proposes 
a framework of analysis, which may assist arbitral tribunals to distinguish 
between regulatory measures – as expression of the police power – and acts of 
indirect expropriation. This approach is not new in the field of investment 
arbitration, but could be applied to the specific case of water resources 
management, incorporating the unique features of water resources – 
addressed in Chapter II – in each criterion of the framework of analysis. 
Chapter IV will set out the criteria that are being proposed as a framework of 
analysis to draw the line between legitimate regulation and indirect 
expropriation. 
 This Chapter revisits the doctrine of the police power of States in various 
contexts, namely the sovereignty of states, domestic legal traditions and 
international investment law. In the context of international investment law, 
the police power has been perceived as the affirmation of the sovereign power 
of States, which could endanger the stability and security of the investment 
regime. When the security of an investment is in jeopardy, the concepts of 
sovereignty and police power become synonymous with political and 
regulatory risks, as opposed to the underlying principles of regulatory activity 
used to protect the common welfare.  
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It is noteworthy that the analysis of the issues presented above does not lie 
solely in the domain of legal studies. Such analysis may be linked to a broader 
problem pertaining to the dynamics of international law and international 
relations, and thus beyond the scope of this thesis. There are, however, 
elements to this analysis under the domain of law; one of which is the issue of 
the scope of the police power of States and its legitimacy. This aspect of the 
police power is the lens through which this thesis will look.  
The conception of the police power gives rise to various questions originating 
specifically in the area of investment arbitration, where the applicable law is 
primarily the investment treaty (IIA) and the rules of procedure stipulated by 
the parties to the treaty. Under this legal framework, arbitral tribunals are 
called to assess whether the action of the host State, in this case a water 
related regulatory measure, conforms to the standard of investment protection 
provided for in the IIA. It follows that the water laws of the host State will 
become the subject matter of the investment dispute under international 
investment law.  
In addition, to the analysis of the police power, this Chapter also refers briefly 
to the development of investment agreements and the protection of foreign 
investment.  
 
3.2  The Sovereignty of States: A Foundation for the Police Power 
Professor James Crawford in his inaugural lecture entitled Continuity and 
Discontinuity in International Dispute Settlement remind us of the constant 
interaction between present and past, to which international law is not an 
exception: ‘The “brave new world” of international dispute settlement turns out 
to have a great deal of the old world in to it too.’1  
Inspired by Professor Crawford’s lecture, this section suggests that old notions 
such as sovereignty have a strong influence in today’s treaty negotiations and 
dispute settlement. In the past forty years sovereignty appeared to be on the 
wane, after the negotiations that gave birth to the United Nations (UN) General 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1  James Crawford, "Continuity and Discontinuity in International Dispute Settlement: An 
Inaugural Lecture" Journal of International Dispute Settlement 1, no. 1 (2010): 4. In this context, 
he expressed that the present of public international law is seeded and nourished by old 
practices of public international law, referring specifically to the dispute settlement regime. He 
contends that international law develops ‘through processes of accumulation and accretion’ 
and, in comparison, domestic law develops by displacement of present over past uses. Ibid., 23. 
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Assembly’s resolutions on the Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources 
(PSNR) 2  and the New International Economic Order (NIEO), 3  generated 
resentment between capital importing and capital exporting countries. The 
new global dynamic, however, appeared to give place to an unprecedented 
number of agreements on economic integration and cooperation. 4 
Comparatively, such as in the area of environmental governance, States 
appear more reluctant to give up sovereignty. This confirms the perceptions 
toward their inherent power over their own natural resources and their 
attitudes towards the environment.5 This is not to say that all negotiations in 
the area of trade and investment have succeeded; in fact, many have failed 
due to a lack of consensus.6  
International lawyers may perceive sovereignty as a hurdle to cooperation and 
integration.7 States may adopt two types of approaches toward obligations 
under international law. Under the first approach, sovereignty may be invoked 
by the negotiating parties as an ex-ante preventive strategy to avoid State 
responsibility. In other words, States would prefer to refrain from entering into 
international agreements that are perceived as a hindrance to the exercise of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2  RA1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962. See Section 3.4.1.3. 
3 RA 3201 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974. See Section 3.4.1.3 
4 The Association of Southeast Asian Nations ASEAN (1967), Acuerdo de Cartagena (1969), 
Caribbean Community CARICOM (1973), MERCOSUR 1991, The Marrakech ‘WTO’ Agreement 
(1994), North American Free Trade Agreement NAFTA (1994), Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa COMESA (1994), Agreement on the European Economic Area (1994), and the 
more than 3000 International Investment Agreements recorded by the end of 2012. See United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), "Towards a New Generation of  
International Investment Policies: UNCTAD’S Fresh Approach to Multilateral Investment Policy - 
Making," (Geneva: United Nations, 2013), 4. 
5 There exist roughly 250 Multilateral Environmental Agreements, according to the World Trade 
Organisation, see http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/envir_e/envir_neg_mea_e.htm, last 
visited July 20 2013. For instance, Climate change lost three important players at its Durban, 
South Africa meeting when Canada, Japan and Russia pulled out of the Kyoto protocol in 
December 2011. For this Canada has been largely condemned, see 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/environment/2011/dec/13/canada-condemned-kyoto-climate-
treaty, last visited January 2012.  The 1997 Convention on the Law of Non-Navigational Uses of 
International Water Courses still awaits the ratification of five States to enter into force (by June 
2013). The International Convention for the Regulation of Whaling has been subject to several 
reservations and notifications of withdrawal since it was signed in 1946. Norway, Iceland, Japan 
and Canada have presented substantial oppositions to the provision of this Convention. See 
http://iwcoffice.org/_documents/ commission/convention_status.pdf, last visited February 
2012.  
6 OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment (MAI), ceased negotiations in December 2008, see 
http://www.oecd.org/daf/mai/intro.htm, last visited June 20 2013; International Trade 
Organisation, negotiated in the Havana Conference in 1947, was never ratified by its members, 
notably the United States, see 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/fact4_e.htm, last visited June 20 2013. 
The WTO Doha Round started negotiations in 2001, has proved a difficult challenge. 
7 José E. Álvarez, "The Return of the State" Minnesota Journal of International Law 20, no. 2 
(2011), 225. 
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their sovereign powers. By the second approach, sovereignty may be invoked 
as means of justification of an ex-post measure that breaches the State’s 
obligation under international agreements. Note, however, that the reasons 
why sovereign States chose one or another strategy cannot be explained from 
a purely legal perspective. On the contrary, such situations may be better 
explained under the fields of political science and international relations. 
Notwithstanding, the thesis will consider the two scenarios from a legal 
perspective. 
The first scenario – ex ante prevention of State responsibility – could be 
illustrated in the sphere of water resources management and trans-boundary 
shared water resources. As argued in Chapter II, water has a special nature 
and contrary to other parts of the environment generally, it has not been 
subject to substantive global governance. 8  During negotiations of the 
Convention on the Law of the Non-Navigational Uses of International 
Watercourses (UN Water Courses Convention) of 1997, not yet in force,9 there 
was disagreement between the negotiating parties as to the right of upstream 
countries, to ‘reasonably and equitably’ use international waters within their 
territories. This played out - in contrast - to the right invoked by downstream 
countries, not to be ‘harmed’ by upstream riparian States. 10  Sovereignty 
played a pivotal role in the negotiators’ positions, e.g. China, Turkey and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 Notwithstanding, water is part of environment, as was stated by the arbitration tribunal in the 
Iron Rhine (“Ijzeren Rijn”) Railway case, Belgium v Netherlands, Award of the Permanent Court of 
Arbitration ad hoc Arbitral Tribunal, Reports of International Arbitral Awards, United Nations, 
Volume XXVII pp.35-125, para. 58. Chapter 2 argues that the combined characteristics of water 
as a natural resources are distinct from other natural resources.  
9 For a discussion on the ratification and enter into force of the Convention see Chapter II, 
supra note 171. For a further analysis on adoption process and its obstacles see, Salman M. A. 
Salman, "The United Nations Watercourses Convention Ten Years Later: Why Has its Entry into 
Force Proven Difficult?" Water international. 32, no. 1 (2007); Alistair Rieu-Clarke and Flavia 
Rocha Loures, "Still not in Force: Should States Support the 1997 UN Watercourses 
Convention?" Review of European Community & International Environmental Law 18, no. 2 
(2009). 
10  Both ‘reasonable and equitable utilization’ and ‘no-significant harm’ are principles of 
customary international law, along with the ‘obligation to cooperate’; such principles may also 
be contained in international agreements signed by countries sharing international river basins 
at the regional and bilateral levels. These principles were adopted as substantial obligations 
under the UN Watercourses Convention. In the context of international obligations linked to the 
protection and consequent management of water resources (which are related to the quality and 
quantity of water resources that flow cross border into downstream countries), it was suggested 
in Chapter II that for the purpose of the analysis of host States’ obligations (both under 
international agreements and customary international law), the obligations of the host country 
are carried out or operated under domestic law. In fact, the management of water resources is 
undertaken at the national level and hence domestic regulation may have an impact on 
downstream countries. Substantive obligations toward neighbouring countries could constitute 
a source of conflict with other obligations acquired by host States in the area of international 
economic law. 
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Czech Republic, expressly pointed out their concerns with regard to the 
hindrance of their sovereign rights as an effect of adopting several provision of 
the UN Watercourses Convention: 
Territorial sovereignty is a basic principle of international law. A watercourse 
State enjoys indisputable territorial sovereignty over those parts of international 
watercourses that flow through its territory. It is incomprehensible and 
regrettable that the draft Convention does not affirm this principle.11    
In the context of the negotiations of the UN Watercourses Convention, State 
sovereignty, as a recognised principle of international law, is potentially an 
obstacle to the protection of fresh water resources and their sustainable use. 
The abovementioned example illustrates the sensitivity of the management of 
water resources at the national level, which may hinder overarching 
sustainability goals at the international level.12 
The second scenario – ex post States’ responsibility – could be observed in the 
ambit of economic integration, trade and investment. Currently 3196 IIAS 
(between Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs) and Free Trade Agreements 
(FTAs) have been signed up to 201213 and virtually all these agreements 
contain clauses under which States agree to refrain from adopting measures 
that could negatively affect investors’ property rights. Capital exporting 
countries proposed tight standards of investment protection in order to 
guarantee an adequate environment for their national investors. Professor 
Alvarez points out, for instance, that the 1984 US BIT Model is ‘highly 
investor-protective’.14 Furthermore, the BIT between Cuba and Cambodia has 
adopted a similar investor-protective model, and China has adopted BITs 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 Statement of the representative of China, Official Records of the United Nations Conference 
on the Convention on the law of the non-navigational uses of international watercourses (United 
Nations, General Assembly, A/51/PV.99: New York), May 12, 1997, 6. See also the Statements 
of Turkey, Ibid, 5 and Rwanda, Ibid, 12. 
12 In the specific case of water resources governance, the discussion is relevant, for it is 
generally argued that water management should be undertaken from the lowest level i.e. a 
bottom up approach. This implies that the regulation of water resources should be designed 
and adopted at the local or national level, in principle, giving States an ample margin of 
discretion in the manner they allocate and regulate water resources. Such recognition is not 
contested in principle, as one of the main attributes of State sovereignty is the prima facie 
exclusive jurisdiction over a territory and the population therein (See Brownlie: Principles of 
International Law 290). 
13 United Nations Conference on Trade and  Development (UNCTAD), "World Investment Report 
2013. Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development", (Geneva: UNCTAD, 2013), 
101. 
14 José E. Álvarez, "A BIT on Custom" New York University journal of international law and 
politics New York University Journal of International Law and Politics 42, no. 1 (2009), 13. 
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similar to the US Model.15 In addition, multilateral agreements such as the 
Energy Charter Treaty (ECT) contain expansive provisions on the definition of 
protected investment and also include the Hull formula of full, prompt and 
adequate compensation. Notably, however, the international investment 
regime seems to be experiencing some discontent in both developed and 
developing counties. Recently Venezuela, Ecuador, Argentina and Bolivia have 
criticised the regime after being subject to a number of investors’ claims that 
have resulted in awards in the millions being rendered against these States.16 
Yet, it is not only developing countries that have had second thoughts 
regarding their investment agreements. The US and Canada, for instance, 
have also been subject to a number of claims for breaches of their 
international obligations under the NAFTA Chapter 11.17 Further, recently 
Germany and Spain have been subject to claims under the ECT.18 Such a 
situation appears to have put in perspective the need for revisiting the 
regulatory prerogatives of States.19 
This work focuses on the dispute settlement stage of investment agreements. 
It suggests that a State’s failure to comply with both economic integration and 
environmental governance agreements is often shielded behind the State’s 
sovereignty. The meaning of sovereignty, however, appears to have shifted 
from past nationalistic and political conceptions of sovereignty, such as the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
15 See ibid., 13, fn 115. He compares the expansive definition of protected investment contained 
in the Cuba-Cambodia BIT of 2001. See Agreement between the Government of the Kingdom of 
Cambodia and the Government of the Republic of Cuba Concerning the Promotion and 
Protection of Investments, Cambodia-Cuba, Article 1 I (1), May 28, 2001, available at 
http://www.unctad.org/sections/dite/iia/ docs/bits/cuba_cambodia.pdf, last visited August 2 
2013. 
16 By 2011 Argentina’s Award liabilities reached closed to 430 Million US Dollars (plus interest), 
see IA Reporter, ‘Argentina by the numbers: Where Things Stand with Investment Treaty Claims 
arising out of the Argentine Financial Crisis’, February 1, 2011. Available at: 
www.iareporter.com/articles/20110201_9, last visited July 9, 2013. In October 2012 Occidental 
Petroleum Corporation was awarded 1.77 Billion US Dollars (without interest), in the case 
followed against the government of Ecuador, see Tai-Heng Cheng and Lucas Bento, ‘ICSID’s 
Largest Award in History: An Overview of Occidental Petroleum Corporation v the Republic of 
Ecuador’, Investment Arbitration Blog, December 19, 2012. Available at: 
http://kluwerarbitrationblog.com/blog/2012/12/19/icsids-largest-award-in-history-an-
overview-of-occidental-petroleum-corporation-v-the-republic-of-ecuador/, last visited April 4 
2013.  
17 See for instance: Chemtura Corporation v Canada, Ad hoc—UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Award signed 
2 August 2010, Methanex Corp. v. United States of America Ad hoc—UNCITRAL (NAFTA), 3 August 
2005, Glamis Gold Ltd. v United States of America, under UNICTRAL Rules, Sun Belt v Her 
Majesty the Queen (Government of Canada), (NAFTA Chapter 11, under UNCITRAL Rules), among 
others. 
18 Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG, Vattenfall Europe Generation AG v Federal Republic of 
Germany, (ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6); Charanne (the Netherlands) and Construction Investments 
(Luxembourg) v Spain, under SCC rules, 2013 (not public). 
19 See Álvarez, "The Return of the State"; Álvarez, "A BIT on Custom". 
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PSNR, to a somewhat nuanced perspective of regulatory prerogatives that aim 
to protect the public interest.  
It is appropriate to address some of the meanings of the principle of 
sovereignty, and how these meanings affect the perception of the community 
toward sovereignty. Professor Henkin describes the ‘S word’ as an ‘illegitimate 
offspring’, subject to several meanings, some of them even ‘destructive of 
human values’. 20  There are difficulties in approaching the meaning of 
sovereignty under a single discipline of knowledge, for sovereignty belongs to 
the realm of law as much as it belongs to the realms of politics and 
international relations. As expressed above the realms of politics and 
international relations are beyond the scope of this work; however their 
perspectives may provide some further understanding of the principle.21  
Professor Koskenniemi, for example, approaches the origins of sovereignty 
from legal as well as political perspectives through the ideas of Kelsen and 
Schmidt. Kelsen explained sovereignty as a creation of the law, which has 
granted the State a number of rights and freedoms to be exercised within the 
limits of the law. Conversely, Schmidt explained sovereignty as a factual truth, 
independent of any other external factor. Professor Koskenniemi asserts that 
the objectivity or subjectivity of each approach to sovereignty contradicts one 
another, and while it is arguable that both cannot coexist, they cannot fully 
nullify each other, and thus sovereignty oscillates between both law and fact:22  
In general, law and politics have similarities and differences. They are similar in 
that they are broadly concerned with the problem of power. The definition of 
politics should probably be partly included in the definition of law because it 
certainly seems that all law is politics but not all politics is law.23  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 L. Henkin, "That "S" Word: Sovereignty, and Globalization, and Human Rights, Et Cetera" 
Fordham Law Review 68, no. 1 (1999), 1. For discussions on the positive and negative meaning 
of sovereignty, see Martti Koskenniemi, "What Use for Sovereignty Today?" Asian Journal of 
International Law I (2011).  
21 Currently, there appears to be new attempts to approach the principle sovereignty – as well 
as other several notions– from an interdisciplinary perspective. See for example, Winston P. 
Nagan and Craig Hammer, "The Changing Character of Sovereignty in International Law and 
International Relations" Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 43, no. 1 (2004): 2. Antony 
Anghie, Imperialism, Sovereignty, and the Making of International Law  (Cambridge, UK; New 
York, NY: Cambridge University Press, 2005). Martti Koskenniemi, The gentle civilizer of nations : 
the rise and fall of international law, 1870-1960  (Cambridge, UK; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, 2002). 
22 See Martti Koskenniemi, From apology to utopia  (New York: Cambridge University Press, 
2005). 
23 Nagan and Hammer, "The Changing Character of Sovereignty in International Law and 
International Relations", 146, fn.21. 
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The relevance of the abovementioned approach becomes apparent as the 
meanings of sovereignty differ, serving the needs and values of States. 24 These 
needs and values have a spatial, temporal and cultural component. In sum, 
they are all contextual in outlook. Professor Nagan identifies thirteen 
meanings of sovereignty,25 ranging from monarchic exercise of power to basic 
governance competencies, all of them having a historical or contemporary use. 
A similar approach is adopted by Alison Von Rosenvinge, who proposes a 
framework of three ‘ideal types’ in which the notion of sovereignty is 
subsumed: i) ‘the prince’ where the supreme power of the State requires no 
justification, ii) ‘the protector’ as the power justifying the ability to protect the 
State’s citizens from internal and external threats, and iii) ‘the citizen’ as 
holder of rights and obligations granted by a larger – perhaps international – 
community. These three types are suggested as a workable language that has 
been used by the International Court of Justice (ICJ) in the analysis of several 
cases.26  The aim is not to answer what sovereignty is, but how in fact it 
works.27    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
24 The Treaty of Westphalia of 1648 brought to an end the 30 Years War in Europe. Sovereignty 
was understood in the context of religious equality among States, and as independence from the 
church and the freedom to govern within their respective territories. ‘By specifying which 
sovereign ruled which lands, the Westphalian model linked sovereignty and territory, and thus 
attempted to fix domestic sovereignty among European belligerents. But its primary concern 
was the independence of the sovereign’s State from the pope and other rival authorities’. See 
Douglas Howland and Luise White, "The state of sovereignty territories, laws, populations," 
Indiana University Press, available at: 
http://public.eblib.com/EBLPublic/PublicView.do?ptiID=437616, last visited 10 July 2011. 
With regard to the influential effect of the Westphalia Treaty in current international law, Gross 
asserts that Westphalia constitutes a milestone in the separation of international law from 
religion.  See Leo Gross, "The Peace of Westphalia, 1648-1948" American Journal of International 
Law 42, no. 1 (1948), 26. 
25 Sovereignty as a personalized monarch (real or ritualized); Sovereignty as absolute, unlimited 
control or power; Sovereignty as political legitimacy; Sovereignty as political authority; 
Sovereignty as self-determined, national independence; Sovereignty as governance and 
constitutional order; Sovereignty as a criterion of jurisprudential validation of all law 
(Grundnorm, rule of recognition, sovereign); Sovereignty as the juridical personality of sovereign 
equality; Sovereignty as international recognition; Sovereignty as a formal unit of a legal system; 
Sovereignty as legal immunities; Sovereignty as jurisdictional competence to make and/or apply 
law; and Sovereignty as basic governance competencies (constitutive process).  
26 See Legality of the Use by a State of Nuclear Weapons in Armed Conflict, Advisory Opinion, 
1996, I.C.J. 68 (July 8); Fisheries Jurisdiction Case, (Spain v. Canada), 1998 9 (Dec. 4); 
Construction of Wall, Advisory Opinion, 2004 I.C.J. 9 (July 9); The Gabcikovo-­‐Nagymaros 
Project, (Hungary v Slovakia), 1997 I.C.J. 32 (Sept. 25); Application of the Convention on the 
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia & Herzegovina v Serbia & 
Montenegro), 2007 I.C.J. 23 (Feb. 26). 
27 D. Alison Von Rosenvigne, "Creating a working vocabulary of sovereignty language at the 
international court of justice" Comparative Research in Law & Political Economy, Network. CLPE 
Research Paper 05/2010 6, no. 2 (2010), 1.  
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The classification proposed by Von Rosenvinge is useful in the analysis of the 
different ways in which States, investors and arbitrators may perceive 
sovereignty. Host States appear to play the role of the ‘protector’ when 
adopting measures deemed to pursue the general welfare e.g. water resources 
management intended to achieve long-term sustainability. The exercise of 
sovereignty under this point of view may involve limiting the liberties of 
individuals in order to protect the interest of a much larger portion of society. 
Such prerogatives can be found in the doctrines of the police power and 
eminent domain.  
The same measure, however, from the investor’s perspective may be 
considered as a unilateral act of the State, exercising its supreme power as 
‘the prince’. This approach inherently involves the Hobbesian model of 
protection and obedience, and thus the power of the prince can hardly be 
contested. Looking at the function of sovereignty from this perspective, the 
past and present concerns over political and regulatory risk become apparent. 
Investors and their home States assessed these risks before embarking on the 
negotiation of investment treaties and contracts containing standards of 
treatment and stabilization clauses, aiming to avoid the negative effects of the 
exercise of this type of sovereignty.28   
It is arguable that in the sphere of investor-State arbitration the ultimate 
meaning of sovereignty may be provided through the interpretation of an 
arbitral tribunal. This approach looks at state sovereignty as the ‘citizen’, 
under which it functions as a member of a larger international community 
with rights and obligations. The rationale behind this approach could be found 
in the decision of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in the 
SS Wimbledon of 1923: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
28 In this regard, political and regulatory risk involving foreign investment, have been long 
discussed, as a major source of investment instability. In order to curb these risks, investors 
and their home-States negotiated stabilisation clauses in concession contracts, as well as 
standards of protection in IIAs. Prosper Weil addressed the case of ‘stabilization clauses’ in 
concession contracts for the exploitation of natural resources. Weil identifies two types of 
clauses: i) stabilisation clauses per se, limiting the legislative risk, whereby States may modify 
the contract by a legislative action; ii) Clauses D’intagibilite, which seek to limit the exercise of 
the public authority of the State. See Prosper Weil, "Les Clauses de Stabilisation ou 
D'intangibilité Insérées dans les Accords de Développement Economiques", in Mélanges offerts à 
Charles Rousseau: La Communauté Internationale, ed. Mélanges Rousseau (Charles) (Paris: 
Editions A. Pedone, 1974). See also A. Z. El Chiati, Protection of investment in the context of 
petroleum agreements, vol. 204, Recueil des Cours (The Hague: The Hague Academy of 
International Law, 1987). As regards the shift from political risk to regulatory risk see, Wälde 
and Dow, "Treaties and Regulatory Risk in Infrastructure Investment. The Effectiveness of 
International Law Disciplines versus Sanctions by Global Markets in Reducing the Political and 
Regulatory Risk for Private Infrastructure Investment". 
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The Court declines to see, in the conclusion of any treaty by which a State 
undertakes to perform or refrain from performing a particular act, an abandonment 
of its sovereignty … the right of entering into international engagements is an 
attribute of State sovereignty. 29  
When States give up their sovereign prerogatives because they are sovereign 
enough to do so, their prerogatives are reduced and substituted with 
obligations of not-to-do.30 However, those prior prerogatives of action may be 
later deemed necessary to address unforeseeable circumstances. The 
Argentinean financial crisis illustrates this situation, where the country was 
found in breach of its international obligations to protect foreign direct 
investment due to measures adopted to tackle the crisis. Some of the arbitral 
tribunals constituted to decide the investment disputes – between investors 
and Argentina – understood that the State – as a citizen – was prevented from 
exercising regulatory prerogatives under the provisions of the BITs. However, a 
number of ICSID annulment committees disagreed with some of these arbitral 
tribunal decisions. The annulment committees observed that the obligation to 
protect foreign investment could not always ‘trump’ the sovereign obligation to 
protect the population in the face of a fundamental crisis.  
Similarly, arbitral tribunals have read the exercise of the regulatory 
prerogatives of States as being in conflict with other international obligations, 
but have found that such exercise did not breach those commitments. This 
inconsistency among tribunals may have raised a sense of unpredictability 
within the international investment community as to when a State’s exercise 
of its sovereignty breaches an obligation and when the exercise thereof 
escapes the consequences of such a breach. The question arises as to whether 
there is the emergence of a new understanding of sovereignty, or as 
Koskenniemi inquires, what is the use of sovereignty today.31 
Despite the undeniably high degree of global governance and transnational 
harmonization and cooperation, communities still share ties made of values 
and common concerns and preferences. Such values are reflected in the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
29 S.S. Wimbledon (U.K. v. Germany), 1923 P.C.I.J. (ser. A) No. 1 (Aug. 17), para. 35. On this case 
see also Ian Brownlie, Principles of public international law, 7th ed. (Oxford: Oxford University 
Press, 2008), 290; Koskenniemi, "What Use for Sovereignty Today?"; Álvarez, "The Return of the 
State"; Jan Klabbers, "Clinching the Concept of Sovereignty: Wimbledon Redux" Austrian Review 
of International and European Law 3, no. 3 (1998). 
30 See the case Nationality Decrees Issued in Tunis and Morocco (French Zone) on November 8th, 
1921, Advisory Opinion, [1922] P.C.I.J. 3, 23-4.  
31 See Koskenniemi, "What Use for Sovereignty Today?". 
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internal sovereignty of States – under a democratic process – thus, affirming a 
better understanding of this principle:  
A vocabulary for articulating alternative preferences and for carrying out 
(strategic) manoeuvres in order to limit the powers of global executive classes and 
expert groups. This would mean, inevitably, highlighting the importance of the 
vocabulary of political sovereignty as the expression of local values and 
preferences as well as traditions of self-rule, autonomy, and continuous political 
contestation.32 
In this vein, a new meaning of sovereignty may be seeking to meet newly 
embraced values. What we today understand as legitimate may be the right to 
participate fully and freely in the government’s decisions of what is good for 
us, and what we understand by human and economic development.  
Professor Reisman raises two relevant issues when considering the increasing 
influence of international investment law on the administrative domestic 
frameworks of host States which appear problematic. On the first point, he 
refers to the growing tendency of States to shift from the laissez-faire model to 
a regulatory one, driven by environmental, social and economic concerns. On 
the second point, he holds that concerns from civil society groups and the 
increasing empowerment they have received, permits their increased influence 
on governments’ decision-making, which may not always be in line with the 
governments’ preferred policy choices.33  
3.3  The Police Power 
This section revisits the regulatory prerogative (police power) of States in the 
context of indirect expropriation (also referred to as regulatory takings and/or 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
32 Ibid., 68. 
33 William Michael Reisman, "The Evolving International Standard and Sovereignty", (paper 
presented at the The Future of International Law, Washington DC, 2007), 464. On this point, 
there are nowadays various examples of dichotomies between preferred governmental policies 
and communities/civil society’s preferences, i.e. the Bolivian government has launched a project 
for the construction of a highway in the northern part of Bolivia, which will connect Villa 
Tunari-Cochabamba –in the central Antes part- to Trinidad-Beni –the amazon region- which is 
much less connected from the rest of the country. The project is opposed by native 
communities, which allege the project goes through Isiboro Secure National park and the 
communities’ territories: http://www.lostiempos.com/diario/actualidad/economia/20110816/ 
tipnis-marcha-indigena-avanza-26-kilometros-y-llega-al-rio_137996_282218.html. Likewise, 
Peru has launched a large irrigation project and the construction of a dam in the Province of 
Espinar. Communities allege that the project will divert their water resources, with negative 
consequences for the agriculture and other uses. Discussions between government and 
communities have come into conflict and have brought unrest to the region. See:  
http://www.bnamericas.com/news/waterandwaste/Angostura-Siguas_group_wins_Majes-
Siguas_II_concession1; http://climate-connections.org/2010/09/18/repress ion-over-water-in-
peru/. Last visited 12 March, 2013. 
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de facto expropriation). The purpose of this section and the following ones are 
to serve three objectives: i) to trace the very essence of the police power, ii) to 
examine how it is assessed by arbitral awards, and iii) to enable the 
development of a framework of analysis in order to assess the legitimate 
exercise of police power in the context of water resources-related investment 
disputes. 
The adoption of the police power as a conceptual framework in this Chapter is 
based on the following reasons: i) it constitutes the corollary – within the 
internal sovereignty of States – for the exercise of regulatory prerogatives and 
the protection of public welfare (e.g. health, safety and the environment), ii) it 
cannot be derogated from, and its exercise is pivotal for the internal 
functioning of States, and iii) it cannot be subject to the payment of 
compensation because a State should not buy out its inherent right to 
regulate, provided that such regulation does not constitute a disguised act of 
expropriation.34 In this light, this following chapter depicts how the police 
power can inform the analysis of indirect expropriation in the context of water-
related investment disputes.  
The origin of the term ‘police’ can be traced back to ancient Greece. The term 
polis means cities and government. The social contract theories that 
flourished during the 1600s and 1700s underlined the idea of authority, 
protection and order. The Hobbesian, as well as the Lockean social models, 
while having opposed nature, both deal with the need to defer power to an all-
powerful sovereign/government. This need in both cases could be identified as 
the anxiety for self-preservation in the idea of Hobbes, and the need for 
stability and protection of private property in the case of Locke. Ultimately, in 
both societies there is a willingness to give up the natural freedom for 
governance and direction in the form of rights and obligations.  
The sovereign of Hobbes (Leviathan) does not recognise control over himself 
because he is the law. However, the government under the Lockean model, 
which is underpinned by the consent of the majority, introduces a sovereign 
that is beholden to itself through a separation of powers that gives different 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
34 The prerogative of States to expropriate private property is recognised under their eminent 
domain, such prerogative is recognised under most Constitutions, and when there is no 
Constitution under other legislative acts. The same provisions that allow expropriation by the 
states, stipulate strict conditions for the protection of private property, amongst which is the 
payment of compensation.  
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branches of government the power to watch over each other. 35 Interestingly, 
Locke’s federal arrangement grants the executive branch of government with a 
doctrine of prerogative that can be used to regulate in the absence of the law or 
even against the law, namely ‘the power of doing public good without a rule’, 
‘also referred to as the preservation of human life’36. Such a prerogative has 
been compared with the modern notion of ‘eminent domain’.37 It follows that 
abuse of power by the executive branch is not only possible but also likely; 
and therefore needs additional safeguards for instances where the executive’s 
prerogative is exceeded. However, this thesis will not attempt a full analysis of 
sovereignty through the perspective of political philosophy. This brief reference 
to the social contract, through Hobbes and Locke, attempts to draw a line of 
similarity across two opposite views of the nature of humankind and the origin 
of governments. It suggests that there is a common acceptance of an 
overarching power to organise the functioning of societies, which provides a 
basic justification for the police power of States.  
The next Section addresses the development of the police power in the US. 
This thesis suggests that various parallels could be drawn between current 
conflicts arising from regulatory activity in the context of international 
investment law, and two spheres of government of the US, namely State and 
Federation. 
 
3.3.1 The Police Power in the United States 
The term ‘police power’ was coined by the US Supreme Court,38 and its notion 
is the result of the then evolving relationship between the States’ and the 
Union’s powers and the idea of residual sovereignty.39 Such a relationship 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35  See Alex Tuckness, "Locke's Political Philosophy", ed. Edward N. Zalta, The Stanford 
Encyclopedia of Philosophy (http://plato.stanford.edu/archives/win2012/entries/locke-
political/ Winter 2012). 
36 ‘Locke’s understanding of separation of powers is complicated by the doctrine of prerogative. 
Prerogative is the right of the executive to act without explicit authorization for a law, or even 
contrary to the law, in order to better fulfil the laws that seek the preservation of human life.’ 
(Two Treatises 1.159 – 1.167), ibid., 6. 
37 Steven Smith, ‘Locke, The American Regime and the Current State of Political Philosophy’, 
Lectures on Political Philosophy, (Open Yale Courses). Available at: 
http://oyc.yale.edu/political-science/plsc-114/lecture-17, last visited July 30, 2013.   
38 Brown v. Maryland - 25 US 419 (1827), March 12 1827. 
39 As Denny asserts the term was not articulated until later the notion was developed: ‘The term 
is nowhere found in our Constitution, and it first appears in our jurisprudence slightly less 
than one hundred years ago. It found no place in Bouvier's Law Dictionary until 1883, and the 
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could be compared with the one between international and national law. Two 
notions are relevant from those addressed by the framers of the US 
Constitution:  
The first notion is the division of sovereignty, where a federation receives the power to 
regulate over those matters of general interest for the union, and the individual states 
receive the residual sovereignty to regulate all other matters related to the interest of its 
citizens. This constitutes the origin of the police power and eminent domain.40  
The second notion, inherited from Blackwell, is the doctrine of vested rights,41 
which is recognised in the US Constitution, but was later overridden by the 
general principle of public interest.42 In this regard, Mendelson asserts that 
‘no society, certainly no democracy, could thrive on the pristine simplicity of 
such a foundation. Even Marshall came by degrees to recognize that…’.43  
The US Supreme Court not only applied and interpreted the law, it also 
became a policy maker, as its decisions appear to reflect the changing needs of 
a given context and time. In this regard, while the constitutional jurisprudence 
is rich in its dealings with the police power and the delineation of its notions, 
this section addresses a few cases relevant to understand the origin of the 
police power in the North American tradition.  
In Dartmouth College v Woodward,44 where public education was at stake, the 
Court acknowledged the notion of the police power without explicitly referring 
to the term. By upholding its previous judgment in Fletcher v Peck45 (on the 
protection of vested rights), the Court stated:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
United States Digest did not contain it until 1879. See Collins Denny, "The Growth and 
Development of the Police Power of the State" Michigan Law Review 20, no. 2 (1921), 173.  
40 Ibid. 
41 Blackstone on the absolute rights of individuals: ‘For the principal aim of society is to protect 
individuals in the enjoyment of those absolute rights, which were vested in them by the 
immutable laws of nature, but which could not be preserved in peace without that mutual 
assistance and intercourse which is gained by the institution of friendly and social 
communities’. See William Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England, vol. Available at: 
http://oll.libertyfund.org/index.php?option=com_content&task=view&id=1415&Itemid=262, 
Vol. 1 - Books I & II. Chapter  I (1893). In the context of the US Jurisprudence, see Justice 
Marshall’s Opinion in Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, (U.S. 1810), 136. 
42 On this guarantee, it is useful to refer to the Fourteen Amendment of the US Constitution, an 
extended commentary can be found at: http://www.gpo.gov/fdsys/pkg/GPO-CONAN-
1992/pdf/GPO-CONAN-1992-10-15.pdf, last visited April 20, 2013. 
43 Wallace Mendelson, "New Light on Fletcher v. Peck and Gibbons v. Ogden" The Yale Law 
Journal 58, no. 4 (1949), 572. 
44 Dartmouth College v Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 629 (U.S. 1819). 
45 Fletcher v Peck shows a strong conviction in favour of the principle of vested rights that the 
US Supreme Court under the presidency of Chief Justice Marshall held. In Marshall’s opinion: 
‘Conveyances have been made, those conveyances have vested legal State, and, if those States 
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The framers of the Constitution did not intend to restrain the States in the 
regulation of their civil institutions adopted for internal government, and that the 
instrument they have given us is not to be so construed is admitted.46  
In Gibbons v Ogden,47 Chief Justice Marshall appears to delineate the notion of 
the police power: ‘the acknowledged power of the State to regulate its police, 
its domestic trade and to govern its own citizens may enable it to legislate on 
this subject to a considerable extent’.48 However, in Charles River Bridge v 
Warren Bridge,49 Chief Justice Taney presented a new interpretation toward 
the inherent power of States:  
No one will question that the interests of the great body of the people of the State 
would, in this instance, be affected by the surrender of this great line of travel to a 
single corporation, with the right to exact toll and exclude competition for seventy 
years. While the rights of private property are sacredly guarded, we must not 
forget that the community also have rights, and that the happiness and wellbeing 
of every citizen depends on their faithful preservation… We cannot deal thus with 
the rights reserved to the States, and, by legal intendments and mere technical 
reasoning, take away from them any portion of that power over their own internal 
police and improvement, which is so necessary to their wellbeing and prosperity.50  
The debate between the protection of vested rights and the power of states to 
regulate per se, briefly discussed above, was eventually settled between the 
States and the Union, and such prerogative was widely recognised in favour of 
States as their residual sovereignty. The scope of the police power of the States 
may well be matter of another discussion.  
Ernest Freund identified three spheres of activity under the scope of the police 
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may be seized by the sovereign authority, still that they originally vested is a fact, and cannot 
cease to be a fact. When, then, a law is in its nature a contract, when absolute rights have 
vested under that contract, a repeal of the law cannot divest those rights; and the act of 
annulling them, if legitimate, is rendered so by a power applicable to the case of every individual 
in the community. It may well be doubted whether the nature of society and of government does 
not prescribe some limits to the legislative power; and, if any be prescribed, where are they to be 
found if the property of an individual, fairly and honestly acquired, may be seized without 
compensation?’ Fletcher v. Peck, 10 U.S. (6 Cranch) 87, (U.S. 1810), 136. 
46 Dartmouth College v Woodward, 4 Wheat. 518, 629 (U.S. 1819). See also Mendelson, "New 
Light on Fletcher v. Peck and Gibbons v. Ogden", 567-68. 
47 Gibbons v Ogden 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1(U.S.1824).   
48 In this case the Court historically brought to an end the monopoly over the Hudson River, 
under the commerce clause, turning down an injunction of Court Chancery of New York, 
banning Gibbons to navigate in the said River. See Gibbons v Ogden 22 U.S. (9 Wheat.) 
1(U.S.1824).   
49 Charles River Bridge v Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837). 
50 Charles River Bridge v Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 420 (1837), at 36. Some commentators argue 
that Tanney’s views were aimed at protecting the regulatory faculties of the States. See 
Mendelson, "New Light on Fletcher v. Peck and Gibbons v. Ogden", 573, footnote 24. 
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conceded sphere affecting safety, order and morals, under the type of 
restrictive legislation which appears to broaden as activities increase, ii) a 
debatable sphere, linked to the generation and distribution of wealth, for 
which legislation was still incipient, and iii) an exempt sphere, developing 
under the principle of individual liberty, linked to moral, intellectual and 
political movements:51  
The exercise of the police power for the protection of safety, order, and morals, 
constitutes the police in the primary or narrower sense of the term. It is a power 
so vital to the community that it is often conceded to local authorities of limited 
powers. It is the police power in this narrower sense of the term, which the 
Supreme Court of the United States concedes on principle to the States, even 
where its exercise affects interstate and foreign commerce.52 
Interestingly, more than hundred years have passed since Freund identified 
this sphere of interest, and perhaps the only clear addition to it has come in 
the form of environmental protection. It is of course true that the elements of 
the conceded sphere are broad and virtually every regulatory measure may fall 
under such categories. The police power could then be narrowly linked to 
regulations of negative obligation or obligations of omission:  
Under the police power, rights of property are impaired not because they become 
useful or necessary to the public, or because some public advantage can be 
gained by disregarding them, but because their free exercise is believed to be 
detrimental to public interests; it may be said that the State takes property by 
eminent domain because it is useful to the public, and under the police power 
because it is harmful.53 
Over the past century, regulations put in place under the scope of the police 
power have exponentially grown in number as well as in complexity. Joseph 
Sax applies a broader approach than that of Freund, asserting that, while 
there is no definition of police power, the notion generally relates to the 
‘prohibitions which are valid and which may be invoked without payment of 
compensation’. He confirms that the use of the notion of the police power is 
commonly employed to protect safety, health and morals, but notes 
nonetheless that such scope was not intended to be exclusive to those narrow 
uses.54  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
51 Ernst Freund, "The police power public policy and constitutional rights", (Chicago: Callaghan 
& Company, 1904), 11. 
52 Ibid., 10. 
53 Ibid., 546-47. 
54 See Sax, "Takings and the Police Power", 36. 
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In 1922 the US Supreme Court in Pennsylvania adopted an important 
decision in the case of Pennsylvania Coal Co. v Mahon.55 The Mahons had 
prevented the Pennsylvania Coal Company from mining under their property 
and removing the supports, seeking to prevent to subsidence of their property. 
The Supreme Court of the State of Pennsylvania had decided – on appeal – 
that the mining company had protected contract and property rights, under 
the protection of the Constitution of the United States. The Court, however, 
asserted that the Kohler Act56 was a legitimate exercise of the police powers of 
the State.57  In the words of Fischel:  
Holmes was willing to cut the government a lot of slack. The diminution in the value of 
the asset affected by the new regulation had to be sizable before the Court would be 
interested. This off-hand qualification is the source of the “diminution in value test”, 
one of several unweighted criteria by an attorney can supposedly determine when a 
regulation becomes a taking. Far more significant was that Holmes disallowed the 
argument that all property is held under the “implied limitation” of police power 
regulations.58 
The ‘diminution of value’ test advanced by Holmes in Pennsylvania Coal was 
further developed in 1978 in the case Penn Central Transportation v New 
York.59  
The Penn Central Transportation Company was the owner of the historic 
Grand Central Terminal, which had been designated as a landmark of the city 
of New York by the Landmark Preservation Commission. As a result, the 
Company could not transform or destroy the exterior of the building without 
the approval of the Commission. When Penn Central sought to sell its rights to 
build structures above its terminal, the Commission stopped the sale, stating 
that it would constitute a breach of the regulations. Penn Central sued the 
commission, alleging taking of its property without compensation; but it lost 
the case. On appeal, the New York Supreme Court of Appeals ruled in favour 
of the city. The US Supreme Court confirmed the judgement, issuing – in an 
opinion written by Justice Brennan – a test to determine when a regulation 
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55 Pennsylvania Coal Co. V. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) 260 U.S. 393, Decision of December 11, 
1922. 
56 The Kohler Act forbade the mining of Anthracite or hard coal to prevent subsidence of 
structures destined to human habitation.  
57 William A. Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics and Politics  (Cambridge: Harvard 
University Press, 1995), 15. 
58 Ibid., 16. 
59 Penn Central Transportation Co v New York City, 366 N.E. 2d 1271 (NY 1977), affirmed 438 
U.S. 104 (1978). 
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generation of IIAs to determine the existence of an indirect expropriation:60 i) 
the character of the governmental measure, ii) interference with investment-
backed expectations, and iii) extent of the diminution of value.61   
This brief reference to the North American tradition supports the conclusion 
that many similarities could be drawn between the development of the police 
power in the US jurisprudence and the treatment of the police power in the 
context of indirect expropriation in International Investment Law. Perhaps the 
most important value of the United States’ tradition of police power is the 
historical one, because it provides a proper understanding of the underlying 
issues that preceded its current shape. The struggles between the 
Constitutional provisions of the United States, such as the commerce clause, 
and the residual power of States, could be compared with current struggles 
between the provisions of IIAs and the host States’ prerogatives to regulate. In 
sum the overview is an important step in the revisit of the police power of 
states.   
 
3.3.2 The Civil Law Traditions of Latin American Countries 
The police power is common to most judicial systems; notwithstanding it is 
referred to with different names (e.g. state prerogative to regulate, or 
regulatory powers). Authors familiar with the civil law tradition clearly identify 
the police power within the regulatory prerogatives of the executive branch. 
Some civil law traditions find additional sources for the exercise of the police 
power in the faculties of the administration to clarify the limits of individual 
rights as guaranteed by the normative system. These faculties of the 
administration may be the result of a somewhat discretionary competence 
entrenched in the same normative system, thus imposing on society some 
negative obligations.62 The German approach to the police power considers Ius 
Politae, which argues for the general welfare and the public interest.    
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 The inspiration drawn from the test adopted in Penn Central v New York will be addressed in 
Chapter 4. See also Section 3.4.2.3 
61 The test of Penn Central has been criticised by Fischel as vague, because its elements of 
analysis – in his view – do not give enough information to predict a decision. Moreover, 
according to Fischel the Court did not state the weight that each criterion should be given by a 
court.  See Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics and Politics, 50-51. 
62  Polícia administrativa é a atividade administrativa, exercitada sob previsão legal, com 
fundamento numa supremacia geral da Administração, e que tem por objeto ou reconhecer os 
confins dos direitos, através de um processo, meramente interpretativo, quando é derivada de 
uma competência vinculada, ou delinear os contornos dos direitos, assegurados no sistema 
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In contrast, Agustin Gordillo – an Argentinean scholar – asserts that to date 
there is no independent notion of the police power. He claims that such a 
notion has been distributed across all regulatory activities of the State where it 
is acting within the sphere of its own prerogatives as provided in the law. At 
the core of the police power seems to be the limitation of individual liberties. In 
this regard, Gordillo argues that this is an old doctrine that should be 
derogated altogether in order to give a place to the protection of the freedoms 
of individuals as a doctrinal rule, and the limitation of their enjoyment shall 
then become the exception to such rule. 
 
3.3.3 The Police Power as ‘Limitation’ of Individual Freedoms: 
What is the Limit to the ‘Limitation’?  
It has been proposed above that the police power constitutes a corollary to the 
internal sovereignty of States. Yet, as suggested by Gordillo at the end of the 
previous Section, such a prerogative ought to be scrutinized so that 
constitutional guarantees of freedom remain protected to a reasonable extent. 
While the police power pursues the protection of the public interest, by means 
– generally – of limiting individual freedoms, of both natural and legal persons, 
it is not clear whether the police power constitutes a rule or an exception. In 
other words the question arises as to whether the purpose of regulatory 
prerogatives is the limitation of individual freedoms or to guarantee and 
secure the enjoyment of such individual freedom.  
The answer to this question may become relevant regarding the level of 
scrutiny to which governmental measures could be subject. General 
administrative law would examine the following: i) whether the authority has 
the mandate to adopt the regulatory measure under scrutiny, ii) whether the 
purpose of such regulation aims to protect the public interest, and iii) whether 
the goal of the regulation has been achieved in a proportional manner. 
Further, and for the purpose of the impact of the exercise of the police power 
in international law, two additional elements appear to be relevant: i) whether 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
normativo, quando resultante de uma competência discricionária, a fim de adequá-los aos 
demais valores albergados no mesmo sistema, impondo aos administrados uma obrigação de 
não fazer. See Clóvis Beznos, Poder de polícia (São Paulo-Brazil: Revista dos Tribunais 1979), 
76. (Police power is the administrative activity, exercised under the law and supported by the 
supremacy of the General Administration. It aims to delimit the rights of individuals, through a 
process merely interpretative of a broader mandate that outlines the contours of the rights of 
individuals, in order to adapt them to other values embedded in the same legal system, through 
an obligation of not-to-do.) (Author’s translation). 
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there could be a disguised aim behind the adoption of the regulatory measure, 
which may imply an undue use of the police power, and ii) whether the host 
State has provided the foreign investor with certain guarantees in regard to 
the stability of the regulatory environment, and whether the investor has a 
legitimate expectation in such a regulatory environment.  
This work suggests that the three first elements mentioned above constitute 
prima facie criteria that may shed some light on the legitimacy of the police 
power. The second group of elements – arguably more relevant in the sphere of 
international investment law – may provide additional information to the 
analysis, in order to determine whether the police power has gone too far in 
the adoption of a regulation.     
Consider, for instance, early conflicts in the US between the union and the 
states which dealt with cases where disguised actions of protectionism sought 
to enhance the economic interest of the state, as well as the development of its 
incipient industry, under the veil of public interest regulation. The assessment 
of the legitimacy and transparency of the exercise of the police power in regard 
safety or health measures, for instance, addressed the following questions:  
Does a danger exist if so is it of sufficient magnitude? does it concern the public? 
does the proposed measure tend to remove it? is the restraint or requirement in 
proportion to the danger? is it possible to secure the object sought without 
impairing essential rights and principles? does the choice of a particular measure 
show that some other interest than safety or health was the actual motive of 
legislation?63 
Parallels could be drawn with development of the European Union’s (EU) 
single market economic integration.64 Likewise, the World Trade Organization 
(WTO) has provided for general exceptions (Article XX) to the obligation under 
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT 1994). The assessment of 
governmental measures, however, is undertaken under strict rules in order to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
63 Freund, "The police power public policy and constitutional rights", 133. 
64 The European Communities, customs union and economic integration is briefly referred to in 
this work, only as an example of States’ measures adopted disguisedly to protect national 
interests, and internal industry competitiveness. See for instance Commission of the European 
Communities v Federal Republic of Germany, Case 18/87, Judgement 27 September 1988. 
(Charging of fees for inspections carried out during intra-Community transport of live animals), 
Judgment of the Court of 20 February 1979; Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für 
Branntwein (Cassis de Dijon), Case 120/78, Judgement 20 February 1979 (Measures heaving an 
effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions- Reference for a preliminary ruling: Hessisches 
Finanzgericht – Germany). 
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determine whether the measure adopted by the State does not actually 
constitute a disguised restriction to trade.65  
Similarly, when the exercise of police powers negatively affects investors’ 
property rights, the question arises as to what is the degree of deprivation of 
the investment. 66  Some arbitral tribunals have considered whether the 
regulatory measure adopted was proportionate to the aims sought by the 
governmental measure.67 In other cases, arbitral tribunals have adopted a 
broad definition of expropriation that also covers regulatory activity 
undertaken through the exercise of the police power, even when the effects of 
such an expropriation are non-discriminatory. Section 3.6 addresses the 
police power in the contexts of international law and international investment 
law. Prior to it, it is pertinent to briefly address the history of protection of 
foreign investment (Section 3.4), with special focus on the issue of 
expropriation (Section 3.5).  This work intends to contribute to the current 
debate on indirect expropriation through the lens of the exercise of the police 
power, but most importantly it aims to assist arbitrators in scrutinising the 
exercise of the police power, as applied to issue water resources management. 
In this vein, Chapter IV proposes a framework of analysis via a set of criteria 
to determine when the police power constitutes a regulation, and when such 
exercise is actually an indirect expropriation.  
 
3.3.4 Conclusions 
The notion of the police power constitutes a pivotal element of the notion of 
sovereignty. Sovereignty in turn, is the quintessential element of States’ 
political independence and territorial integrity. It follows that the police power 
endows States with legitimate authority that enables a presumption of legality 
of regulatory measures adopted to achieve social welfare. According to this 
view, the regulatory prerogative of States to regulate natural resources, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
65 Article XX (General Exceptions) of the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 1994 (GATT 
1994): ‘Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner which 
would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination between countries where 
the same conditions prevail, or a disguised restriction on international trade, nothing in this 
Agreement shall be construed to prevent the adoption or enforcement by any contracting party 
of measures …’  
66See Section 3.6. and Chapter IV Section 4.7.1 for a full account of the Level of Deprivation of 
the Investment.   
67 See for instance Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, (ICSID Case 
No. ARB(AF)/00/2), Award 29 May 2003, para. 122 
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economy, health, security and morals within its territory is not contested by 
international law, just as expropriation is not per se unlawful in international 
law. Yet, the regulatory activity may well become expropriatory, when its 
effects have gone beyond legitimate exercise of the police power. Likewise, 
expropriation may turn unlawful when the host State omits compliance with 
certain conditions such as payment of compensation. In turn, limitations to 
the regulatory prerogatives of States may be the effect of obligations acquired 
under international law – as discussed in the next Section – yet, such 
limitations may not imply a derogation of State’s sovereignty, but rather the 
effect of the exercise of State’s sovereign power.  
The question then follows as to why host States have started to perceive that 
the adoption of IIAs potentially has a chilling effect on their regulatory 
prerogatives.68 Two possible scenarios may address this inquiry. The first 
scenario relates to the negotiation and adoption of IIAs under which States 
have the opportunity to secure the exercise of their sovereignty by contracting 
out of certain prerogatives from the scope of their treaty obligations. As 
Professor Alvarez explains, several IIAs have adopted strict rules in favour of 
investors’ interests. However one could also argue that the provisions 
contained in IIAs were broad in nature, as is the case of expropriation, and 
arbitral tribunals may have interpreted them in such a way that the decision 
was beneficial to investors. Indeed, the broad interpretation of the 
expropriation standard, for instance, raised concern in developed countries 
acting as capital importing countries – e.g. US, Canada, Germany, Spain – 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
68  This argument has been put forward by various authors who address the topic of 
international investment law in the context of potential conflicts with environmental, labour and 
health legislation. See for instance Schreiber, "Realizing the Right to Water in International 
Investment Law: An Interdisciplinary Approach to BIT Obligations"; Mann, "Implications of 
International Trade and Investment Agreements for Water and Water Services: Some Responses 
from Other Sources of International Law"; Mann, "The Right of States to Regulate and 
International Investment Law"; Gus Van Harten, "Five Justifications for Investment Treaties: A 
Critical Discussion" Trade, law and development Trade, Law and Development 2, no. 1 (2010); 
Lorenzo Cotula, "Stabilization Clauses and the Evolution of Environmental Standards in Foreign 
Investment Contracts" Yearbook of International Environmental Law 17(2006); Cumming and 
Froehlich, "NAFTA Chapter XI and Canada's Environmental Sovereignty: Investment Flows, 
Article 1110 and Alberta's Water Act". On the issue see also the cases raised by Canada in Sun 
Belt, and in fuel additives. Recently in May 2012, the Czech Republic announced its plan to 
approve a moratorium on shale gas exploration that would ban research projects for nearly two 
years. The Minister of Energy in this expressed his concern about potential arbitration cases 
against the Czech Republic due to insufficient and flawed legislation. See 
 The Prague Post, Residents reject shale gas drilling, May 16 2012. Available at: 
http://www.praguepost.com/business/13127-residents-reject-shale-gas-drilling.html, last 
visited September 20, 2013. The scope of this work, however, does not consider data and 
evidence as to whether international obligations, acquired under IIAs have a chilling effect on 
the regulatory activity of host States.  
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which encountered hurdles to the exercise of their own police power.69 In order 
to remedy such a situation, they sought renegotiations of IIAs, devising 
specific rules for the analysis of indirect expropriation.70  
The second scenario is the international investment arbitration regime. There 
are still hundreds of IIAs containing broad rules on direct and indirect 
expropriation, which have not been renegotiated. These rules would be 
interpreted by arbitral tribunals when a dispute emerges, which means that 
the police powers of the States are yet to be decided under the arbitration 
regime by arbitral tribunals themselves.  
The police power has been addressed in various investor-State arbitration 
cases, the analysis of which has not always reached consistent conclusions.71 
In addition, arbitrators have not applied the same criteria to determine 
whether the exercise of the police power has gone too far in diminishing the 
investors’ property rights. For instance, arbitral tribunals apply different 
criteria to determine whether an expropriation has occurred. Some arbitrators, 
while not contesting the police power of States, focus only on the effects that 
the regulatory measure has had on investor’s property rights. Another group 
of arbitrators do give relevance to the regulatory prerogative of the State and 
consider whether it can be balanced against the effects it had on the protected 
investment.  
Scholars have reflected on the criteria used by arbitrators when deciding 
claims on indirect expropriation. There is agreement among them with regard 
to the relevant elements of analysis that may determine the existence of 
indirect expropriation.72 However, there is opposition that argues that this test 
is not part of the framework of investment arbitration.73 Before analysing the 
police power in the context of international law and investment arbitration, it 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
69 See Chapter III, Section 3.2. supra notes 18, 19 
70 See for instance the new Free Trade Agreements negotiated by the United States with South 
Korea, Chile, and Dominican Republic and Caribbean Countries.  
71 See Section 3.6.2. 
72 See August Reinisch, ed. Standards of Investment Protection (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2008); August Reinisch, "Legality of Expropriations", in Standards of Investment Protection, ed. 
August Reinisch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008); Reinisch: Oxford Handbook of 
International Investment Law, Standards of Investment protection; Stern, "In Search of the 
Frontiers of Indirect Expropriation". See also the analysis of Article 1110 of NAFTA in the issue 
of expropriation versus regulation in the Separate Opinion of Dr Brian Schwartz in the Partial 
Award of S.D. Myers Inc. v The Government of Canada, November 12, 2000. 
73  Kenneth J. Vandevelde, Bilateral Investment Treaties. History, Policy, and Interpretation  
(Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2010). In this regard see also the discussion held in OGEMID 
forum, Archive, November 28 2005, 'Methanex - erroneus on expropriation?' (under Chatham 
Rules) 
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is important to briefly address the background of international investment as 
it stands today, and to devote further attention to a specific standard of 
protection, namely expropriation, which is the primary standard under 
scrutiny in this study.  
 
3.4 Obligations of host States under Public International Law 
 
3.4.1 Historical Background on the Protection of Alien Property 
 
3.4.1.1 The Minimum Standard of Treatment 
The protection of aliens abroad was originally intended to guarantee the 
development and security of alien economic interests in the foreign countries 
in which they were residing. These protections included, as inherent rights of 
all persons, access to justice and impartiality of treatment.74 This standard 
translated into a national treatment standard where nationals and aliens 
would be treated equally.75  In principle, this standard sought the application 
of the same laws, procedures and institutions, as well as procedural 
guarantees, to nationals and aliens.76 However, during this period, both North 
American and European States started seeking additional protection for their 
citizens and corporations77 by claiming that the law of former colonies in Latin 
America, Asia and Africa, ‘[were] considered inferior, not well developed or 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
74 Newcombe and Paradell assert that ‘International law treatises written in the early 1900s 
focus on issues such as denial of justice, equality before the law and mob violence, usually in 
the context of the rights of the individual’. In making this point, they refer to a group of scholars 
such Brownlie, Oppenheim, Westlake, Wilson, whose writings focused especially on issues such 
as equality before the law, denial of justice, mob violence. See Andrew Newcombe and Lluís 
Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment  (Alphen aan den Rijn: 
Kluwer Law, International. Wolters Kluwer, 2009), 11, at fn 56.  
75  Elihu Root, "The Basis of Protection to Citizens Residing Abroad" American Journal of 
International Law 4, no. 3 (1910), 527-28.; Stephan Schill, The multilateralization of international 
investment law  (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 26. 
76 See for instance Emmerich Vattel when referring to the treatment of aliens, as much subject 
to the law of the territory they are being allowed to enter, as they are entitled to the protection 
and security, in the same manner as the nationals of the host territory. Vattel Emmerich, The 
Law of Nations of the Principles of Natural Law  (Available at 
http://www.lonang.com/exlibris/vattel/vatt-208.htm, last visited 2 June 2011, 1758). Book 2, 
Chapter VIII, paras. 101, 104.  
77 Newcombe et al assert that American and European jurists recognised the existence of a 
minimum standard of justice, in the protection of foreigners abroad. See Newcombe and 
Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment: 11. 
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failed to meet standards of justice and equity’.78 The ‘minimum standard of 
treatment’, as a rule of customary international law, raised the level of the 
national treatment standard in order to reach general principles of law 
recognised by civilized countries. Schwarzenberger asserts that the national 
standard could not replace the minimum standard of treatment. This meant 
that the inclusion of a national treatment standard in an agreement would not 
preclude the preferred application of the international minimum standard 
under customary international law.79 The Commission, in deciding the case of 
Neer v United States of Mexico, dealt with a claim of denial of justice brought 
by the US against Mexico by defining the parameters of the minimum 
standard as it continues to be expressed today.80  
Latin American countries have traditionally challenged the privileges of foreign 
investors in their territories by asserting that they should be treated in the 
same manner as their own nationals.81 Carlos Calvo, an Argentinian jurist, 
asserted that aliens should not be afforded treatment more favourable than 
that afforded to the nationals of the receiving country. 82  Accordingly, ‘the 
twin pillars of the Calvo Doctrine are the absolute equality of foreigners with 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
78 Surya P. Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle  (Oxford; 
Portland, OR: Hart, 2008), 9. In this regard, Elihu Root warned in 1910, that not all countries 
have always transparent and impartial legal systems in place, and the lack of legal stability may 
endanger the most basic guarantees of fair trial. 
 Newcome et al assert that American and European jurists recognized the existence of a 
minimum standard of justice, in the protection of foreigners abroad. See Newcombe and 
Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment, 11. 
79 Georg Schwarzenberger, International law as applied by international courts and tribunals  
(London: Stevens, 1957), 248. See also Borchard, referring to the principle of equality, for 
instance by the Chilean Civil Code, written by Andres Bello in 1855: ‘In granting such equality, 
they go beyond the requirements of international law. But in so doing they cannot, as some 
profess, escape the obligations of international law. And the civil equality, even if it were in 
practice granted as written, is a very limited one and hardly different from that accorded by 
most western States’. Edwin Borchard, "The "Mininmum Standard" of the Treatment of Aliens" 
American Society of International Law: Proceedings. Thirty-Third Annual Meeting. April 27-29 
33(1939), 55. 
80 In the Commission’s view ‘the propriety of governmental acts should be put to the test of 
international standards and the treatment of an alien should be carried out in such a way that 
all elements of impartiality and transparency are disregarded, and the ‘insufficiency of 
governmental action so far short of international standards that every reasonable and impartial 
man would readily recognize its insufficiency’ L. F. H. Neer and Pauline Neer (U.S.A.) v. United 
Mexican States, Volume IV p. 60-66 United Nations, 2006, 61-62 (15 October  1926).  
81 Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle, 8. 
82 ‘In Calvo’s view, State equality required that there be no intervention, diplomatic or otherwise, 
in the internal affairs of other States, and that foreigners were not entitled to better treatment 
than host State nationals’ Newcombe and Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: 
Standards of Treatment: 13. 
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nationals and the principle of non-intervention’. 83  For instance, Latin 
American countries have resisted the internationalization of disputes, as well 
as the application of higher standards of protection for foreign aliens. This 
approach has been reflected generally in provisions of laws, treaties and 
agreements that preclude recourse to commercial arbitration by foreigners, or 
that at a minimum provide for the exhaustion of local remedies before resort 
to international dispute settlement.84 As Bishop points out, however, Latin 
American countries eased their position by adopting investment laws, 
concession contracts, and international investment agreements that allow for 
the settlement of disputes in international forums that require the application 
of international law.85 This scenario is – in some cases - shifting back towards 
Calvo-era doctrines as some Latin American countries (e.g. Bolivia, Ecuador 
and Venezuela) have withdrawn from arbitration centres such as the 
International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes (ICSID). Other 
countries, such as Argentina and Nicaragua, have threatened to withdraw.86 
For these countries, there has been an overall dissatisfaction with the 
settlement of disputes through investment treaty arbitration. The reasons for 
this dissatisfaction include the large amounts in compensation demanded by 
foreign investors, as well as a perceived partiality or bias towards investors’ 
claims.87 While the minimum standard of treatment under international law 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
83 D.R. Shea as cited by Andrew Newcombe, Lluís Paradell, and International Kluwer Law, Law 
and practice of investment treaties: standards of treatment  (Alphen aan den Rijn: Wolters Kluwer, 
2009), 11. 
84 R. Doak  Bishop and E. Etri James, "International Commercial Arbitration in South America" 
Available at: http://www.kslaw.com/library/pdf/bishop3.pdf, last visited June 9, 2011, 4, 11-13.  
Bishop refers to a number of Constitutional and (generally) Civil Code provisions adopted by 
Latin American countries, such as Colombia, Costa Rica (providing for equal treatment between 
national and aliens, but Calvo Clause in some concession contracts); Chile (precluded third 
party arbitral proceedings); Ecuador (‘renuncia diplomática’). In this vein, the US for instance 
has adopted the position that the requirement of exhaustion of local remedies does not breach 
obligations under international law, as long as local remedies satisfy the international minimum 
standard. See Bishop ibid., 11-4. 
85 Ibid., 11-16, 7. 
86See for instance International Law Reporter, Bolivia’s Denunciation of the ICSID Convention, 8, 
July, 2007. Available at: http://ilreports.blogspot.com/2007/07/bolivias-denunciation-of-
icsid.html, last visited 12 June, 2013.  Investment Arbitration reporter, Stated that the 
Ecuadorian government explained in a brief note that ‘[T]he terms of a new constitution 
approved last year in a popular referendum. Article 422 of the constitution contains a stricture 
against international agreements, which provide for investor-State arbitration, although the 
constitution exempts regional (Latin American) arbitration from that stipulation. See Investment 
Arbitration Reporter, Ecuador becomes Second State to Exit ICSID; Approximately two-thirds of 
Ecuador's BIT Claims were ICSID-based, 17 July 2009. Available at: 
http://www.iareporter.com/articles/EcuadorExit, last visited 12 June, 2013. 
87 With regard to the perceived dissatisfaction Nowrot observes: ‘Rather, and even more notable, 
there are by now clear indications in State practice that an increasing number of countries 
assume a more cautious or even openly critical position on the presently predominant approach 
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has remained relatively unchanged throughout the twentieth century, the level 
of protection to aliens as required by international law has varied, reflecting 
the ‘pendulum swings’ of various political and economic movements.  
 
3.4.1.2  Diplomatic Protection  
Diplomatic protection during the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries 
included the use of force or threat thereof against the offender country. The 
era of Gun Boat Diplomacy witnessed numerous examples of military 
intervention against Latin American countries by British, German and Italian 
forces in the intent of protecting alien property and assets.88 This use of force 
was strongly opposed by Latin American countries when the United Kingdom, 
Germany and Italy intervened in Venezuela in 1902 in order to enforce 
compliance with State-issued bonds.89 The Hague Conventions I and II of 1899 
and 1907, respectively, provided for the settlement of international disputes in 
a pacific manner ‘as far as possible’.90 The Hague Convention II included a 
provision, submitted by Argentine Foreign Minister Luis Drago, on the 
limitation of the use of force for the recovery of contractual debts.91 Note, 
however, that the abovementioned Convention still allowed for the use of force 
should the offender country refuse to reply and comply with an offer of 
arbitration. 92  It was not until 1928, under the General Treaty for the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
to the international legal protection of foreign investors. This applies in particular –albeit by far 
not exclusively – to the recently renewed suspicion displayed by many Latin American 
countries, which are among the primary drivers behind the “backlash” against the current 
international investment regime’. See Karsten Nowrot, International investment law and the 
Republic of Ecuador from arbitral bilateralism to judicial regionalism  (Halle (Saale): Institute of 
Economic Law, 2010), 5.  
88 See Newcombe and Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment, 
9. The authors State that between 1820 and 1914, Great Britain intervened Latin American 
countries in at least 40 occasions, seeking redress for alleged failures to protect aliens and 
property.  
89 Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle, 12. See also Newcombe 
and Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment, 9.  
90 Article 1 of the Convention (I) for the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Hague I), 29 
July, 1899, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/hague01.asp, last visited, 
June 12 2011. And Article 1 of the Pacific Settlement of International Disputes (Hague II), 
October 18, 1907, available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/20th_century/ pacific.asp, last 
visited June 12, 2011.  
91 Limitation of Employment of Force for Recovery of Contract Debts (Hague, II), October 18, 
1907 
92 Article 1, Limitation of Employment of Force for Recovery of Contract Debts (Hague, II), 
October 18, 1907. 
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Renunciation of War, that a full prohibition on the use of force was finally 
adopted.93   
The protection of patrimonial and inherent rights through diplomatic 
protection implies that the home State of the investor would represent the 
interest of its national, making the claim of the affected party its own.94  
In the Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions case, the Permanent Court of 
International Justice (PCIJ) asserted: 
By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action 
or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting 
its own rights, its right to ensure, in the person of its subjects, respect for the 
rules of international law.95  
Shaw explains that there is no legal obligation, under international law, for 
States to provide diplomatic protection to their citizens. As soon as the State 
takes the claim on its behalf, the case no longer constitutes a claim of the 
aggrieved national, but one of the State.96 In addition, once a State undertakes 
such a claim, it becomes exclusively a claim of the State. 97 
As trade and investment relations grow in number, complexity and quantum, 
citizens – today, most likely corporations – may face difficulties in lobbying 
their national governments when seeking redress for an internationally 
wrongful act that is affecting their inherent personal rights, economic interests 
and property rights, or benefits.98  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Newcombe and Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment, 9-
10. 
94 Vattel asserted that ‘Anyone who mistreats a citizen directly offends the State’, as quoted by 
Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle: 12. Root contends that: 
‘When justice is denied for such reasons there is a failure on the part of the Government to 
perform its international duty, and a right on the part of the Government whose citizen has 
failed to secure justice to demand reparation. See Root, "The Basis of Protection to Citizens 
Residing Abroad", 526. Finally Borchard asserts that: ‘[F]ew foreign countries have been willing 
to abandon their nationals to the arbitrariness of corrupt courts or administrative bodies’. See 
Borchard, "The "Mininmum Standard" of the Treatment of Aliens", 63. 
95 Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. U.K.), 1924 P.C.I.J. (ser. B) No. 3 (Aug. 30), 12 
96 Malcolm N. Shaw, International Law, Fifth ed. (Cambridge, UK: Cambridge Univesity Press, 
2003), 722. 
97 Shaw asserts ‘This is a result of the historical reluctance to permit individuals the right in 
international law to prosecute claims against foreign countries, for reasons relating to State 
sovereignty and non-interference in internal affairs’. Ibid. 
98 The WTO protects the attainment of benefits, as opposed to only the violation of a right. See 
for instance Jackson, referring to the dispute settlement process under the GATT which is 
‘usually invocable on grounds of 'nullification or impairment' of benefits expected under the 
Agreement, and did not depend on actual breach of legal obligation’.  John H. Jackson, "Dispute 
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The novel investor-State arbitration regime departs from the traditional 
diplomatic protection provided by home States to national investors by 
allowing them to directly introduce claims against States hosting their 
investments, provided the home State of the investor and the host State have 
agreed beforehand on the possibility of arbitration in an international 
agreement such as a BIT. The host State may also grant rights directly to the 
investor through arbitration clauses – in concession contracts – under an 
ICSID arbitration mechanism. This particular dispute settlement regime will 
be discussed later in this chapter.   
 
3.4.1.3  The New International Economic Order (NIEO) 
The Russian Communist revolution (1917) and the Mexican agrarian 
revolution (1938) proclaimed State ownership and control over their natural 
resources. In such circumstances, the expropriation of foreign investors’ 
assets was not accompanied by compensation in favour of the affected 
investors. The underlying argument for the lack of compensation for 
expropriation in these cases was based on the sovereignty of States over their 
natural resources. 99  Mexico rejected the conditions for payment of 
compensation demanded by the US. The exchange of diplomatic 
correspondence between the two countries led to the pronouncement of the 
Hull formula, which requires prompt, adequate and effective compensation in 
the case of State expropriation.100 Developed countries have forcefully put 
forward the Hull formula as a requirement of lawfulness when expropriation 
takes place.101  In other words, expropriation, whether lawful or unlawful, 
requires prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. 
Eventually, the discussion over the treatment of aliens and the protection of 
their assets was taken to a new forum, the UN General Assembly. After several 
years of consideration and analysis undertaken by the Commission on 
Permanent Sovereignty over Natural Resources, the General Assembly issued 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Settlement and the WTO. Emerging Problems" Journal of International Economic Law 1, no. 3 
(1998), 332.  
99 Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle, 16. 
100 For reference to the process of negotiation between the diplomatic representatives of Mexico 
and United States (Hull) see Ibid., 16-18. 
101 M. Sornarajah, The International Law of Foreign Investment, Third ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge 
University Press, 2010), 125. 
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Resolution 1803,102 which: i) recognised the rights of peoples and nations to 
permanent sovereignty over their natural wealth and resources, ii) the 
application of national legislation to foreign capital, and iii) expropriation and 
nationalization should be carried out for public purpose and under payment of 
appropriate compensation.  
General Assembly Resolution 3201103 established a NIEO. While ratifying the 
principles set out in previous resolutions on PSNR, Resolution 3201 stated the 
need to regulate and monitor the actions of transnational corporations on 
their operations within the receiving country. Finally, the Charter of Economic 
Rights and Duties of States,104 recognised the right of each State to: 
[…] nationalize, expropriate or transfer ownership of foreign property, in which 
case appropriate compensation should be paid by the State adopting such 
measures, taking into account its relevant laws and regulations and all 
circumstances that the State considers pertinent. In any case where the question 
of compensation gives rise to a controversy, it shall be settled under the domestic 
law of the nationalizing State and by its tribunals, unless it is freely and mutually 
agreed by all States concerned that other peaceful means be sought on the basis 
of the sovereign equality of States and in accordance with the principle of free 
choice of means.105 
This resolution adopted several other principles reflected in many of the 
provisions contained in preceding resolutions mentioned above. The Charter 
was adopted by an impressive majority of 120 votes against six, and ten 
abstentions. However, the General Assembly Resolutions from 1974 on the 
NIEO show the increasing imbalance and lack of agreement between major 
capital exporting countries and capital importing countries (which held, and 
continue to hold, an overwhelming majority in the General Assembly). The 
absence of international law principles on the protection of aliens and the 
imposition of the capital importing country domestic law remain the most 
important factors for the perceived lack of legitimacy of these resolutions.     
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
102  GA Resolution 1803 (XVII) of 14 December 1962. 
103  GA Resolution 3201 (S-VI) of 1 May 1974. 
104 GA Resolution 3281 (XXIX) of 12 December 1974. See also Burns H. Weston, "The Charter of 
Economic Rights and Duties of States and the Deprivation of Foreign-Owned Wealth" American 
Journal of International Law 75, no. 3 (1981); Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling 
Policy and Principle. 
105 See Article 2 (b) of the General Assembly Resolution 3281 (XXIX) Charter of Economic Rights 
and Duties of States, adopted in 2315th plenary meeting, 12 December 1974.  
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3.4.2 International Investment Agreements (IIAs) 
 
3.4.2.1  Early Bilateral Treaties on Navigation and Commerce 
Negotiation of commercial treaties, including provisions for the protection of 
private property and payment of compensation, started during the eighteenth 
and nineteenth centuries primarily between the US and Europe and some 
Latin American countries.106 Likewise, peace treaties and other treaties signed 
for specific purposes other than commerce included private property 
protection provisions. For example the Jay Treaty of 17 November 1794 
famously set out provisions on security for the peaceful enjoyment and 
protection of property.107 Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation as 
well as Treaties of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights focused on 
trade, and often included investment provisions as well. These types of treaties 
provided for the protection of foreign nationals’ property and the pacific 
enjoyment of private property.108   
As Wilson points out, treaty provisions before 1923 included reference to 
access to courts, embargoes and detentions, protection and security of 
property, and expropriation and compensation. 109  Treaties of commerce, 
signed after 1945, noticeably contain provisions related to the obligation to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
106 Robert R. Wilson, "Property-Protection Provisions in United States Commercial Treaties" 
American Journal of International Law 45, no. 1 (1951), 91-93. 
107 Ibid., 91. The Jay Treaty between United States and Great Britain guaranteed several years 
of peace between the signatory parties and an end to the American Revolution.  
108 For instance The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Consular Rights between the United 
States and Germany, signed on December 8, 1923, US Treaty Series 725, promoting cultural, 
spiritual, economic and commercial aspirations of their citizens. Article 1 provides ‘The 
nationals of each high contracting party shall receive within the territories of the other, upon 
submitting to conditions imposed upon its nationals, the most constant protection and security 
for their persons and property, and shall enjoy in this respect that degree of protection that is 
required by international law.  Their property shall not be taken without due process of law and 
without payment of just compensation’. The Treaty of Friendship, Commerce, and Consular 
Rights between the United States and El Salvador', signed on 22 February 1926, US Treaty 
Series N. 827. Article 1 provides that persons and their property shall enjoy constant protection 
and security at all times, in accordance with international law. The taken of property, should 
only be undertaken upon payment of just compensation and in observance of due process of 
law. In contrast, the Treaty of Commerce and Navigation between the United States of America 
and the Turkish Republic, signed on 1 October 1929, US Treaty Series N. 813, which contains 
mainly trade provisions and the most-favoured-nation treatment standard. See also Schill, The 
multilateralization of international investment law, 29-30. Newcombe and Paradell, Law and 
Practice of Investment Treaties: Standards of Treatment, 41-42. 
109 Wilson referring to the treaties of commerce negotiated and signed by the United States. See 
Wilson, "Property-Protection Provisions in United States Commercial Treaties", 92. 
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pay compensation for takings of property.110 Note that the criteria adopted for 
compensation in these instruments are based partially on the Hull Formula of 
prompt, adequate and effective compensation. In some cases, the signing of 
commerce-based treaties in the post-War period was a reaction against the 
perceived shift in customary international law that resulted from the General 
Assembly resolutions calling for the NIEO. These treaties allowed capital 
exporting countries to seek additional protection for their patrimonial interests 
abroad through specific lex specialis agreements. However, in this context 
Wilson argues that in particular cases both customary international law and 
treaty law could be invoked: ‘it is also clear that parties to a treaty may 
provide for treatment more specific and more favourable to aliens than would 
a provision to apply [customary] international law’.111 
Bilateral treaty negotiations parallel to the discussions over the NIEO, 
previous to and shortly after 1974, are regarded as a period of ‘rationalization 
undertaken by the State’. 112  There exists a contrast between collective 
positions of developing countries in their international economic relations 
during the NIEO negotiations and the stances adopted individually at the 
national level in order to attract foreign investment.113  
The period of negotiation of treaties of friendship, commerce and navigation 
show a development in the protection of property and payment of 
compensation.114 The second half of the twentieth century shows the adoption 
of more specific rules with regard to expropriation for public purpose and the 
payment of prompt, adequate, and effective compensation. While the 
prerogative of States to regulate does not appear clearly articulated in the 
commerce treaty negotiations, it was at the heart of the PSNR and NIEO 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
110 Wilson referring to the treaties of commerce negotiated and signed by the United States in 
the period between 1945 and 1956, Robert R. Wilson, "A Decade of New Commercial Treaties" 
American Journal of International Law 50, no. 4 (1956), 930. Note, for instance, the Treaty of 
Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the United States and Japan of 1953, in which 
the parties agree to refrain from taking of property, except for a public purpose and upon 
payment of prompt and just compensation (Article VI-3). Available at 
http://www.mac.doc.gov/japan-korea/market-opening/US-Japan%20Treaty%20on% 
20Friendship%20Commerce%20and%20Navigation%201953-04-02.pdf, last visited on January 
25 2012. 
111 Wilson, "Property-Protection Provisions in United States Commercial Treaties", 91. 
112 Sornarajah, The International Law of Foreign Investment, 23. 
113 Ibid. 
114 See for instance the Treaty of Friendship Commerce and Navigation between the United 
States and Argentina, proclaimed in 1855, in which the provisions of Articles XII and XIII, 
provide for the protection of property, yet on the bases of non-discriminatory and full protection 
principles. Available at http://avalon.law.yale.edu/19th_century/argen02.asp, last visited on 
January 25 2012. 
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discussions. Unfortunately there was not much cross-fertilization between the 
signing of commercial treaties on the one hand, and discussions in the UN 
General Assembly on the other.  The next subsection discusses one of the 
attempts towards a multilateral investment agreement that – arguably - 
sought to balance commercial interests of foreign investors against the State’s 
prerogative to regulate in the public interest.  
 
3.4.2.2  The OECD Multilateral Agreement on Investment 
Between 1995 and 1998 the Organisation for Economic Cooperation and 
Development (OECD) promoted negotiations for a Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment (MAI). Previous to this initiative, some other plurilateral projects 
such as NAFTA and the ECT were signed and entered into force. Previous 
attempts at multilateral investment treaties had failed, including inter alia, the 
Draft Convention on the Treatment of Foreigners,115 and the Havana Charter 
that promoted the International Trade Organisation.116  The MAI did not fare 
any better. A lack of consensus and social pressure prevented the MAI from 
ever being adopted.117 Arguments in favour of the MAI emphasized consistent 
interpretation of substantive rules, disincentives for a ‘race to the bottom’ 
among capital-importing countries, guarantees against discrimination between 
foreign investors and the possibility of a predictable dispute settlement regime. 
As a commentator points out, the MAI failed due to the ‘lack of political 
support, protectionist opposition of the influential French cultural industries 
and NGO-criticism related to the widespread anti-globalization campaigning 
against international economic organisations’.118  Critical views consider that 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 Draft Convention on the Treatment of Foreigners, was drafted by officials of the League of 
Nations and the International Chamber of Commerce. It aimed a broad scope of all economic 
activity as well civil and legal rights on the acquisition, and transmission of property by 
foreigner. As commented by Van Harten it failed due to objections to the inclusion of the 
national treatment. See Gus Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law  (New 
York: Oxford Univesity Press, 2007), 19. For further reading on the Draft Convention see Arthur 
K. Kuhn, "The International Conference on the Treatment of Foreigners" The American Journal of 
International Law 24, no. 3 (1930). 
116 The Havana Charter for an International Trade Organization (ITO), 24 March 1948, contained 
in UN Conference on Trade & Employment, UN Doc. E/CONF.2/78 (1948). 
117 Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law: 22. 
118  Abba Kolo and Thomas Wälde, "Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and 
"Regulatory Taking" in International Law" International and Comparative Law Quarterly 50, no. 4 
(2001): citing Henderson footnote 5. Jan Paulsson wrote in 1995: “Such a document would then 
supplant BITs, which are threatening to create confusion by their variety of formulations. In 
other words, what is envisaged is a global charter for a legal regime applicable to all types of 
investments, overarching both regional and sectorial treaties”. Jan Paulsson, "Arbitration 
without Privity" Foreign Investment Law Journal 10, no. 2 (1995), 257. 
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the OECD members saw it as a convenient forum for the MAI negotiations 
because it could negotiate provisions that favoured capital-exporting countries 
to the detriment of capital importing-countries.119 There also appeared to be a 
disproportionate emphasis on the protection of foreign investment, while 
dismissing other concerns such as the protection of the environment and 
human rights.120  
 
3.4.2.3  International Investment Agreements (IIAs)  
The relevance of these agreements121 in the field of international investment 
lies in the investment protection provisions and dispute settlement clauses 
incorporated in them. 
In the case of investment treaties and investment clauses, it seems difficult to 
assert to what extent the text of the treaty – stipulating a standard of 
protection – determines the decision of an arbitral tribunal, and to what extent 
the contextual application and interpretation of the same treaty provision – by 
an arbitral tribunal – may determine the outcome of the dispute. There is on-
going academic and diplomatic discussions on the legitimacy and fairness of 
the content of IIAs and how they are negotiated.  
Contracting parties to an investment agreement aim at protecting a wide range 
of economic activities within the territory of a host State. It follows that in 
order to cover these economic activities within the definition of investment, 
incorporated in the treaty, the provisions tend to be open-ended, and in turn 
rather broad. The standards of investment protection provide guarantees, inter 
alia, of:122 i) national treatment, ii) most-favoured nation treatment, iii) fair and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
119 Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law, 22. See also Sornarajah, The 
International Law of Foreign Investment, 54. 
120 See Sornarajah, The International Law of Foreign Investment, 54. 
121 The term IIAs includes generally Bilateral Investment Treaties (BITs), Preferential Trade and 
Investment Agreements, such as Free Trade Agreements (FTAs) or other cooperation 
agreements, up to 2011 UNCTAD included in it notion of IIA International Taxation Agreements 
(ITAs). For instance, NAFTA Chapter 11 refers to the issue of Investment. This extensive chapter 
includes standards of investment protection as well as dispute settlement mechanism. Similar 
provision can be found in the DR-CAFTA, ASEAN. The number of BITs has increased 
exponentially since the 1950’s, UNCTAD reports that by May of 2011, 6140 IIAs were negotiated 
(this data includes Double Taxation Treaties). 
122 Most importantly, but not restricted to... There is extensive literature on the standards of 
protection, among which the most influential ones have been written by Rudolph Dolzer and 
Christoph Schreuer, Principles of International Investment Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 
2nd edition, 2012); Reinisch, Standards of Investment Protection; Sornarajah, The International 
Law of Foreign Investment; Newcombe and Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: 
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equitable treatment; iv) full protection and security; v) non-performance 
requirements; and vi) non-expropriation without compensation.   
This work focuses on the standard of expropriation with compensation, and 
more specifically indirect expropriation. The definition of expropriation in the 
context of IIAs is increasingly changing, as states adopt new stances toward 
their police power and the scope of its exercise. Past negotiated IIAs, many of 
them still in force, do not provide a definition of expropriation but instead 
include abundant terminology in order to cover a broad variety of measures 
that could have a confiscatory effect over investors’ assets.123 The provisions of 
IIAs generally cover expropriation – direct and indirect – and any other 
measure tantamount or equivalent to expropriation or measures having a 
similar or equivalent effect to expropriation.  
In the last three years, UNCTAD has reported a shift in the approach towards 
a more balanced negotiation of IIAs with an observable effect on the definition 
and scope of expropriation. In 2010, UNCTAD reported that governments 
sought to formulate more specific provisions in their agreements: for instance, 
regarding the scope of the parties’ right to regulate. One of the most important 
additions to the State’s right to regulate has been the protection of the 
environment.124  
The exercise of the police power within the traditional areas of public health, 
safety and environment were notably incorporated in the 2004 US Model BIT. 
For the purpose of this work – especially the analysis undertaken in Chapter 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Standards of Treatment. Subedi, International Investment Law: Reconciling Policy and Principle. 
See on the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard Peter Muchlinski, "'Caveat Investor'? The 
Relevance of the Conduct of the Investor under the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard" 
International and Comparative Law Quarterly 55 (2005). 
123 Stern, "In Search of the Frontiers of Indirect Expropriation",  30. 
124 UNCTAD reported in 2010: ‘[M]any recent treaties, whether new, renegotiated or revised, 
suggest that governments, developed and developing countries alike, are increasingly seeking to 
formulate agreements more precisely, by clarifying the scope of treaties or the meaning of 
specific obligations, in order to preserve States’ right to regulate.’ United Nations Conference on 
Trade Development (UNCTAD), "World Investment Report 2010: Investing in a low-carbon 
economy," (New York: United Nations, 2010), xxxvi, 87. See for instance United States 2004 
Model Bilateral Investment Treaty and United States 2012 Model Bilateral Investment Treaty; 
Foreign Investment Promotion and Protection Agreement, 2004 Canada, available at 
http://italaw.com/documents/Canadian2004-FIPA-model-en, last visited February 13, 2013; 
United States-Dominican Republic, Central America Free Trade Agreement, 2004 (DR-CAFTA), 
available at: http://www.ustr.gov/trade-agreements/free-trade-agreements/cafta-dr-
dominican-republic-central-america-fta, last visited February 13, 2013; ASEAN Comprehensive 
Investment Agreement, 2012. Available at 
http://www.thaifta.com/trade/ascorner/asean_doc2.pdf, last visited February 13, 2013. These 
treaties provide arbitral tribunals with extensive guidance as to the treatment of indirect 
expropriation claims.  
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IV – the exercise of the police power within the narrow scope of public health, 
safety and the environment will be referred as police power strictu sensu.  In 
this regard the provisions of expropriation are to be read in the light of Annex 
B of the 2004 US Model BIT: 
Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party 
that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such 
as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect 
expropriations.125 
In addition, the 2004 US Model BIT provides for a wider exercise of regulatory 
prerogative of states, which this works refers as police power latu sensu:  
The determination of whether an action or series of actions by a Party, in a 
specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation, requires a case-by- 
case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors:  
(i) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that an 
action or series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the 
economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish 
that an indirect expropriation has occurred;  
(ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct, 
reasonable investment-backed expectations; and  
(iii) the character of the government action. 126 
The Common Market for an Eastern and Southern African Investment 
Agreement, Common Investment Area (2007) states that ‘bona fide regulatory 
measures taken by a Member State that are designed and applied to protect or 
enhance legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety and 
the environment, shall not constitute an indirect expropriation’. 127  Such 
provision invokes the legitimate exercise of the police power as recognised 
under customary international law.  
The US-Korea Free Trade Agreement (FTA),128 while in line with previous US 
FTAs, also expands the provisions with regard to the parties’ right to regulate. 
It establishes in Annex 11-B (3)(a) of the agreement that: i) the economic 
impact of the governmental action should not be considered in isolation, ii) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
125 US BIT Model 2004 Article 6 Expropriation, Annex B (b). Likewise, the Dominican Republic-
Central America-United States Free Trade Agreement has adopted in Annex 10-C (4)(b) the 
same provision regarding the exceptional character of regulatory measures applied over 
investors’ property rights.  
126 US BIT Model 2004 Article 6 Expropriation, Annex B (a) 127 	  See Article 20(8) Available at http://vi.unctad.org/files/wksp/iiawksp08/docs/ 
wednesday/Exercise%20Materials/invagreecomesa.pdf 
128 United States – Korea Free Trade Agreement, entered into force 15 March 2012.   
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investment backed expectations should be reasonable (i.e. investors are 
expected to know the dynamics of the sector they are entering into),129 and iii) 
the governmental action should be characterized in regard to the level of 
burden that investors are expected to endure for the public interest and that 
this analysis should be done on a case-by-case basis.130 Finally, paragraph 
(3)(b) states:  
except in rare circumstances, such as, for example, when an action or a series of 
actions is extremely severe or disproportionate in light of its purpose or effect, 
non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party that are designed and applied to 
protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such as public health, safety, the 
environment, and real estate price stabilization (through, for example, measures 
to improve the housing conditions for low-income households), do not constitute 
indirect expropriations.131 
Not only has there been an expansion of newly negotiated FTAs with 
investment chapters, there has also been some renegotiation of investment 
agreements, and notably the modification of Model BITs. Arbitral tribunals’ 
decisions could have influenced reflection over the provisions contained in the 
first generation of IIAs, as their awards have contributed significantly to the 
development of international investment law overall.132 The World Investment 
Report 2010 identifies four main drivers for the revision of Model BITs: i) 
clearer and more precise treaty provisions, ii) consistency with countries’ 
public policy, right to regulate, and economic agenda, iii) balance between 
investors’ and countries’ interests, iv) adjustment of BIT to new developments, 
such as the interpretation adopted by arbitral tribunals in investor-State 
arbitration cases.133 The right of States to regulate appears to be at the 
forefront of discussions regarding the legitimacy of investor-State dispute 
settlement,134 and this may imply cross-fertilization between the negotiation of 
IIAs and their interpretation at the dispute settlement level.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
129 Ibid. Annex 11-B (3)(a)(ii) footnote 18. 
130 Ibid. Annex 11-B (3)(a)(iii) 
131 Ibid. Annex 11-B (3)(b) 
132 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), World Investment Report 
2009: Transnational Corporations, Agricultural Production and Development  (Geneva: UNCTAD, 
2009), 32. 
133 United Nations Conference on Trade Development (UNCTAD), "World Investment Report 
2010: Investing in a low-carbon economy", 85. 
134 Ibid., 87. 
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3.5 Expropriation  
Professor Schreuer, in his introductory remarks at a Conference on the 
Standards of Investment Protection held in 2007, stated that expropriation 
has been for a long time the most important standard of protection in 
international law. In the past protection of investment was equivalent to 
protection against expropriation without compensation.135 Nowadays, however, 
this standard has retreated and direct expropriations have become unusual.136 
Regulatory, creeping and indirect expropriations have become much more 
common in international practice.  
Expropriation is not illegal per se. The right to expropriate has been widely 
recognised in public international law under the principle of internal 
sovereignty, whereby a State derives an ability to legitimately exercise its 
discretionary power over nationals and aliens equally.137 The 1959 Report on 
Expropriation of the International Law Commission (ILC) stated: 
In fact, save in the exceptional circumstances […] an act of expropriation, pure 
and simple, constitutes a lawful act of the State and, consequently, does not per 
se give rise to any international responsibility whatever.138 
Furthermore, the ILC expresses that State responsibility can arise when 
expropriatory measures are adopted inconsistently with the international 
standards that guide the exercise of the right to expropriate. In such cases, 
the omission to observe the standards constitutes an arbitrary exercise of the 
right of States to expropriate. The elements leading to a finding of 
international responsibility for an arbitrary act of expropriation have been 
identified by the Special Rapporteur Garcia Amador as regarding: i) the 
motives and purpose of the expropriation, ii) the method or procedure 
adopted, iii) discrimination between nationals and aliens, and iv) the payment 
of compensation.139  
These elements are currently incorporated in most IIAs and have become part 
of the rule of law as regards to the limitations to the right to expropriate by 
host States. The breach of such treaty obligations would constitute an 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
135  Christoph Schreuer, "Introduction: Interrelationship of Standards", in Standards of 
Protection, ed. August Reinisch (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2008), 1. 
136 Ibid. 
137 International Law Commission, "Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1959 -
Volume II. Documents of the eleventh session including the report of the Commission to the 
General Assembly," (New York: United Nations, 1959), 11.  
138 Ibid. 
139 Ibid., 8, 14. 
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unlawful expropriation.140 Reflecting on these elements, Professor Schreuer’s 
introduction into the notion of expropriation becomes apparent - expropriation 
used to be considered the only standard of protection. One could argue that a 
majority of standards of protection – currently embedded in IIAs – would have 
developed to a certain degree from those elements of non- arbitrariness.141 
This is relevant in the context of evaluating expropriation claims, as in many 
respects, the standards of protection in modern IIAs are linked to one another.  
The criteria coined by Garcia Amador, which informs the test to determine the 
existence of arbitrariness in expropriation, is included nowadays in IIAs as 
follows: i) public purpose, ii) non-discrimination, iii) due process of law, and iv) 
payment of compensation. 
Some IIAs omit one criterion, while others add additional requirements in 
order for the contracting parties to meet the needs of their own context. In 
addition, there have been modifications to some requirements, through 
current renegotiation of IIAs, in order to face new challenges and situations 
that were not foreseen by the parties.  
One of these situations is the issue of regulatory measures that have an effect, 
substantial or not, permanent or temporary, on the property of investors. In 
this case, a transfer of ownership from the investor in favour of the State, its 
institutions or third parties, would not take place. Instead, substantial 
deprivation or dispossession of the investment interests may have an effect 
equal to expropriation, rendering the investment useless. In such cases, a 
distinction should be made as to when an actual indirect expropriation has 
taken place, and when the measure constitutes a legitimate regulation, which 
inherently does not entitle any compensation.  
Several authors, addressing this distinction refer to regulatory measures as 
lawful and uncompensable regulations. Such description, however, appears a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
140 Ibid. The ILC report identifies arbitrary expropriation from unlawful expropriation, the latter 
consist of the breach of international treaties and contracts (concession and licences), that is 
when the contracting party has made a commitment not to expropriate, which will consider 
exceptions that allow States to take such expropriatory measures.  
141 The element of method and process may have further developed in the other specific 
standards of protection, such as full protection and security and fair and equitable treatment, 
as linked to the issues of transparency, denial of justice and due process of law, to mention 
some. The non-discrimination element may have developed in the standards of national 
treatment and most-favoured nation treatment. In sum, the analysis of a claim of expropriation 
appears to require a comprehensive approach to various elements that are otherwise 
independently embedded in IIAs.  
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tautology, since regulations entail a presumption of legality and do not raise 
the obligation to compensate.  
The report of the ILC on Expropriation expressly considers such a distinction:  
Moreover, the distinction between a State's acts of expropriation founded on the right of 
“eminent domain” and those which fall within the exercise of its police power—a 
distinction which originally stems from differences in grounds and purposes and also 
has a bearing on the question of compensation—is daily becoming more difficult to 
make, because of the evolution which the conception of the State's social functions has 
undergone in both those areas.142  
The next subsections address direct and indirect expropriation. Since indirect 
expropriation is the focus of this study, the issue of direct expropriation will 
only be discussed briefly.  
 
3.5.1 Direct Expropriation 
It is relevant to make a distinction between direct expropriation and 
nationalisation, and then address the specific issues relating to indirect 
expropriation (or regulatory takings), as they are the focus of this work. 
The Institut de Droit International in 1952 defined nationalisation as ‘the 
transfer to the State by legislative act and in the public interest, of property or 
private rights of a designated character, with a view to their exploitation or 
control by the State, as to their direction to a new objective by the State’.143 
This definition was further developed by Professor Francioni who incorporated 
a number of relevant elements to the definition above: i) obligation, ii) general 
and impersonal character, iii) transfer of control or management by public bodies 
or private individuals/entities designated by the State.144  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
142 International Law Commission, "Yearbook of the International Law Commission 1959 -
Volume II. Documents of the eleventh session including the report of the Commission to the 
General Assembly", 12. 
143 44 Annuaire de l'Institutde Droit International (II) 279 et seq. (1952), 283, See also Kenneth S. 
Carlston, "Concession Agreements and Nationalization" The American Journal of International 
Law 52, no. 2 (1958); Newcombe and Paradell, Law and Practice of Investment Treaties: 
Standards of Treatment. 
144 Francesco Francioni, "Compensation for Nationalisation of Foreign Property: The Borderland 
between Law and Equity" The International and Comparative Law Quarterly 24, no. 2 (1975), 
257.  
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Likewise, the definition of expropriation generally considers the same 
elements, except for the character of singularity, 145  and the issue of 
compensation.146 In a direct expropriation, the measure by the government is 
undertaken by individual administrative acts, for a public purpose, and is 
aimed at specific property rights. Nationalisation, on the other hand, concerns 
the transfer of an entire segment of the economy or an important part thereof. 
On certain occasions, the nationalisation measure may affect individual 
investments, such as natural resources industries,147 or large banks.148 There 
is, however, a key element that differentiates expropriation from 
nationalisation:  
The political connotation, that is to say the intention of the State to operate an 
intervention in the economy in order to establish a certain measure of planning, is 
ultimately what keeps the nationalization qualitatively distinguished from 
expropriation.149    
Taking of property through nationalisation was more commonly seen during 
the first half of the past century.150 This type of governmental measure is 
characterised for being sector-wide or industry-wide.151 For example, Mexico 
undertook large-scale nationalisations of land and natural resources in the 
aftermath of the Mexican agrarian revolution. Central and Eastern European 
countries adopted similar measures after the First World War.152  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
145  See for instance the Report on Expropriation prepared by the Special Rapporteur Garcia 
Amador in 1959 stated: ‘in brief, therefore, except in the matter of compensation, where 
important distinctions can be noted, the two juridical institutions are, at least from the point of 
view of international law, substantially the same.” International Law Commission, "Yearbook of 
the International Law Commission 1959 -Volume II. Documents of the eleventh session 
including the report of the Commission to the General Assembly", 13.   
146 Ibid. 
147 Supreme Decrees 493 and 494 of 1 May 2010 and “Bolivia revierte a su dominio fundidora 
Vinto Antimonio”, Agencia Boliviana de Información, 2 May 2010. See 
http://www.unctad.org/en/docs/ webdiaeia20105_en.pdf  
148  Decree No.56, 7 June 2010. The Kyrgyz Republic nationalised one of the country’s largest 
banks, the foreign-controlled Asia Universal Bank. See United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), "World Investment Report 2011: Non-Equity Modes of International 
Production and Development," (Geneva: United Nations, 2011), 98. 
149 Francioni, "Compensation for Nationalisation of Foreign Property: The Borderland between 
Law and Equity", 258, fn 10. 
150 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), "International Investment 
Agreements: Key Issues Volume II", 3. 
151 Meg N. Kinnear, Andrea K. Bjorklund, and John F. G. Hannaford, Investment Disputes under 
NAFTA. An Annotated Guide to NAFTA Chapter 11  (Alphen aan den Rijn Kluwer Law 
International, 2006), 1110-13. 
152 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), "International Investment 
Agreements: Key Issues Volume I," (Geneva: United Nations, 2004), 6. 
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The specific character of direct expropriation, on the other hand, is generally 
directed at a single investor or applied to one specific property. 153 
Governmental measures resulting in nationalisations or direct expropriation 
are rarely seen nowadays.154 The unfavourable publicity of such a drastic 
action would negatively affect the investment climate in the host State, hence 
an open seizure of property is not considered as a wise undertaking.155  
A detailed analysis of the issue of direct expropriation is beyond the scope of 
this work, as it is analysed under a distinct legal framework; further, 
identifying a direct expropriation is generally not a difficult task.156 Tribunals 
which are to decide on a measure that directly expropriates an investment 
need not enter into further consideration as to whether an expropriation has 
occurred (as opposed to a legitimate regulation).  
In such cases, the tribunals will generally consider the legality or illegality of 
the expropriation by assessing whether the requirements established under 
the agreement have been met. Claims of direct expropriation and 
nationalisation may only become contentious over the issue of compensation. 
Rarely will a direct expropriation be an unsuccessful claim by an investor, 
thus the discussions will focus on the amount of compensation and the 
methodology for calculation. However, absence of an agreement may call, for 
instance under the ICSID Convention, for the application of domestic law and 
international law, as appropriate.157  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
153 Kinnear, Bjorklund, and Hannaford, Investment Disputes under NAFTA. An Annotated Guide 
to NAFTA Chapter 11, 1110-13. 
154 Note however, that some Latin American governments have started a trendy wave of 
nationalizations: In 2006 president Evo Morales nationalised oil fields in Bolivia. In 2007 
president Hugo Chavez, also nationalised oil fields in Faja de Orinoco, operated by American, 
Norwegian, French and British investors. (‘Estamos recuperando la propiedad y la gestión de 
estas áreas estratégicas’) We are recovering the ownership and control of these strategic sectors, 
he asserted (own translation). See BBC News, “Chavez Nacionaliza Campos Petroleros”, BBC 
World.com, 27 February 2007, available at: 
 http://news.bbc.co.uk/hi/spanish/business/newsid_6399000/6399481.stm 
155 Schreuer, "The Concept of Expropriation under the ECT and other Investment Protection 
Treaties", 2. 
156 See Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. 
Argentine Republic, (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19), Decision on Liability (30 July 2010) 
(France/Argentina and Spain/Argentina BITs), para. 132, and  Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. 
United Mexican States (ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/99/1) Award 16 December 2002, para. 100. 
Where both tribunals state that recognizing a direct expropriation is not difficult, comparing the 
task with identifying an indirect expropriation.   
157 See for instance Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v The Republic of Costa Rica, 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1), related to a direct expropriation case, whereby the government of 
Costa Rica expropriated – by decree – important extension of land from a corporation with 
several US investors. In this case the tribunal focused on the discussion of the value that 
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In Santa Elena v Costa Rica the issue of direct expropriation was discussed in 
the context of the protection of the environment by means of a natural reserve. 
In 1978, Costa Rica issued an expropriation decree for Santa Elena. Costa 
Rica proposed to pay Santa Elena the sum of approximately USD 1,900,000158 
as compensation for the intended expropriation of the property. The Claimant, 
while not objecting to the expropriatory measure, did contest the price of the 
property,159 and claimed approximately USD 40,337,750 as fair market value 
of the property. 160 In this case, the right of the Respondent to expropriate the 
property was not in dispute, neither was the size of the property. 161 The 
arbitration tribunal limited its review to the issue of compensation and its 
calculation. In this context, the tribunal stated:  
While an expropriation or taking for environmental reasons may be classified as a 
taking for a public purpose, and thus may be legitimate, the fact that the Property was 
taken for this reason does not affect either the nature or the measure of the 
compensation to be paid for the taking. That is, the purpose of protecting the 
environment for which the Property was taken does not alter the legal character of the 
taking for which adequate compensation must be paid. The international source of the 
obligation to protect the environment makes no difference.162  
The tribunal worked on the basis of a decree of direct expropriation, which 
otherwise seemed to comply with all the other conditions of lawful 
expropriation under international law. Arguably, in this case the government 
made use of its prerogative of eminent domain for a public purpose (as is the 
protection of the environment). Similar measures may be taken under different 
methods such as the exercise of the prerogative to regulate or police power. 
Yet, this does not mean that the outcome would have been different. If 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
should be paid by the government of Costa Rica in favour of the investor. See also Libyan 
American Oil Company (Liamco) v the Government of the Libyan Arab Republic, Ad Hoc Tribunal 
(Draft Convention on Arbitral Procedure, ILC 1958), Award 1977; where the sole arbitrator 
considered the case of nationalizations of concessions for the exploration and exploitation of oil 
fields in Libya. In this case the arbitrator concluded that restitutio in integrum was impossible, 
and expressed that the investor was entitled to indemnification for what was considered a lawful 
nationalization of assets. 
158 The sum resulted from an appraisal of the Property conducted by one of its agencies less 
than one month earlier the Government approved the Decree (14 April 1978). See Compañía del 
Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v The Republic of Costa Rica, (ICSID Case No. ARB/96/1), Final 
Award, February 17, 2000, para. 17. 
159 The Claimant advised for approximately USD 6’400.000. This amount was the result of an 
appraisal of the property by CDSE and conducted by the Chief Appraiser of the Banco de Costa 
Rica in February 1978, three months prior to the expropriatory Decree. Santa Elena v Costa 
Rica, para.19. 
160 See Santa Elena v Costa Rica, para. 38. 
161 See Santa Elena v Costa Rica, para. 55. 
162 Compañía del Desarrollo de Santa Elena, S.A. v The Republic Of Costa Rica, (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/96/1), Final Award, February 17, 2000, para. 71.(emphasis added) 
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anything, the tribunal would have undertaken further scrutiny of the 
governmental measure. The next section discusses such situations under the 
scope of indirect expropriation.   
 
3.5.2 Indirect Expropriation  
For a long time there was no definition of indirect expropriation expressly 
stated in IIAs, and it is referred to ‘often interchangeably, as regulatory, 
constructive, consequential, disguised, de facto or creeping.’163 
 Currently indirect expropriation has become subject of extensive discussion 
among scholars and practitioners. Professor Wälde once referred to the ever-
increasing taking of property via regulatory measures as ‘regulatory risk’ in 
addition to ‘political risk’164. An indirect expropriation does not necessarily 
involve a physical taking of property or transfer of ownership, but may still 
result in the effective loss of management, use or control, or a significant 
depreciation of the value, of the assets of a foreign investor.165 There exist 
difficulties in asserting a proper definition of indirect expropriation, especially 
when it comes to differentiating it from ‘non-compensable regulation’ 166 . 
Therefore, the ‘fuzzy’ character of indirect expropriation contributes to the lack 
of consensus regarding the conditions necessary to distinguish an act of 
indirect expropriation from a regulation. In any case, the specific facts of each 
case and its context will provide the necessary elements to decide whether an 
indirect expropriation has occurred. Further, as illustrated in Section 3.4.2.3 
there are increasing efforts to provide a framework of analysis to guide the 
assessment of investment tribunals. This work aims to contribute in 
distinguishing legitimate regulation from indirect expropriation, through the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
163 W. Michael  Reisman and Sloane Robert D., "Indirect Expropriation and its Valuation in the 
BIT Generation" British Yearbook of International Law (2004), 119. In regard the issue of 
creeping expropriation, it should be briefly explained that: ‘[b]ecause of their gradual and 
cumulative nature, creeping expropriations also render it problematic, perhaps even arbitrary, 
to identify a single interference (or failure to act where a duty requires it) as the 'moment of 
expropriation.’ See ibid., 125. 
164  Wälde and Dow, "Treaties and Regulatory Risk in Infrastructure Investment. The 
Effectiveness of International Law Disciplines versus Sanctions by Global Markets in Reducing 
the Political and Regulatory Risk for Private Infrastructure Investment"; Wälde and Kolo, 
"Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and ‘Regulatory Taking’ in International 
Law". 
165 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), "International Investment 
Agreements: Key Issues Volume I", 235. 
166 OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, ""Indirect Expropriation” and the 
“Right to Regulate” in International Investment Law".  
 	   143	  
analysis of the police power of States. In so doing this work relies largely on 
the methodology proposed by Professor Brigitte Stern,167 who observes that 
the definitions of indirect expropriation in FTAs and BITs are diverse and cover 
several terms, expressing that the measure at issue – or its effects – should be 
equivalent to a direct expropriation: 
In light of these various expressions, it is particularly difficult to determine 
whether or not either the measure or the effect must be rigorously equivalent to 
an expropriation, or if the degree of similarity can be more or less important.168  
While some authors suggest that the nature of the industry plays an 
important role in the determination that an indirect expropriation has 
occurred,169 this work attempts a further step into the nature of the natural 
resource – water resources in this case – because it relates to many industries 
in diverse manners.  
Indirect expropriation is linked to various types of regulatory measures, 
actions or legislation adopted by governments, which have an effect over 
investor’s property, material or immaterial. Arguably, beyond that notion of 
indirect expropriation - which makes it formally distinct from direct 
expropriation - there is no widely accepted definition of indirect 
expropriation.170 Regardless of the formal differences between indirect and 
direct expropriation, the real difficulty lies in distinguishing indirect 
expropriation from legitimate regulation, which does not entitle payment of 
compensation.  
The arbitral tribunal of the Norwegian Shipowners Case undertook the task to 
determine the existence of an indirect expropriation back in 1922.171 The 
tribunal disagreed with the defendant’s arguments – the US – that 
international law did not protect contractual rights, and concluded that the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Stern, "In Search of the Frontiers of Indirect Expropriation". Wälde and Kolo, propose a 
similar criteria, considering US takings jurisprudence. See Wälde and Kolo, 
"Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and ‘Regulatory Taking’ in International Law" 
826. 
168 Stern, "In Search of the Frontiers of Indirect Expropriation", 34. 
169 Wälde and Kolo, 
"Environmental Regulation, Investment Protection and ‘Regulatory Taking’ in International Law
” 487. 
170 See Burns H. Weston, ""Constructive Takings" under International Law: A Modest Foray into 
the Problem of "Creeping Expropiation" " Virginia Journal of International Law 16, no. 1 (1975); 
Dolzer, "Indirect Expropriations: New Developments?"; Stern, "In Search of the Frontiers of 
Indirect Expropriation"; Anne Hoffmann, "Indirect Expropriation", in Standards of Investment 
Protection, ed. August Reinisch (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). 
171 Norwegian Shipowners’ Claims (Norway) v United States of America Permanent Court of 
Arbitration Award of the Tribunal, October 13 1922, 11-18. 
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series of measures adopted by the US (affecting the contractual rights of the 
Norwegian shipbuilders) constituted an indirect expropriation. Later, in 
Biloune v Ghana, the ad-hoc arbitral tribunal considered that a series of 
actions and omissions by the host State constituted ‘constructive 
expropriation’ of contractual rights, unless the respondents could show 
through ‘persuasive evidence sufficient justification for these events’ 172 
(emphasis added).  
The tribunal in Pope & Talbot v Canada173 considered the level of interference 
in determining whether an indirect expropriation had occurred or not. In 
Metalclad v Mexico,174 the tribunal focused on the effects of the measure; in 
this case, the NAFTA tribunal stated that a deprivation of the whole or a 
significant part of the to-be-expected economic benefits of the property ‘even if 
not to the obvious benefit of the host State’, constitutes an indirect 
expropriation.  
Recently, the arbitration tribunal in Suez & Vivendi v Argentina175 considered 
the following definition of indirect expropriation: 
In case of an indirect expropriation, sometimes referred to as a “regulatory 
taking,” host States invoke their legislative and regulatory powers to enact 
measures that reduce the benefits investors derive from their investments but 
without actually changing or cancelling investors’ legal title to their assets or 
diminishing their control over them.176 (emphasis added and footnote omitted). 
The test applied by the tribunal in Tecmed v Mexico stated that: 
[...] if due to the actions of the Respondent, the assets involved have lost their 
value or economic use for their holder and the extent of the loss. This determination 
is important because it is one of the main elements to distinguish, from the point 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
172 See Biloune and Marine Drive Complex Ltd v Ghana Investments Centre and the Governments 
of Ghana, UNCITRAL as hoc Tribunal, Award on Jurisdiction and Liability of 27 October 1989, 
95 ILR 183, 209.   
173 Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Interim Award (NAFTA), 26 June 2000. 
174 Metalclad Corp. v Mexico, Arb (AF)/97/1, 5 ICSID Reports, 209, para. 103 
175 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A. v Argentina, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19, and AWG Group v Argentina (under UNCITRAL Rules), Decision on 
Liability, July 30, 2010. 
176 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona, S.A. and Vivendi Universal, S.A. v. Argentine 
Republic, (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19), Decision on Liability, 30 July 2010, (France/Argentina 
and Spain/Argentina BITs), para. 132. (The tribunal referred to Dolzer, Schreuer, as well as 
Reinisch for the definition of indirect expropriation. See also a different approach as adopted by 
the tribunal in Impregilo v Pakistan, where arbitrators declined jurisdiction on the basis –among 
others – that refusal to pay under a Contract do not constitute an exercise of the police power of 
the State, hence such action does not fall within the scope of the investment treaty. See 
Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, (ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3), Decision on 
Jurisdiction, 22 April 2005, para 278.  
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of view of an international tribunal, between a regulatory measure, which is an 
ordinary expression of the exercise of the State’s police power that entails a 
decrease in assets or rights, and a de facto expropriation that deprives those assets 
and rights of any real substance177 (emphasis added).  
Likewise in the tribunal in Impregilo v Argentina explains: 
Expropriation is to be distinguished from less far-reaching measures which 
regulate or restrict the right to use property. Such measures may also have 
serious economic effects for the investor but do not constitute expropriation. 
However, there are borderline cases where restrictions on the use of property go 
so far as to leave the investor with only a nominal property right. This could in 
appropriate cases be regarded as indirect expropriation.178 
There appears to be substantial differences in the definitions of indirect 
expropriation proposed by the tribunals in Metalclad and Suez & Vivendi on 
one hand, and the tribunals in Tecmed and Impregilo on the other hand. The 
former appears to adopt a sole effects approach to the cases at hand, whereas 
the former - and an important number of awards - adopt a more nuanced 
approach, where the effects of the measures over the investor and the purpose 
of the governmental measure are weighted against each other.  
Professor Dolzer points out that there is no doubt about the impact that a 
regulatory measure may have on the ‘owner’s ability to use and enjoy his 
property’; the discussion, however, should rather concentrate on ‘whether the 
focus on the effect will be the only and exclusive relevant criterion’.179  
[T]he Metalclad definition deserves to be quoted not just because it reflects a 
recent broad effort to state the law, but also because it highlights a distinct line of 
thinking. Remarkably, the Metalclad Award laid down its definition without 
reference to any previous decision or codificatory norm, focusing strongly and 
exclusively on the effect of the governmental measure on the alien owner.180  
Professor Stern suggests that one approach would be to analyse a measure 
against the definition of indirect expropriation set forth in Metalclad because 
such a definition seems to set a lower threshold to find indirect expropriation 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
177  Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, (ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2), Award of 29 May 2003, 19 ICSID Rev. —FILJ 158 (2004), para. 115.  
178 Impregilo S.p.A. v Argentine Republic, (ICSID Case No. ARB/07/17), Award, June 21, 2011, 
para. 270. 
179 Dolzer, "Indirect Expropriations: New Developments?", 79. See the opinion of the Arbitral 
tribunal in Chemtura Corporation v Canada, Ad hoc—UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Award signed 2 August 
2010, para. 248.  
180 Ibid., 72, 79. 
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than the threshold for a direct expropriation.181 This could mean that the body 
of arbitral awards similar to the Metalclad award may be adopting an 
approach to finding an indirect expropriation which is less tolerant of 
governmental intervention than a direct expropriation would be. The approach 
adopted by the arbitral tribunal in Pope & Talbot found that the word 
‘tantamount’ used in Article 1110 of the NAFTA cannot mean more than 
expropriation, thus making both actions equivalent as regards the effects of 
the governmental measure.   
In the case of the Metalclad approach, the intent of the host State is not 
relevant to the analysis; therefore, the tribunal did not need to engage in 
further considerations as to the purpose of the measure adopted by the State, 
thereby adopting the ‘sole effects’ approach to regulatory measures.182 In this 
regard, there is the view, that the Metalclad tribunal suggested a list of 
regulatory measures with an expropriatory effect, rather than a comprehensive 
definition of indirect expropriation.183  
Scholars and practitioners have expressed concern that the international 
arbitration regime may trump the regulatory activity of States in areas such as 
environmental protection, water management and services, health and safety, 
public policy, etc.184 On the relationship between international investment law 
and international environmental law, Professor Sands, commenting on the 
Metalclad approach to regulatory measures, asserts:  
The effect of the Award is to open the door to “tantamount to expropriation claim” 
on many environmental regulations (or other national regulations intended to 
protect human health), including some adopted pursuant to international treaty 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
181 Professor Stern identifies two approaches to distinguish an indirect expropriation from a 
regulation; both of them are related to the level of interference with the property rights of the 
investor. One approach considers that indirect expropriation entails a lesser interference with 
the investment than a direct expropriation. The second approach contends that indirect 
expropriation has similar results as direct expropriation. See Stern, "In Search of the Frontiers 
of Indirect Expropriation", 39.  
182 See also Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Ltd v Arab Republic of Egypt (S.P.P. v Egypt), 
ICSID Case No ARB/84/3, Award, 20 May 1992, at para. 227; Compañía de Aguas del Aconquija 
S.A. and Vivendi Universal v Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/97/3, Award, 20 August 
2007, para. 7.5.21. 
183 Jan Paulsson as cited in Kinnear, Bjorklund, and Hannaford, Investment Disputes under 
NAFTA. An Annotated Guide to NAFTA Chapter 11,1110-21. In view of Bjorklund et al, such an 
interpretation by Paulsson and Douglas does not consider that Metalclad concentrates on the 
adverse effects of the measure over the interest of the investor. 
184 Muñoz, "La administración del agua y la inversión extranjera directa ¿Cómo se relacionan?"; 
Van Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law; Mann, "The Right of States to 
Regulate and International Investment Law"; Mann, "Implications of International Trade and 
Investment Agreements for Water and Water Services: Some Responses from Other Sources of 
International Law". 
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obligations (such as the 1992 Convention on Biological Diversity or the 1971 
Wetlands Convention).185   
The relevance of regulatory activity has become central to the analysis of 
indirect expropriation. While the police power of States has never been 
questioned under international investment law, its exercise has had 
consequences for the State’s ability to exert regulatory activity with an effect 
on the scope of the regulatory measure. Therefore, even when the decision is 
adopted on a case by cases basis, investors and host States may welcome 
certain criteria that allow them to predict – to a certain extent – the possible 
outcome of their dispute.  
Having illustrated that States are seeking to reinforce their regulatory 
prerogatives, and that arbitral tribunals appear to be deferring to such 
prerogatives, one could conclude that an approach that considers the effects of 
the measure over the investment, the public purpose of the measure, and the 
element of good faith on the part of the State, constitute the starting point to 
draw a dividing line between regulation and indirect expropriation.186 This 
approach will be advanced in Section 3.7 and fully developed in Chapter IV. 
Before turning to it, this work continues a revisit to the police power, in the 
context of international investment law and arbitration. 
 
3.6  Analysis of the Police Power in the Contexts of International 
Investment Law and International Investment Arbitration  
 
3.6.1 The Police Power in International Investment Law  
Several international instruments have addressed the regulatory prerogatives 
of States within the scope of expropriatory measures. In fact, the issue is as 
old as is the protection of aliens and their property under customary 
international law; and while some international instruments have recognised 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
185 Philippe Sands, "Litigating Environmental Disputes: Courts, Tribunals and the Progressive 
Development of International Environmental Law", (paper presented at the Global Forum VII on 
International Investment, Paris, 27-28 March, 2008), 10. 
186 This work suggests that the object – in this case water resources – and its regulatory 
framework, which the measure is aimed, may provide relevant insights to arbitral tribunals. 
This is because most societal interests enjoy different forms of property rights and regulation, 
attending not only its physical characteristics but also the role they play in a contextual and 
temporal setting.  
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the police power, some others have attempted to extend the protection against 
its exercise.  
The European Convention of Human Rights of 1950 incorporated Protocol 1 to 
its main text in 1952. Article 1 provides:   
Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law. 
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State 
to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in 
accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other 
contributions or penalties.187 
Protocol 1, while recognising the right to a peaceful possession of property, 
also recognises the eminent domain of States to expropriate property in the 
public interest and – while not expressly provided for – upon payment of 
compensation. Such an obligation can be derived from the provisions of 
national law and customary international law. Moreover, the second 
paragraph of Article 1 seems to further recognise the police power of States to 
regulate the enjoyment of private property subject to the public interest. This 
prerogative, however, is not conditioned on the payment of compensation.188  
Within the framework of customary international law, the ILC in its Eleventh 
Session on State Responsibility, expressed with regard to the protection of the 
property of aliens:  
The possibility of the State incurring international responsibility is remote; and it 
is equally so when the State destroys property belonging to aliens for reasons of 
public safety or health, provided that the circumstances are ones in which the 
notion of force majeure or state of necessity is recognized by international law. In 
international jurisprudence exemption from responsibility has also been based on 
the “police power” of the State.189 
In 1969, the Harvard Law School undertook the project of revising the Draft 
Convention on Responsibility of States for Damage Done in Their Territory to the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
187 Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (Paris: 1950) 
and Protocol to the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental 
Freedoms as amended by Protocol No. 11 (Paris: 1952) 
188 See OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, ""Indirect Expropriation” and the 
“Right to Regulate” in International Investment Law ". 
189 United Nations, "Yearbook of the International Law Commission. Volume II", (1959), para 43. 
(Emphasis added) 
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Person or Property of Foreigners (Harvard Draft Convention), prepared in 1929 
by Professor Borchard for the Harvard Research in International Law. The 
developments of international law, however, demanded a deeper re-
examination of the whole issue, which was entrusted to Professors Sohn and 
Baxter. This work recognised the exercise of the police power of the State, 
under the scope of uncompensated takings. Article 10 (5) allows for taking of 
property or the deprivation of use or enjoyment thereof:  
An uncompensated taking of property of an alien or a deprivation of the use or 
enjoyment of property of an alien which results from the execution of the tax laws; 
from a general change in the value of currency; from the action of the competent 
authorities of the State in the maintenance of public order, health, or morality; or 
from the valid exercise of belligerent rights; or is otherwise incidental to the 
normal operation of the laws of the State shall not be considered wrongful.190  
Scholars and jurists have incessantly referred to the Harvard Draft 
Convention, to point out that regulatory measures adopted to maintain the 
public order health or morals are exempted from the payment of 
compensation.191 The approach adopted in Article 10 suggests that a breach of 
the obligation of States to refrain from taking or depriving aliens of their 
property is otherwise justified by circumstances ‘which are universally 
recognized as properly calling for such action’. 192  In such cases, taking 
expropriatory measures do not entail compensation nor does the State bear 
international responsibility, because of the exception contained in Article 10 
(5) rather than the inexistence of a breach. Contrary to the approach adopted 
by the Harvard Draft Convention, this thesis contends that regulatory 
measures aimed to protect the general welfare or other societal values could 
be distinguished from takings or acts of indirect expropriation. In doing so, 
this thesis proposes a framework of analysis for drawing a dividing line 
between regulations and takings.  
Article 3 of the 1967 OECD Draft Convention on the Protection on Property 
provides a set of comments relevant to the consideration of the police power 
within the scope of takings of property. Article 3 stipulates that a taking may 
be lawfully undertaken upon compliance of the requirements stated under 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
190 Louis B. Sohn and R. R. Baxter, "Responsibility of States for Injuries to the Economic 
Interests of Aliens" American Society of International Law 55(1961), 553-54. 
191 In addition, for the measure to be deemed lawful, the State adopting the measure must 
observe certain conditions: i) non-discrimination, ii) non-denial of justice or adverse judgment, 
iii) no departure from the principles of justice as recognised by civilized nations, and iv) it is not 
an abuse of power or covert act of deprivation. See ibid. (Emphasis added). 
192 Ibid. 
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international law: i) public interest, and due process, ii) non-discrimination, 
and not contrary to undertakings previously given, and iii) payment of 
compensation. The annotations to this provision, however, recognise the right 
of States to regulate in the public interest whenever the regulatory measure 
does not amount to a disguised act of expropriation.193 Annotation 3(a) states 
the recognition of the sovereign right of States to deprive aliens of their 
property. However, for such a deprivation or interference to be considered as a 
deprivation of property, would be determined by the duration and extent of the 
measure.194   
According to Yannaca-Small, the Restatement Third of the Foreign Relations 
Law of the United States aims to provide some guidance for the distinction 
between a regulation and an indirect expropriation:  
[…] a State is not responsible for loss of property or for other economic 
disadvantage resulting from bona fide general taxation, regulation, forfeiture for 
crime, or other action of the kind that is commonly accepted as within the police 
power of States, if it is not discriminatory […].195      
The MAI also contemplated the exercise of the police power of States, in Article 
3 (right to regulate) of the draft project: 
A Contracting Party may adopt, maintain or enforce any measure that it considers 
appropriate to ensure that investment activity is undertaken in a manner 
sensitive to health, safety or environmental concerns, provided such measures are 
consistent with this agreement.196  
In connection with this provision, the interpretative note to Article 5 on 
expropriation,197 states:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
193 OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, ""Indirect Expropriation” and the 
“Right to Regulate” in International Investment Law", 8. See 4 (a) “[...]By using the phrase ‘to 
deprive…directly or indirectly …’ in the text of the Article it is, however, intended to bring within 
its compass any measures taken with the intent of wrongfully depriving the national concerned 
of the substance of his rights and resulting in such loss (e.g. prohibiting the national to sell his 
property of forcing him to do so at a fraction of the fair market price). OECD Draft Convention 
on Foreign Property, 12 October 1967. 
194  See Annotation to Article 3 A(1)(a) and A(1)(b). http://www.oecd.org/dataoecd/35/4/ 
39286571.pdf 
195 OECD Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, ""Indirect Expropriation” and the 
“Right to Regulate” in International Investment Law", 8. See “Restatement of the Law Third, the 
Foreign Relations of the United States,” American Law Institute, Volume 1, 1987, Section 712, 
Comment: g.  
196 Organisation for Economic Cooperation and Development, The Multilateral Agreement on 
Investment, (Report by the Chairman to the Negotiating Group), DAFFE/MAI(98)17, 4 May 
1998. 
197 Proposed by the Chairman in the package on Labour and Environment  
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This Article is intended to incorporate into the MAI existing international legal 
norms […] compensation for an expropriatory taking without regard to the label 
applied to it, even if title to the property is not taken. It does not establish a new 
requirement that Parties pay compensation for losses which an investor or 
investment may incur through regulation, revenue raising and other normal 
activity in the public interest undertaken by governments. It is understood that 
default by a sovereign State subject to rescheduling arrangements undertaken in 
accordance with international law and practices is not expropriation within the 
meaning of this Article.198 
It seems paradoxical, in the context of capital exporting/capital importing 
country negotiations, that efforts to recognise the States’ prerogative to 
regulate are mostly included in multilateral agreements as opposed to bilateral 
ones. For instance, the failure of the MAI negotiations, which was partly 
attributed to the – allegedly – disadvantageous position of capital importing 
countries in the negotiations, contain provisions that were not contemplated 
in BITs; and yet, would have possibly contributed to more consistent arbitral 
awards. As noted earlier,199 new BITs and FTAs appear to adopt the traditional 
approach of customary international law in regard to States’ police power and 
the right to regulate. The US and Canada’s Model BITs have followed this 
approach as well as other recently negotiated IIAs.200 Numerous agreements of 
the second generation stipulate specific situations in which the exercise of 
regulatory prerogatives of States will not constitute indirect expropriation, and 
other governmental measures would be scrutinised, considering the effects of 
the measure, the expectations of the investor and the character of the 
governmental measure. The police power strictu sensu and the prerogative of 
states to regulate, lato sensu, respectively, seem increasingly subjected to 
different standards of review by arbitral tribunals, as investment agreements 
continue to include specific provisions allowing for increased deference to the 
exercise of the police power of states.201 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
198 Article 5, fn. 5. Available at http://www1.oecd.org/daf/mai/pdf/ng/ng9817e.pdf, last visited 
November 2012. See the comments on this and the abovementioned treaties in OECD 
Directorate for Financial and Enterprise Affairs, ""Indirect Expropriation” and the “Right to 
Regulate” in International Investment Law". 
199 See Section 3.4.2.3 
200 This has been addressed in Section 3.3.3. 
201 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), "EXPROPRIATION: A 
Sequel. UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II", 13. One could 
argue that such deference toward the police power of states have been always part of customary 
international law; however, many IIAs have adopted specific provisions in order to prevent or to 
assist tribunals in considering claims of indirect expropriation. See Section 3.4.2.3. 
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 Likewise, these agreements also provide guidelines to address measures that 
could potentially be expropriatory. This trend shows the relevance of the 
notion of the police power and the importance of its assessment for the 
legitimacy and consistency of the investment arbitration regime. 
3.6.2 The Police Power Doctrine in Investment Arbitration  
The investor-State dispute settlement mechanism has been invoked in 514 
known cases through to the end of 2012. The highest number of investment 
disputes – 58 in one year - has been recorded for 2012.202 With more than 
3000 IIAs in force,203 the negotiators of the provisions contained in these 
instruments could not have foreseen many of the interpretive issues that 
would come under the scrutiny of arbitral tribunals. The issue of 
interpretation of IIAs is, therefore, essential to the development of investment 
arbitration because it has an effect on the consistency and predictability of 
investment regime as a whole. That said, however, it is important to recall that 
an in-depth analysis of treaty interpretation under Articles 31 and 32 of the 
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, is beyond the scope of this work.204 
The question that arises in the context of predictability and consistency is 
whether they should be looked at from a systemic perspective or whether they 
could be achieved under a case specific approach, following a common 
analytical framework. The question that follows is whether there is really 
conceptual difference between these two approaches. Professor Reisman, for 
instance, advocates for a case-specific analysis, under the argument that 
arbitral tribunals are granted law-applying faculties, rather than law-making 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 (UNCTAD), "World Investment Report 2013. Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for 
Development.," xxi; United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), "IIA 
Issues Note. Recent Developments in Investor- State Dispute Settlement (ISDS)" (Geneva: 
UNCTAD, 2013). 
203 Ibid. 
204 For authoritative writings in the area of treaty interpretation see Campbell McLachlan, "The 
principle of systemic integration and Article 31(3) (C) of the Vienna Convention" International 
and comparative law quarterly. 54, no. 2 (2005); Diane A. Desierto, "Conflict of Treaties, 
Interpretation, and Decision-Making on Human Rights and Investment During Economic 
Crises" Transnational Dispute Management 1(2013); William W. Burke-White and Andreas Von 
Staden, "Investment Protection in Extraordinary Times: The Interpretation and Application of 
Non-Precluded Measures Provisions in Bilateral Investment Treaties" University of Pennsylvania 
Law School Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series, no. Research Paper No. #07-14 
(2007); Bruno Simma and Theodore Kill, "Harmonizing Investment Protection and International 
Human Rights: First Steps Towards Methodology", in International Investment Law for the 21st 
Century Essays in Honour of Christoph Schreuer, ed. Ursula Kriebaum Christina Binder, August 
Reinisch, and Stephan Wittich (Oxford, New York: Oxford University Press, 2009); J. Romesh 
Weeramantry, Treaty Interpretation in Investment Arbitration  (Oxford, U.K.: Oxford University 
Press, 2012).  
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prerogatives.205 This thesis asserts that in order to achieve some level of 
consistency and predictability, in the context of the legitimate exercise of the 
police power, arbitral tribunals should follow a framework of analysis common 
to all investment disputes. In this case such framework seeks to distinguish a 
legitimate regulation from compensable expropriation.  
This section analyses several arbitral awards addressing the police power of 
States or their regulatory prerogatives. The issue is relevant to the exercise of 
regulatory prerogatives over water management, as the use and enjoyment of 
water resources is increasingly becoming subject to regulation due to stress 
and competitive use of the resource. Therefore, while the hydrological cycle 
becomes more unpredictable, it is predictable that legal rights over water 
resources may become insecure. Note that the notion of predictability in this 
case plays a relevant role in the framework of analysis that will be discussed 
in the next chapter, as it is linked to the issue of legitimate expectations. 
In Chemtura v Canada,206 a case under the NAFTA, the tribunal recognised the 
validity of the police power doctrine as a defence for the decision of the 
Canadian government to phase out all agricultural application of the chemical 
lindane. The tribunal in this case expressly stated that regardless of the issue 
of deprivation, there was no expropriation since Canada had lawfully exercised 
its police powers in aiming at protecting the public health and the 
environment.  
The tribunal found no substantial deprivation of the investment and thus no 
indirect expropriation. It went further, however, in spelling out a set of 
conditions under which the exercise of the police power would be deemed only 
a legitimate regulation and not an act of expropriation. The tribunal concluded 
that, even in the event that there was a substantial deprivation of the 
investment; there would be still no expropriation because: 
Irrespective of the existence of a contractual deprivation, the Tribunal considers 
in any event that the measures challenged by the Claimant constituted a valid 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
205 Professor Michael Reisman observes: ‘Glamis Gold, caught between the requirement of 
rendering a ‘case- specific’ decision, which it accepted as its mandate and the siren of ‘systemic 
implications', invented some new, intermediate categories: ‘a modicum of awareness of the 
system as a whole’ and ‘greater contextual awareness'. Wholly apart from the question of 
whether a single investment tribunal should presume to try to introduce constitutive changes, 
this particular change purports to import into arbitral law-applying a variable which is central 
and unique to law-making and law-terminating.’ See Reisman, "'Case Specific Mandates' versus 
`Systemic Implications': How Should Investment Tribunals Decide? - The Freshfields Arbitration 
Lecture", 149. 
206 Chemtura Corporation v Canada, Ad hoc—UNCITRAL (NAFTA).  
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exercise of the Respondent's police powers. As discussed in detail in connection 
with Article 1105 of NAFTA, The PMRA took measures within its mandate, in a 
non-discriminatory manner, motivated by the increasing awareness of the 
dangers presented by lindane for human health and the environment. A measure 
adopted under such circumstances is a valid exercise of the State’s police power 
and, as a result does not constitute an expropriation. 207  
While a regulatory measure is always the exercise of the police power of the 
government, the notion has not been always expressly articulated in the body 
of arbitral awards, even when the doctrine inspired the decision. In Methanex 
v United States, for instance, the tribunal stated: 
[…] as a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a 
public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process and, which 
affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed expropriatory 
and compensable unless specific commitments had been given by the regulating 
government to the then putative foreign investor contemplating investment that 
the government would refrain from such regulation.208 
As suggested earlier in this Chapter, the tribunal’s reading of Article 1110 of 
the NAFTA has been subject of analysis and criticism.209  
In Saluka v Czech Republic,210 the tribunal stated that the approach adopted 
by the arbitral tribunal in Methanex v United States is one that has been 
recognised under customary international law. 211  Notwithstanding, it also 
warns that the adoption of the police power is not absolute and it is necessary 
to find a dividing line between regulation and expropriation:  
International law has yet to identify in a comprehensive and definitive fashion 
precisely what regulations are considered “permissible” and “commonly accepted” 
as falling within the police or regulatory power of States and, thus, 
noncompensable. In other words, it has yet to draw a bright and easily 
distinguishable line between non-compensable regulations on the one hand and, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
207 Chemtura Corporation v Canada, Ad hoc—UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Award 2 August 2010, para. 
266. 
208 Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, Ad hoc—UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Final Award, 3 
August 2005, Part IV - Chapter D - Page 4, para. 7 
209 See Chapter III, Section 3.3.4. 
210 Saluka Investment BV (The Netherlands) v Czech Republic. 
211 The tribunal in this case made echo of previous Arbitral Awards: Methanex Corp. v. USA, 
Final Award, 3 August 2005, para. 410. See also Too v. Greater Modesto Insurance Associates, 23 
Iran U.S. Cl. Trib. Rep. 378, para. 26; S.D. Myers, Inc. v. Canada, 40 ILM 1408, para. 281; Lauder 
(USA) v. Czech Republic, Final Award, 3 September 2002, para. 198; Tecnicas Medioambientales 
Tecmed S.A. v. United Mexican States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/2, 29 May 2003, para. 119. 
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on the other, measures that have the effect of depriving foreign investors of their 
investment and are thus unlawful and compensable in international law.212  
Further in Saluka, the tribunal attributed such responsibility to the 
adjudicators to decide when, why and at what point a lawful regulatory 
measure, thus non-compensable, becomes ‘in fact and effect’ an unlawful 
expropriation on the basis of case by case analysis.213  
It is interesting to note that while the arbitral tribunal did not find the 
regulatory measure adopted by Czech Republic as expropriatory, it did find a 
breach of the fair and equitable treatment (FET) standard, considering 
elements directly linked to the exercise of the State’s police power. It has been 
argued that arbitral tribunals may find a breach of FET in lieu of the 
expropriation standard.214  
In Pope & Talbot v Canada, the tribunal did refer to the police powers doctrine 
and stated that it should be analysed with special care.215 In addressing the 
argument put forward by Canada that every regulation that is non-
discriminatory falls outside the scope of Article 1110 of the NAFTA, the 
tribunal considered such an argument as going too far. According to the 
tribunal, a regulation within the exercise of the State’s police powers could 
amount to creeping expropriation, and ‘a blanket exception for regulatory 
measures would create a gaping loophole in international protections against 
expropriation’. 216  In a footnote to this paragraph, however, the tribunal 
clarifies that this would not mean to express that every ‘regulatory restraint’ 
can be compared to expropriation, emphasizing – apparently – the element 
relating to the degree of interference with the property.217 Based on these 
assertions, the tribunal proceeded to determine whether the level of 
interference in the case at hand was significant. It is important to consider the 
wording used by the arbitration tribunal in both Chemtura and Pope & Talbot 
with the regard to the application and relevance of the element of deprivation. 
While the tribunal in Pope & Talbot based its analysis on the level of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
212 Saluka Investments BV (The Netherlands) v Czech Republic, Partial Award 17 March 2006, 
para. 363 
213 Ibid. para. 264 
214 Lucy Reed and Daina Bray, "Fair and Equitable Treatment: Fairly and Equitably Applied in 
Lieu of Unlawful Indirect Expropriation?", in Contemporary Issues in International Arbitration and 
Mediation: The Fordham Papers 2007, ed. Arthur W. Rovine (Leiden; Boston: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 2008). 
215 Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Interim Award (NAFTA) 26 June 2000, para 99. 
216 Ibid. para 99. 
217 This additional element is also referred to in the Restatement of the Law Third Foreign 
Relations Law of the United States para. 712 comment  (g) and note 6 
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deprivation of the property of the investor, the tribunal in Chemtura recognised 
and applied the doctrine of the police power of the State, ‘irrespective of the 
existence of contractual deprivation’.218   
In this case, while the methodology applied by the tribunal did inquire into the 
level of deprivation, the tribunal nonetheless appears to adopt a standard of 
review that gives somewhat more deference to the exercise of the police power.  
The elements of analysis used by the tribunal in Chemtura v Canada may 
serve as the basis of the proposed analytical framework for water related 
disputes that will be developed in the next chapter, and briefly addressed 
below.  
 
3.7 A Framework of Analysis that Distinguishes Regulation from 
Indirect Expropriation as Applied to Water Resource Related 
Disputes 
It was proposed above that in order to understand what a legitimate 
governmental measure is not, we must be clear about what indirect 
expropriation actually is. As has been observed in previous sections, however, 
a definition of indirect expropriation has not been fully developed in IIAs, nor 
has it been defined in international law. Only quite recently countries such as 
the US and Canada have addressed the issue closely in a new generation of 
BITs and FTAs, some of which are Models – hence only potentially an 
agreement -, some have been renegotiated and some are new. Indeed, these 
agreements attempt to provide guidelines to draw a dividing line between 
legitimate regulation – through the exercise of the police power – and indirect 
expropriation.  
As elaborated throughout the Chapter, one could argue that arbitral tribunals 
have addressed the exercise of the police power in three ways:219   
i) the sole effects approach, which implies the rejection of the 
police power altogether, with focus solely on the effects of the 
measure over the investment;  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
218 See Chemtura Corporation v Canada, Ad hoc—UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Award signed 2 August 
2010, para. 266.  
219 See for instance Caroline Henckels, "Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate: 
Revisiting Proportionality Analysis and the Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitration" 
Journal of International Economic Law 15, no. 1 (2012). 
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ii) the police power as an exception, such an approach would 
thus suggest logically that an indirect expropriation has 
occurred, and that the police power constitutes an exception 
precluding wrongfulness. (This would mean to say that a 
regulatory measure constitutes a regulatory taking.)? It is 
debatable whether States are now departing from this view, as 
– for instance - Annex B 4 (a) of the 2004 US Model BIT seems 
to suggest.220 
iii) the analysis of the object and purpose, as well as the economic 
effects of the regulatory measure, which address the element of 
good faith and lawfulness of the exercise of the police power. 
(While such an approach would consider that a lawful 
regulation does not entail the payment of compensation, it also 
considers that such regulatory prerogative is not absolute, and 
that an unlawful exercise of the police power may be deemed to 
be expropriatory, and thus compensable).  
A legitimate regulation, which is not a breach of obligation and requires proof 
of legality, is different from a regulatory measure that is illegal – because it 
constitutes a taking – but is exempted from responsibility due to imperative 
circumstances. Under the position that the exercise of the police power does 
not constitute an act of indirect expropriation, but rather a mere exercise of 
regulatory prerogatives not subject to compensation, the host State would be 
bound to show that its measure was a legitimate regulation. 
The framework of analysis, proposed in the next Chapter, seeks to establish 
the dividing line between indirect expropriation and legitimate regulation, 
following the previous work carried out by several scholars.221 In sum, this is a 
process for determining whether a regulatory measure that negatively affects a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
220 US BIT Model 2004 Article 6 Expropriation, Annex B (4) (a). 221	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Expropriation Rules and Federalism" Stanford Environmental Law Journal 23, no. 3 (2004). 	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foreign investor was taken in a manner that is consistent with the Rule of Law. 
In other words, the dividing line between regulation and expropriation requires 
an evaluation of how, when, and why a regulation was adopted.  
The previous sections have devoted a great deal of attention to the notions of 
sovereignty and police power, as a revisiting of the origin of States’ regulatory 
prerogatives. The adoption of the police powers as a conceptual framework is 
of particular importance in the approach to water resources management 
since the protection of health, safety, and the environment may well be linked 
to the management of water resources. This thesis attempts a much closer or 
more specific look at the subject matter that could give rise to an investment 
dispute. In some cases, a water-related dispute may not address the issue of 
water resources directly. The arbitral tribunal in Methanex v United States did 
not focus on the relation of water-resource management to the production of 
methanol. Instead, the claimed expropriation focused on whether or not a 
regulatory measure can be justified if taken for the protection of the 
environment more generally. In other words, this case may have been a failed 
opportunity to justify a water quality related regulatory measure as non-
expropriatory.  
The reason for such a line of inquiry, namely water resources specifically, is 
because water is a unique and special natural resource whose physical and 
regulatory characteristics require a distinct approach that may yield very 
different outcomes (in the context of expropriation) from non-water-related 
regulatory measures. The reasoning for such a water-specific approach is 
based on the properties of water and is not necessarily political in nature. This 
means that water-related measures should enjoy a prima facie presumption of 
legality and legitimacy under international law (in other words, the uniqueness 
of water and its relation to the analysis of expropriation are not mere policy 
choices).  
The criteria for the framework of analysis proposed in Chapter IV will consider 
a three-fold analysis: i) a first stage addressing firstly the nature of property 
rights/entitlements in water and secondly the definition of investment, which 
inquires whether such property rights constitute an investment under 
protection of the investment agreement. This first stage is followed by two 
further stages of analysis, partly following the approach of Professor Stern ii) a 
second stage quantitative, looking at the level of deprivation over the 
investment, and iii) third stage qualitative, which – in turn – includes various 
 	   159	  
elements aiming to determine the nature and legitimacy of the governmental 
measure, namely public interest, non-discrimination, due process and 
legitimate expectations. 
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CHAPTER 4 
A FRAMEWORK OF ANALYSIS 
 
4.1  Introduction  
This Chapter is developed on the basis of the prerogative of States to exercise 
their police power and will be pursued in the context of hypothetical 
investment disputes arising from the management of water resources. 
It is not new to public international lawyers that international agreements may 
limit the freedom of States to exercise their full and absolute sovereignty. Such 
a limitation is not to be seen as a negative effect of the investment treaty. 
Rather it may be a consequence of a signatory State’s decision to enter into an 
agreement that creates obligations towards another State and the beneficiaries 
of such obligations, in this case foreign investors. After all, it is not possible to 
foresee every potential challenge that parties to an agreement may face during 
the life of the agreement. Such challenges could result from unforeseen, 
abrupt and sudden changes in the circumstances of the parties e.g. the 
Argentinean financial crisis of 2001-2002. Other challenges could be the 
result of slow and evolutionary changes, which may require actions by States 
that have both large and small-scale effects in this case, on foreign investors 
and/or host States. In many cases, these investors may have failed to see the 
signals of change and expect, at times unreasonably, that legal frameworks 
remain static. An example of such a case – and of particular interest in the 
context of this work – is increasing hydrological variability, which may pose 
new commercial risk on investors’ expectations regarding water availability.  
Arbitral tribunals assessing water resource-related claims may fail to consider 
the specific nature of the subject matter at hand, namely water resources. 
This could mean - for the host State - that the purpose of the measure and the 
long-term sustainability of the water resource could be put in danger. As a 
result, the risks and costs related to water uncertainty would be borne solely 
by the host State and its citizens.    
This study intends to answer whether, due to the special nature of water 
resources (physical, social and economic) investment tribunals should 
specifically address water resources. Chapter II’s prima facie conclusion is that 
water is special, the question that follows is whether this has implications for 
the standard of review applied by investment tribunals and whether such 
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standard of review should be more deferential to the issue of water resources. 
As stated above, the measures adopted by host States, under their police 
power, will be approached in the context of an indirect expropriation claim. In 
order to draw the line between legitimate regulation – that is the result of the 
exercise of the police power of States – and unlawful indirect expropriation, 
through a scrutiny of such police powers, this Chapter will compile and 
instrumentalise a framework which focuses on the elements of scrutiny 
required for the assessment of claims of indirect expropriation. These are 
elements of analysis that have been long discussed in the context of 
international investment law, and which serve to examine the extent and 
nature of the regulatory measure under the police power of the State. This 
thesis intends to add to the existing literature on indirect expropriation, the 
incorporation of factors specific to claims of indirect expropriation of water 
resources within the analytical framework considered below.  
Chapter III revisited the police power from various perspectives, but suggested 
that its essence, as embraced by customary international law, has been 
mostly nurtured and developed by the United States (US) tradition.  The police 
power, however, does not constitute a ‘blanket exception’ from State 
responsibility for a breach of international obligations,1 and it ought to be 
scrutinized to determine whether the effects and nature of a regulatory 
measure, actually constitute an expropriatory one.   
Embedded in the proposed framework of analysis is the incorporation of a 
standard of review that focuses on water resources, as a sector specific 
analysis. Focus on the issue of water resources rather than the investment as 
a whole – when water rights have been affected – provides distinctive insights 
into the exercise of the police power, such insights stem from the special 
nature of water resources, which in turn shape the nature of the property 
rights under examination. 
The next two sections briefly address the issue of indirect expropriation versus 
regulation (Section 4.2), with emphasis on the potential water measures likely 
to be adopted by a host State (Section 4.3). Section 4.4 introduces a three-fold 
analytical framework, which aims to assist arbitrators in drawing a line 
between legitimate regulation and indirect expropriation. This framework 
addresses first whether there exists a property right in water (Section 4.4.1), 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 As illustrated by the tribunal in Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Interim Award (NAFTA) 26 June 
2000, para.99.  
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and if so whether such property right is subject to protection under an 
investment agreement, i.e. whether it constitutes an investment under that 
agreement, and it is thus protected (Section 4.4.2). In practice, the first stage 
of analysis takes place prior to the analysis of the merits of the case, when the 
tribunal assess its own jurisdiction, hence the first stage concludes when the 
tribunal determines that a property right exists and constitutes an investment 
subject to protection under an IIA. The second stage of analysis (Section 4.4.3) 
comes into play to analyse the level of deprivation that a water-related 
measure is likely to exert over the investor’s rights/interests. Section 4.4.4 
presents the third stage (third fold) of analysis, introducing several elements 
addressing the nature of the regulatory measure, namely i) the public interest 
of the measure, ii) the due process under which the measure was carried out, 
iii) the potential discriminatory nature of the measure, and iv) the legitimate 
expectations of the investor. Finally Section 4.5 offers some preliminary 
conclusions of this work.      
 
4.2  Regulation versus Indirect Expropriation 
The provisions of the first generation of investment agreements were 
constructed in a broad manner so as to provide wide protection to all kinds of 
investors from the contracting States. 2  These agreements left significant 
discretion to adjudicators, allowing them to read and apply the provisions of 
the agreements according to factual and contextual specificities. This liberty, 
in turn, has raised concerns that tribunals will reach inconsistent and 
contradictory decisions. As Jan Paulsson expressed in 2005: 
there is no magical formula, susceptible to mechanical application, that will 
guarantee that the same case will be decided the same way irrespective of how it 
is presented and irrespective of who decides it. Nor is it possible to guarantee that 
a particular analysis will endure over time; the law evolves, and so do patterns of 
economic activity and public regulation.3 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
2 The agreements generally meant a capital exporting country and capital importing country, 
the roles however have switched and traditional capital exporting countries, found themselves 
facing the challenges of capital importing countries, in their duties to protect investment under 
broad standards of protection.  
3 Jan Paulsson, "Indirect expropriation: is the right to regulate at risk?", in Making the Most of 
International Investment Aagreements: A Common Agenda, ed. Organisation for Economic Co-
operation and Development (Paris 2005), 1.  
Vaughan Lowe notes that still after the clarifications incorporated in BITs such as the US Model 
BIT 2004 there are still challenges to find the dividing line between regulation and 
expropriation:  
 	   163	  
However, over the past decade there have been new developments in the area 
of indirect expropriation, which have arguably evolved out of the increasing 
number of arbitral tribunals discussing the issue. It is not surprising then 
that the academic literature on investment arbitration has devoted a great 
deal of attention to the decisions and new trends led by these arbitral awards. 
Perhaps, it is the reflection on such decisions that has led numerous - newly 
signed - IIAs to incorporate express provisions in order to assist - or perhaps 
to limit - the interpretation of indirect expropriation provisions. An increasing 
number of IIAs expressly state that the exercise of the police power generally 
does not constitute an indirect expropriation.4 These statements, however, are 
generally restricted to the protection of the general welfare, such as public 
health, safety and the environment. This suggests that the conceded sphere of 
activity under the United States (US) doctrine of the police power (safety, order 
and morals),5 has evolved with time, and has incorporated new societal values, 
such as the environment. Conversely, provisions on the protection of public 
morals is increasingly absent in IIAs,6 as the notion of morality becomes 
rather vague and culturally oriented.  
It has been discussed in the previous Chapter that the exercise of the police 
power, understood broadly, will not entail compensation for damage caused to 
investors. Nonetheless, in some cases its exercise may create responsibility 
and the obligation to compensate.7 The new generation of BITs and FTAs, 
especially the model agreements set forth by the US and Canada since the 
mid-2000s, contain two approaches to the interpretation of a claim of indirect 
expropriation. A first approach covers a broad sphere of regulatory action, 
which is not specified by the wording of the agreement. In order to determine 
whether such broader sphere of regulatory action – police power latu sensu – 
constitutes indirect expropriation, the abovementioned agreements stipulate 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
‘I have tried to make two points here. The first is that there is a real uncertainty as to the kinds 
of interest that are to be protected by BITs; and the second is that there is also real uncertainty 
as to the criteria for distinguishing between lawful regulation and unlawful expropriations’. 
Vaughan Lowe, "Changing Dimensions of International Investment Law" Oxford Legal Studies 
Research Paper No. 4/2007(2007). 
4 See US Model BIT 2004 and 2012, Article 6 – Annexes A-B; Canada Model FIPPA 2004, Article 
13 Annex B(13)(1)  
5 On this point see the work of Freund referred to in Chapter III, Section 3.3.1 and supra note 
51.  
6 The protection of public morals can be found in the provisions of the GATT 1994, Article XX (a) 
(General Exceptions).   
7 See discussion in Chapter III, Section 3.3.3 and 3.6.2.  
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three elements of analysis to guide arbitrators in the determination.8 The 
second approach covers a restrictive sphere of governmental action – police 
power strictu sensu – with the aim of protecting the environment, safety and 
public health. Under this second approach the sphere of governmental action 
would rarely constitute an indirect expropriation, and therefore, one could 
conclude: i) that it benefits from a higher level of deference from arbitral 
tribunals, and it does not constitute a violation of investment protection 
obligations. This kind of provision is illustrated in treaties such as the 2012 
US Model BIT: 
except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party 
that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such 
as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect 
expropriations.9;  
Or ii) that it constitutes an exception to responsibility for breach of an IIA 
obligation, or a presumption of legality of the regulatory measure. This type of 
treaty provision can be found in agreements such as the India – Singapore 
Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement:10 
1. Subject to the requirement that such measures are not applied in a manner 
which would constitute a means of arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination 
against the other Party or its investors where like conditions prevail, or a 
disguised restriction on investments of investors of a Party in the territory of the 
other Party, nothing in this Chapter shall be construed to prevent the adoption 
or enforcement by a Party of measures: 
(a) necessary to protect public morals or to maintain public order; 
(b) necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health; 
(c) necessary to secure compliance with laws or regulations which are not 
inconsistent with the provisions of this Chapter including those relating to: […] 
 (iii)  safety; […] 
 (e) relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources if such 
measures are made effective in conjunction with restrictions on domestic 
production or consumption. 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
8 See Chapter III, Section 3.4.2.3 for an account of relevant IIAs, which incorporate elements of 
analysis to address claims of indirect expropriation: i) the level of deprivation; ii) the character 
of the governmental measure; and iii) the investor’s backed expectations.    
9 See 2012 US Model BIT, Annex B (4)(b). This Annex constitutes the interpretative rule, as 
provided for in Article 6 (Expropriation) of the Agreement (footnote 10). 
10 Comprehensive Economic Cooperation Agreement between the Republic of India and the 
Republic of Singapore of 29 June 2005, Chapter 6 (Investment), 6.11 (General Exceptions) 
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In regard, to water-related measures, the question arises as to which sphere of 
regulatory action (police power strictu sensu or broad sphere of regulatory 
action) water measures belong. When would a water-related measure 
constitute an exercise of the State’s prerogative to regulate, and when would 
such an action constitute an indirect expropriation? In order to address these 
questions, and propose a framework of analysis that addresses water-related 
measures, it is critical to identify potential water-related regulatory measures 
in the context of a foreign investment.  
 
4.3  Classification of a Water-Related Measures that could be 
Deemed Expropriatory: Measures over Quantity and over 
Quality  
Chapter III argues that, historically, the notion of the police power has 
underpinned the States’ right to regulate under both national and 
international law.11 Its exercise has been often invoked by host States as a 
defence against Investors’ claims of indirect expropriation. Arbitral tribunals – 
in turn – have recognised the legitimacy of the exercise of the police power 
under international law. However, these same tribunals have also warned that 
its application as a blanket exception would be detrimental to the protection of 
foreign investment.12 
Article 27 of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties holds that States 
shall not invoke their own domestic law as a justification for breaches of 
international agreements. 13  Likewise, the International Law Commission’s 
(ILC) Articles on State Responsibility state that the characterisation of an act 
of State as internationally wrongful is independent of the characterisation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 References to the police power by the International Law Commission, "Yearbook of the 
International Law Commission 1959 -Volume II. Documents of the eleventh session including 
the report of the Commission to the General Assembly". See Chapter III, Section 3.5 
Expropriation.  
12 See Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Interim Award (NAFTA), 26 June 2000, para. 99. See also 
Section 3.6.2   
13 Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, May 23, 1969, 1155 U.N.T.S. 331, Article 27: 
“Internal law and observance of treaties) A party may not invoke the provisions of its internal 
law as justification for its failure to perform a treaty. This rule is without prejudice to article 
46”. 
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the same act under the domestic law of the State.14 It follows that a water-
related measure adopted under water resources management could be deemed 
expropriatory under international investment law. As Professor Park points 
out:   
prevailing opinion holds that an act wrongful under the law of nations remains so 
even if a nation’s internal law deems otherwise.15 
Investment tribunals do not always have an accurate or comprehensive 
understanding of the social and economic situation of the host-State. It follows 
that the regulatory measure under assessment could also be misconceived. 
This may partially explain the current crisis of legitimacy that exists within 
the investment arbitration regime.16  
The taxonomy of a regulatory measure requires careful consideration, and so 
does its foundations. This means that regulatory measures are not always 
founded exclusively on national policy. Often, regulatory measures may be 
adopted to implement international agreements related to the environment, 
human rights and other societal values. The implementation of some 
provisions of the UN Watercourses Convention, for instance, may require the 
adoption of domestic legislation to comply with obligations of ‘reasonable 
utilisation’, ‘no harm’ and the protection of ecosystems. In one scenario, host 
States could be required to modify prior water uses, historical water rights and 
allocation of new water rights in order to support the implementation of the 
Convention. Note that this scenario is also possible without the 
implementation of the UN Watercourses Convention, but due to developments 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 Article 3 of the ‘Draft articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, 
with commentaries 2001’, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, vol. II, Part Two, 
as corrected. 
 ‘The characterization of an act of a State as inter- nationally wrongful is governed by 
international law. Such characterization is not affected by the characterization of the same act 
as lawful by internal law’.  
15  William W. Yanos Alexander A. Park, "Treaty Obligations and National Law: Emerging 
Conflicts in International Arbitration" The Hastings Law Journal 58, no. 2 (2006), 252. 
16 See Susan D. Franck, "The Legitimacy Crisis in Investment Treaty Arbitration: Privatizing 
Public International Law through Inconsistent Decisions" Fordham Law Review 73(2005); Van 
Harten, Investment Treaty Arbitration and Public Law; Andreas Von Staten, "Deference or No 
Deference, That is the Question: Legitimacy and Standards of Review in Investor-State 
Arbitration"  Investment Treaty News 19 July(2012), 
http://www.iisd.org/itn/2012/07/19/deference-or-no-deference-that-is-the-question-
legitimacy-and-standards-of-review-in-investor-state-arbitration/, last visited 2 January 2013; 
Stephan W. Schill, "Enhancing International Investment Law's Legitimacy: Conceptual and 
Methodological Foundations of a New Public Law Approach" Virginia Journal of International Law 
52, no. 1 (2011); Henckels, "Indirect Expropriation and the Right to Regulate: Revisiting 
Proportionality Analysis and the Standard of Review in Investor-State Arbitration". 
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in customary international law obligations, or the adoption of other treaty 
commitments. 17  In any case, the implementation of international law 
obligations – at the national level – could affect the enjoyment of property 
rights by investors, protected under IIAs. Whether regulatory measures are the 
result of treaty implementation, or the result of the exercise of the internal 
sovereignty of the host State, they could conflict with States’ obligations to 
protect foreign investment.  
This work claims that a sector-specific approach - in this case, water 
resources - may provide arbitrators with an improved perspective of the 
regulatory measure under analysis. Such an approach would require that 
arbitrators adopt a holistic outlook in regard to the nature of water property 
rights. This means an analysis of the domestic laws linked to water resources 
as a whole, individually and in relation to each other. Only then would the 
characterisation of a water right reflect all the legislation involved, making 
apparent the nature of such right.  
However, this work cannot anticipate the wide range of water-related 
regulatory measures that a host State could possibly adopt, in regard to the 
management of its water resources. The economic sectors (e.g. mining, 
farming, energy, industry, etc.) in which water-related measures could be 
undertaken by States is quite broad. For this reason, this section proposes 
two categories of potential regulatory measures a host State could adopt in 
managing and allocating water resources. These two prospective types of 
measures respond to current discussions concerning business practice and 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  17	  See for instance the Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement between the United States and 
Canada, discussed in Section 4.3.2, infra notes 38-39. The Agreement on the Nile River Basin 
Cooperative Framework (not yet into force), creates a legal and institutional framework for the 
‘use, development, protection, conservation and management of the Nile River Basin and its 
resources’ (Article 1). The Framework Agreement under the influence of the UN Watercourses 
Convention will facilitate harmonisation of national laws among its members. See Musa 
Mohammed Abseno, “Nile River Basin” ed. Flavia Rocha Loures and Alistair Rieu-Clark The UN 
Watercourses Convention in Force: Strengthening international law for transboundary water 
management (Oxon, Routledge: 2013), 151. The United Nations Economic Commission for 
Europe (UNECE) Convention on the Protection and Use of Transboundary Watercourses and 
International Lakes, includes 56 countries located within the EU, outside the EU, Caucasus, 
Central Asia and North America. This Convention, which may soon be open to membership by 
States outside the UNECE region, sets out the obligation for its members to adopt mechanisms 
necessary to pursue joint objectives as regards water-quality (Article 9). Conversely the UN 
Watercourses Convention merely establishes an obligation to enter into consultations for the 
adoption of such mechanisms of water-quality standarisation (Article 21.3). For a detailed 
comparison between these Conventions see: Atila Tanzi, “UN Economic Commission for Europe 
Water Convention” ed. Flavia Rocha Loures and Alistair Rieu-Clark  The UN Watercourses 
Convention in Force: Strengthening international law for transboundary water management (Oxon, 
Routledge: 2013).     
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corporate relationships with water resources: i) measures related to water 
quantity, and ii) measures related to water quality. 
There is an unavoidable degree of speculation, as potential water-related 
measures adopted by States will not necessarily give rise to an investment 
dispute. However, there are certain general uses of water resources which 
could affect other water users (e.g. for instance mining projects and water 
pollution; land leases for large-scale farming with access to water; water for 
energy; and water for ecosystems protection). These examples could create 
imbalances in the relationships between host States and foreign investors.  
 
4.3.1 Regulatory Measures Linked to Quantity of Water Resources  
As suggested above, host States may adopt regulatory measures linked to 
water quantity at two levels: i) implementation of international agreements – in 
fields other than investment law – and ii) adoption of national laws.    
Chapter II described the efforts in the area of water law to implement an 
Integrated Water Resource Management (IWRM) approach, which takes into 
consideration the all-encompassing nature of water. The ‘Status Report on the 
Application of Integrated Approaches to Water Resources Management’ 18 
(Water Management Report) states that nearly 80 per cent of the surveyed 
countries are implementing IWRM principles.19 Yet, globally only 33 per cent 
of the countries surveyed are at an advanced stage of implementation of new 
water laws and regulations.20 This suggests that these countries have in many 
cases secured agreement on a high level of the IWRM process, having perhaps 
overcome potential conflicts among water users, arising from possible 
reallocation and modification of water rights. On the other hand, this also 
suggests that approximately 67 per cent of the countries surveyed have not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 The United Nations Commission on Sustainable Development directed a global survey with 
the participation of 133 countries in order to assess the progress towards sustainable 
management of water resources, using integrated approaches. The surveyed countries were 
classified under the Human Development Index (HDI), which is a composite index that 
measures health, knowledge, and income. Countries are categorized in four HDI bands: ‘Low’, 
‘Medium’, ‘High’ and ‘Very High’. See United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), "Status 
Report on the Application of Integrated Approaches to Water Resources Management", 6.  
19  See Chapter II, Section 2.4.1 for an account of the adoption of Agenda 21 and the 
commitments agreed by states towards de protection of water resources. 
20  United Nations Environment Programme (UNEP), "Status Report on the Application of 
Integrated Approaches to Water Resources Management", 12, Figure 2.2. Note that the status of 
implementation of main water laws is full in 71 per cent of the very high HDI countries, and 20, 
16, and 13 per cent in high, medium and low HDI countries, respectively.   
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completed implementation because they cannot reach an agreement on the 
IWRM process and reallocation of water, and once they do so, they could still 
initiate substantial changes to their water legislation, with potential claims of 
indirect expropriation. It is noteworthy that many water acts protect vested 
rights, which may present difficulties if major reallocation of water resources 
is planned through new policies and laws.21 The Water Management Report 
states that very high Human Development Index (HDI) countries have already 
developed and implemented modern water laws and policies. This suggests 
that most issues around water property rights, hydrological assessment, 
allocation and reallocation have been the product of democratic processes. 
One could reasonably expect high, medium and low HDI countries to adopt 
and implement IWRM in water policies and laws in the coming years. It follows 
that such changes in legislation have the potential to create water-related 
investment disputes should an investor’s water rights be affected by such new 
regulations. Potential conflicts could derive, for instance, from the adoption of 
new laws and regulations affecting the apportionments of water that were 
previously granted to foreign investors under licences or contracts. One such 
potential conflict could arise from water resources reallocation in large-scale 
agricultural projects.22 The reallocation of water resources could be the result 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
21 The Report states that Mexico for instance has made comments on the difficulties in adopting 
water legislation and policy due to vested rights. The Water Act (Ley de Aguas Nacionales) 
transitory provisions (Ninth), recognizes vested rights that were granted before the adoption of 
the new law. Some other have found difficult to implement policies and laws due to lack of 
consensus among stakeholders. Ibid., 15, Box 2.2. 
The Texas Water Code protects vested rights in water: ‘§ 11.001. Vested Rights Not Affected.  (a) 
Nothing in this code affects vested private rights to the use of water, except to the extent that 
provisions of Subchapter G of this chapter might affect these rights, and (b) This code does not 
recognize any riparian right in the owner of any land the title to which passed out of the State of 
Texas after July 1, 1895.’ Yet, these could be affected under the Eminent Domain of the State, 
when water is needed for municipal purposes (Article § 11.033). See the 2005 Texas Water 
Code, Chapter 11, Subchapter A General Provisions.  
The Peruvian Water Act (Ley de Recursos Hídricos No 29338 - 2009) also recognizes that water is 
under the dominion of the state and expressly prohibits the private property of water resources. 
Yet, it recognizes and protects vested rights through the Principle of Legal Certainty (Article 3), 
gives priority to human consumption (uso personal), water services supply (Article 39: uso 
poblacional) and productive use (Article 42: uso productivo), where Article 43 of the Act lists 
agriculture, fisheries, energy, health, industry, mining, etc. The Act does not express any 
preference among these water users. Pursuant to Article 73 the water authority can terminate a 
water licence due, among others, an official declaration of water scarcity. Compensation is not 
expressly provided for. In addition, Reglamento de la Ley N 29338 Ley de Recursos Hídricos 
(Complementary Act to the application of the Water Act) allows exceptionally to grant new water 
licences for water services supply (uso poblacional) when it is proven that there does not exist 
other water resources available, under the condition to pay due compensation. (Article 128.2).  
22 On the concept of ‘virtual water’, see Chapter II Section 2.3.1.2, supra note 79. In some 
instances the concept of virtual water could be linked to the phenomena of ‘land grabs’ and or 
‘water grabs’. On these issues see the work of Carin  Smaller and Howard Mann, "A Thirst for 
Distant Lands: Foreign Investment in Agricultural Land and Water", International Institute for 
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of substantial changes in the water laws of the host State, which might require 
the implementation of a whole new system for water allocation. Conflicts could 
arise out of changes to regulatory activity under existing water laws. Another 
element that plays an important role in forecasting potential water investment 
disputes, in this specific area, is the consideration that adequate water 
management can only be reached through the monitoring and measurement 
of water resources.23 The Water Management Report states that less than ten 
per cent of the countries with high, medium and low HDI have a fully 
implemented water monitoring and information management system.24 In this 
regard, overcoming deficiencies in information and monitoring of water 
resources could be used – among others – to support changes in to water uses 
and allocation. In turn, improved methods to monitor water resources, could 
potentially involve the adoption of new water regulations potentially affecting 
existing water entitlements.  
As governments sign new IIAs, they should also be aware of the scope of 
protection that their new water laws are providing to investors’ property rights. 
This aspect will be further discussed under Section 4.4.1 in regard to the 
nature of water property rights over water resources. 
Water allocation systems such as licensing, riparian (land-based), or prior 
appropriation systems, may provide different scopes of protection of water 
rights. In the context of international investment law, regulatory measures 
affecting quantities of water previously allocated to users, and modified, e.g. to 
protect environmental flows, may also enjoy different levels of protection, due 
to strictu or lato sensu application of the police power. 
In many cases governments might be confronted with the need for 
prioritisation of water uses (e.g. protection of environmental flows). Such need 
to prioritise could be driven by two situations: i) water scarcity, and ii) 
particular public policy objectives (which can occur even when there is no 
scarcity problem). Governments could pursue policy objectives, seeking to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Sustainable Development (IISD), http://epe.lac-
bac.gc.ca/100/200/300/iisd/2009/thirst_for_distant_lands.pdf. Last visited March 13, 2013; 
John A. Allan et al., eds., Handbook of Land and Water Grabs in Africa: Foreign Direct Investment 
and Food and Water Security (Abingdon, New York: Routledge International, 2013). 
23  Monitoring and measurement includes information on water quality, quantity, aquatic 
ecosystems, water use and early warning systems, as expressed in the report United Nations 
Environment Programme (UNEP), "Status Report on the Application of Integrated Approaches to 
Water Resources Management", 31, Figure 4.4. 
24 Ibid. 
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develop a specific sector of the economy. For instance, the discovery of new 
mineral deposits could be prioritised over other downstream projects (such as 
farming). This appears to be the case in the controversial hydro and irrigation 
Majes Siguas II Project in Peru. This project exemplifies the controversies that 
could arise between communities, as well as communities and foreign 
investors, competing for water resources.25  
 Regarding the first situation, namely water scarcity, prioritisation measures 
adopted to tackle scarcity may fall within the scope of the police power strictu 
sensu, when such measures aim at protecting safety, public health and the 
environment. In regard to the second situation, namely particular public 
policy objectives, regulatory measures reallocating water from one sector to 
another, due to policy preferences, may fall within the broader police power. 
There might be cases where reallocation may seek to protect public health or 
even the environment by allocating water quantities for human consumption 
and environmental flows, under situations of scarcity. Arguably investment 
tribunals may be more deferential to regulatory measures dealing with water 
scarcity, for two possible reasons. Firstly, the provisions contained in several 
of the new generation of IIAs, regarding the assessment of indirect 
expropriation, state how the IIA will give more deference to certain spheres of 
regulatory activity.26 Secondly, there is an increasing view that investment 
arbitration is of a public nature, which could lead some tribunals to be more 
deferential to issues relating to the provision of public utilities such as water 
supply and services, as well as the management of common goods or common-
pool resources such as water resources. 27  In regard to the adoption of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
25 For many years the Peruvian government has been developing a hydrogenation and irrigation 
project, the controversial Majes Siguas II Project. This project involves the construction of three 
dams for electricity generation, which would also feed water resources for irrigation 
downstream. On the one hand, this project confronted the communities of Arequipa – 
beneficiary of the project - and Cusco – opposing the project – over water resources. See La 
Republica, ‘Proyecto Majes Siguas II ya no represará aguas del Apurímac’, Tuesday, 14 August 
2012. Available at http://www.larepublica.pe/13-08-2012/proyecto-majes-siguas-ii-ya-no-
represara-aguas-del-apurimac, last visited 30 June 2013. In addition, one of the three dams, 
Tucurani was licensed to Tucarani Generation Company S.A. by the former president Valentin 
Paniagua (2001). There exists concern that the operation of Tucarani may negatively impact the 
operation of two other damns and irrigation of Majes Siguas II. Elizabeth Huanca, Region Sur, 
‘Tarucani sí afectará inversión en Majes II’, 23 May 2013. Available at: 
http://www.larepublica.pe/23-05-2013/tarucani-si-afectara-inversion-en-majes-ii, last visited, 
30 June, 2013.  
26 See Chapter III, Section 3.4.2.3. 
27  See for instance the argument advanced by Anthea Roberts with regard to increasing 
discussion over the public nature of investor-State arbitration. According to Roberts there is 
much debate as to the adoption deferential standards of review towards States’ regulatory 
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reallocation measures due to policy preferences, the measure could fall within 
the broad regulatory prerogative of States, and be scrutinised accordingly. Yet, 
there is an important caveat, the link between quantity and quality of water 
should not be overlooked. Generally, changes in water quantity could affect 
water quality and vice versa and several measures seeking to protect water 
quality maybe adopted through reallocation of water quantities.         
 
4.3.2 Regulatory Measures Linked to the Quality of Water 
Resources 
The protection and improvement of the quality of water resources (i.e. water 
pollution-related regulatory measures) constitute a second category of 
regulatory measures. Water-quality regulatory measures are likely to occur at 
some stage of the life of an investment that is linked to the use of natural 
resources, because of the long life-span of investment projects and the 
changing political and social environment in several host States. As States 
continue to develop and evolve their environmental regulations, pollution 
control also becomes more sophisticated and costly. In addition, public 
awareness and participation increase scrutiny on governments, and may 
eventually force governments to become more critical of corporations’ 
pollution. International investment law, in the context of water resources 
management, has addressed such problems in Vattenfall v Germany,28 PacRim 
v El Salvador,29 Methanex v United States,30 and Lucchetti v Peru.31 These cases 
are linked to regulatory measures seeking to improve the quality of water 
resources (Methanex v United States), to prevent the depletion of fresh water 
ecosystems (Vattenfall v Germany), to protect water resources before they 
could be negatively affected (PacRim v El Salvador) and to protect wetlands 
(Lucchetti v Peru).32    
These types of measures are generally geared towards the protection of public 
welfare such as safety, public health and the environment, and are recognised 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
activity. Anthea Roberts, "The Next Battleground: Standards of Review in Investment Treaty 
Arbitration" International Council for Commercial Arbitration Congress Series 16(2011), 175-80.  
28 See Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG, Vattenfall Europe Generation AG v Federal Republic of 
Germany, (ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6).  
29 Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of EI Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12. 
30 Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, Ad hoc—UNCITRAL (NAFTA). 
31  Empresas Lucchetti, S.A. and Lucchetti Peru, S.A. v Republic of Peru, (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/4) 
32 For an account of some of these cases see Chapter II, Section 2.5.2. 
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as a legitimate exercise of the police power of Sates. The protection of the 
above-mentioned welfare objectives, as they may be linked to the quality of 
water resources, appears to be of a restrictive application. Indeed, a regulatory 
measure aim at protecting public health, the environment and safety would 
rarely be deemed as expropriatory. However, given this extensive deferential 
treatment toward host Stats, a question arises as to how strict the scrutiny of 
such measure shall be. Water-protective measures may be adopted through 
amendments to existing water or environmental laws.33 They could also arise 
out of regulatory changes affecting legal provisions linked to water quality 
under/within other laws, such as mining laws, energy laws, and other legal 
provisions, other than water laws per se.34 .  
Likewise, governments could modify requirements with regard to levels of 
pollution. These modifications may not necessarily be implemented in water or 
environmental laws, but in specific licences granted to the investor. For 
instance in Vattenfall v Germany, the government of Germany modified the 
conditions of the project, requiring the final approval to meet additional 
restrictions in regard the use of water resources for the purpose of changing 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
33 For instance the amendments to the Environment Protection and Biodiversity Conservation 
(EPBC) Act 1999, adopted by the Federal Senate of Australia, which will require additional 
Commonwealth approval trigger for: ‘an action involving coal seam gas development or large 
coal mining development that has, will have, or is likely to have a significant impact on a water 
resource’.  See Andrew  Poulos, "Australia: Senate passes Economic Protection and Biodiversity 
Conservation "water trigger" Bill", Mondaq 2013. Available at: 
http://www.mondaq.com/australia/x/246634/Environmental+Law/Senate+passes+Economic+
Protection+and+Biodiversity+Conservation+water+trigger+Bill, last visited June 30 2013.  
34 For instance see the State of California’s ban on the sale and use of the gasoline additive 
known as “MTBE”.  Section 2 of the California Senate Bill 521 of 1997 provided:  
‘The Legislature hereby finds and declares that the purpose of this act is to provide the public 
and the Legislature with a thorough and objective evaluation of the human health and 
environmental risks and benefits, if any, of the use of methyl tertiary-butyl ether (MTBE), as 
compared to ethyl tertiary- butyl ether (ETBE), tertiary amyl methyl ether (TAME) and ethanol, 
in gasoline, and to ensure that the air, water quality, and soil impacts of the use of MTBE are 
fully mitigated.’ (Emphasis added) 
Challenge to the Bill was later withdrawn by Methanex and the measures challenges were: The 
1999 California Executive Order, the California Phase III Reformulated Gasoline Regulations 
implemented the California Executive Order, and Amended California Regulations of May 2003.   
Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, Final Award (NAFTA), 3 August 2005, Part II - Chapter 
D - Page 3, para. 9. 
Also noteworthy is the refusal of the Government of El Salvador to grant new mining licences to 
the investor, who previously undertook the exploration of mineral reserves in “El Dorado”.  See 
Pac Rim Cayman LLC v. Republic of EI Salvador, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/12, Notice of Arbitration, 
April 30 2009, para. 9. The reason for the El Salvatorian Government refusal to grant additional 
mining licences appears to be the intention to protect water resources. See Katie Zaunbrecher, 
"Pac Rim Cayman v. Republic of El Salvador: Confronting Free Trade's Chilling Effect on 
Environmental Progress in Latin America" Houston Journal of International Law 33, no. 2 (2011), 
497. 
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its quality and/or quantity.35 In such case, an investor could argue that the 
measure imposes higher costs, decreasing their expected profit margins.36    
Amendments in water laws – or specific modifications in the conditions of the 
project – leading to potential investment disputes could arise out of: i) national 
laws and IIAs, and ii) international law, implemented at the national level e.g. 
SPP v Egypt. 37  At the national level, it seems reasonable to expect that 
regulatory frameworks dealing with issues of pollution control are not static. 
This is particularly the case in countries where environmental standards have 
not reached an optimum level due to ineffective policy and law 
implementation. International obligations towards the protection of the quality 
of water resources may also play a significant role within the domestic 
regulatory framework of a host State. For example, the Great Lakes Water 
Quality Agreement between the US and Canada aims at restoring and 
maintaining ‘the chemical, physical, and biological integrity of the Waters of 
the Great Lakes’.38 In order to do so, the parties agree to implement ‘measures 
that are sufficiently protective to achieve the purpose of [the] Agreement.’39 
The Great Lakes Water Quality Agreement exemplifies the manner in which 
international obligations may lead to the adoption and implementation of new 
domestic regulatory measures.  
The implementation of international obligations at the national level may be 
restrictive and onerous to investment projects. As a result, the implementation 
of such international obligations into the domestic legal order may lead to 
breaches of the standards of protection provided for under IIAs. However, 
these types of regulatory measures are generally addressed under the 
umbrella of environmental measures, which already enjoys especial protection 
under the police power strictu sensu. Such an approach would weaken a 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
35 See Chapter II, Section 2.5.2.2.  
36 This was also the case in Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG, Vattenfall Europe Generation AG 
v Federal Republic of Germany, (ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6), where the investor argued that 
under the new conditions the project would become unprofitable.  
37 In this case the foreign investor, a Hong Kong based company, entered into a joint venture 
with the Republic of Egypt in 1974 to develop tourist complex. In 1978 the Government 
cancelled the project, under the argument that sites of archaeological importance were to be 
protected in the area. It is noteworthy, that the tribunal in this case took into account the 1972 
UNESCO Convention for the Protection of the World Cultural and Natural Heritage, and stated 
that the expropriation was not unlawful, but compensation was due in favour of the investor.  
See Southern Pacific Properties (Middle East) Limited v Arab Republic Of Egypt, (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/84/3) 
38 Article 2(1) of the Protocol Amending the Agreement of Great Lakes Water Quality of 1978 as 
amended on October 16, 1983 and on November 18, 1987. Between Canada and the United 
States.   
39 Ibid. Article 2(3)   
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deferential assessment – by arbitral tribunals – of specific water-related 
measures. Although water pollution measures may be covered by 
environmental provisions, in order to also address the issue of water quantity 
and allocation in the context of the special and integrated nature of water 
resources, this work’s approach may assist arbitrators in looking at water as a 
category in itself. As expressed in Subsection 4.3.2, tribunals could adopt a 
deferential standard of review due to the direct link between water quality and 
health and environmental concerns. These concerns, as discussed above, fall 
within the scope of the police power of States, and would rarely constitute 
indirect expropriation.40   
 
4.4  A Three-Fold Analytical Framework to Distinguish Indirect 
Expropriation from Legitimate Regulation  
Water measures related to quantity or quality would rarely constitute an act of 
direct expropriation.41 It follows then that investors’ claims over measures 
affecting their water rights are going to be assessed in the context of whether 
or not they constitute a legitimate regulation – as adopted under the police 
power – or an indirect expropriation. This Section proposes a framework of 
analysis, seeking to assist arbitrators in such determination. It consists of a 
three-fold analytical framework, which seeks to determine the legitimacy of the 
regulatory measure:  
i) First stage – Finding jurisdiction: This stage of the framework 
addresses two inquiries in turn. The first inquiry is whether 
property rights in water resources exist and what the nature of 
such rights is.42  The second inquiry seeks to answer whether the 
property rights in water – if they exist – constitute an Investment 
protected under the IIA. Therefore, in order to determine the 
existence of an indirect expropriation, tribunals will first examine 
whether a property right subject to expropriation exists, and 
further whether such property right conforms to the definition of 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
40 See Chapter III, Section 3.4.2.3 for reference to relatively recent IIAs, incorporating provisions 
guiding the standard of review of claims of indirect expropriation.   
41 See Chapter III, Section 3.5.1 on the notion of direct expropriation. 
42  The existence of property rights (rights in rem), and the determination of whether these 
property rights are deemed to be an Investment under the meaning of the IIA, constitute a 
necessary analysis by arbitral tribunals, previous to addressing each of the specific investor’s 
claims, such as the claim of indirect expropriation.  
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Investment, as stipulated in the investment agreement. These two 
inquiries constitute the first stage of the analytical framework 
explained above and will be addressed in the next two sections. 
ii) Second stage – Distinguishing indirect expropriation from 
legitimate regulation: This stage of this analysis adopts a 
quantitative approach to determine the level of economic 
deprivation suffered by the investor. The level of economic 
deprivation from a quantitative perspective focuses on the effects 
of the measure over the investment. The question is – as Professor 
Stern proposes –43 whether the analysis would conclude that an 
indirect expropriation has occurred when the effects of the 
measure have affected the investment substantially. This work 
further submits that the analysis should not conclude there, as 
that would mean adopting a sole effects approach. It is therefore, 
important to further analyse the nature of the governmental 
measure, in order to ascertain the legitimate objective of the 
regulatory measure and dismiss any possible attempt by the 
government to adopt a disguised act of expropriation, through 
welfare objectives.  
iii) Third stage – Distinguishing indirect expropriation from legitimate 
regulation: This part of the framework adopts a qualitative 
approach, seeking to determine whether the nature of the 
regulatory measure conforms to standards of good faith and has 
not been adopted as a disguised act of expropriation. The stage 
encompasses four aspects that should assist arbitrators in 
determining the nature of the governmental measure: 1) the public 
purpose aspect of the regulatory measure, 2) whether it was not 
discriminatory, 3) whether it was undertaken under due process of 
law, and 4) whether the government offered assurances to the 
investor, in other words, whether the investor had legitimate 
expectations. (See Chart 1). 
  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
43 Stern, "In Search of the Frontiers of Indirect Expropriation". 
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Chart 1: Analytical Framework to Distinguish a Legitimate 
Regulation from an Indirect Expropriation 
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4.4.1 The Nature of Property Rights over Water Resources  
One of the first considerations in an investment dispute originating under a 
claim of indirect expropriation of water rights or entitlements is likely to begin 
with the determination of whether those alleged rights actually exist. As 
accurately put by Zachary Douglas: 
Investments disputes are about investments, investments are about property, and 
property is about specific rights over things cognisable by the municipal law of the host 
state.44 
It is common ground, at least in principle, that property rights or rights in rem 
are not acquired under international law.45 In order to determine the existence 
and scope of property rights one must look into to the municipal law of the 
host State where the investor claims to have an investment subject to 
protection.46 Only following a determination of the scope of the property rights 
under the domestic law of the host State, can one examine a claim of indirect 
expropriation under the standards of international law.  
First it is important to recall that domestic law is addressed in different ways 
by international tribunals, for the purpose of this thesis two ways suffice to 
illustrate this point. As stated by the Appellate Body of the World Trade 
Organization, domestic law may be addressed as facts, providing evidence of 
State practice. Domestic law can also be addressed as evidence of compliance 
with international obligations. 47 
Examples of this approach are vast, and can be observed in several areas of 
International law, some inspiration can be drawn from the area of the Law of 
the Sea. The issue of domestic law as a matter of fact was considered by the 
International Tribunal for the Law of the Sea (ITLOS) in the M/V SAIGA (No.2) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
44 Zachary Douglas, "The Hybrid Foundations of Investment Treaty Arbitration" The British 
Yearbook of international Law 74 (2003),197. 
45 Yet, this does not preclude that some patrimonial rights may be conferred by international 
treaty, as has been stated in decisions of the International Court of Justice. See United Nations, 
"Yearbook of the International Law Commission. Volume II", 3.   
46 In this regard Zachary Douglas offers a comprehensive analysis of the relationship of property 
right and municipal law of the host State, which in his analysis constitutes the respondent in 
an investment dispute. “Rule 4. The law applicable to an issue relating to the existence or scope 
of property rights comprising the investment is the municipal law of the host state, including its 
rules of private international law”. See Zachary Douglas, The International Law of Investment 
Claims  (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 52. 
47 See also Appellate Body Report, India – Patent Protection for Pharmaceutical and Agricultural 
Chemical Products (India- Patents (US), WT/DS50/AB/R, adopted on 16 January 1998, paras 
65-66 and 68. 
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Case48, where ITLOS stated that the relevant question in the case at hand was 
whether the SAIGA (ship) had the nationality of Saint Vincent and the 
Grenadines at the time of the arrest.49 The ITLOS applied Article 91 of the 
United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea, which provides that every 
State would set the conditions for the grant of nationality to ships, their 
registration and the right to fly a flag.50 The ITLOS further stated that these 
are matters regulated by national law and under the sovereignty of each State, 
hence the tribunal considered the issue – nationality of the ship – as question 
of fact ‘to be considered like other facts in the dispute before it’.51 
In the area of International Trade Law, the Panel in China – Auto Parts52 was 
required to make an objective assessment of the meaning of the relevant 
provisions of Chinese law within the scope of its terms of reference. As the 
Panel stated:  
Although we are mindful that the measures are part of the domestic law of China, we 
will be required to determine the meaning of particular provisions of the measures if 
interpretations of such provisions are contested by the parties.53 
In this case the United States, the EU and Canada claimed that Decree 125 
and other legal provisions adopted by China, adversely affected exports of 
automobile parts, in breach of the GATT 1994 and other covered agreements. 
In order to determine if the measure at issue (Decree 125 and other legal 
norms) was indeed in breach of WTO Law, the Panel proceeded to the 
construction of Article 2(2) and the overall structure of Decree 125. On appeal, 
the Appellate Body revised the construction of the Municipal Law of China 
undertaken by the Panel, with the following caveat:  
The Appellate Body has reviewed the meaning of a Member's municipal law, on its face, 
to determine whether the legal characterization by the panel was in error, in particular 
when the claim before the panel concerned whether a specific instrument of municipal 
law was, as such, inconsistent with a Member's obligations. We recognize that there 
may be instances in which a panel's assessment of municipal law will go beyond the 
text of an instrument on its face, in which case further examination may be required, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
48 The M/V “SAIGA” (No.2) Case – Saint Vincent and The Grenadines v Guinea, International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Judgement 1 July 1999.   
49 Ibid., para. 62. 
50 Article 91 of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea.  
51 The M/V “SAIGA” (No.2) Case – Saint Vincent and The Grenadines v Guinea, International 
Tribunal for the Law of the Sea, Judgement 1 July 1999, para. 66.   
52  China — Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, Panel Report WT/DS339/R, 
WT/DS340/R, WT/DS342/R, adopted on 12 January 2009.  
53 Ibid., para. 7.1.  
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and may involve factual elements. With respect to such elements, the Appellate Body 
will not lightly interfere with a panel's finding on appeal.54 
In the context of investment arbitration a tribunal will be expected to 
construct and delve into the nature of the allegedly affected property rights. In 
this construction, even when the tribunal approaches the domestic law as 
facts –and not as matter of law – it is bound to consider all the evidence –laws 
and regulations – that will shape the nature of the water property right. 
After the determination of the existence and scope of water rights, the arbitral 
tribunal will undertake the determination of whether such rights constitute an 
investment that is subject to protection under international law. Unlike the 
determination of the scope of property rights under the municipal law of the 
host State, this determination will be made applying the provisions of a 
particular investment treaty.     
Inspired in the practice of other international tribunals, this Section proposes 
a close look at the nature of water property rights and the legislation 
surrounding and shaping them. It argues that different types of property 
rights, within every legal system, include not only the cultural background of 
each nation, but also the physical, social and economic characteristics of the 
asset. As Lehavi states: ‘time will tell whether BIT disputes will be resolved 
differently based on the type of resource at stake’.55 Following this line of 
reasoning, the distinct nature of water resources may justify the application of 
a distinct standard of review by arbitral tribunals.  
The determination of the nature and scope of water rights requires the arbitral 
tribunal to analyse the nature and historical background of water resources 
and the way in which they shape the expectations and preferences of users in 
a particular State. Such analysis may involve an understanding of: i) why 
under most legal systems water resources are not subject to private 
ownership, ii) why water resources entitlements differ from other resources 
(such as land or oil), and iii) and why the use of water resources requires a 
holistic approach. These aspects are somewhat embedded in most domestic 
legal systems, and reflect social, economic and physical realities pertaining to 
the water resources in each country.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
54  China — Measures Affecting Imports of Automobile Parts, 
WT/DS339/AB/R/WT/DS/340/AB/R/WT/DS342/AB/R, Panel Report, adopted 12 January 
2009, para. 225. (Footnotes omitted)  
55  Amnon Lehavi and Amir N. Licht, "BITs and Pieces of Property" The Yale Journal of 
International Law 36, no. 1 (2011), 154.  
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While this work attempts to adopt a general view on domestic water laws, 
without engaging in any specific country’s legal system, it is acknowledged 
that each country’s water law system adopts specific forms of water allocation, 
reallocation and protection. In this context, this work recognises the challenge 
in attempting to draw detailed commonalities across all domestic water laws 
and management practices. 56  Yet, some commonalities exist, which are 
embraced by several water laws in many countries. Likewise, emerging 
principles of water management are increasingly embraced at the 
supranational level, this is the case of the Dublin Principles of 1992, a well as 
the adaptive management approach, which have been briefly discussed in 
Chapter II.   
Property rights scholars argue that the construction of property rights, while 
delimiting the scope of protection subject to the application of domestic law, 
also harmonizes such protection vis a vis other members of society.57 In doing 
so, countries embed societal values that may be linked to limitations on the 
enjoyment of certain types of property. Therefore an analysis of the nature of 
property rights could not be complete without taking into account these values 
and limitations.58 This construct, which is underpinned by the sovereignty of 
the host State as well as an array of institutional and legal mechanisms, 
cannot be easily transposed into the international investment law sphere due 
to the latter’s broad approach to property rights protection. Under the 
investment mechanism, every property right that meets the description 
provided for in the IIA constitutes an Investment, but it is subject to protection 
only in relation to the foreign investor.59 Conversely, in domestic law the right 
to exclude other users from the sources of water – as an absolute right – is 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
56 It is not the purpose of this work to focus on one country or region. This does not mean, 
however, that arbitral tribunals will not construct the scope of property rights on the basis of 
the specific water laws and related regulatory framework of the host State under analysis.  
57 Lehavi and Licht, "BITs and Pieces of Property", 133-34.  
58 Richard Barnes, Property rights and natural resources: Studies in international law no. 19  
(Oxford, Portland: Hart Publishing, 2009), 27. 
59 Lehavi approaches the issue of property rights under domestic law and the protection of such 
under the lex specialis of the BITs:  
‘Investors seek to have these rights to assets protected against all types of third parties, 
including domestic private actors that have a conflicting claim to the assets. In so doing, foreign 
investors turn not only to local property doctrines in the host country but also to BITs to protect 
their property rights more broadly. 
In this sense, investors aspire to be shielded by a kind of property lex specialis that would bind 
not only the host government but also other private actors that may have rival contentions to 
rights in these assets.’ Lehavi and Licht, "BITs and Pieces of Property", 130. 
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subject to limitations in most legal systems. 60  This is because national 
systems of property define rights in relation to other property holders, either 
for reasons of public interest or competition among property holders.61 In 
addition, certain property rights may be infringed if they interfere with rights 
that States value as more important.  
In the context of investment arbitration, reconciling this convoluted web of 
interrelated interests (i.e. in defining investment/property rights) requires a 
holistic approach to the legal rules pertaining directly or indirectly to the 
conformation of a water entitlement. While arbitral tribunals are primarily 
called to undertake the construction of property rights over water resources, 
host States are called to present a case through evidence of all legal 
arrangements linked to the water right under analysis. This is because a host 
State has a wider knowledge and understanding of the intertwined 
relationships of its domestic water law in relation to other laws. In this regard, 
it is appropriate to clarify that arbitral tribunals are experts in the field of 
international law and investment arbitration, with a focus in the investment 
treaty under application, but less so in the domestic legal system of the host 
State, which will be treated as facts for the analysis of the tribunal.  
Depending on the domestic legal tradition, different water rights may allow for 
more or less sticks within the bundle of property rights.62 This is because 
water rights are rather precarious in comparison to other types of property. 
Yet each entitlement allows for complicated relations at both horizontal and 
vertical levels. The horizontal level refers to the arrangement of norms of the 
same hierarchy which pertains to the enjoyment of different sticks of the 
bundle of water rights, in their interrelation with other stick-holders’ rights 
(e.g. land, forest, downstream users). These domestic laws regulating each 
stick resemble a web of sticks rather than a bundle of individual sticks.63 In 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
60 Paul Stanton asserts, in his analysis of the definition of investment under Article 1139 
NAFTA, that under domestic law private rights ‘acquired’ to use water are subject to significant 
limitations. The questions that follows is to what extent such limitation apposite at the domestic 
level, are relevant under NAFTA’s notion of investment. See Stanton Kibel, "Grasp on Water: A 
Natural Resource that Eludes NAFTA's Notion of Investment", 107.  
61 Several authors argue that property do not entail rights to the holder, but also obligations 
towards society. See also Gregory S. Alexander, The Global Debate over Constitutional Property: 
Lessons for American Takings Jurisprudence (Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2006); 
Amnon Lehavi, "Mixing Property" Seton Hall Law Review 38, no. 1 (2007). 
62 A brief reference to the concept of the bundle of rights in property law has been made in 
Chapter I, Section 1.4.3 supra note 38. 
63 Zellmer attempts the use of the metaphor of a web rights, precisely trying to depict the real 
interlinks between different right holders and the enjoyment of intertwined property rights. 
Sandi  Zellmer and Jessica Harder, "Unbundling Property in Water",  College of Law, Faculty 
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such a scenario – the horizontal level – water laws are connected to other laws 
of the same hierarchy, such as the laws of land, environmental protection, 
forestry, and indigenous rights (unless they have a higher hierarchy, in which 
case the relationship will become vertical). This intertwined legal web of 
legislation linked to water laws may confer certain expectations to other users, 
who would, as a result, acquire some sort of interest vis a vis the investor’s 
entitlement to use water resources or to discharge on water resources. For 
instance, the relationship between pollution permits for mining (with an effect 
over water quantity and/or water quality and downstream farmers. Even when 
downstream farmers lack formal water entitlement to use certain volumes of 
water or to receive it under certain quality, there will be a potential for conflict 
if the resource upstream does not comply with certain standard of quality.  
A similar scenario of horizontal relations could be observed at the 
supranational level. In this regard horizontal relations do not only interlink at 
a national level, there may be horizontal relations at the international level, i.e. 
obligations arising from investment treaties, human rights declarations, 
environmental agreements, etc. Yet still, the latter type of obligation will be 
generally applied within the domestic legal system of the host State through 
the implementation of domestic laws.64 Such situation may partially explain 
inconsistent arbitral awards in which arbitrators approached non-investment 
obligations in different ways, contributing to the legitimacy crisis of the 
investment arbitration mechanism.  
Likewise at the vertical level, property rights legislation could be exemplified 
when international obligations affect domestic law in regard to the same 
asset/property right. For example, one could imagine a different outcome of an 
environmental case brought by Argentina against Uruguay, 65  in which 
Argentina challenged the development of a pulp mill project undertaken by a 
Finnish investor in agreement with the government of Uruguay. In the case 
before the International Court of Justice (ICJ), the Court addressed several 
legal issues in regard the obligation of optimal and rational utilization of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Publications. Available at: http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/lawfacpub(2007), 
http://digitalcommons.unl.edu/lawfacpub/11.    
64 Lehavi refers to this phenomenon as Horizontal Heterogeneity of Legal Norms, to explain the 
problem of over fragmentation of legal systems due to the high number of BITs signed by host 
states, which may have a detrimental effect on the level of protection that each investor may 
demand from the BIT signed by their home state. Lehavi and Licht, "BITs and Pieces of 
Property", 157.  
65 Case Concerning Pulp 'Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay)' (Judgment) [2010] ICJ 
Rep (20 April 2010). 
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River Uruguay, notification, preservation of the aquatic environment and 
prevention of pollution, among others.66 Relevant to the argument of this 
section, is the Court finding that Uruguay did not breach its substantive 
obligation,67 allowing the respondent State to continue the development of the 
pulp mill,68 which Argentina had requested to be dismantled.69 Should the ICJ 
have agreed with Argentina’s request to dismantle the plant due to 
hypothetical breaches of substantive obligations by Uruguay and the request 
of Argentina of restitutio in integrum, it is likely that the decision – as 
implemented by Uruguay at the domestic level – would have triggered the 
dispute settlement mechanism provided for in the BIT between Finland and 
Uruguay. This hypothetical outcome, which would weigh primarily 
international environmental law obligations, may have trumped the property 
rights of the Finish investor, who in turn, could have sought redress for any 
economic injury under the provisions of the Finland – Uruguay investment 
treaty. Under this hypothesis, an arbitral tribunal would have decided the 
investment case, guided primarily under international obligation of Uruguay of 
investment protection.  
From this perspective, the hypothetical Decision of the ICJ – described above – 
would have had an affect on the property interest of the Finish investor. This 
could mean that the conditions for the acquisition of property rights, such as 
the investor’s licence to operate, would not be completely autonomous, but 
somewhat linked and limited by the shared obligation – of Argentina and 
Uruguay – to protect the Uruguay River’s environment.  
In constructing water property rights, tribunals should consider, for instance, 
that countries almost consistently have avoided the private ownership of water 
resources.70 Haneman, as quoted by Stanton, observes:  
 
The public good nature of water . . . has had a decisive influence on the legal status of 
water. In Roman Law, and, subsequently, in English and American common law, and to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
66 Ibid. para. 22. 
67 Ibid. para. 282. 
68 Ibid. para. 275. 
69 Case Concerning Pulp 'Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v Uruguay)' (Judgment) [2010] ICJ 
Rep (20 April 2010), para. 270. 
70  Stanton Kibel, "Grasp on Water: A Natural Resource that Eludes NAFTA's Notion of 
Investment", 134. 
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an extent in Civil Law systems, flowing waters are treated as common to everyone (res 
communis omnium), and are not capable of being owned.71  
In this vein, States have adopted different legal arrangements, predominantly 
based on State ownership or stewardship of water resources.72 For instance, 
some legal systems, such as the English one, consider that flowing water 
cannot be subject to ownership,73and its use is therefore overseen – or in 
stewardship – of the government.74 Likewise, the US has complex systems of 
water allocation, including a system of prior appropriation in some States.75  
Currently, domestic water laws are moving towards systems of permits and 
licences and they seem to favour higher levels of flexibility in the management 
of the resource.76 It follows, by implication, that more flexibility (e.g. to tackle 
hydrological variability) may have an impact on the security and predictability 
of water rights.77 These changes in reality, however, should not be considered 
as potential breaches of international law obligations. The Restatement of the 
Law, Second: Foreign Relation Law of the United States, for example, states that 
even when property rights are to be conferred in conformity with the domestic 
law of the host State, this arrangement ‘may not violate international 
standards of justice.’ 78  The withdrawal and cancellation of water permits 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
71 Ibid., 104. 
72 For instance Brazil’s Constitution 1988 (as amended 2004) recognizes ownership of water 
resources by the States (Article 26) and the Union (Article 20). Likewise, the Mexican 
Constitution recognizes that water resources belong to the Nation (Article 27.5 Constitution of 
Mexico 1917, amended 2004); Kazakhstan’ Constitution recognizes the ownership of water 
resources and other natural resources in favour of the State (Article 6). These examples are 
drawn from the work of Salman and Bradlow, see Salman and Bradlow, Regulatory Frameworks 
for Water Resources Management: A Comparative Study: 24, 68 and 76.   
73  Jane Ball, "The Boundaries of Property Rights in English Law" Electronic Journal of 
Comparative Law: Report to the XVIIth International Congress of Comparative Law 10, no. 3 
(2006), 19. 
74 Hodgson, "Modern water rights. Theory and practice", 22. Also relevant is the German system 
of water permits which does not have constitutional provisions regarding the ownership of water 
resources. Yet, Article 89 of the German Constitution gives federal ownership over inland 
waterways. The use of water requires a permit or licence under the Federal Water Act, as 
explained by Salman and Bradlow. See Salman and Bradlow, Regulatory Frameworks for Water 
Resources Management: A Comparative Study, 61-63.  
75 The literature regarding the American system of water rights and ownership is extensive, and 
it concentrates in two main traditions: the prior appropriation doctrine, used in the west part of 
the country, and riparian doctrine, used in the east of the country. An account of these two 
common law systems is undertaken in Hodgson, "Modern water rights. Theory and practice", 
11-14. 
76 Chapter II discusses the increasing need for a flexible approach to the management of water 
resources. 
77 See Zellmer and Harder, "Unbundling Property in Water", 687-88 
78 American Law Institute, Restatement of the Law, Second: Foreign Relations Law of the United 
States. As adopted and promulgated by the American Law Institute at Washington D.C. in May 26 
1962  (St. Paul, Minn.: American Law Institute Publishers, 1965). § 185,  555-56. 
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without payment of compensation as provided for in some domestic legal 
systems, such as the Alberta Water Act,79 could be said to constitute a breach 
of the provisions on expropriation in most IIAs and under general 
international law. However, it could be argued – especially in the interest of 
host States – that a proper construction of water rights should incorporate the 
unique nature of water resources. First, such construct should consider the 
unpredictability and variability of the hydrological cycle, embedded in the 
nature of water resources, which in turn affects the security of water rights. 
Second the communal characteristic of water traditionally limits the bundle of 
rights linked to water licences, such a condition should also play an role in the 
construction of water rights. These considerations are substantially different 
from those informing de construction of other property rights, such as those 
on land.80   
Another consideration likely to be discussed in an investment dispute is 
whether water entitlements, as a covered investment, constitute a physical 
asset or an intangible right to use water resources conferred to investors by 
host States.81 The answer to this question may have an effect on the decision 
of the tribunal. For example, if water is considered a physical asset, regulatory 
measures affecting the use of water resources at the point of extraction could 
be considered as a direct expropriation since the character of the measure 
would be one of physical occupation.82 The tribunal in Burlington v Ecuador 
undertook an extensive analysis in order to determine whether the tax laws of 
Ecuador, directed at oil production, amounted to an indirect expropriation. 
While the tribunal did not find that the level of deprivation was substantial,83 
it did find that the last measure adopted by Ecuador (physical occupation of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
79 s 55(2), Water Act RSA 2000 c. W-3 (Alberta Canada). See Chapter II supra note 204. 
80 See Saxer, "The Fluid Nature of Property Rights in Water", 3. 
81 On this issue it is noteworthy the article by John Leshy which addresses such a question, 
referring especially to takings of appropriative water rights. Leshy explains that the argument 
has been invoked by several practitioners on claims of takings against governmental measures 
affecting water rights. This is because a physical taking would be deemed a per-se taking under 
American takings jurisprudence See Loretto v. Teleprompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S. 
419, 421-22 (1982). Arbitral tribunals in investment arbitration cases have adopted similar 
view, see footnote 165 below. See also Grant, who asserts that US Courts, in the past, have 
found the reduction of water entitlements as a per se physical taking, and for that have been 
widely criticised by commentators. See Douglas L. Grant, "ESA Reductions in Reclamation of 
Water Contract Deliveries: A Fifth Amendment Taking of Property?" Environmental Law 36, no. 4 
(2006). 
82 See for instance Burlington Resources Inc. v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, 
Decision on Liability, 14 December, 2012 
83 See Section 4.4.3.2.1 and infra note 167. 
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Blocks 7 and 21), constituted a direct expropriation.84 Although it is unlikely 
that an arbitral tribunal would find that water entitlements constitute a 
physical asset, the argument could well be invoked in a dispute, because the 
nullification of a water licence effectively affects the physical access to the 
resource. An acceptance of this argument could favour a claim of direct 
expropriation, in which case the decision in Burlington v Ecuador becomes 
relevant.  
The above-mentioned inquiry is significant to the analysis of water rights vis a 
vis indirect expropriation because – as analysed in Chapter II – a water 
entitlement ‘does not give ownership of the molecules of water’,85 but the right 
to use a certain amount of water.86 For this reason, an approach to water 
entitlements that considers water as a physical asset would be fundamentally 
misleading. 
Arbitral tribunals have favoured the analysis of the physical characteristics of 
water resources and the resulting intangible nature of the water rights. The 
tribunal in Bayview Irrigation District v Mexico in an obiter dictum addressed 
the issue of water rights as follows:  
there is an evident and inescapable conceptual difficulty in positing the existence 
of property rights in water up-river in Mexico in a context where the entitlement of 
each Claimant depends upon the apportionment of a certain volume of water, […] 
which can be determined only by reference to the volume of water that actually 
reached the main channel of the Rio Bravo / Rio Grande.  
[…] the holder of a right granted by the State of Texas to take a certain amount of 
water from the Rio Bravo/Rio Grande does not 'own', does not ‘possess property 
rights in’, a particular volume of water […].87  
In that case, the obiter dictum of the tribunal appears to take into account not 
only the domestic laws of Mexico – the host State – in the construction of the 
property rights in water alleged by the claimant,88 but also the 1944 Treaty for 
the ‘Utilization of the Water of the Colorado and Tijuana Rivers and the Rio 
Grande/Rio Bravo’, in order to shape those rights.89 The tribunal, however, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
84  Burlington v Ecuador, para. 530-538. As to the possible argument, regarding the 
comparability of water entitlements and water as a physical asset see supra note 78.  
85 Leshy, "A Conversation About Takings and Water Rights", 2009. 
86 Ibid. 
87 Bayview Irrigation District et al. v. United Mexican States, ICSID (Additional Facility) Case No. 
ARB(AF)/05/1), Award, June 19, 2007, paras 115-116. See also Chapter II Section 2.5.2.3. 
88 Ibid., para. 118. 
89 See Bayview Irrigation District et al. v. United Mexican States, ICSID (Additional Facility) Case 
No. ARB(AF)/05/1), Award, June 19, 2007, paras 120-21. 
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made no pronouncement as to whether the claimants’ rights would have been 
protected under NAFTA should they have existed. 
In addition to the specific case of water resources in the context of investment 
arbitration, other arbitral tribunals have looked into the domestic legal system 
of the host State, in order to appreciate the nature of such rights.   
In Suez v Argentina, for instance, the tribunal expressed:  
as in a case of the expropriation of physical assets, a tribunal must first 
understand the nature of the rights allegedly expropriated before proceeding to 
determine whether they have been expropriated under international law. To 
assess the nature of these rights, in a case of alleged expropriation of contractual 
rights one must look to the domestic law under which the rights were created.90   
Zachary Douglas provides a critical account of the construct of property rights 
under the renvoi to domestic law in the context of investment disputes. 
Douglas criticises the analysis of domestic law as facts, as it weakens the task 
of the arbitral tribunal in the determination of the scope of legal 
entitlements,91 which entails a comprehensive analysis of all legal rules in 
their relation to the property right.92  
The case of Wena Hotels v Republic of Egypt assists in illustrating this 
situation. Wena – a British investor – was granted a lease agreement to 
administer two hotels, which later were confiscated by the Egyptian 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
90 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A. v Argentina, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/19 and under UNCITRAL Rules AWG Group v Argentina, Decision on 
Liability, July 30, 2010, para. 151. See also Bayview Irrigation District et al. v. United Mexican 
States, ICSID (Additional Facility) Case No. ARB(AF)/05/1), Award June 19, 2007, analysing the 
nature of water resources ownership. See also EnCana v Ecuador where the tribunal addressed 
the claim of VAT returns, which the claimant alleged to be entitled to under Ecuadorian law. 
“Unlike many BITs there is no express reference to the law of the host State. However for there 
to have been an expropriation of an investment or return (in a situation involving legal rights or 
claims as distinct from the seizure of physical assets) the rights affected must exist under the 
law which creates them, in this case, the law of Ecuador”. See En Cana Corporation v Republic of 
Ecuador, London Court of Arbitration (under UNCITRAL Rules), Award, 3 February, 2006, para. 
184. 
91 Douglas, The International Law of Investment Claims: 70. 
92 Ibid., 69-72. Note, however, that the opposed argument asserts that tribunals look at the 
domestic legal system of the host state as facts in order to avoid interferences into the internal 
sovereignty of the states. In doing so arbitral tribunals need not pronounce on whether the 
internal laws of the states are effective, fair or adequate. See for instance the decision of the 
Permanent Court of International Justice, Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia, 
[1926] PCIJ Rep., Series A, No.7, para. 19. It is one thing to analyse domestic law within the 
context of assessing a breach of the investment treaty, in which case the governmental 
measures constitutes a fact, because the analysis takes place in the plane of international law. 
It is a different thing, that the rules of international law – under which the claim of 
expropriation is addressed – provide a renvoi to domestic law, in order to determine the scope of 
property rights.    
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government. Domestic courts had ordered the return of the hotels to Wena; 
however, the government continued interfering with the operation of the lease 
agreement. The arbitral award concluded that the Egypt had unlawfully 
expropriated Wena’s investment and ordered the payment of compensation. 
Douglas asserts that the arbitral tribunal, as well as the Ad Hoc annulment 
committee, failed to determine the extent and scope of the property rights 
allegedly affected. The tribunal did not analyse breaches of the lease contract 
by Wena, which if taken into consideration would have changed the extent of 
property rights alleged by the claimant.93  
This work concurs that a holistic approach to the domestic law of the host 
State would certainly assist arbitral tribunals in achieving a comprehensive 
construct of the property right under dispute. The tribunal in Bayview 
Irrigation District v Mexico considered in its analysis the physical 
characteristics of water resources and appears to acknowledge that water 
resources have unique characteristics which have an effect on the 
construction of water rights.94 The tribunal also paid due consideration to the 
host State legal tradition, reflected in the Mexican Constitution which 
stipulates fundamental limitations in private ownership of water resources. 95 
These considerations on water resources from geographical, economical and 
social perspectives provide adequate context to water entitlements and 
determine if they are precarious or secure. 
  
4.4.2 The Definition of Investment 
The question of whether all assets constitute an investment, subject to the 
protection under an IIA, does not always have an affirmative answer. Following 
the determination of whether the domestic laws of the host State confer a 
property right to the investor (Section 4.4.1), it remains to analyse whether 
those property rights constitute an investment under the relevant investment 
treaty.   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
93 Ibid., 57-58. 94	  See Bayview Irrigation District et al. v. United Mexican States, ICSID (Additional Facility) Case 
No. ARB(AF)/05/1), Award, June 19, 2007, paras. 114-116	  
95 Ibid., para. 118. 
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This section addresses whether water entitlements, which are not the sole 
purpose of the investment, but part of it, constitute an investment in their 
own right or as part of the operation of the investment as a whole. 
The definition of investment is negotiated in the IIA, which generally 
encompasses a broad and open ended range of property rights, and such 
definitions often refer to virtually to ‘every kind of asset’ including direct, and 
in most cases, portfolio investments.96 Since water entitlements are generally 
granted in the form of licences, permits or concessions, a water entitlement 
would be considered an investment. The Energy Charter Treaty (ECT), which 
is a sector-specific agreement, includes all assets, present and future, that are 
related to the economic activity in the energy sector.97   
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
96 UNCTAD states that lists of investments usually includes ‘movable and immovable property, 
interests in companies – including both portfolio and direct investment – contractual rights, 
intellectual property and business concessions.’ United Nations Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD), Investor-State Dispute Settlement and Impact on Investment Rulemaking  
(New York, Geneva: United Nations, 2007), 22. 
97 See the Energy Charter Treaty’s definition of Investment, provided for in Article 1 (6): 
‘‘Investment’ means every kind of asset, owned or controlled directly or indirectly by an Investor 
and includes: (a) tangible and intangible, and movable and immovable, property and any 
property rights such as leases, mortgages, liens, and pledges; (b) a company or business 
enterprise, or shares, stock, or other forms of equity participation in a company or business 
enterprise, and bonds and other debt of a company or business enterprise; (c) claims to money 
and claims to performance pursuant to contract having an economic value and associated with 
an Investment;(d) Intellectual Property; (e) Returns; (f) any right conferred by law or contract or 
by virtue of any licenses and permits granted pursuant to law to undertake any Economic Activity 
in the Energy Sector. A change in the form in which assets are invested does not affect their 
character as investments and the term “Investment” includes all investments, whether existing 
at or made after the later of the date of entry into force of this Treaty for the Contracting Party of 
the Investor making the investment and that for the Contracting Party in the Area of which the 
investment is made (hereinafter referred to as the “Effective Date”) provided that the Treaty shall 
only apply to matters affecting such investments after the Effective Date. “Investment” refers to 
any investment associated with an Economic Activity in the Energy Sector and to investments 
or classes of investments designated by a Contracting Party in its Area as “Charter efficiency 
projects” and so notified to the Secretariat.’ (Emphasis added) 
NAFTA’s definition of Investment, under Article 1139, excludes specific assets: ‘[…](a) an 
enterprise; (b) an equity security of an enterprise; (c) a debt security of an enterprise (i) where 
the enterprise is an affiliate of the investor, or (ii) where the original maturity of the debt 
security is at least three years, but does not include a debt security, regardless of original 
maturity, of a state enterprise; (d) a loan to an enterprise (i) where the enterprise is an affiliate 
of the investor, or (ii) where the original maturity of the loan is at least three years, but does not 
include a loan, regardless of original maturity, to a state enterprise; (e) an interest in an 
enterprise that entitles the owner to share in income or profits of the enterprise; (f) an interest 
in an enterprise that entitles the owner to share in the assets of that enterprise on dissolution, 
other than a debt security or a loan excluded from subparagraph (c) or (d); (g) real estate or 
other property, tangible or intangible, acquired in the expectation or used for the purpose of 
economic benefit or other business purposes; and (h) interests arising from the commitment of 
capital or other resources in the territory of a Party to economic activity in such territory, such 
as under (i) contracts involving the presence of an investor's property in the territory of the 
Party, including turnkey or construction contracts, or concessions, or (ii) contracts where 
remuneration depends substantially on the production, revenues or profits of an enterprise; but 
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Dominican Republic – Central America Free Trade Agreement (CAFTA), 
Chapter 10 (Investment) provides for list of covered investments in Article 
10.28 (Definitions) Investment:  
[…] g) licenses, authorizations, permits, and similar rights conferred pursuant to 
domestic law.  
Footnote 10 to letter g) states:  
Whether a particular type of license, authorization, permit, or similar instrument 
(including a concession, to the extent that it has the nature of such an instrument) has 
the characteristics of an investment depends on such factors as the nature and extent 
of the rights that the holder has under the law of the Party. Among the licenses, 
authorizations, permits, and similar instruments that do not have the characteristics of 
an investment are those that do not create any rights protected under domestic law. For 
greater certainty, the foregoing is without prejudice to whether any asset associated 
with the license, authorization, permit, or similar instrument has the characteristics of 
an investment. 
Although a water entitlement may constitute only one investment within a 
larger group of investments, the role of each investment is relevant to the 
success of the project as a whole i.e. water resources required for mining 
projects, electricity generation and land leases, among others. It is important 
to consider that some of these assets – or investments – could be substituted 
in case of shortage, some others constitute the core of the investment, such as 
the land and the minerals, and therefore no investment could continue if they 
are affected. The case of water is somewhat different, it may appear as a 
modest bundle within the bundle of investment rights i.e. it is inexpensive, 
weakly regulated (especially in developing countries, where most extractive 
industries operate). However, without water most project would turn unviable 
i.e. it has no substitutes to operate, and cannot be easily transported. 
In the context of the ICSID Convention rules, Article 25 of the Convention 
states that: ‘the jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any legal dispute 
arising directly out of an investment’.98 The Convention, however, does not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
investment does not mean, (i) claims to money that arise solely from (i) commercial contracts for 
the sale of goods or services by a national or enterprise in the territory of a Party to an 
enterprise in the territory of another Party, or (ii) the extension of credit in connection with a 
commercial transaction, such as trade financing, other than a loan covered by subparagraph 
(d); or (j) any other claims to money, that do not involve the kinds of interests set out in 
subparagraphs (a) through (h) [….]’ 
98 Article 25 (1) ICSID Convention Rules: ‘(1) The jurisdiction of the Centre shall extend to any 
legal dispute arising directly out of an investment, between a Contracting State (or any 
constituent subdivision or agency of a Contracting State designated to the Centre by that State) 
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provide for a definition of investment, and nor was there an attempt to do so.99 
Only in a few instances, ICSID tribunals have declined jurisdiction on the 
basis that the interest at issue was not an investment under Article 25(1),100 
yet, tribunals do scrutinise their own jurisdiction. In the recent case of 
Electrabel v Hungary, the tribunal considered whether it had jurisdiction to 
decide the claim under the provisions of Article 25(1). In so doing, the tribunal 
assessed three elements necessary for an investment, under the ICSID 
Convention: i) a contribution, ii) certain duration, and iii) an element of risk. 
The tribunal also recalled the Salini test,101 which includes the elements of the 
economic development contribution to the host State. The tribunal did not 
consider the ‘contribution to economic development of the host State’ as an 
element of the investment, but it asserted that such a contribution was rather 
a desirable consequence of the investment.102 
The above discussion does not present difficulties when identifying water 
entitlements as investments, and would not – most likely – be at the core of an 
investment tribunal’s discussion in a water-related case. It is, however, of 
interest as part of general legal inquiry on the issue. The notion of investment 
in the context of water resources is of interest, since the use of water 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
and a national of another Contracting State, which the parties to the dispute consent in writing 
to submit to the Centre’. 
99 Christoph Schreuer et al., The ICSID convention: A commentary on the Convention on the 
Settlement of Investment Disputes between States and Nationals of Other States (Cambridge 
[England]; New York: Cambridge University Press, 2009), 119. 
100 See for instance Joy Mining Machinery Limited v. The Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/11, Award on Jurisdiction, 6 August 2004, paras. 40-52 where the tribunal rejected the 
claim of Joy Mining, because it considered that a bank guarantee did not fall under the scope of 
the ICSID Convention.  
101 In Salini Costruttori S.P.A. and Italstrade S.P.A. v Kingdom of Morocco, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/OO/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, 23 July 2001. the tribunal considered the following 
elements relevant to the definition of investment:  ‘The doctrine generally considers that 
investment infers: contributions, a certain duration of performance of the contract and a 
participation in the risks of the transaction […]. In reading the Convention's preamble, one may 
add the contribution to the economic development of the host State of the investment as an 
additional condition. In reality, these various elements may be interdependent. Thus, the risks 
of the transaction may depend on the contributions and the duration of performance of the 
contract. As a result, these various criteria should be assessed globally even if, for the sake of 
reasoning, the Tribunal considers them individually here.’ (para. 52) 
Such elements have been later contested by academics and practitioners, and there has been 
discussion as to whether the real intent of the parties was to leave the ICSID Convention 
without any definition of Investment, giving enough freedom to the parties to negotiate their 
own definition in the relevant investment agreements.  
102 Electrabel S.A. v. The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Award on Jurisdiction, 
Applicable Law and Liability, November 30, 2012, para. 5.43. See also Deutsche Bank AG v. 
Democratic Socialist Republic of Sri Lanka, ICSID Case No. ARB/09/2, Award, 31 October 2012, 
para. 295, where the tribunal expressed that the economic contribution to the host State does 
not constitute a requirement or element of the notion of Investment under the ICISD 
Convention.   
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resources is needed for most types of industrial activity, and yet it will not 
necessarily constitute the sole purpose of the investment. There are few 
instances where water rights might constitute the main purpose of the 
investment, e.g. when water is provided as a service, when water is bottled for 
consumption, etc. Conversely, water may be required either as an element of 
input (in the production process) or will become subject to pollution as a 
result of different production processes. This is case when the investment is 
related to mining, electricity generation, industry, and farming; or as part of 
an extensive list of economic activities where water is needed.103 
It is in the latter situation where the question arises as to whether water 
entitlements or water rights should be considered as stand-alone investments 
or as part of the whole of the investment project. In Electrabel v Hungary, the 
notion of investment under the ECT Article 13(1) was addressed by the 
tribunal as a whole for the purpose of analysing the claim of expropriation, 
‘even if different parts may separately qualify as investments for jurisdictional 
purposes’.104 Similarly, such a discussion could well arise in a water-related 
case, in which the regulatory measure would only affect water entitlements, 
leaving the rest of the elements of the investment untouched (such as in the 
case of mining concessions, electricity generation permits, land leases, etc.).105 
In this vein, the issue could be addressed in the context of the jurisdiction of 
the tribunals with regard to the definition of investment, as well as in the 
context of the analysis of the claim of expropriation, as noted by the arbitral 
tribunal in Electrabel v Hungary.   
Each of these pieces of property rights are complementary to the 
materialization of the investment as a whole, and they are comparable to a 
bundle of investment rights, 106  as approved by the host State under its 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
103 In this regard pollution may not only mean the quality of water resources (as would be the 
case at hand in Pacific Rim v El Salvador), but also its temperature (as was the case in Vattenfall 
v Germany), and in general its original state, which may affect the normal development of 
ecosystems and consumption.  
104 Electrabel S.A. v The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Award on Jurisdiction, 
Applicable Law and Liability, November 30, 2012, para. 6.58. 
105 The complexity of international projects require a combination of licences, concessions and 
contracts, among others, in order to put in place the machinery necessary to carry out the 
operation. In the context of this work, the question could in principle be linked to the issue of 
partial expropriation. See Section 4.4.3.2.3. 
106 The comparison of the investment with a bundle of rights was adopted for instance in ATA 
Construction, Industrial and Trading Company v Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, ICSID Case No. 
ARB/08/2, Award May 18 2012, paras. 96 and 117.  
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national laws and international agreements. 107  Potential concerns would 
generally be first addressed in the context of the jurisdiction of the tribunal 
over claims originating in the impairment of benefits accruing from such 
property rights (investments), such as water rights. 108  Therefore, the 
regulatory measure under analysis may affect only one stick of the bundle of 
investment rights – water entitlements – and therefore the inquiry – at this 
first stage – will require a determination of whether the water right in question 
constitutes the main purpose of the investment e.g. bottled water. The 
Tribunal in Holiday Inns v Morocco addressed the indivisibility of the 
investment in the following terms:  
it is well known, and it is being particularly shown in the present case, that 
investment is accomplished by a number of juridical acts 'of all sorts. It would not 
be consonant either with economic reality or with the intention of the parties to 
consider each of these acts in complete isolation from the others. It is particularly 
important to ascertain which is the act which is the basis of the investment and 
which entails as measures of execution the other acts which have been concluded 
in order to carry it out.109    
The tribunal in CSOB v Slovakia was confronted with a similar issue, having to 
decide whether an obligation acquired by the Slovak Republic under a 
Consolidation Agreement, in the context of a much larger investment, was 
within the scope of its competence. The tribunal addressed the question under 
the provision of Article 25(1) of the ICSID Convention, through a two-fold test: 
first, whether the dispute arose out of an investment, within the meaning of 
the Convention; if so, second, whether the dispute relates to an investment as 
defined in the parties’ consent to ICSID arbitration, in their reference to the 
BIT and the definitions contained in the relevant parts of such a BIT.110  The 
tribunal found it had jurisdiction to hear the case, concluding as follows: 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
107 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), "EXPROPRIATION: A 
Sequel. UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II", 23.  
108 See Enron v Argentina: ‘The Tribunal notes in this context that an investment is indeed a 
complex process including various arrangements, such as contracts, licences and other 
agreements leading to the materialization of such investment, a process in turn governed by the 
Treaty. This particular aspect was explained by an ICSID tribunal as ‘the general unity of an 
investment operation” 
 
and by one other tribunal considering an investment based on several 
instruments as constituting “an indivisible whole’
 
 Enron Corporation and Ponderosa Assets, L.P. 
v Argentine Republic, Decision on Jurisdiction, (ICSID ARB/01/3), Award 14 January 2004, 
para. 70 
109 Holiday Inns v Morocco, (ICSID Case No. ARB/72/1)Decision on Jurisdiction, 12 May 1974. As 
cited in Pierre Lalive D'Epinay, "The first 'World Bank' arbitration (Holiday Inns v. Morocco): 
Some legal problems" British Yearbook of International Law 51(1982), 159.  
110 Teskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v The Slovak Republic (CSOB v Slovakia),  ICSID Case 
No. ARB/97/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, May 24, 1999, para. 68. See also Fedax N.V. v. Republic 
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an investment is frequently a rather complex operation, composed of various 
interrelated transactions, each element of which, standing alone, might not in all 
cases qualify as an investment. Hence, a dispute that is brought before the Centre 
must be deemed to arise directly out of an investment even when it is based on a 
transaction which, standing alone, would not qualify as an investment under the 
Convention, provided that the particular transaction forms an integral part of an 
overall operation that qualifies as an investment.111   
In Joy Mining v Egypt,112 the tribunal departed from the approach of Holiday 
Inns v Morocco and CSOB v Slovakia, and concluded that bank guarantees 
under a contract constituted contingent liabilities that could not be considered 
an asset under the relevant BIT.113  
The notion of the ‘unity of economic purpose and functionality’114  of the 
investment is important in asserting the jurisdiction of the arbitral tribunal to 
hear the substance of the case. Therefore, consideration of complementary 
investments widens the types of investments that could fall with the definition 
of the investment agreement, and the jurisdiction of the tribunal. In a 
challenge to jurisdiction, for instance, a respondent host State may argue - 
most likely unsuccessfully - that a water permit or any type of water 
entitlement does not constitute an investment on its own. Pierre Lalive’s 
exhaustive account of Holiday Inns v Morocco explains that in that case the 
tribunal found jurisdiction over a contract, signed by the parties, as part of 
the charter of the investment along with its various supplements, which 
allowed for the realization of the investment overall.  
In the context of the tribunal’s jurisdiction, an investment that is a 
complementary piece of the whole project may be considered as a standalone 
investment. Additionally, since each complementary investment has a function 
within the overall operation, one could inquire as to the significance of each 
complementary investment within the overall operation. Water resources could 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
of Venezuela, Decision on Jurisdiction, 37 I.L.M. 1378, July 11, 1997, para. 24 (1998), as referred 
to by the tribunal, in which the tribunal found inspiration to reach its decision. 
111 Teskoslovenska Obchodni Banka, A.S. v The Slovak Republic (CSOB v Slovakia), ICSID Case 
No. ARB/97/4, Decision on Jurisdiction, May 24, 1999, para. 72.   
112 Joy Mining Machinery Limited v The Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, 
Award on Jurisdiction, 6 August 2004.  
113 The tribunal did not disagree with the approach adopted by the tribunals with the findings 
in CSOB v Slovakia, FEDAX NV v Venezuela and Salini v Morocco, it simply did not find that the 
facts of these cases were comparable to the specific issues dealt with in the case at hand. See 
Joy Mining Machinery Limited v The Arab Republic of Egypt, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/11, Award 
on Jurisdiction, 6 August 2004, paras 41-63.  
114 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), "EXPROPRIATION: A 
Sequel. UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II", 22-23.  
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have an important effect in the success and continuity of the investment, 
because water does not have substitutes and would be difficult and expensive 
to be transported for long distances.115 This issue will be further discussed in 
the following sections.  
In Methanex v US116 the tribunal was confronted with the scope of Article 1139 
of the NAFTA. The United States challenged Methanex’s claim that access to 
the market was a ‘property interest subject to protection under Article 1110’ of 
NAFTA.117 The tribunal, in adopting the approach in Pope & Talbot v Canada, 
acknowledged the existence of a new conception of property, which includes 
‘managerial control over components of a process that is wealth producing’.118 
However, it stated it would be difficult to see good will and market share as 
stand-alone elements, and they would rather be considered as part of the 
calculation of compensation.119  
The comparison of a whole investment with the bundle of rights, as proposed 
above, may be of assistance when assessing the weight of each complementary 
piece of investment within the whole operation, in the context of a partial 
expropriation and the analysis of the economic impact of the measure over the 
investment.   
In regard to the notion of investment and the jurisdiction of the tribunal, two 
considerations are of special relevance to this Chapter. Firstly, water 
entitlements could be seen as stand alone investments e.g. a licence to extract 
water resources for the provision of water services, licences to extract water for 
the development of an energy project. Perhaps less obvious is the type of water 
rights granted by Canada to Abitibi-Bowater for the operation of paper mills, 
which – as alleged by the claimant – were not conditional on the continuous 
operation of the paper mill, and as argued by the claimant perpetually 
renewable. 120  These types of water rights are part of a larger project, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
115 As regard to the nature of water and its lack substitutes, see Chapter II, Section 2.2. The 
weight of water resources (water entitlements) within the overall investment is dealt with in 
Section 4.7  
116 Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, Ad hoc—UNCITRAL (NAFTA). 
117 Methanex v United States, Ad hoc—UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Final Award, 3 August 2005, Part IV-
Chapter D – Page 7, para. 17. 
118 Ibid. para. 17 
119 The tribunal in Methanex v US relied on the approach of Prof White quoting the following 
passage: ‘[market share and good will] constitute [] an element of the value of an enterprise and 
as such may have been covered by some of the compensation payments’. Ibid para. 17. See also 
Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Interim Award (NAFTA), 26 June 2000, paras 96-105. 
120 See AbitibiBowater Inc., v. Government of Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to 
Arbitration under Chapter II NAFTA, 23 April 2009, para.23. 
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complementary to the investment as such under the ‘unity of the investment’ 
approach. Secondly, it follows that the potential withdrawal of a water right 
may be claimed as expropriatory, arguably affecting the operation of the 
investment as a whole. In the case of Abitibi-Bowater’s claims, not only water 
rights were allegedly expropriated, but also several other property rights, such 
as timber licences and land rights. 121  Unfortunately, the case of Abitibi-
Bowater does not provide much light as to the treatment that the tribunal 
would have given to water entitlements, as the case was settled between the 
claimant and Canada for 130 million USD. 122  The relevance of water 
entitlements vis a vis the investment as a whole should be addressed 
rigorously under the criterion on the economic impact of the measure.  
 
4.4.3 The Effects of the Measure over the Investor’s Property 
Rights (Second Stage of Analysis) 
The assessment of a claim of indirect expropriation is different from the 
assessment of a claim of direct expropriation. While the latter focuses on the 
legality of the expropriatory measure and the quantum of the compensation, 
the former will first make a prima facie inquiry into whether the measure 
under examination is expropriatory at all. As the tribunal in Glamis Gold v the 
United State explained: 
There is for all expropriations, however, the foundational threshold inquiry of 
whether the property or property right was in fact taken. This threshold question 
is relatively straightforward in the case of a direct taking, for example, by 
nationalization. In the case of an indirect taking or an act tantamount to 
expropriation such as by a regulatory taking, however, the threshold examination 
is an inquiry as to the degree of the interference with the property right. This 
often dispositive inquiry involves two questions: the severity of the economic 
impact and the duration of that impact.123 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
121 See AbitibiBowater Inc., v. Government of Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to 
Arbitration under Chapter II NAFTA, 23 April 2009, para. 27. 
122 Canada has been heavily criticised for this settlement, which ‘has effectively privatized 
Canada's water by allowing foreign investors to assert a proprietary claim to water permits and 
even water in its natural state’. See The Council of Canadians, ‘AbitibiBowater NAFTA 
settlement has privatized Canadian water, trade committee hears’, Media Release, 8 March 
2011. Available at: http://www.canadians.org/media/trade/2011/08-Mar-11.html, last visited 
September 3, 2013. 
123 Glamis Gold Ltd. v United States of America, Award under UNICTRAL Rules, June 8, 2009, 
para. 156. 
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This second stage of analysis pertains to a ‘quantitative’ assessment, to 
borrow the term used by Professor Brigitte Stern,124 of a claim of indirect 
expropriation, under the three-fold analytical framework proposed by this 
thesis. The quantitative analysis is linked to the economic effects of the 
measure over the protected investment and to the level of deprivation suffered 
by the investor. Such analysis may provide insight as to whether the level of 
deprivation is substantial enough so as to amount to an expropriation. The 
‘qualitative’ analysis, on the other hand, addresses the character and purpose 
of the regulatory measure.125 The analysis of the effects of the measure over 
the investment is in practice the most common approach used by investment 
tribunals, and rarely do tribunals go further into the analysis of the character 
of the measure in determining the existence of an indirect expropriation.  
Before turning to the test on the level of deprivation, it is relevant to address 
the issue of the sole effects approach. It is important to explain at this point 
why this work departs from such an approach and why it is inadequate for 
accessing an indirect expropriation.   
 
4.4.3.1  Preliminary Consideration: The Inadequacy of the Sole 
Effects Approach 
The sole effects approach as explained in the previous Chapter126 focuses on 
the effects that a governmental measure has over an investor’s property rights 
and ignores the regulatory purpose and nature of the governmental action, 
which may or may not amount to an indirect expropriation. The sole effects 
approach is not necessarily spelled out in the provisions of IIAs, rather it 
appears to be an interpretation of the broad notions of expropriation that are 
included in the IIAs. Conversely, other tribunals have adopted an 
interpretative approach that gives deference to the exercise of the police 
powers. An example of the above could be found in the comparison of two 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
124 See Stern, "In Search of the Frontiers of Indirect Expropriation", 38. 
In addition, Dalhuisen and Guzman have proposed a similar test to address claims of indirect 
expropriation under international law. They consider that a regulatory measures that have a de 
minimis effect over the investment, would be considered an expropriation, unless the measure is 
adopted for a public purpose (‘super public purpose’) or it is adopted under regular 
governmental activity. The authors give a close look into the lawfulness of the taking. See H. 
Jan Dalhuisen and Andrew T. Guzman, "Expropriatory and Non-Expropriatory Takings Under 
International Investment Law" UC Berkeley Public Law Research Paper No. 2137107 (2012). 
125 Stern, "In Search of the Frontiers of Indirect Expropriation", 44. 
126 See Chapter III, Section 3.5.2. 
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NAFTA cases: Methanex v United States and Metalclad v Mexico. Both were 
decided under Article 1110 of Chapter 11 of the NAFTA and involve alleged 
claims of expropriation of investor assets for environmental purposes. While 
the arbitrators based their decisions on the specific facts and context of each 
case, what is relevant to this example is their distinct understanding of the 
notion of expropriation as a starting point for the analysis of the claims under 
the NAFTA. 
In Metalclad v Mexico, the tribunal began its analysis from the following 
reading of Article 1110 of the NAFTA: 
 expropriation under NAFTA includes […] also covert or incidental interference 
with the use of property which has the effect of depriving the owner, in whole, or 
in significant part, of the use of reasonably-to-be-expected economic benefit of 
property even if not necessarily to the obvious benefit of the host State.127  
In Methanex v United States, the tribunal addressed the notion of expropriation 
proposed in Metalclad. While the tribunal acknowledged that a discriminatory 
regulation may constitute an expropriation,128  it departed from the above 
reading of Article 1110 NAFTA and proposed the following assessment to the 
claim of expropriation:  
a non-discriminatory regulation for a public purpose, which is enacted in 
accordance with due process and, which affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or 
investment is not deemed expropriatory and compensable unless specific 
commitments had been given…129 
This example shows two somewhat different readings of the provisions on 
expropriation contained in the same treaty. It follows that in each case, the 
tribunals will analyse the facts against these different reading of the provisions 
on expropriation, where the outcome can only be also different.  
Traditionally, the literature has identified the approach in Metalclad v Mexico 
with the sole effects approach.130 In a similar vein, the departing point of 
analysis for the determination of the existence of an indirect expropriation, 
proposed by the tribunal in Suez and Inter-Agua v Argentina, held that an 
expropriation inquiry: ‘…is directed particularly at the “effects” of the measure 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
127 Metalclad Corp. v. Mexico, Arb(AF)/97/1, 5 ICSID Reports, 209, para. 103 
128 Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, (NAFTA) Final Award, 3 August 2005, Part IV - 
Chapter D - Page 3 
129 Ibid. 
130 See Dolzer, "Indirect Expropriations: New Developments?"; Henckels, "Indirect Expropriation 
and the Right to Regulate: Revisiting Proportionality Analysis and the Standard of Review in 
Investor-State Arbitration". 
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on an investment, rather than at the intent of the government enacting the 
measure’. 131  The wording of the tribunal appears to give deference, in 
principle, to the sole effects approach. 
Heiskanen describes the sole effects approach as follows: 
[…]if the effect of the measures on the value of the investment is made the sole 
criterion in assessing the measure's legality and no attention is paid to the nature 
of the act.132 
A few tribunals adopted the sole effects approach in recent years: Starrett 
Housing, Phelps Dodge, Tippetts (Iran-US Claims Tribunal), 133  Biloune v 
Ghana, Metalclad v Mexico, and Fireman’s Fund v Mexico.134 The result of the 
interpretative process exercised by arbitrators has the potential to impact on 
the interaction between capital-exporting and capital-importing countries, 
regardless of their level of development. As Professor Higgins expressed at the 
Hague Academy of International Law in 1982:  
every time a judge decides whether compensation is not due, he is really deciding 
whether such losses shall be borne by the individuals on whom they happen to 
fall.135  
Higgins expressed the difficulties in appreciating the underlying policy that 
distinguishes a taking for the public purpose, which entails the right to 
compensation, from an indirect taking for regulatory purpose, which does 
not.136  
Currently, there seem to be a transition from a sole effects approach towards 
the police power approach. This is not to say that in the past arbitrators did 
not embrace the police power approach in a number of awards. For example, 
the Oscar Chinn Case, Sea-Land Service Inc. v Iran and S.D. Myers v Canada 
constitute a number of examples where the States’ prerogative to regulate was 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
131 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and Vivendi Universal S.A. v Argentina, 
ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17 and under UNCITRAL Rules AWG Group v Argentina, Decision on 
Liability, July 30, 2010, para. 122. 
132 Heiskanen, "The Contribution of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal to the Development 
of the Doctrine of Indirect Expropriation", 177. 
133 Dolzer and Bloch, "Indirect Expropriation: Conceptual Realignments?", 163.  
134 Fireman’s Fund v. Mexico, Award, 17 July 2006, para. 176(f). See United Nations Conference 
on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), "EXPROPRIATION: A Sequel. UNCTAD Series on Issues 
in International Investment Agreements II", 97.  
135  See Rosalyn Higgins, "The Taking of Property by the State. Recent Developments in 
International Law" Recueil des Cours (The Hage Academy of International Law) T. 176(1982), 
277, 330-31. 
136 Ibid., 330-31. 
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given preference by arbitral tribunals.137 More recent cases include: Chemtura 
v Canada, Glamis Gold v United States, Pope & Talbot v Canada,138 Saluka v 
Czech Republic,139 and Continental Casualty Company v Argentina.140  
New provisions on indirect expropriation in Model BITs as well as negotiation 
of new IIAs, suggest that States seek more deference towards their 
governmental measures.141  
The effects approach continues to be relevant to the determination of whether 
the governmental measure has deprived the investor substantially. This work 
however, submits that it cannot constitute the sole factor for the decision of 
whether an indirect expropriation has taken place.142  
 
4.4.3.2  The Level of Deprivation: Economic Impact, Duration 
and Control over the Investment   
 
4.4.3.2.1  The General Approach to the Level of Deprivation  
There seems to be agreement, within the academic literature as well as the 
body of arbitral awards that the impact of the measure ought to be substantial 
to conclude that there is an indirect expropriation.  
The US Supreme Court addressed the issue of interference with the property 
in 1922 in the case of Pennsylvania Coal v Mahon.  The opinion issued by 
Justice Holmes introduced the notion that a taking may be assessed in the 
light of the diminution of the value of the property: 
the general rule at least is that while property may be regulated to a certain 
extent, if regulation goes too far it will be recognized as a taking.143 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
137 See Dolzer and Bloch, "Indirect Expropriation: Conceptual Realignments?", 159-61. 
138 Chemtura v Canada, Glamis Gold v United States, Pope & Talbot v Canada were all decided 
under NAFTA. 
139 The Netherlands – Czech Republic BIT. 
140 United States – Argentina BIT. 
141 Examples of such investment agreements of the second generation are provided in Chapter 
III, Section 3.4.2.3, supra note 124.  
142  See also United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), 
"EXPROPRIATION: A Sequel. UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements 
II". 
143 Pennsylvania Coal Co. V. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393 (1922) 260 U.S. 393, Decision of December 11, 
1922. 
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This approach appears to have influenced largely the approach adopted by 
tribunals addressing the issue of indirect expropriation and the protection of 
property rights more generally. However, as Fischel suggests:  
The phrase “goes too far” is almost famous, but like “diminution of value,” it gives no 
guide to how far is too far. Holmes’s resort to this language ought to suggest how 
difficult it is to formulate a precise policy with respect to regulatory takings. His main 
purpose was to show that there is some limit to police power.144 
While most experts use related words such as ‘serious’, ‘significant’ and 
‘fundamental’, among others, they do not always reach the same outcome in 
the interpretation and application of the provisions of an IIA.145 Despite the 
extensive discussion on this matter, it is far from clear whether there is or can 
be a consistent approach to determine the level of substantiality of the 
economic impact of a regulatory measure over investment rights.  
The categories of regulatory measures over water resources, described above, 
may require different levels of analysis. Regulatory measures linked to water 
quantity146 may be subject to higher scrutiny as to the character of the 
governmental measure than measures linked to water quality.147 Likewise, 
water measures led by government’s policy preferences may also be more 
strictly scrutinised than measures adopted to face problems of water scarcity. 
This aspect could be applicable to both water quantity and quality.  
The way in which arbitral tribunals approach water rights, under the 
definition of investment in the relevant IIA, would have an effect on the 
analysis in regard to the level of deprivation. Section 4.4.2 concluded that 
water entitlements can fall within the definition of investment under most 
IIAs148, because a water entitlement is generally granted as a licence, permit or 
concession. Under the conclusions proposed in Section 4.4.2, a specific look at 
each component of the investment project may lead to an individual 
determination of each component within the larger project. This means that 
some components would be essential to carry out the operations of the 
investment, while other elements are auxiliary or could be replaced by other 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
144 Fischel, Regulatory Takings: Law, Economics and Politics: 20-21. 
145 In this regard see for instance the analysis undertaken by the tribunal in GAMI v Mexico of 
the arbitral award in Pope & Talbot v Canada as regards the level of deprivation. See GAMI 
Investments v. Mexico, (under UNCITRAL Rules), Final Award, 15 November 2004, para. 125-128. 
146 See section 4.3.1 
147 See section 4.3.2 
148 See for instance Article 1 (6) of the Energy Charter Treaty: (f) any right conferred by law or 
contract or by virtue of any licences and permits granted pursuant to law to undertake any 
Economic Activity in the Energy Sector’, supra note 95.  
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elements of similar characteristics or properties, even if temporarily. In this 
regard, Section 4.4.2 addressed the issue of whether a water entitlement, as a 
stick of the bundle of investment rights, would constitute a stand-alone 
investment for the purpose of establishing the jurisdiction of an investment 
tribunal.149 For the purpose of determining the level of deprivation, water 
entitlements would need to be examined as part of the whole operation. This is 
because, if the water entitlement were to be assessed in isolation from the rest 
of the bundle of investment – as a project – the level of deprivation might be 
insignificant, leading to a dismissal of the claim of indirect expropriation. In 
such case the tribunal would not be addressing the real impact of the 
regulatory measure over the whole investment project. Therefore, under the 
unity of the investment approach an arbitral tribunal could assess the real 
relevance of water entitlement in relation to the rest of the bundle of 
investment rights.  
The special nature of water resources and its lack of substitutes play a 
relevant role in this analysis, because deprivation of water - from the 
perspective of the project as a whole – could render the project useless. 
Another way to look at the problem would be to look at a water entitlement as 
an independent investment150 and assess it in its own right. In such a case, 
one could argue that a partial expropriation has occurred. This example 
introduces the issue of partial expropriation, which will be discussed in the 
next Section.  
The wording of numerous IIAs, especially the first generation of BITs, do not 
always specifically state the level of interference required to consider a 
regulatory measure as expropriatory. 151  Such level has been and still is 
determined by arbitrators, who appear to agree that it ought to be substantial. 
It seems less clear, however, what degree of severity the word ‘substantial’ 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
149 Chapter II elaborates on the nature of water resources, its ownership and the characteristics 
of water entitlements, such special nature has been addressed in investment arbitration. The 
tribunal’s dictum in Bayview Irrigation District v Mexico, provides some lights as to the deference 
arbitrators may give to disputes linked to water resources. This work addresses these four 
systems in a broad manner, as it assumes that most legal systems have at least one of the four 
allocation systems, or a combination of them. It is acknowledged that each national legal system 
will have its own particularities regarding water allocation and water usage. Although, this 
should not hinder a generalized analysis of a regulatory measure linked to water resources, 
taking into consideration a particular allocation system. 
150 The issue of partial expropriation is discussed in Section 4.4.3.2.3. It is noteworthy that a 
partial expropriation approach may require the investment to have certain characteristics, as 
will be addressed below.   
151 See Chapter III section on investment treaties and the wording regarding expropriation. 
Section 3.4.2.3.  
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precisely entails. Recently, the United Nations (UN) Conference on Trade and 
Development (UNCTAD) has identified a trend in relation to the severity of the 
economic impact of the measure, suggesting that the level of interference 
should be total or close to total and should not ‘simply be significant or 
substantial, as some tribunals have suggested.’152 The Report seems to adopt 
the approach of Pope & Talbot v United States.153 In that case the tribunal was 
confronted with a claim of expropriation under Article 1110 of the NAFTA, and 
it examined the effects of the governmental measure and whether they were 
‘equivalent to…’ or ‘tantamount to …’ a (direct) expropriation.154 The tribunal’s 
analysis stated: ‘the test is whether that interference is sufficiently restrictive to 
support a conclusion that the property has been ‘taken’ from the owner’.155 In 
addition, the tribunal asserted that: ‘[s]omething that is equivalent to 
something else cannot logically encompass more.’156 It also recalled that the 
NAFTA constitutes a lex specialis regime, conveying that different legal 
frameworks may accord arbitrators different mandates.157 A similar approach 
was adopted by the tribunal in S.D. Myers v Canada, where the tribunal refers 
to the analysis of Pope & Talbot v Canada.158 However, as expressed above, 
diverse readings and interpretations of the same agreement may be adopted 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
152 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), "EXPROPRIATION: A 
Sequel. UNCTAD Series on Issues in International Investment Agreements II", 64. 
153 The UNCTAD’s Report refers to Fortier and Drymer’s recollection of arbitral awards assessing 
the level of interference required to make a finding of indirect expropriation: ‘…significant 
part…’, ‘deprivation of fundamental rights’. See ibid. 
154  See Chapter 3 and the reference to provisions contained in IIAs regarding indirect 
expropriation. See also the Article 4 of the Germany-Egypt BIT of 2005, Article 6 of the 2012 US 
Model BIT, Chapter 11 Article 1110 of NAFTA; Article 7 of the UK – Mexico BIT of 2006.  
155 Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Interim Award, 26 June 2000, para. 102. (Emphasis added)  
156 Pope & Talbot v. Canada, Interim Award, 26 June 2000, para. 104. See also the conclusions 
of Professor Stern on this issue: Stern, "In Search of the Frontiers of Indirect Expropriation", 34. 
Cases that have followed this line of reasoning and have ruled under a similar approach to Pope 
& Talbot are CMS Gas Transmition Company v Argentina, Award  (US-Argentina BIT), May 12, 
2005, para. 262; Occidental Exploration and Production Co. v Ecuador, Award (US – Ecuador 
BIT), July 1, 2004, para. 89, Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States of America, Award under 
UNICTRAL Rules, June 8, 2009, para. 357.   
157 On this point, the tribunal illustrated its analysis by referring to the Iran-US Claims 
Tribunals, under which ‘other measures affecting property rights’ could be subjected to 
compensation, perhaps encompassing a sole effects approach. See for instance the comments 
by Dolzer and Stevens in Rudolf Dolzer and Margrete Stevens, Bilateral investment treaties  (The 
Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1995). In the same vein, Heiskanen discusses the mandate conferred 
to the Iran-US tribunals, which conferred jurisdiction not only to analyse cases of expropriation 
but also ‘other measures affecting property rights’. See Heiskanen, "The Contribution of the 
Iran-United States Claims Tribunal to the Development of the Doctrine of Indirect 
Expropriation", 179.  
158 S.D. Myers, Inc. v Canada, First Partial Award (NAFTA) of 13 November 2000, para. 386. Note, 
however, that the tribunal expressed the view that a partial or temporal deprivation of the 
property rights, may tantamount to expropriation in some specific contexts. See S.D. Myers, Inc. 
v Canada, First Partial Award (NAFTA) of 13 November 2000, para. 283.  
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by tribunals, assessing claims of expropriation or breaches of other standards 
of protection. While factual and contextual determinations are claimed as 
pivotal elements leading to the determinations adopted by tribunals, the 
conceptual notion of indirect expropriation, in this case (as the starting point 
of the assessment), also plays a relevant role, as discussed in Section 
4.4.3.1.159  
The Pope & Talbot v Canada decision remains an inspiration for numerous 
arbitral awards, under the NAFTA, as well as other IIAs. In Occidental v. 
Ecuador, the tribunal had to decide on the legality of tax measures adopted by 
the government of Ecuador, applying the ‘criterion of substantial deprivation’. 
The tribunal concluded that the tax measure adopted by Ecuador did not 
constitute an expropriation.160 Similar views were adopted by the tribunal in 
Chemtura v Canada. The tribunal deciding the claim of indirect expropriation 
addressed three questions:   
i) whether there is an investment capable of being expropriated, ii) whether the 
investment has in fact been expropriated, and iii) whether the conditions of Article 
1110(1)(a)-(d) have been satisfied.161  
In Glamis Gold v United States, the tribunal considered two questions: i) the 
severity of the economic impact, and ii) its duration.162 It is possible to argue 
that numerous arbitral tribunals share the opinion that the impairment over 
the property should be of such an extent that ‘must be seen as “taken”.’163  
In Tecmed v Mexico, the tribunal seems to set a fairly clear line between a 
regulatory measure and a de facto expropriation; yet, focusing on the effects of 
the measure over the covered investment: 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
159 As suggested in Chapter III, Section 3.5 (Expropriation) claims of expropriation could have 
inconsistent outcomes, due to the initial reading – by tribunals - of broad notions of 
expropriation, against which tribunals test the facts of the case. An example is precisely the 
notion of the severity of the economic impact of the measure. This may support the point that 
older generations of IIAs may have left arbitrators wider freedom of interpretation of the notion 
of standard of protection.  
160 Occidental Exploration and Production Company v The Republic of Ecuador, London Court of 
International Arbitration, Case No. UN3467, under UNCITRAL Rules, 1 July 2004, para. 89.  
Similar approach in Achter Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. 
v Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/04/05, 21 November 2007, para. 240; Burlington Resources 
Inc. v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Liability, 14 December, 2012, 
para. 396  
161 Chemtura Corporation v Canada, Ad hoc—UNCITRAL (NAFTA), Award signed 2 August 2010, 
para. 242. 162	  Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. United States of America, Award under UNICTRAL Rules, June 8, 2009, 
para. 356 
163 Ibid., para. 357 
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 ... if due to the actions of the Respondent, the assets involved have lost their value 
or economic use for their holder and the extent of the loss. This determination is 
important because it is one of the main elements to distinguish, from the point of 
view of an international tribunal, between a regulatory measure, which is an 
ordinary expression of the exercise of the state’s police power that entails a 
decrease in assets or rights, and a de facto expropriation that deprives those assets 
and rights of any real substance (emphasis added).164 
The wording of the treaty (the NAFTA) has been consistently pivotal in the 
decision of the tribunals, but the development of the international investment 
mechanism and the collection of arbitral awards (under other BITs and FTAs) 
is also of great importance. In this vein, the determination of the tribunal in 
Total v Argentina is of interest, because it notes the specific wording of the BIT 
between France and Argentina, which extended the protection from 
expropriation to ‘other measures’ such as dispossession. However, despite the 
apparent sole effects approach of the treaty, the tribunal found no 
expropriation in that case, as the deprivation was found to not be substantial:   
looking beyond the specific wording of Article 5(2) [of the French-Argentine BIT], 
the Tribunal considers that under international law a measure which does not 
have all the features of a formal expropriation could be equivalent to an 
expropriation if an effective deprivation of the investment is thereby caused. An 
effective deprivation requires, however, a total loss of value of the property such 
as when the property affected is rendered worthless by the measure, as in case of 
direct expropriation.165 
Similar wording is contained in the BIT between Spain and Argentina, which 
was relevant in the case of Suez & InterAgua v Argentina. This case was 
governed by the Spain-Argentina and France-Argentina BITs, whose 
expropriation provision could be interpreted in favour of the sole effects 
approach.166 Indeed, as the tribunal established, the wording – at least in the 
France – Argentina BIT – directs the inquiry toward the effects of the measure, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
164  Técnicas Medioambientales Tecmed, S.A. v. United Mexican States, (ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/00/2), Award of 29 May 2003, 19 ICSID Rev. —FILJ 158 (2004), para. 115. In addition, 
the tribunal appears also to favour the perspective that the exercise of the police power should 
not be subject to compensation: ‘The principle that the State’s exercise of its sovereign powers 
within the framework of its police power may cause economic damage to those subject to its 
powers as administrator without entitling them to any compensation whatsoever is 
undisputable’. Ibid., para. 119. 
165 Total v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1Decision on Liability, 27 December 2010, paras 
195,199. 
166 France – Argentina BIT Article 5 (Author’s translation) 
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rather than the intent of the government.167 Following this reasoning, the 
tribunal examined the severity of the effects of the measure over the 
investment as well as the nature of the measure in the context of the police 
power of the State, concluding that no expropriation took place. However, 
relief was granted in favour of the investor on other grounds.168  
Recently the tribunal in Burlington v Ecuador analysed the tax laws on oil 
revenues, adopted by Ecuador. The tribunal did not find that the taxes applied 
at 42 per cent substantially deprived the company from expected revenues, 
nor did the tribunal find a substantial deprivation at 99 per cent. The tribunal 
considered that despite those levels of taxation, the company was not 
substantially deprived from its investment because it was still in control of the 
blocks.169 
It is therefore, safe to argue that in principle, a regulatory measure affecting in 
total or in part of a water entitlement would not be expropriatory - under the 
unity of investment approach - provided that other elements of the investment 
project (e.g. land leases, mining agreements, oil production sharing 
agreements, etc.) would remain unaffected. However, this work has argued 
extensively that numerous projects could not operate without water resources, 
rendering the overall investment ‘substantially’ affected. Such conclusion 
would give rise to a prima facie finding of indirect expropriation. The next 
section addresses this problem.      
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
167 Suez, Sociedad General de Aguas de Barcelona S.A., and InterAgua Servicios Integrales del 
Agua S.A. v the Argentine Republic, ICSID Case No. ARB/03/17, Decision On Liability, July 30, 
2010, para.122 
168 Ibid., paras. 128-129. It is noteworthy the contrast between the case just referred and the 
analysis of the tribunal in Total v Argentina. In the latter, the tribunal – considering the civil law 
tradition of both signatory states (France and Argentina) – established that the notion of 
dispossession is linked to the loss of control, which is a characteristic of the notion of 
dispossession. The tribunal observed that Total had not lost the control over its investment, 
which remained under the management of Total, concluding that the condition of dispossession 
had not been met. See Total v. Argentina, ICSID Case No. ARB/04/1 Decision on Liability, 27 
December 2010, para. 193-194. While in both cases the tribunals arrived to the conclusion that 
no expropriation took place, the analysis to arrive to such conclusions is quite different. 
169 Burlington v Ecuador, para. 457.  
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4.4.3.2.2  A Measure Affecting the Enjoyment of Water Rights 
May Constitute a per se Substantial Deprivation Due to 
the Inherent Nature of Water Resources   
The sections on the nature of water property rights170 and the definition of 
investment171 discussed water entitlements as a discrete investment, which 
may be part of a whole bundle of investment rights granted to the investor by 
the host State. A discussion on the level of deprivation proposes an inquiry as 
regards the impact of the governmental measure over the investment. To 
address this question, it is important to determine what the boundaries of the 
investment are. Water entitlements that allocate water resources (quantity), or 
entitlements allowing discharge of pollutants (quality),172 may not constitute 
the core of the investment, such rights instead could be a vehicle to achieve 
the goals of the whole operation. However, it has also been illustrated that 
water resources do not have substitutes, and cannot be stored 173  or 
transported in large quantities, due to water resources’ inherent nature. 
Therefore, when water entitlements are essential to the overall operation, one 
could argue that a regulatory measure directed at those entitlements may 
indirectly expropriate the whole of the covered investment. One could also 
argue, perhaps with less success, 174  that reallocation of water resources 
toward other uses may constitute a de jure expropriation and a physical 
seizure of the resource, since the amount of water available to operate the 
investment would be diminished partially or totally.  
The latter scenario i.e. the approach to water as a physical asset, could prove 
problematic for host States’ defence, given the view of investment tribunals 
that physical takings would be deemed a per se expropriation or regulatory 
taking. The issue has been discussed in the context of the nature of property 
rights in water. 175  In such a scenario, the tribunal should undertake a 
thorough analysis of the nature of water rights, in line with the discussion of 
Chapter II, and Section 4.4.1 above. Under such an approach, water becomes 
an asset when it is physically subtracted from its hydrological flow. Prior to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
170 Section 4.4.1 
171 Section 4.4.2 
172 See Section 4.3.2 
173 Dams may be an exception, yet, they require large extensions of territory, not always 
available for this purpose 
174 See Section 4.4.1 on the discussion of the alleged physical nature of water entitlements. 
175 Section 4.4.1 briefly addresses the hypothesis of a regulatory measure as a physical taking. 
See also supra note 80. 
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that moment, water constitutes an expectation of the benefit to use the 
resource under a given allocation system. This follows from the inherent 
nature of water resources that allows for allocation systems which do not 
entitle the users to specific molecules of water, but rather to an amount (or 
even share) of water at a given time.  
Regardless of which approach is taken to the water entitlement, i.e. intangible 
or physical, the assessment leads back to the original inquiry, namely the 
determination of the level of deprivation, exerted by the regulatory measure. In 
both cases, assuming the economic activity cannot be undertaken without the 
input of water resources, the ultimate effects of the measure would turn the 
investment worthless and meaningless.   
This issue has important implications for host States and the policies 
associated to water resources management, which could have a de facto 
expropriatory effect. Put it in practical terms water unavailability could 
undermine the whole project. . A contrario argument would suggest that such 
a situation might arise in the context of the management of any natural 
resource (such as hydrocarbons, land, forests), which could be affected by a 
regulatory measure limiting their use. In this regard, it is important to recall 
the especial nature of water, discussed in Chapter II. 
There could be cases where the level of deprivation may not become 
substantial, if the measure does not affect the whole of the water entitlement, 
e.g. reduction of water quantities or reduction of the duration of the permit.176 
While water permits of a shorter duration may allow flexibility for reallocation 
purposes to tackle scarcity, they may provide less incentive for investors to 
embark on large projects.177 After an account of several jurisdictions, Hodgson 
asserts that water permits for hydropower projects may last between 50 and 
70 years. Currently, the development of such projects is under intense 
scrutiny by local communities and NGOs. The question that arises is whether 
a reduction of the duration of a water permit under certain conditions would 
amount to a substantial deprivation of the whole investment. The answer will 
certainly be a contextual one, however, investment tribunals may consider the 
following inquiries: whether the project i) can still be carried out, ii) will still 
make profit, iii) could be undertaken until its conclusion (meaning until the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
176 It is important to consider, however, that despite the fact that numerous countries have 
adopted modern water right systems; these are not always implemented due to monitoring and 
enforcement problems. See Hodgson, "Modern water rights. Theory and practice", 61. 
177 Ibid., 62. 
 	  210	  
expiration of the other licences occurs), and iv) whether water resources are 
being reallocated. Provided that only the water permit is affected under such a 
scenario, it seems plausible to answer affirmatively to questions i) and ii). 
Question iii) addresses the issue of sustainability, namely the change in 
duration of the life of the whole project, since hydropower generation would be 
at the core of the investment. Finally, question iv) may be addressed in the 
context of the nature of the governmental measure, dealt with in Section 4.4.4.  
In this hypothetical scenario, arbitrators addressing whether the project could 
be undertaken until its conclusion, may consider that the early – but properly 
announced – termination of the project, due to the diminution in duration of 
the water permit, may amount to a significant or total deprivation of the 
investment. Therefore, the question of whether water resources are being 
reallocated (question iv)), may assist in the determination of whether an 
unlawful indirect expropriation has occurred, as opposed to a legitimate 
regulation. The question of whether there was a proper notification to the 
investors that the water entitlement would be reduced is relevant to the 
analysis of the nature of the governmental measure, which will be discussed 
in Section 4.4.4. 
Notwithstanding, a question still could arise as to whether the deprivation of a 
water entitlement – addressed in isolation of the whole investment - could 
constitute a partial expropriation if the other sticks of the bundle of 
investment rights remain unaffected.  
 
4.4.3.2.3  Assessment of a Possible Partial Expropriation when 
Water Entitlements have been affected  
It is difficult to foresee whether a claim of partial expropriation, in a case of 
revocation of water entitlements, would succeed. Section 4.4.2 (Definition of 
Investment) discussed the role of water entitlements within the overall 
investment project, and whether those entitlements would be considered as 
investments or not. The answer has been affirmative, in the context of the 
‘Definition of Investment’, for the purpose of determining the jurisdiction of the 
tribunal. However, in the context of a discussion on partial expropriation (in 
the merit stage of an investment dispute), it is also appropriate to address the 
nature of water entitlements as part of the overall investment.  
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As synthesised by Professor Kriebaum, a partial expropriation is present when 
‘only parts of the overall investment are taken’.178 As addressed in Section 
4.4.2, an investment is formed by a group of discrete assets, which could be 
compared to a bundle of investment rights (i.e. licences, permits, contracts, 
physical assets), all of which are necessary for the operation of the investment, 
and therefore should be seen as a whole. It may also be the case that the 
investor has an extended portfolio of investments (i.e. provision of water 
services, provision of electricity, etc.). In these cases, it seems more 
appropriate to speak of several investments.179 
Kriebaum proposes a three tier test to determine whether a tribunal may be 
confronted with a partial expropriation: i) whether the investment can be 
disassembled into discrete rights, ii) whether the state’s measure affects rights 
that are covered under the definition of investment, embedded in the relevant 
agreement, and iii) whether that right could be subject of exploitation 
independently of the overall investment.180 
Few tribunals have addressed the possibility of a partial expropriation. In 
Metalclad v Mexico the tribunal stated that a partial deprivation of the value of 
the property rights might as well amount to an expropriation:  
covert or incidental interference with the use of property which has the effect of 
depriving the owner, in whole or in significant part, of the use or reasonably-to-
be-expected economic benefit of property.181  
The tribunal in GAMI v Mexico182 depicted a number of hypotheses under 
which a direct expropriation of the national investor’s assets (GAM’s mills) 
potentially constitute an indirect expropriation of the foreign investor’s assets 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
178 Ursula Kriebaum, "Partial Expropriation" The journal of world investment & trade The Journal 
of World Investment & Trade 8, no. 1 (2007), 72. 
179 Ibid. 
180 Ibid., 83. 
181 See for instance Metalclad Corporation v The United Mexican States, Award (NAFTA), Case No. 
ARB(AF)/97/1, November 15 2004, para.103. See Waste Management v. Mexico, Final Award 
(NAFTA), April 30 2004, para. 141 and En Cana Corporation v Republic of Ecuador, Award under 
UNCITRAL Rules, February 3 2006, para. 183. 
182 GAMI brought an investment dispute against Mexico under NAFTA Chapter 11 Article 1110 
(expropriation) among others. GAMI owned 14.18% of the shares in the Grupo Azucarero Mexico 
S.A. de CV (GAM), which was subject to an expropriatory measure by the Mexican Government 
of five sugar mills. Following a challenge against the expropriatory act, GAM recovered thee of 
the mills and did not continue further actions in regard the two remaining mills, apparently due 
to their lack of value. The questions for the tribunal were whether the investment (shares) of 
GAMI in GAM was indirectly expropriated and whether the shares owned by GAMI lost all of 
their value. The tribunal did not find that GAMI’s investment was expropriated. GAMI 
Investments v. Mexico, (under UNCITRAL Rules), Final Award, 15 November 2004, para.126. 
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covered by the NAFTA (GAMI’s shares in GAM). The tribunal was of the view 
that there was partial expropriation of GAM’s sugar mills (i.e. expropriation of 
two mills out of five would still constitute expropriation), even when the 
damage was not total or equal to a total expropriation.183 In this context, the 
tribunal considered the approach of Pope & Talbot v Canada somewhat 
formalistic.184 It is also possible that the GAMI tribunal treated the taking of 
the mills as a physical dispossession of the property, although with no express 
mention of physical takings.185 The sugar mills were GAM’s property (protected 
under Mexican law), two of which lacked any economic value.186 Since the 
mills were not GAMI’s property, the tribunal could not rule on the direct 
expropriation of some mills, but rather on an act tantamount to expropriation 
of the value of the shares that GAMI had in GAM. In this vein, the arbitral 
tribunal analysed the severity of the impact of the measure in order to 
determine whether the loss of value of GAMI’s shares in GAM constituted an 
indirect expropriation (a ‘taking’ in the words of the tribunal).187 The tribunal, 
however, seemed ready to admit that a partial expropriation of the mills was 
possible, and hence compensable.188  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
183 Ibid., paras.126 – 127. Note however, that tribunal made such consideration on hypothetical 
basis, since it could not assess the case of GAM, which was not a foreign investor.  
184 Ibid., paras. 125-130. 
185 On the issue of physical seizure of assets under investment arbitration see Heiskanen, "The 
Contribution of the Iran-United States Claims Tribunal to the Development of the Doctrine of 
Indirect Expropriation", 178-80. In the context of the American jurisprudence it appears that 
rules has always been clear, physical seizure of property constitutes per se a taking, under the 
5th Amendment. ‘Loretto indicates the continuing power of the older notion that any physical 
invasion gives rise to a compensable taking’ William Michael Treanor, "The original 
understanding of the Takings Clause" Columbia Law Review 95(1995), 804, fn117. Recently in 
case of water management the US Supreme Court found that temporary flooding of property as 
governmental measure, was not exempted of the Takings Clause, thus temporary physical 
occupation of property constitutes a taking under American jurisprudence: ‘This rule is 
arguably inspired by in American jurisprudence of the US Supreme Court. ‘In a recent case we 
have drawn some bright lines, notably, the rule that a permanent physical occupation of 
property authorized by government is a taking. Loretto v Tele-prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 
458 U. S. 419, 426 (1982)’. See Arkansas Game and Fish Commission v. United States of 
America (Case No. 11-597). For a discussion of this issue in the context of investment 
arbitration one can refer to OGEMID, discussion under the Chatman Rules.  
186 GAMI Investments v. Mexico, (under UNCITRAL Rules), Final Award, 15 November 2004, 
para.127 – 128. 
187 The tribunal stated: ‘The Tribunal cannot be indifferent to the true effect on the value of the 
investment of the allegedly wrongful act. GAMI has neglected to give any weight to the remedies 
available to GAM. Assessment of their effect on the value of GAMI's investment is a precondition 
to a finding that it was taken’. See GAMI Investments v. Mexico, Final Award, 15 November 2004, 
para. 133. 
188 Ibid., para 116 -131. 
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GAMI v Mexico depicts a situation in which ‘not everything that counts can be 
counted and not everything that can be counted counts’.189 In this context, the 
tribunals in S.D. Myers v Canada as well as Pope & Talbot v Canada stated 
that some investments are not to be considered as standalone investments, 
such was the case of good will and market share, which the tribunals looked at 
in the broader context of the whole investment.190  
The arguments proposed by some academics such as Professor Kriebaum, and 
the tribunals in GAMI v Mexico and Metalclad v Mexico, raise important 
arguments in favour of an approach to partial expropriation. Yet, the 
conditions of the test proposed by Professor Kriebaum should be present. The 
question is, therefore, whether a measure affecting water entitlements alone 
would, similarly, be seen in conjunction with other complementary 
investments as part of a bundle of investment rights. Section 4.4.2 concludes 
that water entitlements could constitute standalone investments, and under 
the unity of the investment approach could also be part of the overall 
investment. However, as to whether water entitlements could be subject to 
partial expropriation, the answer will probably depend on the relevance of the 
role of water permits within the overall project, and whether the exploitation of 
the permits alone could result in economic benefit. 
Professor Kriebaum asserts that there exist cases in which, even when the 
legal ownership of the installations remain unaffected, the denial or 
withdrawal of a licence to operate could make it impossible for investors to use 
their investments. In such cases tribunals would deem the regulatory 
measures as expropriatory:  
It follows that even a “total expropriation” in a traditional sense may be partial if looked 
at from the perspective of ownership of the assets involved. What is total in this 
situation is merely the impossibility to make economic use of them.191 
The allocation system thus continues to be important in this case, as most 
water permits would be specific as to the volume, duration and conditions. 
Most modern water rights systems grant permits for specific uses, and 
therefore the water entitlement would only grant investors the use of the 
resource to contribute to the realization of their investment project. There are 
also legal systems which allow exploitation of water resources without the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
189 Quoting William Bruce Cameron, “Informal Sociology: A Casual Introduction to Sociological 
Thinking” (1963). The quote has been also attributed to Albert Einstein. 
190 See Section 4.4.2 
191 Kriebaum, "Partial Expropriation", 72. 
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abovementioned conditions.192 As has been discussed above in a number of 
contexts, the type of entitlement and whether it is strictly linked to the 
investment or not (as in the case of Abitibi-Bowater, discussed above) may 
affect the claims, and therefore, the approach of the tribunal. 
This differentiation becomes relevant to the analysis of partial expropriation. 
For one thing, a water permit that is granted with no specific condition of use 
holds some autonomy in relation to the whole investment. It follows that an 
approach to a partial expropriation could be viable. Conversely, a water permit 
granted with the sole purpose of supplementing the main project, has no 
autonomy in practice because the licence would only allow the use of water for 
the purpose of the operation of the investment. In that case, the assessment of 
the withdrawal of a licence, from a partial expropriation, would be 
disingenuous from the perspective of the interests of the investor.  
The discussion over partial expropriation may not be mainstream within the 
analysis of indirect expropriation. It is, however, a necessary exercise that 
links the nature of property rights – in this case in water – with the definition 
of investment, and the overall role of the specific asset – water permits – 
within the operation. Arbitral tribunals may not spell out such a discussion, 
but this does not mean that such cognitive process is not embedded in factual 
considerations.  
In Burlington v Ecuador the tribunal held: 
Most tribunals apply the test of expropriation, however it is phrased, to the investment 
as a whole. Applied to the investment as a whole, the criterion of loss of the economic 
use or viability of the investment implies that the investment as a whole has become 
unviable. The measure is expropriatory, whether it affects the entire investment or only 
part of it, as long as the operation of the investment cannot generate a commercial 
return.193 
Previously, the tribunal in Glamis Gold v the United States took a similar 
approach to the analysis of the level of deprivation in relation to the 
investment as a whole:  
The Tribunal […] begins its analysis of whether a violation of Article 1110 of the NAFTA 
has occurred by determining whether the federal and California measures 
“substantially impair[ed] the investor’s economic rights, i.e. ownership, use, enjoyment 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
192 Hodgson, "Modern water rights. Theory and practice", 64.  
193Burlington Resources Inc. v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on 
Liability, 14 December 2012, para. 398.  
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or management of the business, by rendering them useless. Mere restrictions on the 
property rights do not constitute takings.”194 
In conclusion, the analysis of partial expropriation of water entitlements would 
fit the overall analytical framework proposed in this thesis, to the extent that 
each criterion of the framework is applied only to an autonomous water 
entitlement (not granted for the sole purpose of the investment operation). 
However, as no project could be operated without at least some water 
resources, the framework of analysis would only be of use when the regulatory 
measure only affects quantities of water allocation and only partially.  
 
4.4.3.2.4  Additional Elements to Assess the Level of Deprivation: 
Duration and Control  
The ordinary meaning of ‘substantial’ is: ‘[of] considerable importance, size, or 
worth.’195 The notion of ‘substantial’ used by most tribunals to assess the level 
of deprivation, appears to set a lower threshold than the notion of ‘equivalent 
to’ or ‘tantamount to’ (a direct expropriation).  
The duration of the governmental measure and the investor’s control over the 
investment may assist to accurately articulate the level of substantiality. The 
notions of duration and control, may be indicative of the level of severity of the 
governmental measure, as assessed against the specific facts of the case.  
Duration and control were considered by the Iran-US Claims Tribunals in 
Tippets. The tribunal stated:  
while assumption of control over property by a government does not automatically 
and immediately justify a conclusion that the property has been taken by the 
government, thus requiring compensation under international law, such a 
conclusion is warranted whenever events demonstrate that the owner was 
deprived of fundamental rights of ownership and it appears that this deprivation 
is not merely ephemeral.196  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
194 Glamis Gold Ltd. v United States of America, Award under UNICTRAL Rules, June 8, 2009, 
para. 357. (Emphasis added and footnotes omitted)  
195 The process of interpretation provided in Article 31 a) of the Vienna Convention on the Law 
of Treaties. The meaning of the word substantial available at:  
http://oxforddictionaries.com/definition/english/substantial?q=substantial, last visited 10 
July, 2012. 
196 Tippetts, Abbett, McCarthy, Stratton v Government of the Islamic Republic of Iran, Award No. 
141-7-2, 22 June, 1984, 225. 
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In S.D. Myers v Canada, the tribunal described expropriation as a ‘lasting 
removal of the ability of an owner to make use of its economic rights’.197 In this 
context, the tribunal concluded:  
the Interim Order and the Final Order were designed to, and did, curb SDMI’s 
initiative, but only for a time. CANADA realized no benefit from the measure. The 
evidence does not support a transfer of property or benefit directly to others. An 
opportunity was delayed.198  
In Tecmed v Mexico, the tribunal held that measures are expropriatory only if 
they are ‘irreversible and permanent’. 199  Likewise, in the context of the 
European Community, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) in a Preliminary 
Ruling has stated that a temporary prohibition of new grape vines, which was 
non-discriminatory and had a temporary nature, did not constitute an undue 
limitation of the exercise of property rights.200 
National, as well as foreign investors, face, in each country, certain degrees of 
economic and regulatory risk. To the extent that such risk is bearable in the 
long-term and the prospects of profit are not completely lost, but merely 
reduced, investors could not claim expropriation of an investment. Where the 
prospective profits continue to exist and the value of the investment remains, 
tribunals seem to find difficulties in concluding that an expropriation has 
occurred. The tribunal in Burlington v Ecuador addressed such an issue in 
some detail:  
while losses in one year may indicate that the investment has become unviable 
and will not return to profitability, this is not necessarily so and a finding of 
expropriation would need to assess the future prospects of earning a commercial 
return. It must be shown that the investment's continuing capacity to generate a 
return has been virtually extinguished.201 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
197 S.D. Myers, Inc. v Canada, First Partial Award (NAFTA) of 13 November 2000, para 283 
(emphasis added). Although it also expressed that in certain circumstances an act of 
expropriation could be found as a result of a partial and temporary measure. See Myers v 
Canada para 283.  
198 Ibid., para. 287 (emphasis added) 
199 Tecnicas Medioambientales TECMED S.A. v. The United Mexican States, Award of 29 May 
2003, para. 116. 
200 Liselotte Hauer v Land Rheinland-Pfalz., Case 44/79, ECJ 13 December 1979, para. 28. 
201 Burlington Resources Inc. v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on 
Liability, 14 December 2012, para. 399. In line with this approach and cited by the tribunal in 
Burlington v Ecuador, arbitral tribunals in Sergei Paushok et al. v the Government of Mongolia, 
(UNCITRAL Rules), Award on Jurisdiction and Liability, 28 April 2011, para. 334; and Achter 
Daniels Midland Company and Tate & Lyle Ingredients Americas, Inc. v Mexico, ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/04/05, 21 November 2007, para. 251. 
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Even when the measure appears to be permanent, there are cases in which 
the prospects of the measure being reverted exist, allowing the investor to 
continue with the exploitation of the operation. In such cases, once the 
measure has ceased and the control is returned to the investor, the 
profitability of the investment could be recovered. In cases of reallocation of 
water resources where the measure could be permanent or temporal, investors 
may suffer a diminution of water resources, which does not nullify an 
investor’s ability to continue with the project. Yet, it is likely that investors 
may want to relinquish their project, as was the case in GAMI v Mexico202 and 
Burlington v Ecuador.203  
In Burlington v Ecuador, for instance, members of the tribunal disagreed with 
regard to the level of deprivation. Arbitrator Professor Orrego Vicuna found a 
substantial level of deprivation in Law 42, where the tax imposed was of 50 
per cent, while the other members did not share such a view, even when the 
tax was raised to 99 per cent.204 
As for claims of physical dispossession, the same tribunal in Burlington v 
Ecuador went on to consider that the physical occupation of Blocks 7 and 21 
could be temporal and therefore the prospects of return were not completely 
lost:  
at that time, there still appeared to be – in the words of the tribunal in Sedco v. 
Iran – a “reasonable prospect” that the investor could “return [to] control” its 
investment. As long as there was such prospect, Ecuador's occupation could not 
be deemed to be a permanent measure.205  
In the context of water resources management, a measure adopted with the 
intent to face water scarcity, through reallocation and prioritization of uses, is 
likely to be temporary. However, when the measure happens to be permanent, 
the tribunal’s inquiry should be directed at whether the measure reduces 
volumes of water or completely withdraws the licence.  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
202 GAMI Investments v. Mexico, under UNCITRAL Rules, Final Award, 15 November 2004, 
para.133. See Subsection 4.4.3.2.3 and supra notes 181 and 182. 
203 In this case, the tribunal found that Law 42 at 50% and Law 42 at 99% did not substantially 
deprive the investor of its investment (see Burlington Resources Inc. v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID 
Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on Liability, 14 December, 2012, para. 430-456); hence, up to this 
point there was no a finding of expropriation, as Burlington claimed. Yet, Burlington saw no 
reason to continue with the operation of its blocks.     
204 Burlington Resources Inc. v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on 
Liability, 14 December, 2012, para. 485. 
205 Ibid., para. 532. (footnote omitted). In this vein see also Sedco, Inc. v. national Iranian Oil 
Company and the Islamic Republic of Iran, Interlocutory Award of 28 October 1985, 23. 
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The latter hypothesis brings an additional complication. The withdrawal of a 
licence could be regarded as a direct expropriation, because there is nothing 
indirect in cancelling. A cancellation will require the adoption of a measure 
that expressly withdraws the water permit. The question is, however, how 
such a governmental measure affects the overall investment. As discussed in 
the previous subsections, the tribunal might approach the water licence as 
part of the investment unity, but as discussed above, it may also treat the 
measure as partial expropriation.206 
As for the first hypothesis, i.e. a measure that is permanent reduces the 
volumes of water originally granted to the investor, this may not deprive the 
investment substantially under a unity of investment approach, following the 
approach of Burlington v Ecuador.  
In a case of water scarcity or water stress,207 the adoption of the measure may 
not always attend a situation of urgency, as the measure could aim at 
preventing possible human or ecological damage. It is also possible that in 
responding to policy choices, the measure aims at protecting some industries 
over others. In such scenarios, the imposition of the burden of cost on the 
investor may be considered illegitimate. However, an analysis of the nature of 
the water (property) right under scrutiny may assist arbitrators in evaluating 
the level of protection the activity enjoys, e.g. several national water laws give 
priority to human consumption. In such a case the property over water 
resources could be seen as already limited by another use that has been 
prioritised.  
Host States might draw the tribunals’ attention toward the character of the 
governmental measure i.e. a restrictive exercise of the police power (safety, 
public health and environment) or broad exercise thereof (broader regulatory 
prerogatives). The second part of this chapter analyses the nature of the 
governmental measure, as it constitutes the third stage of the analytical 
framework proposed in this work.208   
The control over the investment is an issue that acquired relevance during the 
nationalisations undertaken after the Iranian revolution. While several 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
206 Section 4.4.3.2.1 have dealt with the view that the inherent nature of water resources is 
essential to the realization of the investment project. Section and 4.4.3.2.2 have dealt to the 
possibility that an arbitral tribunal approaches the regulatory measure affecting the water 
permit as a partial expropriation.  
207 See the definition of water stress and water scarcity Chapter II, Section 2.3, supra note 107. 
208 See Section 4.4.4. 
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investments were taken over by the new government, they were not 
necessarily formally expropriated.  In such cases, some tribunals held a less 
restrictive view in determining whether the Iranian measures were 
expropriatory. As stated by Abtahi in the case of Harza Engineering Company 
v. Iran, the Tribunal suggested in an obiter dictum that ’unreasonable 
interference’ is sufficient to constitute an expropriation.209  
More recently, in Feldman v Mexico, the tribunal examined a claim of 
expropriation for the imposition of tax laws by Mexico for the export of tobacco 
products, which was rejected on several grounds. Regarding the issue of 
control over investment, the tribunal stated: 
... the regulatory action has not deprived the Claimant of control of his company 
…. interfered directly in the internal operations … or displaced the Claimant as 
the controlling shareholder. The claimant is free to pursue other continuing lines 
of business activity …. Of course, he was effectively precluded from exporting 
cigarettes […] However, this does not amount to Claimant’s deprivation of control 
of his company.210  
A view recently expressed in Burlington v Ecuador states that the ‘[the] loss of 
viability does not necessarily imply a loss of management or control’.211 While 
the Burlington case is fairly recent, it seems to spell out trends in new IIAs, 
such as the US BIT Models of 2004 and 2012, Canadian BIT Model and 
several other regional agreements as referred to in in Chapter III.212  
4.4.3.3  Level of Deprivation Conclusions and Remarks  
In the context of the merits of the case, the level of deprivation constitutes the 
first step of the analysis of a claim of indirect expropriation.213 It provides 
arbitral tribunals with an indication of the severity of the regulatory measure 
over the investment. The departure of the sole effects approach allows for 
further analysis of the regulatory measure, even when the measure is - in 
quantitative terms - tantamount to a direct expropriation, i.e. when the 
deprivation is substantial. The qualitative analysis i.e. analysis of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
209 Robert Abtahi, "Indirect expropriations in the jurisprudence of the IranUnited States Claims 
Tribunal" Journal of Law and Conflict Resolution 3, no. 7 (2011), 28.  
210 Feldman v. Mexico, (ICSID Arb(AF)/99/1), Award 16 December, 2002, para. 152. See also 
Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, Final Award (NAFTA), 3 August 2005, Part IV - 
Chapter D - Page 7, para. 16. 
211 Burlington Resources Inc. v Republic of Ecuador, ICSID Case No. ARB/08/5, Decision on 
Liability, 14 December 2012, para. 397. 
212 See Chapter III, Section 3.4.2.3. 
213 The analysis of the Level of Deprivation constitutes the Second Stage of analysis within the 
overall Analytical Framework. See also Chart 1. 
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character of the governmental measure, seeks to determine whether the 
measure was effectively adopted in good faith, measured by public purpose, 
non-discrimination and due process of law, as well as investor’s legitimate 
expectations.  
The elements of analysis – presented in each subsection – intend to address 
the level of deprivation from different perspectives that could be raised by the 
parties to the investment dispute. These elements have been addressed in the 
context of property rights over water resources, which take into account the 
special nature of water and the precarious nature of water rights. In addition,  
the lack of substitutes for water resources could make the investment project 
unviable, leading to a potential determination of total deprivation or a prima 
facie finding of indirect expropriation.  
On one hand, regulatory measures reallocating water resources permanently, 
from one economic sector to another e.g. to encourage the development of one 
sector, are likely to fall under the broader exercise of the police power. 
Therefore, such measures will be subject to higher levels of scrutiny, as 
suggested by a growing number of IIAs.214 On the other hand, regulatory 
measures reallocating water resources, with a view to protect the environment 
or restrict pollution, may fall within a restrictive exercise of the police power. 
Therefore, they may not be deemed indirectly expropriatory – in principle – 
unless the investor could show the host State’s disguised intent to expropriate 
or discriminate between water users. 
One of the most important concerns among academics and advocates of the 
right to water has been to secure water for human consumption. In this 
regard, there are three avenues to secure human wellbeing, in the context of 
this work: i) the provisions adopted by the second generation of IIAs. Under 
these new agreements regulatory measures aimed at protecting public health, 
safety and the environment would rarely constitute indirect expropriation. In 
many cases these public welfare goals will be linked to the management of 
quantity and quality of water resources; ii) the nature of water property rights, 
as discussed in Section 4.4.1, which suggests that the construction of such 
rights ought to take into account the domestic law of the host State, which – 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
214  Note however, that a ‘higher’ level of scrutiny, as suggested in this case, relates to regulatory 
measures aimed at protecting safety, public health and the environment, which rarely 
constitute an indirect expropriation as provided for in the new generation of IIAs.  See Chapter 
III, Section 3.4.2.3 
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in many cases – prioritise water resources for human consumption; and iii) 
when domestic legislation does not contain such provisions, the common and 
non-exclusive characteristic of water resources, could also limit the enjoyment 
of water entitlements. To this end the three fold framework of analysis 
suggested by this work may be of assistance.  
The next section addresses the character of the governmental measure, also 
referred to as the nature of the governmental throughout this work. The 
purpose of this third stage of analysis is to determine the legitimacy and good 
faith of the governmental action.  
 
4.4.4  The Nature of the Governmental Measure 
The second generation IIAs,215 as referred to above, have adopted more specific 
provisions addressing the distinction between indirect expropriation and 
regulation. As illustrated in Chapter III and the previous sections of this 
Chapter, the second generation of IIAs present two scenarios under which an 
alleged indirect expropriation could occur. The 2004 US Model BIT (and 
successor the 2012 US Model BIT) constitutes an illustrative example of other 
IIAs that contain very similar provisions regarding the distinction between 
indirect expropriation and legitimate regulation: 
 
4. […] (a) The determination of whether an action or series of actions by a Party, 
in a specific fact situation, constitutes an indirect expropriation, requires a case-
by case, fact-based inquiry that considers, among other factors:  
(i) the economic impact of the government action, although the fact that 
an action or series of actions by a Party has an adverse effect on the 
economic value of an investment, standing alone, does not establish 
that an indirect expropriation has occurred;  
(ii) the extent to which the government action interferes with distinct, 
reasonable investment-backed expectations; and  
(iii) the character of the government action.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
215 Annex B 2004 US Model BIT. Among others: 2004-2012 US Model BIT, Canada’s FIPA, 
CAFTA-DR, China-New Zealand FTA 2008; Australia – Chile Free Trade Agreement 2009, India – 
Korea Free Trade Agreement 2003.  
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(b) Except in rare circumstances, non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Party 
that are designed and applied to protect legitimate public welfare objectives, such 
as public health, safety, and the environment, do not constitute indirect 
expropriations.’216  
This type of provision appears to invoke two standards of review, hence 
different levels of deference toward States’ prerogatives to regulate. The first 
one appears to cover the exercise of the police power in a broad sense (lato 
sensu), while the second one appears to address the exercise of the police 
power in a narrow sense (strictu sensu) i.e. public health, safety and the 
environment. As prescribed in Annex B of the 2004 US Model BIT and others, 
the first approach requires a closer scrutiny of the nature of the regulatory 
measure through a test that is similar to the test used by the US Supreme 
Court in Penn Central v United States.217 The second approach sets a higher 
threshold for a finding of indirect expropriation, when the regulatory measure 
protects public health, safety or the environment. The 2004 US BIT Model 
suggests, therefore, that such measures could rarely constitute an indirect 
expropriation, provided that the measure is: i) non-discriminatory (US Model, 
Canadian Model, CAFTA-DR, among others); ii) has been adopted in good faith 
(Canadian Model),218  iii) and has been reasonably justified (New Zealand-
China FTA).219 
The aforementioned treaties provide an indication to arbitral tribunals as to 
the intent of the parties in regard to host States’ regulatory measures. This 
could be seen as a way to balance excessive attention on the level of 
deprivation (or in other words, the dismissal of the sole effects approach in 
investment arbitration). In the case of the US, this approach seems to go in 
line with the decision of the US Supreme Court Lingle v Chevron,220 as to avoid 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
216 Annex B (4) 2004 US Model BIT. 
217 In Penn Central v the United States, the Supreme Court - in the opinion wrote by Justice 
Brennan - drew a more specific criteria to determine when a regulation, adopted under the 
police power of states, went too far: i) the character of the measure, ii) interference with 
investment-backed expectations, iii) the extent of the diminution of value. See Chapter III, 
Section 3.3.1 
218 2004 Model BIT Canada, Annex 13(B).(13)(1)(c) 
219 Bilateral Investment Treaty between China and New Zealand, 2008, Annex 13(5). Available at 
http://www.chinafta.govt.nz/1-The-agreement/2-Text-of-the-agreement/0-downloads/NZ-
ChinaFTA-Agreement-text.pdf, last visited May 2, 2013. 
220 Lingle v Chevron U.S. A. INC. (04-163) 544 U.S. 528 (2005). 
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greater protection to foreign investors than that afforded to national 
investors.221  
Once the tribunal has assessed the level of deprivation over the investment, 
and assuming, arguendo, that the deprivation is so severe that the measure 
could be deemed an indirect expropriation, a determination of the nature of 
the water-related measure should proceed.  
Under the classification of water-related measures, proposed in Section 4.3, a 
tribunal – as a preliminary step – would be advised to determine whether the 
measure could be linked to a broad or narrow exercise of the police power. In 
this vein, one could safely argue that measures linked to water quality, at 
enhancing control or reducing pollution of fresh water resources, may protect 
public health, public safety, or the environment. Such regulatory measures 
would fall within the narrow approach to the police power that gives a greater 
degree of deference to the host State to regulate in the public interest. In 
contrast, measures related to water quantity, such as reallocation of water 
resources or diminution of water permits, would be subject to stricter 
scrutiny, thus less deference. This determination would be subject to the 
analysis of whether water reallocation intends to protect public health, safety 
or the environment, such as in the case of drinking water supply, or whether 
it is intended to protect or encourage another sector of the economy. In such 
cases, the analysis of discrimination becomes relevant.222  
A legitimate act of regulation is generally described as non-discriminatory, for a 
public purpose, and sustained by a due process of law. While these conditions 
constitute a test for the determination of lawful expropriation (adding the 
condition of compensation), they also lead the determination of a different 
inquiry, which seeks to respond whether the measure has been adopted in 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
221 The Congress set out a view of ‘no greater protection’ in the negotiation of future BITs: ‘the 
principal negotiating objectives of the United States regarding foreign investment are to reduce 
or eliminate artificial or trade-distorting barriers to foreign investment, while ensuring that 
foreign investors in the United States are not accorded greater substantive rights with respect to 
investment protections than United States investors in the United States, and to secure for 
investors rights comparable to those that would be available under United States legal 
principles and practices’ (2002 Trade Promotion Act, Section 2(b)(3)(D)). As quoted in a 
discussion on ‘NAFTA Renegotiated through the TTP?’, OGEMID Platform under Chatman 
House Rules.  
222 Section 4.3.1 and subsections 4.4.3.2.1 and 4.4.3.2.4, addressed the issue regarding the 
adoption of a regulatory measure affecting – more generally – water quantity, for reasons of: i) 
water scarcity, and ii) governmental policy preferences.  
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good faith and in a reasonable manner.223 The tribunal in Quasar de Valores 
Sicab S.A. v Russia was of this opinion in its assessment of a claim of 
expropriation:  
Indirect expropriation, of course, does not speak its name. It must be deduced from a 
pattern of conduct, observing its conception, implementation, and effects as such, even 
if the intention to expropriate is disavowed at every step. The fact that individual 
measures appear not to be well founded in law, or to be discriminatory, or otherwise to 
lack bona fides, may be important elements of a finding that there has been the equivalent 
of an indirect expropriation, an expropriation by other means, even though there be no 
need to determine whether the expropriation was unlawful.224 
Likewise, the tribunal in Fireman’s Fund v Mexico 225  considered several 
aspects in the task of distinguishing a ‘compensable expropriation from non 
compensable regulation’226 and whether a regulatory measure – adopted by 
the Mexican government – was within the recognised police power. Notably 
these aspects can be summarised as: public purpose, the effect of the measure 
over the investment, discrimination, bona fide, proportionality and legitimate 
expectations.227 
These questions are intimately related to a legitimate exercise of the police 
power. While international law recognizes that States have the prerogative to 
regulate, such prerogatives are expected to be exercised in accordance with 
commitments adopted by States in their relations with other states. In the 
case of Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, the ICJ 
noted:  
the power […] rests with the […] authorities, but it is a power which must be 
exercised reasonably and in good faith.228  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
223 For instance, the Colombia – India BIT of 2009, which provides in Article 6: “2.[…] b) The 
determination of whether a measure or series of measures of a Contracting Party constitute 
indirect expropriation requires a case-by-case, fact-based inquiry considering: […] iv) the 
character and intent of the measures or series of measures, whether they are for bona fide public 
interest purposes or not and whether there is a reasonable nexus between them and the intention 
to expropriate. […] c. Non-discriminatory regulatory actions by a Contracting Party […] do not 
constitute expropriation or nationalization; except in rare circumstances, where those actions 
are so severe that they cannot be reasonably viewed as having been adopted and applied in good 
faith for achieving their objective.” (Emphasis added)  
224 Quasar de Valores Sicav S.A., 0rgor de Valores Sicav S.A., GBI 9000 Sicav S.A., ALOS 34 S.L. v 
The Russian Federation (SCC No. 24/2007), Award July 20, 2012, para. 45.  
225  Fireman’s Fund Insurance Company v The United Mexican States, (ICSID Case No. 
ARB(AF)/02/01, Additional Facility). 
226 Ibid., para. 176. 
227 Ibid.  
228 Rights of Nationals of the United States of America in Morocco, (France v United States) I.C.J. 
Reports, Judgement 27 August 1952, 212. See also the decision of the ICJ in Barcelona Traction, 
 	   225	  
The United States Restatement (Third) of the Law of Foreign Relations, states 
that bona fide regulations of a general character are part of the police powers 
of States, and when non-discriminatory do not raise the obligation to pay 
compensation.229 Along these lines, the arbitral tribunal in Methanex v United 
States – when analysing the claim of expropriation – invoked the requirements 
of public purpose, non-discrimination and due process to assess the legality of 
a regulatory measure, which under those conditions would not be deemed 
expropriatory, unless the host State undertook commitments to refrain from 
such regulation.230 
As the requirements of due process and non-discrimination may be addressed 
under the provisions of other standards of protection such as Fair and 
Equitable Treatment (FET) and National Treatment, the consideration of such 
standards are relevant to determine the legitimacy of the exercise of the police 
power. The level of deference with regard to the exercise of the police power in 
regulating water resources, must incorporate the precarious nature of water 
property rights, which, in turn, address the special nature of water resources.  
 
4.4.4.1  Public Purpose 
The assessment of public purpose as a criterion to assist in the determination 
of whether an indirect expropriation has occurred presents several challenges: 
i) as some assert, the presence of public purpose cannot constitute the 
absence of indirect expropriation, ii) whether the public purpose could be 
scrutinized and rejected by arbitral tribunals, and iii) the public purpose 
might be contextual temporally and spatially. This section attempts to address 
all these questions, although there may exist some overlap in the discussion 
because of the intertwined nature of the issue. 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Light and Power Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain), ICJ Reports, Judgement 5 February 1970, 
48, para. 93. 
229 “Restatement of the Law Third, the Foreign Relations of the United States”, American Law 
Institute, Volume 1, 1987, Section 712, Comment g. 
230 Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, (NAFTA) Final Award, 3 August 2005, Part IV - 
Chapter D - Page 4 para. 7. Likewise in Saluka v Czech Republic the tribunal addressed the 
claim of breach of the Fair and Equitable Treatment (FET) standard asserting, with regard the 
adoption of regulatory measures:  ‘In order for the Tribunal to find in favour of the Claimant, 
the “measures” assessed in light of Article 5 of the Treaty [deprivation] must be shown, in the 
context of Article 3.1 of the Treaty, to have been “unreasonable or discriminatory’. Saluka 
Investment BV (The Netherlands) v Czech Republic, Partial Award 17 March 2006, para. 469. 
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Regarding the first issue, and perhaps as an analysis of the decision adopted 
in the case of Methanex v United States, Professor Schreuer considered that:  
the fact that a regulatory measure serves some legitimate public purpose cannot 
automatically lead to the conclusion that no expropriation has occurred and that, 
therefore, no compensation is due. Under most treaty provisions… the existence 
of a public purpose is a requirement for the legality of an expropriation. It follows 
that a legitimate public purpose cannot be the basis of an argument that no 
expropriation has occurred.231 
The issue is relevant in the case of water resources because reliance solely on 
the public purpose to justify an indirect expropriation without compensation 
would be equivalent to imposing the burden of risk and costs associated with 
water variability on the investor. 
Virtually all governmental measures respond to a public purpose; ultimately, 
the role of governmental authority is to protect the general welfare. However, 
there seems to be agreement on the need to defer to the relevance of the public 
purpose behind a regulatory measure.232  
In this work, the context of the public purpose is linked to the management 
and protection of water resources, and therefore it appears, at least in 
principle, incontestable because of all the justifications proposed in Chapter II. 
However, as will be addressed below, there might be situations in which the 
public purpose – behind a governmental measure – would be subject to greater 
or lesser deference, and the way in which that measure was adopted, would be 
subject to higher or lower scrutiny.      
What is in the public interest can be of a very diverse nature, and depends on 
the policy priorities, societal needs, cultural background and contextual 
values of a particular State. 233  It is, therefore, a difficult endeavour for 
arbitrators to make a determination on the appropriateness of the host State’s 
justification of the legitimate exercise of the police power. As Newcombe 
stresses:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
231 Schreuer, "The Concept of Expropriation under the ECT and other Investment Protection 
Treaties", 28. 
232 The public purpose is referred differently in different agreements, namely public interest, 
social interest (Colombia-UK BIT 2010), public welfare (China-New Zealand FTA). 
233 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), "World Investment Report 
2011: Non-Equity Modes of International Production and Development", 48-49. 
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international authorities have regularly concluded that no right to compensate 
arises for reasonably necessary regulations passed for the protection of public 
health, safety, morals or welfare.234  
As stated above, public health, safety and morals, have traditionally been 
within the conceded sphere of legitimate exercise of a State’s police power. 
This was recognised by the US Supreme Court at the beginning of the 
twentieth century; and it has also been incorporated into several IIAs which 
have been referred to above.235 The environment was later adopted as one of 
these conceded spheres of regulatory action.236 Yet decisions such as Metaclad 
v Mexico and Santa Elena v Costa Rica, have shown that public purpose is not 
the only criterion to conclude that every regulation is legitimate and therefore 
compensation is not due. In the second case the public purpose did not 
outweigh the existence of a direct expropriation. 
Nonetheless, the inquiry as to whether the public purpose outweighs the 
obligation to protect investments - for the greater good – seems essential to 
determine the legitimacy of a regulatory measure because the lack of public 
purpose could render the governmental measure capricious. On the other 
hand, excessive scrutiny of the governmental measure could undermine the 
capacity of States to tackle internal issues relating to the public interest, 
leading to a regulatory chill. 
 The manner in which a governmental measure was adopted (as addressed in 
the context of due process, non-discrimination and legitimate expectations), 
underscores the notion of good faith and reasonableness, and realizes the 
principle of proportionality.237 The existence of bona fide in the context of the 
pubic purpose assists to dismiss the possibility that the government has 
adopted a disguised act of expropriation.238 For instance in Quasar de Valores 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
234 Newcombe, "The Boundaries of Regulatory Expropriation in International Law", 23. 
235 See Chapter III, Section 3.4.2.3. 
236 Canadian Model BIT (2004) Annex B.13(1) Expropriation; United States Model BIT (2004) 
Annex B Expropriation, and so does the newest 2012 US Model BIT. It was also recognised by 
the arbitral tribunal in Methanex v United States, Part IV - Chapter E - Page 9, para. 20; Chemtura 
v Canada, para. 254.  
237The Public Interest constitutes an important feature of the ECHR examination is the 
evaluation ‘in the light of certain relevant criteria, such as bona fide, reasonableness and 
proportionality’ See Giorgio Sacerdoti, "Bilateral Treaties and Multilateral Instruments on 
Investment Protection", in Recueil des Cours: Collected Courses of the Hague Academy of 
International Law, ed. The Hague Academy of International Law (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff 
Publishers, 1997), 388. In addition, reference to lack of bona fide, in the context of the public 
purpose, addresses a potentially disguised act of expropriation.  
238 Santiago Montt, for instance addresses the possibility of States adopting disguised acts of 
expropriation, behind the veil of “pre-eminent public interest”. In order to scrutinise such a 
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et al v Russia the tribunal analysis the elements of non-discrimination, in 
accordance with the law (due process) and bona fide (in the this specific case 
the real purpose of the measure) seeking to determine whether the measure 
was indirectly expropriatory (as opposed to determine whether there was an 
unlawful expropriation). 239  
As to the second issue, namely the scrutiny of the public purpose, August 
Reinisch observes that while it is generally accepted that there is a need for 
the public purpose requirement, it does not encompass a big hurdle for 
governments, and this seems to be the general opinion among scholars.240  
Few arbitral tribunals would assert the lack of relevance of this requirement 
when assessing an alleged expropriatory measure. In Liamco v Libya, the 
arbitrator Mahmassani, confronted with a claim on the requirement of public 
purpose, stated:  
it is the general opinion in international theory that the public utility principle is 
not a necessary requisite for the legality of nationalization. This principle was 
mentioned by Grotius and other publicists, but now there is no international 
authority, from a judicial or other source, to support its application to 
nationalization. Motives are indifferent to international law, each state being free 
to judge for itself what it considers useful or necessary for the public good… The 
object pursued by it is no the concern to third parties.241 
Along these lines, in the case of Shufeldt (US v Guatemala), the arbitral 
tribunal saw no reason for analysing the existence of a public purpose in the 
decree adopted by Guatemala. Contrarily, the tribunal asserted that it is 
‘perfectly competent for the Government of Guatemala to enact any decree 
they like and for any reason they see fit, and such reasons are not of concern 
to this tribunal’.242 Likewise, in Feldman v Mexico, the tribunal found the 
requirements of public purpose and non-discrimination were of no major 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
disguised intent of host States, Montt suggests a number of considerations linked to 
proportionality, good faith and legitimate expectations, among others. See Santiago Montt, State 
Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration. Global Constitutional and Administrative Law in the BIT 
Generation  (Portland: Hart Publishing, 2009), 281-88. 
239 See Quasar de Valores Sicav S.A., 0rgor De Valores Sicav S.A., GBI 9000 Sicav S.A., ALOS 
 34S.L. v The Russian Federation (SCC No. 24/2007), Award July 20, 2012, paras 44-45, 48. 
240 Reinisch, "Legality of Expropriations", 179. 
241 Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) v The Libyan Arab Republic, Ad Hoc Tribunal (Draft 
Convention on Arbitral Procedure, ILC 1958), Award 12 April 1977, 194. 
242 Shufeldt Claim (US v Guatemala), Award, 24 July 1930, 2 UNRIAA 1079, 1095. 
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importance in the context of assessing a lawful expropriation, as long as 
compensation was paid.243  
In contrast, in Methanex v US, as well as in Saluka v Czech Republic, the 
existence of a public purpose was relevant to the analysis of the claims of 
expropriation. 244  The tribunals, however, did not enter into further 
considerations as to the merits of this requirement. This may suggest that 
arbitral tribunals are reluctant to enter in detailed scrutiny of the merits of the 
public purpose requirement, leaving ample liberty to states to assess their 
risks and define their policies.  
In Reinisch’s view, the decision in Shufeldt may allow for two interpretations. 
On one hand scholars may consider that the tribunal questions the need for a 
public purpose requirement altogether. On the other hand, some may consider 
that the arbitrator set a rather low level of scrutiny of the public purpose 
requirement. The majority of awards, however, allow the conclusion that the 
scrutiny of the public purpose is not intended to make a determination on the 
quality of the State’s decision-making or policies. It is rather a criterion to 
assess whether the measure has not been implemented as a disguised act of 
expropriation.245 This work adheres to this last approach. 
In the context of this Section, it is worth noting the work of Santiago Montt, 
who identifies a conceptual framework for expropriation, especially indirect 
expropriation, which is strongly linked to the public purpose. He proposes a 
notion of ‘pre-eminent public interest’ as an exception to State’s responsibility, 
such public ends justify the sacrifice of private interests without paying 
compensation. The public interest, in that case, is scrutinized from two 
perspectives: i) when the use of private property causes harmful effects on 
society, and the prohibition of its uses should not encompass the payment of 
compensation; and ii) when changes due to policy preferences affect the use of 
private property, compensation should arise.246 The use of this framework, 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
243 Marvin Roy Feldman Karpa v. The United Mexican States (ICSID ARB(AF)/99/1), Award 16 
December 2002, para.99. Note that the tribunal in Feldman v Mexico relied on the Restatement 
of the Law Third, the Foreign Relations of the United States.  
244 Reinisch suggests that while Feldman v Mexico somehow shyly forecasted the reluctant 
intent to give regard to the public purpose requirement, the requirement was later spelled out in 
Methanex v United States and Saluka v Czech Republic. Reinisch, "Legality of Expropriations", 
183. 
245 See Quasar de Valores Sicav S.A., 0rgor De Valores Sicav S.A., GBI 9000 Sicav S.A., ALOS 
34S.L. v The Russian Federation (SCC No. 24/2007), Award 20 July 2012.  
246 Montt refer to these two type measures as Corrective Justice and retributive Justice.  Montt, 
State Liability in Investment Treaty Arbitration. Global Constitutional and Administrative Law in the 
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however, in the view of Montt, would give less deference to States, turning the 
level of scrutiny of the public interest into a rather restrictive inquiry.247 
This work does not adhere to the view that the exercise of the police power 
constitutes an exception from State responsibility for unlawful expropriation 
under international law, as Montt seems to suggest. To do so, would 
undermine and contradict the line of argument – adopted by this work – that it 
is possible to draw a line between legitimate (non-compensable) regulation and 
(compensable) indirect expropriation. However, it is relevant to reinforce the 
notion that harmful uses of private property may give rise to an obligation to 
refrain from causing harm to others. This notion goes in line with the 
traditional approach to the police power, which seeks to restrict some 
individual freedoms (to protect public health, safety and morals). Such 
application of the police power seems to be subject to lower levels of scrutiny, 
and could benefit from greater deference from arbitral tribunals. Conversely, a 
change in policy as a way to achieve higher standards of human and 
environmental development may be subject to stricter scrutiny of the invoked 
public interest. This scenario may prove more complicated because States 
would be transferring wealth from one sector to another without 
compensation, but aiming to raise the overall welfare of the citizens of the 
State. The aim of such measures may not necessarily be the termination of 
harmful effects of industrial/commercial activity, but the adoption of higher 
social standards or protection of economic sectors.  
By way of analogy, one could refer to a few WTO cases. In EC-Hormones,248 for 
instance, the European Communities (EC) adopted measures prohibiting the 
use in livestock farming of certain substances having a hormonal action. In so 
doing, the EC sought to restrict or prohibit imports of meat and meat products 
from the United States and Canada. The US and Canada claimed that the 
measures adopted by the EC were inconsistent with the General Agreement on 
Tariff and Trade 1994 (GATT 1994) (Articles III or XI), the Agreement on the 
Application of Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures (SPS) (Articles 2, 3 and 5), 
the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) (Article 2) and the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
BIT Generation: 281-83. Note that Montt disagrees with the introduction of the Penn Central test 
in the generation of BITs, such –in his example – Chile – United States BIT and the 2004 US 
Model BIT. He asserts: ‘[P]aradoxically, it seems that in investment treaties the Penn Central test 
has been introduced to restrict the extent of indirect expropriations, not to expand them.’ See 
ibid., 287-88. 
247 Ibid., 281. 
248 European Communities – Measures Concerning Meat and Meat Products (Hormones), (EC-
Hormones). 
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Agreement on Agriculture (Article 4).249 On appeal, the Appellate Body decided 
that the EC’s measure were inconsistent with Articles 3.3 and 5.1 of the SPS 
Agreement.250 The EC did not bring its measures into compliance; it sought 
instead to show new evidence justifying the risks associated to meat and meat 
products from the US and Canada:   
Given this perceived challenge to its sovereignty, perhaps it is not surprising 
that the EU has so far refused to comply with the WTO ruling in this dispute. 
The United States has retaliated by imposing restrictions on imports from the 
EU worth $116.8 million per year.251 
The case continued with a series of subsequent disputes linked to the issue of 
compensation and suspension of concessions that the EC chose to bear in 
order to maintain higher standards of health protection.252 While there exists 
some level of cross-fertilisation between WTO Law and International 
Investment Law, provisions linked to withdrawal of inconsistent measures and 
issues related to compensation and retaliation are different in both fields. This 
work suggests that, in the context of the public purpose within the broader 
exercise of the police power, measures may be subject to higher scrutiny and 
less deference, by arbitral tribunals. The EC-Hormones illustrates that in some 
cases a State may chose to transfer welfare from one sector (investor) to 
another sector (citizens), bearing the costs of such transfer to the benefit of the 
latter sector. This situation perhaps constitutes the real challenge to balancing 
the interests of investor and citizens of the host States.   
Article 1 of the First Protocol of the European Convention on Human Rights 
comprises a ‘public interest’ requirement:  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
249  See World Trade Organisation, Dispute Settlement, DS 26. Available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/cases_e/ds26_e.htm, last visited July 13, 2013 
250 In sum the EC had adopted a higher level of sanitary protection than that established by 
international relevant standard of the Codex Alimmentarius (meat products). It is noteworthy 
that under the SPS Agreement, Members have the sovereign right to adopt measures necessary 
to protect human, animal and plant life or health that imply the adoption of higher standards. 
However, such choice requires compliance with other obligations under the SPS Agreement, 
such as the one to carry out a risk assessment (Article 5 of the SPS).    
251 Howard F. Chang, "Risk Regulation, Endogenous Public Concerns, and the Hormones 
Dispute: Nothing to Fear but Fear Itself?" Public Law and Legal Theory Research Paper Series 
Research Paper No. 39 (2003), 5. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=432220 or 
http://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.432220, last visited July 12, 2013. 
252  See United States — Tariff Increases on Products from the European Communities 
(Complainant: European Communities), WT/DS 39; United States — Continued Suspension of 
Obligations in the EC — Hormones Dispute (Complainant: European Communities), WT/DS 
320/AB/R. 
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every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his 
possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public 
interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general 
principles of international law. 
Rather than a requirement for the legality of expropriation, as is in most IIAs, 
the ‘public interest’ in Article 1 seems an exception to the human right to 
private property; under this legal framework, the public interest is balanced 
against the human right to private property, using a proportionality approach 
as a measure of the margin of appreciation to be accorded to States.  
The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) has referred to the public 
interest in the following terms:  
because of their direct knowledge of their society and its needs, the national 
authorities are in principle better placed than the international judge to 
appreciate what is ‘in the public interest’. Under the system of protection 
established by the Convention, it is thus for the national authorities to make the 
initial assessment both of the existence of a problem of public concern warranting 
measures of deprivation of property and of the remedial action to be taken.253 
In sum, this work revisits three approaches to the public purpose 
requirement, which arbitral tribunals have adopted in different contexts and 
times: i) the public purpose should not be a requirement: a sovereignty 
approach. However, this position does not exempt the host State from liability, 
it simply does not scrutinised the motives of the host State to adopt the 
regulatory measure. This approach resembles the sole affects approach; ii) 
while the public purpose is a requirement, it does not need to be highly 
scrutinized: a deference approach; and iii) the public purpose constitutes an 
essential requirement within the analysis of expropriation: strict scrutiny.  
This section suggests that the level of scrutiny is - in principle - going to be set 
by the arguments of the parties, which might prompt the examination of the 
public purpose by the tribunal. This constitutes the first trigger to the 
tribunal’s analysis. 
The level of scrutiny should be linked to the nature of the alleged 
expropriatory measure i.e. exercise of the police power strictu sensu or latu 
sensu, and whether the level of deprivation is significant or not.  
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
253 The James and Others v the United Kingdom, 21, February 1986 (ECHR, Series A, No. 98), 
para. 31. 
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This approach may shed light on whether the arbitral tribunal should evaluate 
the measure within the sphere of a regulatory measure or an expropriatory 
measure. As the approach adopted in Feldman v Mexico and Santa Elena v 
Costa Rica suggest, the public purpose may lose relevance where the 
expropriatory measure is obvious,254 and compensation becomes the centre of 
the dispute. Stricter scrutiny of the public purpose, however, might be more 
adequate when the dividing line between regulation and expropriation is 
somewhat subtle.   
In Methanex v US for instance, the discussion of the public purpose was not 
undertaken under the analysis of Article 1110 of the NAFTA, nor was there an 
analysis of it in the dispositive part of the Award. The tribunal simply rejected 
the contention by the Claimant that the government of California adopted the 
ban with the disguised intention to protect the ethanol market for Archer-
Daniels-Midland – the largest producer of ethanol in the US – and not for a 
public purpose.255 Based on the conclusion that Methanex did not prove its 
claim, the tribunal appears to suggest that, conversely, the measure met the 
requirement of the public purpose.  
In the context of the Methanex case, this work suggest two issues for 
consideration: i) the protection of public health and the environment, which 
could be regarded as long-term public aims, which were invoked by the 
defendant; and ii) an immediate or shorter-term issue of consideration, namely 
the protection of ground water resources, as a basis for public health and the 
environment. The management of California’s water resources appears to have 
taken into consideration principles of water law and best management 
practices. 
The US contended that the government of California adopted its regulatory 
measures as founded solely on the report of the University of California, which 
the tribunal referred to, in some relevant parts: 
9. Water Contamination: There are significant risks and costs associated with 
water contamination due to the use of MTBE. MTBE is highly soluble in water and 
will transfer readily to groundwater from gasoline leaking from underground 
storage tanks (“USTs”), pipelines and other components of the gasoline 
distribution system. In addition, the use of gasoline containing MTBE in motor 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
254 The author is aware, however, that the approach of the tribunal in Methanex v United States 
might suggest otherwise, since the measure had a strong economic impact on the investor and 
yet, the tribunal found the measure non-expropriatory.  
255 Methanex v United States, Final Award Part I - Preface - Page 2 
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boats, particularly those using older two-stroke engines, results in the 
contamination of surface water reservoirs.  
10. California’s Water Resources: It is clear that California water resources are 
being placed at risk by the use of MTBE in gasoline. MTBE has been detected in 
several water supply systems, which have shut down the contaminated sources, 
resorting to alternative supplies or treatment. Since both groundwater wells and 
surface water reservoirs have been contaminated,  alternative water supplies may 
not be an option for many water utilities. If MTBE continues to be used at current 
levels and more sources become contaminated, the potential for regional 
degradation of water resources, especially groundwater basins will increase 15. 
Severity of water shortages during drought years will be exacerbated. California’s 
water resources are placed at risk by the use of MTBE’256. 
Water resources management appears to be at the core of Methanex v United 
States and would perhaps make a good case for the foundation of a public 
purpose in relation to this thesis. Resilience and prioritization of water 
resources constitute a reasonable expectation when the hydrological 
characteristic of the place of the investment – California – is known for being 
prone to water scarcity. 
 
4.4.4.2  Non-Discrimination  
The requirement of non-discrimination could be seen as a standard in itself, it 
is linked to the standards of National Treatment257 and Most-favoured Nation 
Treatment, 258  which are generally included in IIAs. The purpose of this 
requirement was to avoid the ‘singling-out of aliens on the basis of national or 
ethnic origin’.259 In the context of Article 1110 of the NAFTA, for instance, the 
non-discrimination requirement for lawful expropriation pertains to an under-
examined sphere of the expropriation provision, as it has been hardly 
addressed in the NAFTA case law.260 Professor Higgins addressed briefly the 
requirement of non-discrimination, in her lectures at The Hague Academy of 
International Law. She explains that this requirement have been mainly 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
256 Keller et al., UC Report Vol. 1, at 11 (4 JS tab 36) in Methanex v United States, Final Award 
Part III - Chapter A - 5 
257 Non-discrimination between national and foreign investors.  
258 Non-discrimination between foreign investors from different countries.  
259 United Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD), "International Investment 
Agreements: Key Issues Volume I", 239. 
260 Kinnear, Bjorklund, and Hannaford, Investment Disputes under NAFTA. An Annotated Guide 
to NAFTA Chapter 11, 1110-32. Note however that in Methanex v United States this issue was 
addressed and dismissed by the tribunal. 
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referred to along with the public purpose requirement in the context of bona 
fide regulations.261  
As regards the scope of discrimination several authors discuss whether 
discriminatory measures may encompass discrimination between foreign 
investors; discrimination between foreign and domestic investors; or both 
types of discrimination. Most scholars agree that both types may result in 
differential treatment;262 what seems to be relevant is that discrimination is 
generally understood as an ‘unreasonable distinction’.263 This suggests that 
reasonable and justified distinctions between comparable investors are likely 
to occur and could be considered legitimate under certain conditions.264  
Commentators make reference to several cases where the non-discrimination 
requirement was given weight in deciding whether a wave of nationalizations 
in the oil sector was lawful or not. These tribunals concluded in a number of 
cases that a discriminatory taking was not unlawful, as they considered that 
while the states made distinctions between different investors of the same 
nationality, such distinctions were non-arbitrary. 
For instance, in the Libyan nationalization cases, the tribunal upheld British 
Petroleum’s claim of discrimination. Conversely, the tribunals in the LIAMCO 
and Texaco cases did not find a discriminatory treatment. The LIAMCO Award 
held that: 
LIAMCO was not the first company to be nationalized, nor was it the only oil 
company nor the only American company to be nationalized … Other companies 
were nationalized before it, other American and non-American companies were 
nationalized with it and after it, and other American companies are still operating 
in Libya. Thus, it may be concluded from the above that the political motive was 
not the predominant motive for nationalization and that such motive per se does 
not constitute a sufficient proof of a purely discriminatory measure.265 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
261 See Higgins, "The Taking of Property by the State. Recent Developments in International 
Law". 
262 Kinnear, Bjorklund, and Hannaford, Investment Disputes under NAFTA. An Annotated Guide 
to NAFTA Chapter 11, 1110-33. 
263 Reinisch, "Legality of Expropriations", 186. 
264 See Restatement of the Law, Third, Foreign Relations Law of the United States, Comment (f). 
See also Ulysseas, Inc. v. The Republic of Ecuador (UNCITRAL), Final Award, 12 June 2012, 
para. 293, where the tribunal established that in order to make a finding of discrimination, it 
suffice that two similar situation were treated differently.  
265 Libyan American Oil Company (LIAMCO) v The Libyan Arab Republic, Ad Hoc Tribunal (Draft 
Convention on Arbitral Procedure, ILC 1958), Award 12 April 1977, 195 
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Similarly, during Kuwait’s nationalisations, foreign companies brought claims 
of discriminatory expropriation against Kuwait. The tribunal considered that 
Kuwait did not breach its obligation of non-discrimination by leaving out 
Arabian Oil from the nationalization scheme:   
nationalization of Aminoil was not thereby tainted with discrimination … First of 
all, it has never for a single moment been suggested that it was because of the 
American nationality of the Company that the Decree Law was applied to 
Aminoil’s Concession. Next, and above all, there were adequate reasons for not 
nationalizing Arabian Oil.266 
In contrast and as mentioned previously, the tribunal did find expropriatory 
the nationalization undertaken by Libya against British Petroleum, as the 
tribunal contended: 
the taking of the property by the Respondent of the property … clearly violates 
public international law as it was made for purely extraneous political reasons 
and was arbitrary and discriminatory in character.267 
The provisions on expropriation contained in IIAs traditionally include the 
requirement of non-discrimination to assess the legality of an expropriation, 
as was addressed in Chapter III. More recently the new generation of IIAs, 
clarifying the provisions related to indirect expropriation, expressly reflect the 
principle of customary international law that the exercise of police power – 
strictu sensu – ought to be ‘non-discriminatory’.268 Arguably, the latter may 
trigger a higher level of scrutiny in order to secure that the measure was not 
adopted arbitrarily. As regards the broader exercise of the police power – latu 
sensu – for instance the China – New Zealand FTA, provides in Annex 13 
(Expropriation):  
4. A deprivation of property shall be particularly likely to constitute indirect 
expropriation where it is either: 
a) discriminatory in its effect, either as against the particular investor or against 
a class of which the investor forms part.269  
Other IIAs, such as the US Models 2004 and 2012, do not refer specifically to 
the requirement of non-discrimination in the provisions addressing the 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
266 Kuwait v American Independent Oil Company (Aminoil), Award, 24 March 1982 
267 British Petroleum v Libya Award, 10 October 1973 and 1 August 1974, 53 ILR 297, 329. 
268  See reference to the legal provisions in Chapter III, Section 3.4.2.3, supra note 125. 
269  China – New Zealand Free Trade Agreement, 2008, Annex 13. Available at: 
http://www.chinafta.govt.nz/1-The-agreement/2-Text-of-the-agreement/index.php, last visited 
July 15, 2013. 
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broader application of the state’s prerogative to regulate. However, arbitrators 
addressing the nature of the governmental measure – as suggested in this 
framework of analysis - may consider whether the measure does not 
discriminate between investors or between nationals and investors.    
In the water resources sector for instance, distinctive measures could be 
regarded as discriminatory, when singling out certain users, certain 
industries, or certain activities. The reasonableness of the regulatory measure 
should be addressed considering the property rights recognised to each 
investor in relation to other water users, whether they are aliens or not. 
Several national laws provide for the obligation to reserve water flow or 
quantities for purposes such as human consumption or the protection of 
ecosystems.270 While it is acknowledged that national legislation shall not 
constitute justification for the breach of international obligations, the property 
rights of foreign investors as well as of nationals, competing for water 
resources, are going to be shaped by the national law of the host States, 
independently of the nationality of the user.  
One should keep in mind that an integrated management of water resources 
involves not water only, but water in relation to land, wetlands, forests, etc. In 
addition, the use of water resources should also consider the sustainability of 
vital ecosystems.271 It is relevant to consider that in Methanex v United States, 
the tribunal noted the different policies adopted by the government to achieve 
the protection of the different elements of the environment. In first instance, 
as stated by Methanex, California established incentives for the use of ethanol, 
through its Food and Agriculture Act of 1983; however, this happened many 
years before federal law made MTBE – produced by Methanex – a common 
gasoline additive. The tribunal notes, on this point: 
widespread use of MTBE did not begin until after the passage of the federal Clean 
Air Act Amendments of 1990, requiring that the areas of the United States with 
sub-standard air quality use reformulated gasoline with an increased oxygen 
content.272 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
270 See Stefano Burchi, “Trends And Developments In Contemporary Water Resources Legislation: 
A Comparative State-Of-The-Art Perspective”, XIV IWRA World Water Congress 
Governance And Water Law Theme – Sub-Theme GL1, I, 2012, 3. (Unpublished work) 
271 Global Water Partnership Technical Advisory Committee 2000, ‘Towards Water Security: A 
Framework of Action’ (Stockholm: GWP, 2000), 14. As regards integrated water management see 
Chapter II, Section 2.4.2.1. 
272 Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, (NAFTA) Final Award, 3 August 2005, Part III - 
Chapter B - Page 3, para. 6.  
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Later, however, new scientific evidence showed that MTBE, while beneficial for 
the quality of air, turned out to be a risk for groundwater resources, as the 
leakage of the additive into the groundwater resources put at risk the 
sustainability of water resources and reliability of drinking water. The tribunal 
was convinced by the scientific evidence provided by the US,273 and thus, 
found no discriminatory intent against Methanex.  
Some water allocation systems may provide for general mandatory duration 
limits for water withdrawal licences, but exclude licences for drinking water 
abstraction from the duration limit provisions. Additionally, the authority 
granting the licence may decide not to renew any type of licence except those 
for drinking water. In such a case, while the measure may differentiate 
between competing users, the nature of property rights – addressed in Section 
4.4.1 – could play an important role because water permits for uses other than 
human consumption, could be deemed more precarious than permits for 
human consumption, which are not always expressly protected under 
domestic law. However some uses may have priority over others uses, hence 
enjoying some sort of protection at the domestic law level.274 Therefore, an 
investor could reasonably expect that under the domestic law of the host State 
water for human consumption enjoys greater protection than other uses of 
water resources. A question may arise as to the status of large land lease 
contracts signed in Africa as well as in South America, which in many cases 
guarantee necessary quantities of water for the success of the project.275 
Lorenzo Cotula warns of potential conflicts among users in case of water 
scarcity, as it appears that current land-lease agreements grant investors 
better conditions in the competition for water resources. A question arises as 
to whether measures seeking to protect public health, safety and the 
environment, affect investors’ interests in water so as to be considered 
expropriatory. The condition for this kind of measure to be deemed a lawful 
exercise of the regulatory prerogative, as observed in most second generation 
of IIAs, is that the measure should be non discriminatory. The notion of 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
273 Ibid. paras 101-102. 
274 See the priorities set out by the Peruvian Water Act, supra note 20. 
275 See Cotula provide examples of some agreements, providing water rights, for instance:  ‘Mali-
1 grants the investor the right “to use the quantity of water necessary for the project without 
restrictions”’. Likewise, Sudan-1 ‘gives the investor the right to use the water needed for the 
project’. In addition, the contract Senegal 1 expressly states that no fee will be charge for the 
use of water resources; or other contracts such as Mali 1 remain silent as to fees for the use of 
water resources.  See Lorenzo Cotula, Land Deals in Africa: What is in the Contracts?  (London: 
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discrimination acquires relevance in this context because arbitrators might 
need to identify similar investors or investors in similar circumstances.276 
Therefore, investors linked the business of farming, requiring large expanses 
of land, would be similar investors. On the other hand, investors located in the 
same region under water scarcity, may be consider investors in similar 
circumstances.  
Finally, regulatory measures of general application seeking to implement 
principles of water management such as IWRM or adaptive management of 
water resources, would probably be assessed under the broader prerogative of 
States to regulate, where the requirement of non-discrimination may lose 
relevance, precisely due to the general nature of the regulatory measure.      
 
4.4.4.3  Due Process 
The due process of law does not only constitute a requirement for lawful 
expropriation, it also has its own standing in customary international law, 
under the principle of the minimum standard of treatment, which was briefly 
addressed in Chapter III. As Coe describes, violation of judicial procedural 
rights or the lack of adequate judicial remedies, constitute the most common 
violations under due process of law. 277  It, however, encompasses several 
aspects linked to the adequate flow of judicial proceedings, among which are 
the notions of transparency, judicial economy, good faith, etc. Not all 
principles are widely recognised under international law, and not all of them 
constitute requirements under international law. The Panama-US Claims 
Commission, in the Sabla Case (US v Panama), found that proceedings failed 
as a proper remedy for the protection of the claimant’s property: 
the cumbersomeness of a system which required the claimant to oppose 123 
applications for cultivator's licenses, after discovering the licensees on her land 
prior to planting, and gave her no general remedy, is obvious.  
The Commission therefore finds that the authorities should have afforded the 
owners of Bernardino protection, by denying applications for grants and licenses 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
276 The notion of likeness has been mostly used in the context of WTO Law to compare similar 
products offered in a given market, but also to compare products what were directly 
competitive, this not only the manufacturing and composition of the product would be taken 
into account but also the perception of consumers. See for instance Michael J. Trebilcock, 
Robert  Howse, and Antonia Eliason, The Regulation of International Trade  (London: Routledge, 
2013), 138-43.  
277  Jack J. Jr. Coe, "Denial of Justice and NAFTA Chapter Eleven The Mondev Award" 
International Arbitration News Winter/ Spring 3, no. 2 (2003), 9. 
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thereon, and that Panama cannot avoid liability because of the claimant's failure 
to oppose each application. 278 
Currently, the wording of particular IIAs plays a pivotal role in limiting the 
notion of due process. In fact, one may consider the scope of analysis under 
the fair and equitable treatment standard, which is – most likely – going to 
shape the requirement of due process, in the context of an assessment of 
indirect expropriation. The Austria-Mexico BIT, for instance, defines due 
process as follows:   
due process of law includes the right of an investor of a Contracting Party which 
claims to be affected by expropriation by the other Contracting Party to prompt 
review of its case, including the valuation of its investment and the payment of 
compensation in accordance with the provisions of this Article, by a judicial 
authority or another competent and independent authority of the latter 
Contracting Party.279 
Article 1110 (Expropriation) of the NAFTA links the requirement of due 
process, with the provision of Article 1105 on Minimum Standard of 
Treatment. 280  Likewise, similar methodologies might be followed by other 
arbitral tribunals applying provisions of different IIAs (e.g. a requirement of 
due process for expropriation and a fair and equitable treatment standard). In 
the sphere of the NAFTA, some authors suggest that due process (Article 1110 
(1)(c)) and Minimum Standard of Treatment (Article 1105)) appear to be the 
same requirement considered in both legal provisions. Coe and Rubins 
suggest that the due process requirement may not cover all the obligations 
under the international minimum standard, and therefore, would not enable 
the incorporation of Article 1105 into Article 1110.281  
It has been suggested, and well supported, that the requirement of due 
process, identified as the absence of adequate remedies or regulatory 
interferences, could also be read in connection with mala fide procedures and 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
278 Marguerite de Joly de Sabla (United States) v. Panama, Reports of International Arbitral 
Awards, (United Nations) 29 June 1933, Volume VI, 358-370, 363.  
279 Article 4(3) Austria – Mexico BIT 1998.  
280 Note that the Parties to NAFTA have adopted an interpretation of Article 1105, agreeing that 
the scope of the Minimum Standard of Treatment should not set a higher bar than that set by 
Customary International Law. Such standard has developed from the original notions given in 
Francesco Costamagna, "Investor's Rights and State Regulatory Autonomy: the Role of the 
Legitimate Expectation Principle in the CMS v. Argentina Case", Transnational Dispute 
Management 3, no. 2 (2006). The NAFTA parties have also agreed on the scope of fair and 
equitable treatment and full protection and security. Conversely, many other IIAs have raised 
the bar of the standard of treatment under customary international law in the provisions of 
their treaties, especially as it comes to the fair and equitable treatment standard.  
281 L. F. H. Neer and Pauline Neer (U.S.A.) v. United Mexican States.  
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their substantiation, which may result in a disguised expropriation.282 In such 
cases, the lack of due process would be facing substantive and procedural 
rules, which while formally legal, may be used to implement and enforce a 
disguised act of indirect expropriation. In Waste Management v Mexico, the 
tribunal recognised such a possibility, but did not find grounds to affirm the 
existence of a disguised expropriation.283 In ADC v. Hungary, the tribunal 
provided a notion of due process in the context of expropriatory measures:  
“due process of law,” in the expropriation context, demands an actual and 
substantive legal procedure for a foreign investor to raise its claims against the 
depriving actions already taken or about to be taken against it. Some basic legal 
mechanisms, such as reasonable advance notice, a fair hearing and an unbiased 
and impartial adjudicator to assess the actions in dispute, are expected to be 
readily available and accessible to the investor to make such legal procedure 
meaningful. In general, the legal procedure must be of a nature to grant an 
affected investor a reasonable chance within a reasonable time to claim its 
legitimate rights and have its claims heard. If no legal procedure of such nature 
exists at all, the argument that “the actions are taken under due process of law” 
rings hollow.284 
Some types of investments raise high concern among citizens, governments, 
and the international community. In cases where national interests are at 
stake, such as the control over natural resources, the protection of the 
environment, health and safety, host States may have incentives to disguise 
measures towards the recovery of control and ownership of those 
investments.285 In order to so, the judicial and administrative machinery of the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
282‘Whether one reads [Iran US Claims Tribunal] cases as addressing disguised expropriation or 
implicitly finding mala fide regulatory process, there is not much that the law of regulatory 
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issue addressed is conceptually different, and in the latter case the silent finding of mala fide 
provides no guidance on the relevant criteria to identify the required level and kind of 
treatment.’ See Jack Jr Coe and Noah Rubins, "Regulatory Expropriation and the Tecmed Case: 
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283 ‘The Tribunal has no doubt that a deliberate conspiracy—that is to say, a conscious 
combination of various agencies of government without justification to defeat the purposes of an 
investment agreement—would constitute a breach of Article 1105(1).’ See Waste Management v. 
Mexico, Final Award, 30 April 2004, para. 138. The tribunal did not find a breach of Article 1105 
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and fair and the minimum standard of treatment.  
284 ADC Affiliate Limited and ADC & ADMC Management Limited v Hungary, (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/03/16), Award, 2 October 2006, para. 435. 
285 Among the various cases that could be mentioned illustrating this example, some worth of 
mentioning are for instance, Barcelona Traction where, while the Court did not address such 
issues; the obiter dictum of Judge Fitzmaurice suggested the possibility of a disguised 
expropriation. The other two dictums also referred to the quality of the measures, as Judge 
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host State may function in an arbitrary manner in order to reach this goal. It 
is also possible, however, that the same machinery is simply sloppy or poorly 
implemented, in which case the result might look identical, when the actual 
purpose was not a disguised indirect expropriation. This work considers that, 
the reference to disguised expropriation entrenches a substantial difference 
with creeping and constructive expropriation; while the former may generally 
imply the presence of the hidden intent to expropriate, the latter may or may 
not hide such an intention. Therefore, there may be a relationship between 
due process considerations and the effects and impact of the measure in 
regard to expropriation claims.286    
 The cases of water services supply and water resources management may be 
good examples of this potential situation. It is well known that there are 
extreme sensitivities involved in the exploitation of natural resources, perhaps 
even more in the provision of water services. In the ELSI Case, two US 
corporations owned and controlled the Sicilian Electronic Company, which 
apparently was an important source of employment for the region.287 Following 
the financial trouble of the investors, Italian authorities proceeded to acquire 
shares of the company below the market value. The tribunal deciding the 
dispute expressed: 
what is thus alleged by the Applicant, if not an overt expropriation, might be 
regarded as a disguised expropriation; because, at the end of the process, it is 
indeed title to property itself that is at stake.288 
In Vattenfall v Germany, the tribunal did not have to decide on the merits, due 
to a settlement between the parties. The background of the case, however, 
could be linked to the issue that even developed countries with comprehensive 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
Gros appears to focus his analysis in the method of the taking rather the impact of its effects. 
See Martins Paparinskis, "Regulatory Expropriation and Sustainable Development", in 
Sustainable Development in International Investment Law, ed. M.C. Cordonnier-Segger and A. 
Newcombe M.W. Gehring (Kluwer Law International, 2010), 9. See also Oscar Chinn, regarding 
the sensitive issue of a monopoly of transportation in river waterways, on this case, see Higgins, 
"The Taking of Property by the State. Recent Developments in International Law", 327-28.   
286 In support of this point Professor. Stern argues: ‘The ostensible or hidden intention of 
gaining the property is not always present in the process that leads to the dispossession; it can 
even be assumed that it is rarely present’. Stern, "In Search of the Frontiers of Indirect 
Expropriation", 37; Paparinskis, "Regulatory Expropriation and Sustainable Development", 6. 
287 For an analysis of the background of the case from the perspective of behaviour of the 
company and regional sensitiveness. See Paparinskis, "Regulatory Expropriation and 
Sustainable Development", 4-6. 
288 Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (U.S. v Italy), 1989 I.C.J. 15 (July 20), 200-201. 
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and well-functioning judicial system289may face inconsistencies when dealing 
with sensitive resources essential to the operation of the investment. Despite 
the opposition of environmental and political groups, the city of Hamburg had 
agreed on a provisional licence in favour of Vattenfall. The local authority and 
interest groups disagreed on the real demand for energy, as well as some 
environmental issues. In 2008, when the final approval for the project was 
due, the city of Hamburg issued a new permit, including additional 
restrictions on the project in order to avoid impact on the water volume, 
temperature and oxygen content. In regard to the dispute that arose out of 
this investment: ‘it is these additional measures relating to water quality in the 
Elbe River that appear to be at the heart of the dispute.’290 It is difficult to 
assess what the weight of the due process requirement may be in an 
assessment of a claim of indirect expropriation. Tribunals should be mindful 
of the relationship between due process and the FET. One could argue that 
due process is one criterion within the wider standard of FET. This work 
argues that in the context of the nature of the governmental measure, the due 
process requirement should, along with public purpose and non-
discrimination, constitute an indication of the bona fide nature of the 
regulatory measure, especially to discard a disguised indirect expropriation.   
4.4.4.4  Assurances Given to the Investor by the Host State: 
Legitimate Expectations 
The principle of legitimate expectations is generally treated – in academic 
literature and in practice - in the context of the FET standard. 291  This, 
nonetheless, has not precluded various tribunals from addressing the 
principle in the context of indirect expropriation claims, as the reasonableness 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
289 This thesis refers to comprehensive judicial systems as the law in books. Increasing number 
of states have adopted very well developed rule of law and have set strong institutions to 
implement and enforce such systems. Whereas reference is made to functioning judicial 
systems as the law in action, where the human capacity operating the institutions is not well 
developed, is insufficient or corrupt.  
290 Muchlinski, "'Caveat Investor'? The Relevance of the Conduct of the Investor under the Fair 
and Equitable Treatment Standard”, 541-542. 
291 ‘[A]s might be the case with a manifest failure of natural justice in judicial proceedings or a 
complete lack of transparency and candour in an administrative process. In applying this 
standard it is relevant that the treatment is in breach of representations made by the host State 
which were reasonably relied on by the claimant Waste Management, Inc. v. The United Mexican 
States, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/00/3, Award of 30 April 2004, para. 98. In the same vein see 
Bayindir v Pakistan, para 252. 
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of an investor’s expectations constitute an important element for a legitimate 
regulation versus indirect expropriation.292  
Assurances, given to foreign investors by host States, signal the political, 
financial and regulatory stability of the legal system the potential investor is 
entering into.  In addition, assurances provide investors with the necessary 
incentives to undertake the investment project in a given country. However, as 
Peter Muchlinski warns in his article Caveat Investor:  
it may be said that the fairness of such regulatory conduct towards investors 
cannot be judged without also assessing the conduct of investors towards the 
community on behalf of which the State may act.293  
Legitimate expectations, therefore, cannot be derived only from the ‘subjective 
expectations of the investor’, they ought to be assessed against the social and 
political environment of the host State at the moment of the investment. This 
was the approach of the tribunal in EDF v Romania.294 In this vein, the 
element of reasonableness seems of pivotal importance to the notion of 
legitimate expectations:  
the assessment of the reasonableness or legitimacy must take into account all 
circumstances, including not only the facts surrounding the investment, but also 
the political, socioeconomic, cultural and historical conditions prevailing in the 
host State. 295 
In the context of indirect expropriation, legitimate expectations constitute an 
important element, which may provide some light in finding the dividing line 
between indirect expropriation and non-compensable regulation. This has 
been the approach adopted in other areas of law such as European Union (EU) 
Law, the European Court of Human Rights and the US Constitution’s Takings 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
292 Nathalie Bernasconi, "Background paper on Vattenfall v. Germany Arbitration," (Winnipeg: 
International Institute for Sustainable Development (IISD), 2009), 1; Rudolf Dolzer and 
Christoph Schreuer, Principles of international investment law, 2nd ed. (Oxford: Oxford 
University Press, 2012), 115; August Reinisch, "Expropriation", in The Oxford handbook of 
international investment law, ed. Peter Muchlinski, Federico Ortino, and Christoph Schreuer 
(Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2008). See for instance Methanex v United States. 
293 Markus Perkams, "The Concept of Indirect Expropriation in Comparative Public Law - 
Searching for Light in the Dark", in International investment law and comparative public law, ed. 
Stephan Schill (Oxford; New York: Oxford University Press, 2010). See also de analysis of 
arbitral tribunals in Azurix Corp. v Argentine Republic, ICSID CASE No. ARB/01/12, Award 
July14 2006, paras 316-323; Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, Final Award (NAFTA), 3 
August 2005, Part IV - Chapter D. 
294 EDF (Services) Limited v Romania, ICSID Case No. ARB/05/13, Award October 8, 2009, para. 
219. 
295 See Duke Energy Electroquil Partners & Electroquil S.A. v. Republic of Ecuador, (ICSID Case No. 
ARB/04/19), Award 18 August 2008, paras 340, 351-352. 
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Clause.296 In the specific case of investment arbitration, the Methanex tribunal 
rejected a claim of expropriation by stating: 
as a matter of general international law, a non-discriminatory regulation for a 
public purpose, which is enacted in accordance with due process and, which 
affects, inter alios, a foreign investor or investment is not deemed expropriatory 
and compensable unless specific commitments had been given by the regulating 
government to the then putative foreign investor contemplating investment that 
the government would refrain from such regulation.297 
In the award, the tribunal reminded Methanex – the claimant - of the nature of 
the market it had entered into, when it chose to invest in the US. It stressed 
that the US was notorious for the manner in which media, citizens and 
organizations would scrutinise the use of ‘chemical compounds’, especially 
those posing a threat to the environment and health. It further stated that this 
type of public scrutiny was not different from that in Methanex’s home State – 
Canada - and that Methanex had actively participated in such processes at 
home.298 
Currently, it seems debatable whether the legal system of the host State, as it 
was at the moment of the investment, would solely provide legitimate 
expectations to the investor. That would mean to assume that the State’s legal 
system would remain unchanged; thus, unable to develop or improve, or 
tackle unforeseen challenges. This view appears to be favoured by the arbitral 
tribunal in Electrabel v Hungary: 
while the investor is promised  protection against unfair changes, it is well 
established that the host State is entitled to maintain a reasonable degree of 
regulatory flexibility to respond to changing circumstances in the public interest. 
Consequently, the requirement of fairness must not be understood as the 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
296 The principle of legitimate expectations under Community Law was address for instance in 
CIRFS v the Commission, Case C313/90, 1993 ECR I-1125; Ijssel Vliet v Minister van 
Economische Zaken, C-311/94, 1996 ECR I-5023; Mulder v minister van Landbouw and Visserij 
Case 120/86, 1998 ECR 232, among others. The ECHR has addressed the principle of 
legitimate expectations in the context of Article 1 of the First Protocol of the ECHR in Pine Valley 
Developments Ltd and Others  v Ireland, Judgment, 29 November 1991, 
ECHR Series A, No 222 and Baner v Sweden, App No 11763/85, Decision, 9 March 1989, DR 
60, 128., as cited by Muchlinski, "'Caveat Investor'? The Relevance of the Conduct of the 
Investor under the Fair and Equitable Treatment Standard", 534. Fredin v Sweden Judgment, 
18 February 1991, ECHR Series A, No 192, para. 54. Finally, the US Supreme Court included 
the principle of investment-backed expectations in its often used test of Penn Central: a) 
economic impact of the regulation, b) interference with distinct investment-backed expectations, 
and c) the character of the governmental action. 
297 Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, Final Award (NAFTA), 3 August 2005, Part IV - 
Chapter D - Page 4, para. 7.	  
298 Ibid., Page 4, para. 9. 
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immutability of the legal framework, but as implying that subsequent changes 
should be made fairly, consistently and predictably, taking into account the 
circumstances of the investment.299 
In this regard, and as explained in Chapter II, it is increasingly accepted that 
water management requires more flexible regulation, enabling water 
authorities to deal with growing demand for water resources, in the face of 
water scarcity and increased hydrological variability as an effect of climate 
change.   
Should a more restrictive approach to legitimate expectations require specific 
commitments, representations and assurances by the host State that a 
regulatory environment would remain unchanged?300 While the tribunal in 
Methanex v United States appears to suggest such an approach, a majority of 
tribunals have seen such an approach as restrictive. The tribunal in Electrabel 
v Hungary has summarised this position by stating that although specific 
assurances by the host State ‘may reinforce the investor’s expectations, such 
an assurance is not always indispensable’. Specific assurances may provide 
evidence of the information available to the investor and the reasonability of 
such expectations.301  
Governments providing specific assurances of an unchanging legal 
environment ought to be aware of the level of commitment they acquire. In 
this vein, the sector and the related environment under which the investment 
is taking place is of great relevance. For instance, it is general knowledge that 
the protective approach that Canada has adopted toward its water resources 
requires the State’s very strict scrutiny over the management of such 
resources.302 Under such circumstances, it could be argued that investors 
under the NAFTA and several other IIAs, may have a weak case if they did not 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
299 Electrabel S.A. v The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case  No. ARB/07/19, Award on Jurisdiction, 
Applicable Law and Liability, November 30, 2012, Part VII – Page 21, para. 7.77 
300 This was the position adopted in Methanex v United States. See also Glamis Gold, Ltd. v. 
United States of America, Award under UNICTRAL Rules, June 8, 2009, para. 811: 
 ‘Whether these expectations were reasonable or not is not an inquiry that the Tribunal need 
make[…]. The inquiry, as explained above, is solely whether California, or the federal 
government, made specific assurances to Claimant that such a requirement would not be 
instituted in order to induce Claimant’s investment in the Imperial Project.’  
301 Electrabel S.A. v The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/19, Award on Jurisdiction, 
Applicable Law and Liability, November 30, 2012, Part VII – Page 22, para. 7.79 
302 The 1993 Joint Statement by the Governments of Canada, Mexico and the United States; 
Sun Belt v Canada (settled); Gallo v Canada; Clayton/Bilcon v Canada; AtibiBowater v Canada. 
http://www.globalresearch.ca/canada-losing-water-through-nafta/6859; COFFIN Our water 
Canada (see file my documents/ water and industry; 
http://www.canadians.org/media/trade/2011/08-Mar-11.html  
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reasonable foresee a highly sensitive environment regarding the integrated 
management of Canadian water resources, which may potentially have an 
effect over the investor’s water entitlements. Such cases may well justify the 
requirement of specific assurances from Canada, as a host State, regardless of 
the level of development of the Canadian legal system.    
The tribunal in Electrabel v Hungary addressed claims of expropriation and 
breach of the FET standard, due to alleged conflict of laws between the Energy 
Charter Treaty (ECT) and EU law in the area of competition in the electricity 
sector. The tribunal concluded that Hungary’s accession to the EU suggests 
necessary changes in policy and harmonization of the regulatory system. 
Moreover, the tribunal held that the ECT and EU law were not contradictory 
with regard to anti-competitive practices, and for this reason: 
 [f]oreign investors in EU Member States, including Hungary, cannot have 
acquired any legitimate expectations that the ECT would necessarily shield their 
investments from the effects of EU law as regards anti-competitive conduct.303 
Finally, tribunals could take into account the perverse incentives that poor 
regulatory environments may have given to investors, as result of a ‘race to the 
bottom’, seeking to attract investment. Such investments may have allowed 
high profitability for the project, but little economic development to the host 
State. While this is an issue of good governance within the host State rather 
than a problem to be assessed by international law, it is undeniable that such 
an issue has had negative effects over investors’ interests. While the 
developed/developing country or North/South debates are outside the scope 
of this work, it has been suggested that the social and political environment of 
host States should be given a great deal of attention. For instance: i) conflicts 
arising from competition for resources between communities within the host 
State, ii) conflicts between governments and communities regarding 
environmental and social policy, and iii) issues under extensive scrutiny by 
NGOs and the international community, may give investors clear signals as to 
the stability of the legal order in the prospective host State.  
In the area of water resources, the growth of foreign investment in large areas 
of land in Africa and Latin America for food and fuel production has come to 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
303 Electrabel S.A. v The Republic of Hungary, ICSID Case  No. ARB/07/19, Award on Jurisdiction, 
Applicable Law and Liability, November 30, 2012, Part IV – Page 44, paras 4.122 - 4.141 
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be widely criticised.304 It is also known that such production is intensive in 
water utilization, with an effect of increasing demand for water resources in 
times of scarcity. It might be expected that current regulatory frameworks may 
change in the future in the face of new water management demands. It follows 
that such modifications in legislation are likely to affect the property rights of 
investors, either with respect to water entitlements or with respect to the use 
of land. The reasonableness of investors’ expectations may play a relevant role 
in deciding such cases, along with due process and non-discrimination 
principles.  
 
4.5 Conclusions 
The framework of analysis developed in this Chapter is inspired by a number 
of methodologies proposed to address measures of indirect expropriation and 
identify them from legitimate regulation. In fact, the most important 
contribution of such methodologies has been to acquiesce that there exists a 
dividing line between non-compensable legitimate regulation and compensable 
indirect expropriation. Such acquiescence could first be identified in the 
academic literature, and some international organisations such as the OECD 
and UNCTAD, as referred to in Chapter III. 305  It should be noted that 
arbitrators also have an important role in the interpretation of IIAs, as the 
applicable law under an investment dispute. It follows that the combination of 
arbitrators within a tribunal and the dynamics among the group of arbitrators 
also play a role in the application of different analytical frameworks to 
distinguish indirect expropriation from legitimate regulation.   
This perceived interference with the States’ prerogative to regulate could be 
one of the reasons of the legitimacy crisis in investment arbitration. Although 
some commentators contend that this problem is more perceived than real, 
the issue gave rise to a real problem of legitimacy, when several States 
withdrew from the ICSID Convention, 306  and some others reconsidered 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
304 Smaller and Mann, "A Thirst for Distant Lands: Foreign Investment in Agricultural Land and 
Water"; Allan et al., Handbook of Land and Water Grabs in Africa: Foreign Direct Investment and 
Food and Water Security.; Cotula, Land Deals in Africa: What is in the Contracts? 
305 See Chapter III, Section 3.5.2 
306 Bolivia, Ecuador, Venezuela 
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whether to continue using the investor-State dispute settlement 
mechanism.307  
Perhaps influenced by the academic literature, several States narrowed down 
the discretion of arbitrators in the interpretation of expropriation provisions, 
stating definitions and guidance to the assessment of indirect expropriation. 
The provisions on indirect expropriation – embedded in a new generation of 
IIAs – sought to protect States’ regulatory prerogatives.  
However, as suggested by Professors Lowe and Paulsson, even with new 
provisions on indirect expropriation, it would be difficult to draw the dividing 
line between indirect expropriation and legitimate regulation. This on-going 
debate justifies the proposal of a framework of analysis, seeking to provide 
States and investors with predictability of the investment dispute mechanism. 
While, it is undeniable that disputes can only be solved according to the facts 
and context of each case, it is also true that specific issues of global concern - 
such as water resources – should be treated consistently. In this case, the 
criteria included in the analytical framework allow addressing challenges 
around water resources e.g. physical, geographical, economic and social. 
These challenges underpin common concerns linked to climate change, 
increasing hydrological variability, and growing sensitivities and public 
participation towards water as a common good. In sum, this Chapter 
concludes that water has a special nature, which allows for specific analysis 
through each criterion – or at least most of the criteria – contained in this 
framework of analysis.  
The analytical framework considers a three-fold analysis: a first stage, during 
the jurisdictional phase, addressing the nature of water property rights and 
the scope of their protection under IIAs. The second stage, at the merits phase, 
encompasses a quantitative analysis, which assess the level of interference 
and economic deprivation that the governmental measure has over the 
investment. Finally, the third stage (also undertaken at the merits phase) 
encompasses a qualitative analysis of several elements directly linked to the 
nature of the governmental measure, such as the public purpose of the 
nature, its non-discriminatory character, the due process of law and the 
investor’s legitimate expectations.  
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The physical nature of water resources i.e. its fugitive character and lack of 
substitutes, becomes relevant for the analysis of the two components of the 
first stage of the analytical framework, namely the nature of water rights and 
the definition of investment. The first criterion suggests that the determination 
of the existence of a water right, considering the physical nature of water and 
the rules on ownership and use might conclude that water entitlements have a 
precarious nature. This consideration emerges from the fact that water 
resources - generally – are not private property and availability is uncertain. 
Finally, without entering into specific discussion about the human right to 
water, this Chapter asserts that human consumption could be guaranteed, as 
most domestic legal systems give preponderance to it. Therefore, from a 
property rights perspective, investors’ water entitlements would be limited 
through a holistic application of the domestic legislation. It follows that such 
limitation is inherent to investors’ water entitlements and ought to be 
considered in this light by investment tribunals.    
Likewise the nature of water resources plays an important role in the 
considerations of the second component of the first stage (definition of 
investment). This section concludes that it is unlikely that, in the context of an 
infrastructure investment, water would be considered as a discrete right. 
There exist persuasive precedents, which suggests that affected water 
entitlements would be addressed in the context of the investment, under the 
unity of investment approach. This could be seen as a negative prospect for 
host States, as regulatory measures directed to one stick of the bundles of 
investment rights, could be deemed expropriatory of the whole investment. 
This is a reasonable consequence of the weight of certain elements of the 
investment project – such as water resources - which brings the investor to a 
host State for that specific purpose.   
Section 4.4.3 constitutes the second stage of the analytical framework. It 
addresses a set of inquiries, which – in practice – may not be expressly 
undertaken by investment tribunals in an arbitral award. It is, however, of 
relevance to do so – in the context of this thesis – in order to follow a set of 
argumentative steps that would lead to some conclusions: i) the level of 
deprivation will be addressed in the context of the investment project as a 
whole; ii) previous decisions are persuasive that the notion of substantial 
ought to be equivalent to a direct expropriation; iii) however, the elements of 
control over the investment and duration of the deprivation play an important 
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role to determine whether the investor can still enjoy its rights over the 
investment; iv) the nature of water resources – once more – plays an important 
role in the determination that deprivation could often be total, if a regulatory 
measure deprives the investor of the necessary quantities.      
In both cases, the lack of substitutes for water resources and its importance 
for the development of most investment projects, lead to preliminary 
conclusions as to the effects of the water entitlement over the overall project. 
Note however, that this is not conclusive of the presence of indirect 
expropriation.  
Finally, the third stage of the analytical framework undertakes a qualitative 
analysis into the nature of the governmental measure. The components of this 
stage of analysis, being public purpose, non-discrimination, due process and 
investor’s legitimate expectations, appear to be less linked to the physical 
nature of water resources. The criteria considered in the qualitative analysis 
seem to be linked to the social and economic nature of water resources. In this 
vein, the public purpose and legitimate expectations are of particular interest, 
because they better reflect the exercise of the police power strictu sensu in the 
context of the protection of the public health, safety and the environment, and 
latu sensu, which pertains to a much broader spectrum of regulatory 
measures. The classification of water related measures over quantity and 
quality, suggests that generally, although not always, measures over water 
quality would be linked to the police power strictu sensu, whereas measures 
over quantity would be linked to the police power latu sensu. An exception, 
which has been clearly identified, is the adoption of regulatory measures 
intended for human consumption. 
This work observes that it seems unlikely that arbitral tribunals may be 
confronted with cases where the level of deprivation amounts to expropriation. 
Yet, it considers that measures over water resources could be such case. For 
this reason, even when the first tier analysis i.e. the level of deprivation, 
concludes that it is substantial or total, the second tier analysis would further 
assist to determine whether an indirect expropriation has occurred.
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CHAPTER 5 
CONCLUSIONS 
 
5.1 Introduction 
The physical, social and economic characteristics of water when approached 
in a holistic manner demand that this natural resource be viewed as unique. 
There are a number of defining features that require water to be viewed 
through such a lens: i) water’s physical features make it both unpredictable 
and variable, ii) water’s intrinsic value is rarely reflected in its price, even 
when it has no substitutes, and iii) water’s socially sensitive status (and vital 
requirement for living) is such that people perceive it as a resource to which 
they are entitled.  This basic reflection on the unique attributes of water leads 
one to question whether investment arbitration tribunals ought to incorporate 
an evaluation of this uniqueness when tasked with determining claims of 
indirect expropriation that involve a water-related regulatory measure.  In the 
context of water-related regulatory measures, investment arbitration tribunals 
will be required to determine the distinction between a legitimate regulatory 
measure and an indirect expropriation. In terms of guidance that can be 
gleaned from the analysis in this work, investment arbitration tribunals ought 
to consider a number of key features when evaluating a state’s water-related 
regulatory measure against the standards of protection provided in the 
applicable international investment agreement.  
5.2 A Sector-Specific Approach 
This section summarizes the argument developed throughout the thesis with a 
focus on the findings in Chapter IV in the context of the sector specific 
approach to water related measures.   
1) A sector-specific approach to water resources require first that parties 
invoke the unique nature of water resources, and second that investment 
arbitration tribunals inquire into the specific object and purpose of the 
water-related measure before evaluating whether the regulatory measure 
negatively affects the interests of the investor-claimant.  
This first criterion discussed in the analytic framework of this work – detailed 
in Chapter IV – will assist in framing the analysis of claims of indirect 
expropriation in the context of regulatory measures aimed at affecting water 
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quality or water quantity. While there are few cases to date that deal with 
water-related regulatory measures, it is the contention of this work to 
demonstrate that the cases that have arisen were evaluated inappropriately. 
None of these tribunals, except for the tribunal in Bayview Irrigation District v 
Mexico,1 have approached a water-related regulatory measure through the lens 
of a sector-specific approach, which would look at water as a unique resource 
that demands a special set of tools for evaluation. A key example of this 
absence of a sector-specific approach is the case of Methanex v US,2 which has 
been discussed extensively in this work in regard to issues of expropriation in 
international investment law.3 In this case, the arbitral tribunal found that the 
regulatory measure adopted by the State of California, a ban on the gasoline 
additive known as MTBE (methyl tertiary-butyl ether), did not breach US 
investment obligations under the NAFTA. As explained in Chapter IV, it is 
quite likely that water-related measures will be adopted through laws and 
regulations other than water laws.4 In Methanex v US, this is exactly what 
happened. California adopted a measure that would ban the use of MTBE 
because of its potential pollution of the ground water supply. While the 
outcome of this case did find that the ban on MTBE was a legitimate 
regulatory measure and not an indirect expropriation, the analysis failed to 
look specifically at the object of the regulation: the protection of groundwater 
resources. Instead, the Methanex tribunal spent considerable time evaluating 
whether the regulatory measure was applied in a non-discriminatory manner. 
Instead of asking whether it was legitimate to impose a regulatory burden for 
the purpose of water pollution prevention (regardless of its effects on any 
investor), the tribunal focused on whether the regulatory measure was applied 
in a non-discriminatory manner (i.e. whether the measure also affected other 
producers of MTBE or other investors in ‘like’ circumstances). The fact that 
the tribunal did not focus on the object of the regulatory measure can be 
partially attributable to the claims that Methanex made to the tribunal. It 
appears that the approach taken by Methanex in this case was aimed at 
demonstrating that the National Treatment standard of the NAFTA 5  was 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
1 Bayview Irrigation District et al. v United Mexican States, ICSID (Additional Facility) Case No. 
ARB(AF)/05/1), Award June 19, 2007.  
2 Methanex Corp. v United States of America, Final Award (NAFTA), 3 August 2005. 
3 See Chapter III, Sections 3.6.2 and 3.7, which discusses the case of Methanex v US in the 
context of the Police Power. 
4 See Section 4.3.2, supra note 32. 
5  Methanex asserted its claim of breach of the national treatment standard under NAFTA 
Article 1102 (3), which provides: ‘3. The treatment accorded by a Party under paragraphs 1 and 2 
means, with respect to a state or province, treatment no less favorable than the most favorable 
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breached because the State of California was discriminating against methanol 
producers as a means of promoting ethanol producers (which Methanex 
claimed were substitutable products).  
The above illustration is relevant to the application of the first part of the 
analytical framework described in Chapter IV (Property rights in water and the 
Definition of Investment) for two key reasons. First, the Methanex case 
demonstrates that the application of some criteria, such as non-discrimination 
and due process – for instance – are not always going to be evaluated through 
an analysis of standards contained within the expropriation standard itself 
(e.g. in the Methanex case, the non-discrimination standard – which is a part 
of the expropriation standard – was evaluated in the context of the National 
Treatment standard).6 In this vein, the findings in regard to the assessment of 
other standards could inform the tribunal’s determination about the nature of 
the regulatory measure. Secondly, investment disputes have reached a high 
level of complexity, where social, economic and political aspects are intimately 
intertwined. Nonetheless, this work submits that the parties are ultimately the 
framers of the debate that informs the final arbitral award. For example, 
Methanex could have argued whether or not the MTBE ban was the proper 
measure (or least restrictive measure) to protect groundwater resources in the 
State of California. This would have shifted the analysis towards the object 
and purpose of the regulatory measure instead of whether the measure was 
discriminatory and in contravention of the National Treatment standard in the 
NAFTA. 
The above discussion of the Methanex decision sought to highlight two key 
issues in relation to investment arbitrations and water-related regulatory 
measures. The first issue pertains to the importance for tribunals in focusing 
on the essential nature (its object and purpose) of the regulatory measure, 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
treatment accorded, in like circumstances, by that state or province to investors, and to investments 
of investors, of the Party of which it forms a part.”  
The claimant Methanex argued that under Article 1102 NAFTA ‘California and thereby the USA 
plainly intended to deny foreign methanol producers, including Methanex, the best treatment it 
has accorded to domestic ethanol investors, thus violating Article 1102’ (emphasis added). See 
Methanex Corp. v United States of America, Final Award (NAFTA), 3 August 2005, Part II - 
Chapter D - Page 9, para. 26.  
6 See for instance the expropriation provision in Article 1110 of the NAFTA which in regard the 
requirement of due process of law states: ‘No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or 
expropriate an investment …. (c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1);’. 
This provision directs the assessment of whether there was compliance with the requirement of 
due process to the standard of Minimum Standard of treatment under Article 1105 of the 
NAFTA.  
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rather than discussions on peripheral issues arising out of the dispute, to 
bring some benefits to the overall process of analysis. This should be done 
regardless of the parties’ submissions, which certainly ought to be addressed. 
In many cases, the arbitrators focus primarily on the claims made by the 
claimants and the defences brought by the State respondents. However, given 
the public nature of water-related measures, it is equally important that 
arbitral tribunals create their own framework of analysis when assessing 
water-related measures given its unique nature and public importance. The 
second issue pertains to the importance of tribunals being clear in their legal 
reasoning. For example, clearer legal reasoning would allow the parties to the 
dispute – and the public – to follow the logical steps that led to the arbitral 
decision.7 Indeed, the tribunal in Methanex v US8 says little in regard to the 
appropriateness of the measure to protect groundwater in the State of 
California in order to achieve health and environmental objectives. The 
inclusion of all logical steps embedded in the reasoning of the arbitral award 
will provide greater transparency to the dispute settlement mechanism in 
general, which can assist in fostering increased predictability in the 
investment arbitration overall. After all, the numerous actors linked to this 
dispute settlement mechanism appear to value consistency across arbitral 
decisions.9 The first stage of the analytical framework in Chapter IV (discussed 
above), is meant to be applied prior to the analysis of the merits of the case. It 
is relevant to the case of water resources because, as is submitted in this 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
7  Professor Lalive citing Sir Frank Berman who referred to concept of lack of reasoning in the 
case of Lucchetti v Peru as follows: ‘the requirement that an award has to be motivated implies 
that it must enable the reader to follow the reasoning of the Tribunal on points of fact and law 
... the requirement to state reasons is satisfied as long as the award enables one to follow how 
the Tribunal proceeds from Point A to Point B and eventually to its conclusion, even if it made 
an error of fact or law. See Pierre Lalive, "On the Reasoning of International Arbitral Awards" 
Journal of International Dispute Settlement 1, no. 1 (2010), 59. See also Industria Nacional de 
Alimentos SA (Lucchetti) v the Republic of Peru, Decision on Annulment, 5 September 2007.  
In this vein Professor Reisman criticises the extensive analysis (355 single-spaced pages) 
afforded by the tribunal in Glamis Gold, Ltd. v United States of America, (under UNICTRAL Rules), 
Award June 8, 2009. Professor Reisman contends that arbitral awards should communicate its 
reasoning in clear and succinct manner. Reisman, "'Case Specific Mandates' versus `Systemic 
Implications': How Should Investment Tribunals Decide? - The Freshfields Arbitration Lecture", 
137.  
8 The approximate page count in Methanex Corp. v. United States of America, Final Award 
(NAFTA), 3 August 2005, is 307, where Professor Reisman was a member of the tribunal.  
9 UNCTAD annual report on investment and dispute settlement notes: ‘Consistency of arbitral 
decisions. Recurring episodes of inconsistent findings by arbitral tribunals have resulted in 
divergent legal interpretations of identical or similar treaty provisions as well as differences in 
the assessment of the merits of cases involving the same facts. Inconsistent interpretations have 
led to uncertainty about the meaning of key treaty obligations and lack of predictability as to 
how they will be read in future cases.’ (UNCTAD), "World Investment Report 2013. Global Value 
Chains: Investment and Trade for Development", 112. 
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work, the inherent nature of the resource under analysis will play a pivotal 
role in the construction of the property rights conferred to the foreign investor 
by means of a licence, a concession, an entitlement, etc. The second and third 
stages of analysis (discussed in the following two sections) pertain to the 
specific determination of whether the regulatory measure constitutes an 
indirect expropriation or a legitimate regulation.  
Chapter II has provided an extensive account of the nature of water resources, 
as part of a unity, namely the hydrological cycle, and why some of water’s 
unique features have had an effect on the way in which the ownership of water 
is embedded in most legal systems. Indeed, in such systems, the ownership of 
water is either vested in no one or in the State under stewardship. It follows 
from this special situation about property rights in water that such rights are 
not an absolute right. The hydrological cycle –as contested in Chapter II – is 
becoming increasingly unpredictable, and therefore entitlements linked to 
water resources could be deemed predictably insecure. The latter is of course 
a conceptual approach to the current challenges around water resources 
rather than a statement of a fact.  
The first stage of analysis therefore, proposes a holistic approach to the 
historical context that informs the legal frameworks regulating water 
resources, as well as other frameworks that influence the management of 
water resources and its different uses.   
One such condition over the use of water that intertwines with other uses is 
the priority given to human consumption in most legal systems. In this vein, a 
construction of an investor’s property rights might already be derogated under 
the domestic legal system of the host State where there is priority given to 
human consumption over industrial or agricultural consumption.  
2) A sector-specific approach to water-related regulatory measures does not 
negate the fact that there are certain instances where a measure could be 
deemed expropriatory (in other words, the analytical framework detailed 
in this work does not make the case that all water-related regulatory 
measures should be deemed legitimate regulation as opposed to 
expropriations). 
The second stage of the analytical framework – detailed in Chapter IV – namely 
the level of deprivation, requires the inclusion of several hypothetical 
scenarios, which allow tribunals to determine in which cases a water measure 
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could be equated to a direct expropriation. In these cases, as opposed to 
indirect regulatory expropriations, the answer in a great majority of cases – 
especially those linked to the reallocation of water resources – is that a 
measure relating to water quantity reallocated could certainly be deemed 
expropriatory.  
In spite of all other means of production untouched, the lack of water 
resources as an input for production could affect the whole operation in a 
manner that would render the project useless or unviable. For this reason, 
Section 4.4.3.2 tests different approaches to the reduction or cancelation of 
water entitlements. Certainly, there is an argument that the cancellation of a 
water entitlement, while only constituting one stick in the bundle of the 
investment rights given to a foreign investor, is so essential to the project that 
its cancellation renders the whole investment useless. This would be the 
approach taken by many investment tribunals under the unity of investment 
approach. On the other hand, a water entitlement – affected by a specific 
measure – could not be analysed under an approach of partial expropriation, 
since it could not be exploited as an independent asset, separated from the 
rest of the bundle of investment rights. As such, a water entitlement serves 
the functioning of the whole operation and is therefore unlikely to be analysed 
independently of the entire investment. This means that there is always the 
possibility that a reallocation of water resources by a regulatory measure 
could give rise to an expropriation finding over the whole operation. The worst-
case scenario would probably be the case in which the duration of the 
measure is extensive and permanent, in such scenario the conclusion might 
be that the effects over the investment are tantamount to a direct 
expropriation. It is important to consider that, in many situations it is the 
physical nature of water that leads to such results, and not necessarily the 
intent or nature of the regulatory measure. Otherwise, the analysis of the 
issue would always lead to such a result, turning every measure linked to 
water resources management expropriatory. This would undermine the 
doctrine of the police power of States to seek the general welfare limiting the 
liberties of individuals, imposing the burden of water variability risk solely on 
the host States, and ultimately on its citizens.  
3) A sector-specific approach to water-related regulatory measures requires 
that arbitral tribunals scrutinize both the legitimacy and legality of the 
water-related measure. 
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The third stage of the analytical framework – addressed in Chapter IV – assess 
the quality and nature of the measure. Its main objective in the context of the 
proposed framework is to determine when a regulatory measure constitutes a 
disguised act of expropriation. There may be cases where a government 
measure should be deemed expropriatory. These are the cases when it can be 
demonstrated that the adoption of a particular measure lacks good faith. In 
these cases, a discriminatory measure disguised as an environmental measure 
could be deemed expropriatory if it can be shown that the object and purpose 
of the water-related measure was not taken in good faith. Such instances 
would, almost by default, be deemed expropriatory. The element of good faith 
of the governmental measure requires scrutiny in cases when a host State 
claims that a water-related measure has been adopted strictly in face of water 
stress or to maintain the quality of the resource, but further evidence reveals 
that this was not in fact the primary purpose of the water-related measure.  
In regard to the analysis concerning the quality and nature of the measure 
and the level of scrutiny that arbitral tribunals ought to use in evaluating 
such measures, preeminent arbitrator Professor Brigitte Stern, holds that 
there are three basic approaches for qualitatively assessing a regulatory 
measure in the context of an expropriation claim. The first approach is what is 
commonly referred to as the sole effects approach. Under this approach, the 
effect of the measure on the investment is the exclusive means of evaluating 
whether a measure has an expropriatory effect. In essence this approach 
rejects the application of the qualitative stage embedded in the analytical 
framework, i.e.   the analysis of the nature of the regulatory measure. 
The second approach is what is commonly referred to as the police powers 
approach. This approach is in contradistinction to the sole effects doctrine. In 
essence, arbitrators assess the police power as a defence for alleged violations 
of the expropriation standard under the investment treaty. This approach 
seems to support the position that States should regulate in the public 
interest regardless of negative effects on investor’s property rights. In this vein 
the exercise of the police power as an exception to State responsibility 
resembles GATT provisions such as Article XX (General Exceptions) and the 
India – Singapore Economic Cooperation Agreement, Article 6.11 (General 
Exceptions)10. While the wording of the agreement is of pivotal importance, a 
broad interpretation of expropriation standard could have such an outcome in 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
10 See Chapter IV, Section 4.2. 
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the near past. Under this approach it is not difficult to imagine why the police 
power approach would have opponents. With the increase of investment 
disputes, such an interpretation appears to be unlikely nowadays, unless the 
agreements expressly provide that the exercise of the prerogative to regulate to 
protect the environment, public health and safety constitute an exception.  
The third approach, which is advocated in this work, considers that it is 
possible to derive a dividing line between an indirect expropriation and a 
legitimate regulation. Therefore, in order to apply such an approach, the 
second stage of analysis under the analytic framework detailed in Chapter IV – 
level of deprivation – would conclude that even where the effects of the 
measure over the investor have been substantial (and thus expropriatory 
under the sole effects doctrine), a measure can still be deemed a legitimate 
regulation according to the nature and quality of the measure. This third 
approach for accessing the dividing line between a legitimate regulation and 
an expropriation includes an element of proportionality in the broad sense of 
the term. This is because in accessing the nature of the measure, the third 
stage of analysis in the analytic framework in Chapter IV requires an 
evaluation of the measures public purpose, non-discrimination, due process 
and legitimate expectations. These aspects of the analysis are intended to 
determine the legitimacy of a particular regulatory measure.   
4) A sector-specific approach to water resources requires that tribunals be 
sensitive to the underlying social aspects relating to measures affecting 
water resources.  
In addition to the three areas of analysis that arbitrators must consider under 
the framework advocated in this work, they must also look at the policy 
aspects of a water related regulatory measure and sensitivity in having 
international adjudicators evaluating water-related measures legitimately 
adopted by a particular host State. In this context, it is noteworthy that most 
investment disputes linked to water management related measures have been 
settled between the parties. 11  Unfortunately, this has not allowed the 
observation of the extent to which arbitral tribunals would give deference to 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
11 See Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG, Vattenfall Europe Generation AG v Federal Republic of 
Germany, (ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6); Sun Belt v Her Majesty the Queen (Government of Canada), 
(NAFTA Chapter 11, under UNCITRAL Rules); Impregilo S.p.A. v. Islamic Republic of Pakistan, 
(ICSID Case No. ARB/03/3); AbitibiBowater Inc., v. Government of Canada; Aguas del Tunari S.A. 
v Republic of Bolivia, ICSID Case No. ARB/02/3.  
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the exercise of regulatory prerogatives over water resources. Whether this 
aspect is coincidental or direct, one could argue that once a tribunal adopts a 
position over the regulation of water rights or the appropriateness of host 
States’ water management, a precedent could be created with large 
consequences for both host States and foreign investors. Note, however, that 
the payment of settlements is generally the equivalent to a win for the 
investor-claimant and that this fact places the burden of risk and costs in 
regard the protection of its water resources on the host State.12 Perhaps, this 
cautious approach seeks to keep Pandora’s box closed. This is because there 
is considerable risk associated with massive public opposition and advocacy 
that may arise when (and if) an arbitral tribunal finds that a water-related 
regulatory measure is an indirect expropriation that requires the host State to 
compensate a foreign investor for what it believes is a legitimate regulation of 
its water resources.  These issues reflect the social context of water resources, 
and the potential conflicts it brings. Chapter II illustrated a handful of 
investment disputes arising out of investments in water services that showed 
the level of sensitivity and entitlement which people believe that they have over 
their water resources. 
5.3 Water: Securely Unpredictable and Investment: Predictably 
Insecure?  
What the preceding summary of the framework for analysis that has been 
detailed in this work is that the combination of water governance and 
investment protection is an area of legal integration that will require intense 
sensitivity and diligence in the coming years. The first statement above (water 
as securely unpredictable) reflects the idea that the unique nature and 
characteristics of water resources and increased hydrological variability and 
climate change mean that there is little predictability in the future distribution 
of water resources. A holistic or integrated approach to water management 
(which may be referred to as an emerging principle of water law, lacking the 
status of hard law internationally) may be a useful approach for governing 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
12 See for instance AbitibiBowater Inc., v Government of Canada, where the government of 
Canada agreed to make a payment of USD 130 million to settle the dispute. In this regard see 
the press release by the Government Canada, available at 
http://www.italaw.com/sites/default/files/case-documents/ita0235.pdf, last visited August 1, 
2013. In the case Sun Belt v Her Majesty the Queen (Government of Canada), (NAFTA Chapter 11, 
under UNCITRAL Rules), the settlement arrangement remains unknown. In Vattenfall AB, 
Vattenfall Europe AG, Vattenfall Europe Generation AG v Federal Republic of Germany, (ICSID 
Case No. ARB/09/6), the government of Germany reverted its measure, see Section 2.5.2.2.  
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water’s unpredictability, but from a positivistic perspective provides little 
assistance for host States having to defend claims dealing with changes in the 
regulation of its water resources. This increases the likelihood, at least in the 
short-term, that host States will have to be especially careful in changing 
water regulations that may conflict with promises that have been made to 
foreign investors. However, it is also increasingly important that foreign 
investors undertake not only environmental impact assessments, but also 
social and human rights impact assessments. Past experience in the area of 
water services has shown that people feel entitled to water resources and 
sensitivities may escalate to the point where conflicts become unavoidable. A 
nuanced understanding about the unpredictability of water resources may 
assist investors in structuring investments that can survive changes in a host 
States’ water regulation. This will of course require that the costs of due 
diligence as well as the risk of asymmetric information are shared by both, 
investors and host states. Expectations given to investors would only be 
considered reasonable when host States provide investors with transparent 
legal regimes that create a reasonably predictable investment environment.   
As for the second statement (investment as predictably insecure), the 
unpredictable nature of water constitutes a prediction of its variability and 
changing conditions. Therefore, one could argue that water users (i.e. foreign 
investors) – in conditions of water stress and scarcity – operate in an 
environment of predictable insecurity given by the nature of water resources, 
on one hand, but also given by the nature of the investor-State dispute 
settlement mechanism.  
It is perhaps appropriate to note that security and predictability are not the 
ultimate objectives of the investor-State dispute settlement mechanism. With 
over 3000 IIAs, which constitute the primary applicable law to the dispute, 
and 514 known disputes that either are concluded,13 pending or discontinued 
under different IIASs actors of the dispute settlement mechanism are still 
debating whether there should be a case-by-case fact inquiry to decide the 
disputes or whether an all-encompassing legal framework promoting a general 
jurisprudence constante should be developed. This is perhaps an opportunity 
that got lost during the negotiations of the Multilateral Agreement on 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
13 (UNCTAD), "World Investment Report 2013. Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for 
Development", 101, 111-12. 
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Investment,14 addressed in Chapter III. Conversely, for instance the Dispute 
Settlement Understanding under the WTO, provides in Article 3.2 that one of 
the objectives of the dispute settlement of the WTO is to provide security and 
predictability to the trading system. Noteworthy is the fact that the WTO 
agreement includes 159 States under a single multilateral agreement.15 
 
5.4 The way forward and future research 
There are multiple aspects that could still be incorporated in the analytical 
framework to make it more comprehensive. One important aspect is the issue 
of compensation, which is beyond the scope of this work.   
The issue of compensation ought to the incorporated in a future research 
agenda. As it stands currently, the Hull Formula of prompt, adequate and 
effective compensation may hinder the interests of the investor, rather than 
secure the enforcement of his rights. 16  The all or nothing approach to 
compensation17 may not allow for an efficient allocation of risk and costs of 
regulation between investors and host States. The issue of compensation 
needs to be addressed in the new negotiations of investment agreements, 
providing detailed guidelines to arbitrators as to when the costs of the effects 
of the regulatory measure could be shared among the parties to the dispute. 
This aspect acquires additional relevance under the analysis of natural 
resources, as well as environmental and public health, in which the operation 
of the investor is somewhat involved.   
The second issue which ought to the addressed in the light of the analytical 
framework, proposed in this work, is the fair and equitable treatment 
standard. This standard has apparently turned into a blank (or catch-all) 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
14 On the failure of the MAI negotiation see Chapter III, Section 3.4.2.2. The failure to agree on a 
MAI has had as an effect, the negotiation of numerous BITs each under different conditions and 
provisions.  
15 See membership of the WTO in Understanding the WTO: The Organization Members and 
Observers. Available at: 
http://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/whatis_e/tif_e/org6_e.htm, last visited August 12, 2013. 
16 The investment agreements’ provisions on compensation bind arbitrators to decide on full 
compensation, due to the existence of an expropriation or zero compensation due to the 
inexistence of an expropriation –direct or indirect – in such case the burden of risk is fully 
imposed on either the investor or the host State. Therefore, under this scenario the core inquiry 
is whether an expropriation took place or not, and it is the question this thesis attempts to 
answer.   
17 On the issue of full compensation and the quest for a more nuanced approach see Ursula 
Kriebaum, "Regulatory Takings: Balancing the Interests of the Investor and the State" The 
Journal of Word Investment & Trade 8, no. 5 (2007). 
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mechanism for investment protection. Failed claims of expropriation have 
found alternative redress in the standard of fair and equitable treatment.18 
The question arises as to whether there is a relationship between the standard 
of fair and equitable treatment and the criterion contained in the qualitative 
criteria to assess the nature of governmental measure as expropriatory. This 
thesis submits that such a relationship needs further study in order to 
determine whether the tribunals’ findings in e.g. claims of expropriation could 
and should inform findings in e.g. claims of breach of the fair and equitable 
treatment standard.  
 
5.5 Final Reflections 
As with many other dissertations approaching the issue of international 
investment law and its relationship and interaction with other areas of law 
(such as environmental law or human rights law), this dissertation aims at 
striking a balance between investor rights and State regulatory prerogatives. 
However, during the course of researching this work, the question has arisen 
as to whether there really is an imbalance that is in need of correction. This 
work submits that the protection of other societal values in the context of 
international investment disputes – as expressed in previous chapters – is not 
necessarily in danger. While there is considerable criticism in some circles 
claiming that investor-State dispute settlement is slanted or biased in favour 
of investors, there is no conclusive evidence that such is the case. 19 In fact, 
most of the empirical data indicates that investors win less than half of the 
time, and that when they do win, they receive much less than the amount that 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
18 On this issue see for instance: Reed and Bray, "Fair and Equitable Treatment: Fairly and 
Equitably Applied in Lieu of Unlawful Indirect Expropriation?". Of interest, is also the remark 
made by the tribunal in GAMI v Mexico, during its analysis of the claim of expropriation. In this 
case the tribunal addressed the analysis of expropriation made by the tribunal in S.D. Myers v 
Canada, pointing out that while the measure adopted by Canada would not be expropriatory, in 
view that tribunal, redress was granted on different grounds, in this case under the fair and 
equitable treatment standard. See GAMI Investments v. Mexico, under UNCITRAL Rules, Final 
Award, 15 November 2004, para. 124. 
19 See for instance Pia Eberhardt and Cecilia  Olivet, Profiting from injustice - How law firms, 
arbitrators and financiers are fuelling an investment arbitration boom (Published by Corporate 
Europe Observatory and the Transnational Institute, 2012). See also the Public Statement on the 
International Investment Regime 31 August 2010, proposed by several academics among which 
are Gus Van Harten, David Schneiderman, Muthucumaraswamy Sornarajah and Peter 
Muchlinski. Available at: http://www.osgoode.yorku.ca/public-
statement/documents/Public%20Statement%20%28June%202011%29.pdf, last visited 10 
October, 2013. 
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they were claiming. 20 There are, of course exceptions. In some cases, the 
amount of money awarded to investors is staggering. For example, in 
Occidental v. Ecuador, the arbitral tribunal awarded the claimant 1.77 billion 
USD in damages for expropriation of an oil operation in Ecuador.21 There are 
also a number of arbitral awards in excess of 400 million USD. 22 These facts 
perhaps explain why a large number of disputes, notably in the context of 
water resources, settle long before a tribunal is able to issue a final award on 
the merit.23 This could mean at least two things: i) investors and host States 
do not have complete trust and faith in the way that arbitral tribunals 
interpret and apply investment treaties, and ii) host States might 
retrospectively realize that the regulatory measures that they have instituted 
may not be as justifiable as they initially believed them to be, and therefore 
choose to repeal the measure instead of being found liable for damages by an 
international tribunal.24 It is also interesting to note that several settled cases 
involved developed countries as defendants, rather than developing countries, 
as might be intuitively expected.25  This work has not encountered significant 
evidence showing cases where arbitrators would have found environmental 
measures to be in violation of the investment treaty. It is rather the threat 
thereof that has alerted other areas of law to speculate on potential cases 
whose decision by investment tribunals might bring negative consequences for 
environmental regulation or overwhelmingly high amounts of money for 
compensation. In this vein Judge Brower asserts: 
No investment tribunal has ever ordered a State to compensate an investor for simply 
enacting a generally applicable environmental law or for legitimately enforcing a 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
20 For instance Susan Franck asserts that up to 2007 there were more arbitral awards in favour 
of host States. See Franck, "Empirically Evaluating Claims About Investment Treaty 
Arbitration", 49. See Chapter I, supra note 26. Likewise in 2013 UNCTAD reported that up to 
2012 from a universe of 244 investment disputes, 42 per cent were decided in favour of the 
State, 31 per cent in favour of the investor and 27 per cent were settled. (UNCTAD), "World 
Investment Report 2013. Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for Development", 111. 
21 (UNCTAD), "World Investment Report 2013. Global Value Chains: Investment and Trade for 
Development", 111. 
22 The Economist, Foreign Investment Disputes, ‘Come and get me – Argentina is Putting 
International Arbitration to the test’, February 18 2012. Available at: 
http://www.economist.com/node/21547836, last visited March 13, 2013.  
23 See supra note 11 in this chapter.  
24 See for instance the cases of Vattenfall AB, Vattenfall Europe AG, Vattenfall Europe Generation 
AG v Federal Republic of Germany, (ICSID Case No. ARB/09/6), and AbitibiBowater Inc., v. 
Government of Canada, Notice of Intent to Submit a Claim to Arbitration under Chapter II NAFTA, 
23 April 2009. Note also that in both cases the regulatory measures were adopted by developed 
countries (Germany and Canada). 
25 See supra note 11 in this chapter. 
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regulation that caused an investor a loss. Very deferential standards have been applied 
to environmental regulatory measures.26 
The question then arises as to what would be the relevance of this project from 
a legal perspective, if the problem seems more hypothetical than real. What is 
the practical achievement of this work? To answer this question, I must wear 
two hats: one as a water lawyer and one as an international investment 
lawyer. Ultimately, the approach that I take in analysing these distinct areas 
of international law is underpinned by the broader outlook of values and 
preferences that water lawyers and investment lawyers embrace. While an 
investment lawyer wants to protect investments and profits, the water lawyer 
seeks the protection of the environment. It is certainly easy to see how these 
divergent objectives could be in direct conflict. Both sides have strong opinions 
in terms of the prioritization of protections that the law should endorse; and it 
is from within this debate that the idea for this thesis comes.  I was originally 
inspired and informed by strong opinions about the negative effects that 
investment agreements and investment dispute settlement could have on 
States’ prerogative to regulate (especially in the area of water resources). 
However, in the end, rational thought has overcome emotion, and I find that 
my original feelings and fears about investment law may have been overstated. 
Confessions aside, a sectoral approach to the protection of water resources in 
the context of investment treaty protection is still relevant and useful for 
international law. A sector specific approach to investment disputes will 
indeed provide decision-makers with a detailed and outlook on the specific 
regulatory measure at issue and the rationale behind it. Looking at water 
resources specifically allows the decision-maker to identify and properly 
assess the specific challenges and historic development of property law 
relating to water resources that shape the function and object of many water 
regulations. This in turn will allow the decision-maker (the arbitrator) to more 
accurately construct the actual property rights that the investor does or does 
not have in regard to its water entitlements as viewed through the relevant 
legal system of the host State. One of the main concerns, after observation of 
the mainstream methodology followed by arbitrators in many cases, was that 
measures over water resources would almost always have a substantial 
negative effect over the investment (as discussed in the context of the unique 	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
26  Charles N. Brower and Sadie Blanchard, "From “Dealing in Virtue” to “Profiting from 
Injustice”: The Case Against Re-Statification of Investment Dispute Settlement - 2013 Harvard 
International Law Journal Symposium Keynote Address" TDM Journal 10, no. 4 (2013): 5. 
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nature of water). Under such an assumption host States would bear 
difficulties in defending water-related measures. The analytical framework 
proposed in Chapter IV intends to overcome this legal hurdle, but also 
encourages host States to be very specific in their pleadings. One of the 
outcomes of this work is in the realization that if arbitrators are to employ the 
analytical tools that the thesis suggests, it is of equal import for host States to 
be very diligent in informing arbitrators of the specificities of their national 
laws in regard water resources, and object and purpose of the water-related 
measures. As a matter of principle, States do not want to be seen as having 
insecure and unpredictable investment environments; yet, from a practical 
perspective, States do want to avoid the payment of high compensation. In 
both cases, host State are required to act with great transparency and avoid 
confusing or conflicting internal process, as was the case in Metalclad v 
Mexico.27 
 Finally, it is important to reflect that this thesis is not a State-centric or pro-
sovereignty piece of work. Instead, this work holds that the police power of 
states is both an extension and a limitation on sovereignty. The police power 
of the State grants a sovereign a wide discretion to implement measures that 
benefit the public welfare; but at the same time, that same sovereignty allows 
states to enter into binding international agreements that limit their own 
sovereign prerogative. In other words, the police power (as an important 
component of state sovereignty) is not absolute. This means that the State, as 
sovereign, can limit its sovereignty by providing international guarantees to 
foreign investors in the form of treaties. It also means that the state, as 
sovereign, can use its police power to implement measures that benefit the 
public interest. It is at the nexus of these two essential components of a state’s 
sovereignty where this thesis has attempted to add insight and analysis. 
Therefore, when one refers to the police power approach, in the context of 
resolving disputes involving investor and host State, one may be failing to 
understand that the police power of the state is not absolute; it must be 
	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	   	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  	  
27 In this case the tribunal asserted the importance of clarity and transparency to guide the 
actions of investors in the best possible way. ‘Once the authorities of the central government of 
any Party (whose international responsibility in such matters has been identified in the 
preceding section) become aware of any scope for misunderstanding or confusion in this 
connection, it is their duty to ensure that the correct position is promptly determined and 
clearly stated so that investors can proceed with all appropriate expedition in the confident 
belief that they are acting in accordance with all relevant laws.  
See Metalclad Corporation v. United States of Mexico, ICSID Case No. ARB(AF)/97/1, Award, (Aug. 
30, 2000), para. 76. 
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balanced against all of the other commitments that the state has made to itself 
(i.e. constitutional guarantees) and others (i.e. international commitments). 
Simply invoking the police power as a defence to state responsibility is as 
unsophisticated as it is wrong. If such a view were correct, then any measure 
that a state invoked under the police power would be valid – and that clearly is 
not the case. This is something that appears to be generally recognised by 
investment arbitral tribunals: the state, through the use of its police power, 
can make promises to both foreigners and its own citizens; and sometimes a 
state is going to be held liable for reneging on such promises. This work 
attempted to assist the decision-maker in finding the appropriate balance 
between the duties that a state owes to its own citizens and the duties that it 
owes to foreign citizens through its international commitments. Obviously this 
is not something that is simple to delineate, but I hope that this contribution 
will move knowledge in this area of legal interpretation and analysis forward. 
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